The Battle of Baghdad
Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
Op-Ed
The Wall Street Journal
August 23, 2006
Although there has been much good news to report about security progress in Iraq this summer--the killing of Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, the handover of security responsibility for Muthanna province, the fifth of 10 Iraqi Army Division
Headquarters to assume the lead in its area of responsibility--Iraq faces an urgent crisis in securing its capital,
Baghdad. Although Iraqi leaders and the Coalition have a sound strategy to turn the situation around, it is vital that
Iraqis control sectarian violence and come together against the terrorists and outside powers that are fomenting the
violence.
In July, there were 558 violent incidents in Baghdad, a 10% increase over the already high monthly average. These
attacks caused 2,100 deaths, again an increase over the four-month average. More alarmingly, 77% of these casualties
were the result of sectarian violence, giving rise to fears of an impending civil war in Iraq. While statistics should
not be the sole measure of progress or failure in stabilizing Iraq and quelling violent sectarianism, it is clear that
the people of Baghdad are being subjected to unacceptable levels of fear and violence.
This trend is especially troubling because we cannot achieve our goal of a secure, stable and democratic Iraq if such
devastating violence persists in the capital. Baghdad represents one-fifth of Iraq's total population, and is a
microcosm of Iraq's diverse ethnic and sectarian communities. Baghdad is also Iraq's financial and media center, the
latter of which is especially important given that the declared strategy of the terrorists and violent sectarian groups
in Iraq revolves around creating a perception of growing chaos in an effort to persuade Americans that the effort in
Iraq has failed. Therefore, violence in Baghdad has a disproportionate psychological and strategic effect.
The deterioration of security in Baghdad since February's attack on the Samara Mosque is the result of the competition
between Sunni and Shiite extremists to expand their control and influence throughout the capital. Although the
leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq has been significantly attrited, it still has cells capable of operating independently in
Baghdad by deploying car bombs to Shiite neighborhoods. At the same time, Sunni and Shiite death squads, some acting as
Iranian surrogates, are responsible for an increasing share of the violence. This cycle of retaliatory violence is
compounded by shortcomings in the training and leadership of Iraq's National Police. To combat this complex problem,
Iraq's national unity government, led by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, has made securing Baghdad its top priority. The
government's Baghdad Security Plan has three principal components:
• Stabilizing Baghdad zone by zone.Four Iraqi Army battalions, two Coalition brigades and five military police
companies will be redeployed to Baghdad, resulting in more than 12,000 additional forces on the city's streets. The
National Police will simultaneously undergo intensive retraining, with each brigade to be subjected to a three-day
assessment period, with its leadership evaluated and, if necessary, replaced. Each brigade will subsequently receive
additional training focused on countering violent sectarianism before redeployment. Over the last 10 days this approach
began to be implemented in five areas of Baghdad--Doura, Ghazaliyah, Rashid, Ahmeriyya and Mansour. In coming weeks
other districts will be added.
Iraqi government and Coalition forces are adopting new tactics to stem sectarian killings. Increased checkpoints and
patrols are being used to deny freedom of movement and safe haven to sectarian killers. The leaders of the death squads
are being targeted. Security forces have started to work with cross-sectarian neighborhood committees. These and other
new tactics will drive toward the goal of achieving security neighborhood by neighborhood. As each district of Baghdad
is secured, operations will expand into contiguous zones over coming weeks and months.
• Disrupting support zones. Even as Iraqi and Coalition forces concentrate on securing specific neighborhoods, they
will continue to conduct targeted operations in other zones that are staging areas for the violence. This includes
targeted raids and other operations on areas outside of Baghdad's center, where planning cells, car-bomb factories and
terrorist safe houses are located. This will degrade the ability of the terrorists and death squads to mount offensive
operations into the areas we are working to stabilize.
• Undertaking civic action and economic development. One of the most tragic elements of the increasing violence in
Baghdad is that it has robbed the Iraqi people of the sense of normalcy they desperately seek after living under
crushing tyranny for more than three decades. In the immediate aftermath of Iraq's liberation, the entrepreneurial
spirit of the Iraqi people was demonstrated as Baghdad's shops overflowed with consumer goods prohibited under the
previous regime. However, the increasing violence in the streets of Baghdad has forced many Iraqis to close their shops
for fear of their safety.
Consequently, after joint Coalition and Iraqi military operations have secured a neighborhood or district, a structure
of Iraqi security forces sufficient to maintain the peace is expected to be left in place and reinforced with the
capacity to undertake civic action and foster economic revitalization. This will be supported with $500 million in funds
from Prime Minister Maliki's government and at least $130 million of U.S. funds.
These economic support funds will be used to offer vocational training and create jobs, especially for 17-to-25-year-old
males; to foster public support through improved services, such as medical care and trash and debris removal; and to
build local governmental capacity to protect and provide for their citizens. These goals will be achieved through a
mixture of high-impact, short-term programs; mid-term programs designed to stabilize these initial gains; and programs
focused on long-term economic development. Prime Minister Maliki's plan for securing Baghdad is also closely tied to the
national unity government's larger program for reconciliation, which seeks to foster political understanding between
Sunni and Shiite forces, including those that either control or influence unauthorized armed groups involved in
sectarian conflict.
In addition, a moral compact between the religious leaders of the two Islamic communities--which will ban sectarian
killings--will delegitimize the violence. Such a compact would deny the killers a political or religious sanctuary while
Iraqi and Coalition forces deny them physical shelter. For the longer term, the plan seeks to induce insurgents and
militias to lay down their arms by implementing a program to demobilize unauthorized armed groups. It will also review
the implementation of the de-Baathification process--referring those accused of crimes to the judiciary and reconciling
with the rest.
It is understandable that when the American people hear of new U.S. casualties and witness the images of bloodshed from
the streets of Baghdad, they conclude that our plans for stemming sectarian violence in Iraq have failed. Yet,
implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan has only recently begun. Iraq's national unity government has been in office
barely three months, and its ministers of defense and interior have been on the job for less than 80 days. Iraqi
ministers are still hiring key staff, and they are learning to work together, under the leadership of a new prime
minister. The Committee for National Dialogue and Reconciliation, charged with overseeing implementation of the
reconciliation plan, was formed only three weeks ago.
Moreover, as tragic and dangerous as the ongoing violence is to our shared vision of a free and prosperous Iraq, it is
not representative of the Iraqi people's sentiments toward one another. In July, a poll by the International Republican
Institute, a nonpartisan organization dedicated to democracy promotion, found that 94% of Iraqis said they support a
"unity" government representing all sects and ethnic communities, with only 2% opposed. Some 78% of Iraqis opposed Iraq
being segregated by religion or ethnicity, with only 13% in favor. Even in Baghdad, where the worst of Iraq's sectarian
violence has occurred, 76% of those surveyed opposed ethnic separation, with only 10% favoring it. The challenge of the
Baghdad Security Plan and its accompanying effort at national reconciliation is to realize the overwhelming majority of
Iraqis desire to live in peace with one another against the violent minority who seek to impose their vision of hatred
and oppression.
These programs are already beginning to show positive results. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense reports that the crime rate
in Doura has been reduced by 80%. In the Rashid district, Sunni and Shiite political leaders, tribal leaders and imams
met and signed an agreement forswearing violence. The tribal leaders went a step further by renouncing protection for
tribal members who engage in sectarian violence.
Although it is too early to determine whether these success stories will be replicated throughout the city, this initial
progress should give Iraqis, as well as Americans, hope about the future. Contrary to those who portray Iraq as
hopelessly mired in ancient ethnic and sectarian feuds, Iraqis themselves want to put the divisions of the past behind
them. The Battle of Baghdad will determine the future of Iraq, which will itself go a long way to determining the future
of the world's most vital region. Although much difficult work still remains to be done, it is imperative that we give
the Iraqis the time and material support necessary to see this plan through, and to win the Battle of Baghdad.
Released on August 24, 2006
ENDS