A Stillborn Strategic Alliance: The Mexican-Chilean Partnership
• In September 2004, President Ricardo Lagos met with President Vicente Fox in Mexico City to launch a “strategic
alliance” between their two countries. Following the success of their bilateral free trade agreement, the presidents
aimed to promote deeper integration and cooperation in the political, social and cultural spheres.
• No matter the outcome of the OAS race – where each of the presidents’ close associates are in a tired pursuit of the
secretary-general position – one of its certain casualties has been the Mexican-Chilean partnership. Trust, the pivotal
element in the construction of any alliance, was dealt a serious blow last December.
• By analyzing events following the zenith of Mexican-Chilean collaboration – their teamwork in the United Nations
Security Council – it can be concluded that the strategic alliance was probably doomed well before its official birth.
The Two Amigos
Vicente Fox and Ricardo Lagos have run almost parallel mandates. In March 2000, newly instated President Lagos received
candidate Fox at La Moneda, where the two agreed on the need for regionally inclusive development in Latin America. The
same year, Lagos attended Fox’s inauguration and the Mexican president-elect chose Chile as the first country to visit
on his South American tour. In Santiago, Fox remarked at the time that Chile and Mexico were destined to come closer as
both countries shared a commitment to surpass neoliberalist and statist formulas, replacing them instead with a Latin
American third option.
In those days, Fox aimed to position his government as the bridge between the United States and Latin America, by
presenting himself as something akin to a reformist Christian Democrat-style leader. Chile was rightly perceived in
Mexico as the South American country with whom it shared most values and goals. During this era, Mexico and Chile were
achieving international standing due to the strengthening of their democratic institutions with both the Fox and Lagos
administrations being vigorously committed to the idea of “improving globalization”.
Good intentions between the two capitals were translated into joint action. Mexico and Chile responded with one voice to
the Argentine crisis. In mid 2001 Fox and Lagos, during a visit of the former to Chile, demanded the reform of the IMF
and the World Bank. Having only praise for one another, the presidents of Chile and Mexico reaffirmed their commitment
to support Argentina in her economic recovery and to provide leadership to generate capitalismo con rostro humano.
However, there was no more inspiring example of the fruitful cooperation emerging between the two countries than the
teamwork exerted by Mexico and Chile, when they happened to have seats on the United Nations Security Council as
non-permanent members at the same time. In the midst of an impasse regarding what many saw as the Bush administration’s
desire to prematurely use force against Iraq, the countries pushed for a middle ground. They stressed the need for the
permanent members to reach a compromise position and advocated the continuance of inspections for an additional frame of
time. In February 2003, Mexico and Chile opposed the authorization of armed intervention and argued that the use of such
force should be contemplated only as a last resort.
Chilean and Mexican public opinion were overwhelmingly against the war. A united stance enhanced the governments’
capacity to withstand outside pressures while maintaining a position on the issue closely aligned to their
constituencies’ wishes. At the moment, it was easy to foresee a future of closer collaboration. The countries would
support the reliance upon multilateral processes to resolve international disputes and promote an agenda of democratic
values, development and human rights.
When President Ricardo Lagos paid an official visit to Mexico in September 2004, the time was deemed sufficiently
auspicious to officially launch a “strategic alliance” between Mexico and Chile. Their bilateral free trade agreement
would be broadened to incorporate ever greater political, social and cultural cooperation.
The Apple of Discord
Chilean Minister of the Interior José Miguel Insulza had been named as a likely candidate for the position of
secretary-general of the Organization of American States, well before Costa Rica’s ex-President Miguel Angel Rodríguez
was elected in June 2004. The argument that seemed to prevail then was that “it was Central America’s turn” to head the
OAS and Insulza grudgingly stepped aside. When Rodríguez was forced to resign in October after being charged with
corruption in his motherland, the region was baffled. Central American countries wished to retain the post and asked for
time to choose another candidate, but before they agreed on one, Fox announced the candidacy of his Minister of foreign
affairs, Luis Ernesto Derbez, on December 7, 2004.
Chile was astounded by the Mexican move. Shortly thereafter, Lagos resuscitated the Insulza candidacy. Mexico formerly
had declined to support Insulza’s earlier bid against Rodríguez by publicly committing to accepting the Central American
argument of that area’s right to the OAS position. Insulza had particular reasons to expect a favorable nod from Mexico.
He had lived in the country for years as an exile from the Pinochet dictatorship in the 80s, and had put together a
significant network while teaching at some of Mexico’s most prestigious academic institutions.
In an interview with Chilean newspaper La Tercera, Insulza stated his “surprise” at the Mexican decision when the
countries still had “pending conversations on the matter.” The claim was supported by Congress woman Isabel Allende, who
told the Mexican newspaper Reforma that there was an agreement between Chile and Mexico to coordinate on the issue, and
that Mexico had not abided by it. The Fox administration quickly dismissed these allegations.
Since then, accusations have been bandied back and forth. Despite official declarations that there was no strain on the
bilateral relation due to differences over the OAS contest, it would be hard to assert that trust between the two
governments has not been severely eroded by the question. As trust between the two was precisely the factor that allowed
for a strategic alliance to be conceived in the first place, it can be concluded that no matter the outcome of the April
11 election, the Mexican-Chilean partnership can already be counted as one of the casualties of the OAS race.
Doomed From the Start?
The political landscape of the region has changed since 2000, when Lagos and Fox were champions of the Latin American
Third Way. The victory of Tabaré Vázquez in the Uruguayan presidential elections is only the last example of a distinct
regional trend of leftist governments assuming power. The Chilean president has reinvented himself as the “responsible”
partner of the Latin American new left, maintaining open channels of communication with Hugo Chávez and identifying with
the new left leaders’ focus on social policy. On the other hand, the Fox administration has struggled in adapting to the
current environment. Fox drifted away from his initial left-of-center leanings and now it is clear that, ideologically,
he is more akin to Colombia’s Alvaro Uribe than to any other of his Latin American counterparts.
Vicente Fox introduced a main shift in Mexico’s diplomatic tradition by publicly acknowledging that the relationship
with the United States was the country’s most important one. The negotiation of an immigration deal became Mexico’s top
foreign policy objective. Understandably, the costs of not siding with the United States on the Iraq issue were harder
on Mexico than on Chile. With the U.S. government concentrated on the war against terrorism, it became increasingly
obvious for all concerned that migration talks had reached a stalemate just at the time that the mood in the nation had
changed from pro- to anti-immigration.
The Fox administration turned to Latin America. Mexicans across party lines have long supported the idea of closer
cooperation with the region. The general view is that Latin American countries share history, values and international
objectives, and that it is more effective to promote common interests as a front than to go at it separately. Thriving
relations with Chile were in themselves proof of the positive dividends to be extracted from collaboration with
countries of the region. The administration hoped that strengthened relations with Latin America would revitalize
Mexico’s image.
In a bold move, Fox presented Mexico’s application to join Mercosur at the summit in Puerto Iguazu, on July 8, 2004. The
response to Mexico’s advances was surprisingly lukewarm. While promptly accepting Venezuela as an associate member, the
Mercosur heads of state decided to postpone the acceptance of Mexico until the signing of a free trade agreement.
Mexico’s consolation prize was to participate as an observer at the Mercosur meetings. Only Uruguay and Chile seemed to
back Mexico’s aspiration to become a more active partner in South America. Countries in the region assumed Mexico was
turning south only because the door was closed to the north and they acted accordingly.
Another Mexican attempt to become more involved in South America was its proposal to mediate between Bolivia and Chile.
At the Summit of the Americas in Monterrey, Mexico, on January 2004, Bolivian President Carlos Mesa called for
hemispheric support to achieve Bolivia’s access to the Pacific. President Lagos responded by stating that there were no
pending sovereignty problems with Chile and that the issue should be discussed bilaterally. President Fox rose to the
occasion by offering to mediate between the two countries. Perhaps Chile would have preferred for its Mexican ally to
keep to its own counsel on this matter.
Lack of careful consideration of foreign policy options by the Fox presidency can be attributed to the fact that
Mexico’s interest on enhancing its role as regional actor came by default. After the U.S.-Mexican agenda came to a
standstill, the Fox administration realized that other steps had to be taken to improve Mexico’s international standing,
beginning with this hemisphere. The nomination of Minister Derbez to head the Organization of American States can be
understood as stemming from this new outlook.
Unlike Mexico, Chile was not forced to reassess foreign policy goals after 9-11. From the start, the Lagos government
made of Chile’s expansion of regional influence a main foreign policy priority. A vocal sponsor of closer integration
with the Mercosur countries and of Latin America presenting a united front in international organizations, the
administration also had concluded that nurturing a close relationship with the U.S. would be beneficial to Chile’s
economic and diplomatic interests. This balancing act was not unanimously praised. There were some who identified
outright submissiveness in the Lagos approach.
Notwithstanding this criticism, Santiago’s less dependent position did allow it to construct a more diverse network of
alliances than Mexico. If Minister Insulza wins the position of secretary-general of the OAS, this would definitely be
counted by the Lagos administration as proof of its own effectiveness in promoting the recognition of Chile as a major
player in the hemispheric arena.
The OAS race has seriously eroded trust between Mexico and Chile but, in any case, the wishful strategic partners were
bound to collide as Mexico’s choice of actions to regain international confidence happen to concur with Chile’s bid to
be taken seriously as a regional big leaguer. No doubt an array of pragmatic interests will continue to bond Chile and
Mexico together in small ways, but a true strategic partnership like that envisioned in last September’s rhetoric is not
likely to develop in the medium term.
This analysis was prepared by COHA Senior Research Fellow Barbara Gonzalez.
April 6, 2005