NEWS TRANSCRIPT from the United States Department of Defense
DoD News Briefing Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem, Joint Staff Wednesday, November 28, 2001 - 1:30 p.m. EST
(Slides and videos shown in this briefing are on the Web at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2001/g011128-D-6570C.html)
Stufflebeem: Good afternoon, everyone.
We continue operations and focus on building pressure on al Qaeda and the Taliban through strikes on fixed and emerging
targets. We also continue to increase the number of our Marines on the ground in southern Afghanistan.
We conducted airstrikes yesterday in four planned target areas, concentrated against al Qaeda and Taliban cave and
tunnel complexes and support infrastructure in the Jalalabad area, as well as emergent targets in the South, which
included command-and-control elements and Taliban military forces. Yesterday we used about 120 strike aircraft, of which
about 100 were tactical from sea-based platforms, about 12 to 14 were land-based tactical jets, and between six to eight
were long-range bombers.
We again dropped leaflets, this time in the Kunduz and Kabul areas, and continued our Commando Solo broadcast missions.
Our humanitarian relief support continues, and yesterday two C-17s dropped again 34,000 humanitarian daily rations, and
one C-17 dropped 16 containers of wheat and blankets. And this was near Mazar-e Sharif. To date, we've delivered more
than 1,930,000 humanitarian daily rations.
Today we have four videos from recent strikes in southern Afghanistan. The first of today's clips are from Sunday. They
show two in a series of strikes against an armored column that was on the move. This was the one that was reported in
southern Afghanistan heading east at about the time that the Marines were infiltrating. The vehicles were destroyed. And
by the size of the secondary explosions, there were apparently fuel and ammunition in this convoy. And these are Navy
F-14 images you're seeing.
Q: (Off mike.)
Stufflebeem: Right, just from a different angle, so the road doesn't appear quite as obvious.
Q: And it was heading east?
Stufflebeem: They were heading east.
The last two of today's clips were from yesterday's strike on reported Taliban leadership locations near Kandahar. These
videos are from F-16 gun cameras, which show multiple munitions dropped by a B-1 bomber. The first video is of a
macro-view of a Taliban complex, and you'll see the numerous hits around the compound, both in the upper left and lower
right corner. The second video is a zoomed-in view of one of the complexes that was bombed. And as you can see, the
facility was virtually destroyed.
Q: How many bombs were coming down?
Stufflebeem: I don't have the exact number. I think it was on order of about 10 all total.
Q: What kind of munition was it?
Stufflebeem: Precision guided.
Q: (Off mike) -- the B-1?
Stufflebeem: It was from a B-1.
We do not have any specific names or information of who may have been in that facility, other than the initial reports
of it being Taliban leadership.
And with that, I'll take your questions.
Charlie?
Q: Admiral, now that Mazar-e Sharif and Kabul and Konduz have fallen, would you describe Kandahar and perhaps Jalalabad
as besieged cities? Are they tightly surrounded by the opposition, allowing very little flow in and out? And what does
intelligence tell you about the ability of the opposition and how soon to take Kandahar?
Stufflebeem: I think General Franks probably gave you the best description yesterday, if you saw his comments, in
describing both the area south of Jalalabad and Kandahar.
To say that they're "tightly ringed" is probably a little too strong. There certainly are opposition forces around and,
in some cases, in the areas. But there is, again, a number of conflicting reports as to when they actually might be
considered controlled by those opposition groups. Intelligence -- it's too early to tell when the outcome will be for
both of those. Pressure is building. I would say that the best way to characterize it is that the pressure has been
stepped up, and there are fewer Taliban and al Qaeda forces that are resisting than there were days ago.
Q: Admiral, can I do a follow-up?
Q: Have you any indication of surrenders in Kandahar, like there were in Mazar-e Sharif and Kunduz?
Stufflebeem: No reports, as of yet, that give you that same magnitude that you saw in Mazar-e Sharif that are occurring
right now. However, there still are active negotiations ongoing, and we could see that. That's possible.
Q: Admiral, if I understood General Franks correctly yesterday, he said we are not bombing inside Kandahar proper, to
cut down on the possibility of collateral damage. What about the AC-130 gunships, which are very good against urban
warfare, are they being used down there?
Stufflebeem: I haven't seen any reports of any of the strikes that have showed actual attacks inside the city of
Kandahar. So I can't say categorically no, that they AC-130s have not fired into Kandahar, but I've not seen in reports
that they have.
Q: Admiral, can you shed any light on the circumstances in which the CIA person was killed in the prison uprising? Was
he with other -- was he with military personnel, in communication with military personnel that would explain what was
going on?
Stufflebeem: To be quite honest, I don't have any information on the specifics of what happened to that individual. I'd
have to refer you to the agency. They may have more. But I just haven't seen anything other than just a confirmation of
who he is and that he was killed.
Q: Do you know that he was working with U.S. Special Forces present at the time?
Stufflebeem: I don't know that. I don't know that there was a specific coordination going on. The CIA and Special Forces
have been working and had been working very closely together on the ground. In this particular incidence, I just don't
know.
Q: Admiral, can you tell us how many cluster bombs have been dropped up to this point in the war? And how are the
targets for those cluster bombs selected? Is it exclusively front-line troops?
Stufflebeem: I can answer the last part of your question. The first part I just don't know. I don't know the numbers of
cluster bombs that have been dropped. I'm sure we can go back and research that. [About 600 cluster bombs have been
used.]
But to the second part of your question, cluster munitions are most effective against troops that are in lightly
defended positions. So the place to best use them is in an area that would have minimal collateral damage impact and
maximum numbers of forces that you would wish to kill.
So those particular lines of confrontation, as we saw, that were arrayed on the south side of Mazar-e Sharif, especially
in those foothills, is a good physical example of an area that those weapons would be most often used in.
Q: If I could follow up, can you tell us what type of cluster bombs were used?
Stufflebeem: What type. I'm sorry; I couldn't tell you that -- cluster bomb munitions is all that I know them by, and
what they do.
Q: Admiral, what does the United States think -- what do you think that that armored column that was heading toward the
Marines -- what was the intent? Was that apparently an effort by the Taliban? Were they planning to attack or engage the
Marines, or do you have any idea what they were up to before those airstrikes took place?
Stufflebeem: Right. A little impolite, but I don't think we'll ever know now. We did not have intentions. We only had
just the physical indications that this column was formed up and moving from the southwestern part of the country
eastward. And once discovered, then positively identified as belonging to Taliban, they were successfully attacked, and
we don't have any -- any indicators as to what their intent was.
Q: Do you even know if they were on a suicide-attack mission against the Marines?
Stufflebeem: We do not know. We just don't know that.
Q: How far away were they at that time -- roughly how far away from where the Marines were?
Stufflebeem: I don't know. The way I'd seen it described was is that they were -- I think the words were something like
"approaching the vicinity." So I would say miles, but I really don't have a good feel for how many miles it was.
Q: Do you know if the Marines on the ground have fired a single shot yet? Have they met any resistance of any kind?
Stufflebeem: I've not seen any reports that they have engaged yet. That's not to say, of course, that they haven't, but
I just haven't seen any reports that they have.
Q: Secondly, on your attack on the leadership compound yesterday, you said 10 bombs, roughly. You were approximating, I
guess. Is that on one of the two focal points, or is that on both of them?
Stufflebeem: As I understood it, there were two facilities in this target area that we had indications of being Taliban
leadership locations. How the weapons were arrayed against them, I don't know.
And to be quite honest, I'm not sure about the number 10. Someone had told me that it was about -- about 10.
Q: And you have no idea still whether you did, in fact, kill members of the leadership? You assume you did from your
going-in intelligence, but your after-strike intelligence has not given you any sharper view of what you hit?
Stufflebeem: That's correct.
Q: Did your going-in intelligence -- to use that term -- include the possibility that Omar was there?
Stufflebeem: I don't want to get into the specifics of how fine and exact intelligence is or can be. We were confident
that it was Taliban leadership. I think we're always going to be hopeful that the senior leadership will be in one of
these locations once we get those kinds of reports that allow us targeting information. But it also is a little bit of a
leap of faith to make an assumption. And so we wouldn't assume, necessarily, that Omar was there, or would be there, as
much as we would hope that he would be there as we attrite the others.
Q: Admiral, following up on the CIA report, yesterday the secretary painted a picture for us -- Taliban turning
themselves over to the Northern Alliance, defecting, rejoining, re-defecting, mixing in with some of the townspeople.
What are we doing or how can we distinguish the Taliban from the anti-Taliban so that we can recognize friend or foe and
this doesn't become another Vietnam, where you just don't know who your enemy is?
Stufflebeem: Well, that's a good question and it is one of the hazards of this area. Afghan nationals who may be with
the Taliban who decide to switch and become anti-Taliban may in fact not stay there. We don't know what, obviously,
personal intentions would be. We only know what definitive actions are or are demonstrated.
I think that the way that people conduct themselves on the ground -- firstly, U.S. forces are close to opposition groups
and in building relationships there, there's an element of trust. If opposition individuals would trust former Taliban
warriors to some degree, I would take from that that there is some element of trust to be had. However, any individual
with a weapon can become a hostile combatant in the flash of an eye, and I think that we are conducting ourselves in
such a way as that we're protecting ourselves from that. And any individual who, by his actions, would fire upon
coalition forces -- those coalition forces have to assume that as a combatant unless they know it to be a friendly fire
mistake.
Q: But just to follow up, was there evidence that the Taliban who had surrendered in Mazar-e Sharif were trustworthy or
friendly in the eyes of these CIA officers, or was that something that was just misjudged? Or what were the
circumstances?
Stufflebeem: Well, if you're speaking about the compound now, specifically --
Q: Yes.
Stufflebeem: We obviously did not know what the intentions of these individuals were. However, they were not under
coalition control. They were under opposition group control. I had a sense, without knowing facts, that there were in a
large number, hundreds, of these forces who had apparently surrendered. At some point in this detainee status, they then
came to some sort of a decision to do -- to take some action and had the ability to be able to do that. There's a lot of
questions that obviously need to be asked or answers that need to be obtained as to how that came about or how that can
be prevented in the future. My sense is that the opposition groups learned quite a bit from this experience, as well as
what we have observed.
But until you can get into a position where you can start to interrogate some of these people and find out what they're
willing to talk about, you aren't going to know what the intentions are. So there is that risk that you have to live
with.
Q: Admiral, I want to get back to the leadership targets. Is this the top priority now, would you say? And of the
targets of opportunity, what percentage or number are leadership targets, would you say?
Stufflebeem: From Central Command's perspective, I don't know. From where I sit watching this, my sense is that the
pressure that has been brought to bear is on the leadership. So, you know, I could tell you that the entirety of the
effort is to do that. If we break the leadership of the Taliban and break the leadership of al Qaeda, there is very --
or there is reduced emphasis or reduced motivation for troops to stay loyal to the cause and continue to fight.
There will always be pockets who are going to fight to the death in any case. But getting the key leadership and
breaking the chain of command is going to render much of that ineffective. And so, therefore, the pressure is on that
leadership, and we're doing it in a multitude of ways. You know, initially we were talking about getting at the legs of
the stool that supported that leadership. With much of that now gone, and for much of the leadership in hiding and just
trying to survive, the pressure is now being applied to shrink down the areas of where they can go to to be found, and
then they make the decision if they're going to surrender or fight to the death.
Q: But again, are they the priority target now, the leadership? Are you actually trying to strike them first and
foremost?
Stufflebeem: The sense I have is that the pressure that we're trying to bring to bear is on the leadership.
Sir, in the back.
Q: Admiral, there are reports still of planes coming into Afghanistan in different areas and landing. With all of the
surveillance equipment that we have in theater, do you have any reports that any planes, other than U.S. military, are
coming into that airspace, landing and then leaving?
Stufflebeem: The only reports that I have seen are those that have been reported in the press openly. I think I read or
saw this morning that Russia has flown IL-76s into the north and delivered troops and equipment, I think with the stated
intention of rebuilding their embassy. I would leave it to Russia to determine what it is that they're doing.
In terms of small aircraft, like helicopters or small single aircraft, the environment, especially to fly around, with
very steep mountains, provides some shadowing where you don't see all of it, even with all of our capability to see it
from overhead. So, to assume that an airplane could not fly low altitude and terrain-follow into the country and then
exit, would be a bad assumption.
We assume that that could happen. We have a lot of coverage in trying to prevent that and see that. We have not seen any
reports of that having happened yet.
Q: Admiral, there have been -- there was a report this morning from the South of Afghanistan, between Kandahar and the
Pakistani border. Reporters there interviewed a local opposition commander from Pashtun background, who said that he and
his men had captured 160 Taliban prisoners after they refused to surrender and that they executed them in, you know,
firing squad fashion, and that U.S. forces were present and had objected to the execution of the prisoners. Do you know
anything about that?
Stufflebeem: I know of the report that was filed. We do not have any reports from our forces to describe this. And
Central Command, I think, is going to try to track that report down to see if there's anything to that.
Q: Admiral, you mentioned that 120 strike aircraft in the last 24 hours -- and I think, on my count, that's about 30
more than three or four weeks ago, when the Taliban controlled most of the country. Could you just give us an
explanation for the increase? Is this due to better intelligence, or are the U.S. forces becoming more aggressive? And
secondly, what percentage of these aircraft are returning without having dropped their munitions?
Stufflebeem: The fact that there may be a few more aircraft on recent ATOs [air tasking orders] than there were in days
past does not signal a change in this joint campaign as much as what General Franks or the CINC wants to bring to bear.
There are more aircraft that are being brought to bear for on-call engagement or close air support missions. And part of
that is in fact due to more intelligence that is being derived with more people on the ground now. So we're getting more
intelligence, better targeting capability. But we also need to have more aircraft available in response and on call, and
so that can account for some of it.
But there may be other days where we don't have as many up. So you sort of just have to get a sense that this is the way
it's been, and the level of effort is going to be relatively constant through the AOR, because you just have so many
available.
The other part of your question was, how much of the aircraft are returning [with ordnance]? From day to day, it'll
vary. From yesterday's missions, the majority brought their ordnance back. But it will vary. It depends on what kind of
targets emerge or, I should say, how many targets emerge, and then have the positive ID and the controller authority to
release it.
Q: Admiral, there have been some unconfirmed reports that there may be some conventional Army forces from the 10th
Mountain Division operating inside Afghanistan right now. Can you talk about that and, if they are in theater right now,
what they're doing?
Stufflebeem: You know, I can't, but it's only because I've not tracked 10th Mountain to know exactly what it is that
they're doing. So I just don't know the answer. I'll go back and look to see what it is they're up to. I just don't know
the answer. [A small number of soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division are now operating inside Afghanistan.]
Q: Has the United States yet taken any prisoners? And have any non-Afghan fighters been removed from Afghanistan by the
United States for questioning elsewhere?
Stufflebeem: I've not seen any reports that we have taken custody and removed from Afghanistan. I don't know if I would
have access to that information, Jamie, to be honest with you. We obviously have had access to people who have been
detained, and we're getting information from those who are detained and volunteering information. But I think that -- I
think that the U.S. government, in fact, is working through how we would -- maybe not the U.S. government as much as
coalitions are working through how we would do detainees outside of Afghanistan. But as far as I know, it's not yet been
done.
Q: Admiral, you mentioned that there were leaflet drops yesterday around Kabul and Kunduz, if I understood you
correctly. Those areas, as I understand it, are both under control of anti-Taliban forces now. Can you tell us what the
leaflets are -- what the purpose of those leaflets is? Obviously, you're not trying to get people to rise up against the
Taliban. The Taliban are under control. Are you looking for help in tracking down the leadership? What are those leaflet
drops now?
Stufflebeem: There are a variety of ones that are being dropped. We are continuing to drop leaflets that provide
information to nationals about humanitarian assistance, use of radios, positive information, I guess you would call it.
There also are the "wanted" posters in looking for the leadership of the Taliban and al Qaeda. We are still delivering
messages to have those pockets of resistance -- to have those kinds of individuals surrender and give up their fight.
And I would tell you that we're starting to see some success from those. In having the interviews with those who are
detained, there is information that's coming forward that they are having a positive effect, and so I know that we're
happy about that.
I have time for two more questions.
Q: Admiral, you talked about breaking the chain of command in the last day or two. Is there a chain of command to break?
I mean, what's the status of the leadership? Are they trying to organize disparate resistance groups? And how are they
communicating?
Stufflebeem: They're communicating in a number of ways.
They're using radios. They're trying to meet physically together. And in some cases they are severed from communicating
by any means whatsoever. The effect of separating, isolating, and reducing the leadership is then, that the troops under
their control are not going to know, necessarily, what it is they should be doing. Any time that you can dismantle the
leadership or this chain of command, you then have groups of troops who are uncoordinated, uncontrolled, and therefore
much less effective.
In terms of measuring the effect, the pressure again, that we're looking for -- based on intelligence and all-source
reporting - on the leadership is to get at it for that reason.
Q: (Off mike) -- Omar and bin Laden still calling the shots right now?
Stufflebeem: We know that there are elements of the leadership that are trying to reach their seniors for guidance. We
know that there is guidance that is still coming down from the senior leaders. I think that to say that they are still
calling the shots and still firmly in control would be an overstatement. I think they have much less control than they
have had in the past because they have much less access, again, to some of these intermediate leaders and to those
forces.
Q: Admiral, you mentioned that they are still dropping humanitarian rations. With all the airfields that are now under
opposition control, why have we not gone into flying 130s or something like that, you know, where you can deliver them
in bulk a little more efficiently than the air drops?
Stufflebeem: Well, we're dropping the HDRs into areas that don't have any other way to get access to easy foodstuffs at
the moment. That's one reason. Some of the airfields that we are utilizing are good for short-runway use aircraft.
Heavily laden aircraft, like a fully loaded C-130, may in fact not be suitable for a number of runways. There also has
to be the coordination established on the ground for those aircraft to get in and those NGOs to be ready to receive and
then disburse. I can't tell you that I know that that coordination is, in fact, physically set up on all the airports
that have been used so far. But I think those are the elements of what it is.
Q: Quick clarification? On the drop on the compound, were the B-1s the only ones that dropped, or unmanned, manned --
were the B-1s the only ones?
Stufflebeem: It was a single B-1 that dropped its weapons on that compound.
Q: It was loitering?
Q: And that was it? That was the only aircraft that dropped on the --
Stufflebeem: That was the only one that dropped on that compound in that strike.
Q: So the F-16 didn't drop?
Stufflebeem: Did not, specifically.
Q: Okay. Thank you.
Q: See you tomorrow.
ENDS