LOBBY BRIEFING: 4PM MONDAY 26 NOVEMBER 2001
AFGHANISTAN
British Forces
Asked if the Prime Minister had a message for the British soldiers who had been injured in Afghanistan, the PMOS said
that as Geoff Hoon had stated in the House today, a very small number of our forces had been wounded on the ground in
the country. The Prime Minister paid tribute to the professionalism, courage and bravery of all our forces who were
serving, particularly those who had been injured. They were helping to do a very difficult and important job - doing it
superbly as always. The country could continue to be proud of how they were carrying out this role and what they were
helping to achieve.
Asked to comment on a Time Magazine report claiming that the violence in Kunduz had been triggered when a British
journalist had been beaten up by some Taliban soldiers and subsequently rescued by Special Forces and whether the
journalist might have been a Special Forces agent and if the injuries related to this incident, the PMOS said we never
commented on the role of the Special Forces.
In answer to questions relating to how the British soldiers had been injured, the PMOS said that the number that had
been wounded were not the totality of our force currently operating inside Afghanistan. Asked where the forces had come
under attack, the PMOS said that these soldiers had not been injured at Bagram. For obvious reasons it would be unwise
to go beyond that.
LOBBY BRIEFING: 11AM MONDAY 26 NOVEMBER 2001
DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER
The Prime Minister's Official Spokesman (PMOS) advised journalists that the Deputy Prime Minister was departing today
for a series of important visits to the US, Australia, Malaysia and Vietnam. His focus would be the Coalition against
Terror, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, trade and other bilateral relations. He was due to meet US Vice
President Dick Cheney on Wednesday, followed by Kofi Annan. He would also meet Helen Clarke and John Howard on Friday.
Before leaving for his tour, the Deputy Prime Minister would chair the first meeting of the new Cabinet Committee for
the World Summit on Sustainable Development, which would co-ordinate our response and strategy for the Summit next year.
AFGHANISTAN
Deployment
Asked whether Geoff Hoon would be announcing the deployment of British troops during Defence PQs this afternoon, the
PMOS pointed to speculation in today's papers in relation to the notice to move and said that if there was anything to
say on this matter, Mr Hoon would use the occasion of Defence PQs to inform the House. Were he to do so, it should not
be assumed that a change in the notice to move would necessarily apply to all our forces. Equally, any change should be
seen in the context of what was a fluid situation. The fall of Kabul had led to a period of great uncertainty. There had
been widespread predictions of a possible bloodbath. However, that had not happened. Moreover, the humanitarian effort
had made a lot of progress and aid was getting in. The position on the ground was a lot more stable than anyone could
have predicted, which was obviously to be welcomed. Order had been kept and a political process had begun with talks due
to start tomorrow in Bonn. In relation to the initial decision to shorten the notice to move, the PMOS underlined that
this had not of itself constituted a deployment. He pointed out that what went down could go always go up again and vice
versa. One of the many strengths of our armed forces was that they were able to respond quickly and flexibly to changing
situations.
Put to him that our position looked a bit 'ragged' given the US were sending in additional troops to Afghanistan at a
time when it appeared we were winding down our involvement, the PMOS said he would disagree absolutely. British forces
had been put on reduced notice to move just after the fall of Kabul to deal with a very fluid situation there. In his
statement to the House at the time, the Prime Minister had underlined the possible need to put in stabilisation forces
there for humanitarian and other purposes. British troops had been deployed to Bagram and were carrying out important
work at the airport. Were an announcement to be made today, it would show that we were able to adjust to a changing
situation, which was actually better than anyone could have predicted, not worse.
Asked whether Clare Short had been wrong to say that forces were needed to protect the international agencies providing
aid and that a stabilisation force was required, the PMOS said we had dealt with this question last week. We
acknowledged there were always ways to improve the humanitarian co-ordination. However, so far we believed it was
working well in relation to the dovetailing of the military and humanitarian tracks. We were now getting aid into places
where it had not been possible in the past, such as Jalalabad and Kabul. Obviously the situation was being kept under
regular review. In answer to further questions about the use of British troops, the PMOS reminded journalists that we
actually had forces on standby in the region following the Saif Sareea military exercise. That position had not changed.
Asked about perceived differences in opinion between the UK and US as to what the longer term objectives in Afghanistan
should be, the PMOS said that despite attempts by some people to indicate divisions between the US and UK, there were
none. He pointed to the US's humanitarian efforts and drew attention to the fact that they had hosted a reconstruction
conference on Afghanistan only last week. We had always said there were three tracks to the campaign - the military, the
diplomatic and the humanitarian. If progress was made on the military front, obviously that opened up opportunities on
the other two as we had seen. In terms of Kandahar, it was for the US to brief on any deployment they might be making.
However, if the Taliban and Al Qaida thought that we had forgotten about Kandahar just because we had taken Kabul, they
would have to think again. We had been absolutely clear about the three tracks from the outset. We had made progress on
all of them. We would 'keep on keeping on' until all our objectives were met. That was not to say that there weren't
going to be difficulties along the way. There would be, and people needed to recognise that the campaign would be a long
haul. Nevertheless, it was also important to keep in mind the progress which had been made and not to look constantly
for differences where none existed.
Asked how long the British troops at Bagram were likely to remain there, the PMOS said they had an important job to do
and would stay there for as long as it was considered necessary for them to be there. Asked if we had obtained
permission from the Northern Alliance to put in additional troops at Bagram should we wish to do so, the PMOS said if
that was felt to be necessary, obviously we would consult with the Northern Alliance as we had done in the past. He
added that people should not be too surprised if the number of troops there increased or decreased. He underlined that
our forces were under no threat despite some reports yesterday, and they were carrying out important work - not least in
allowing people such as the UN and our diplomats to get in and representatives of the ethnic groups to get out of the
country to attend the talks in Bonn for example.
In answer to questions about an international force, the PMOS said that as Jack Straw had indicated through his remarks
about a 'coalition of the willing' on the radio this morning, we were not ruling about the possibility of deploying an
international force to Afghanistan in the longer term. However, we had to wait and see how the talks process developed
in Bonn. As Mr Straw had suggested this morning, a 'coalition of the willing' could include a UN force or one under the
umbrella of the Organisation of Islamic Countries. Put to him that the talks process was likely to take time and that in
the meantime there was no one to impose order, the PMOS pointed out that people were likely to be killed in war. Yes, we
had all seen the footage of the Taliban prisoners trying to escape a fort near Mazar-e-Sharif. There had been a
situation there which had been dealt with. However, it was important to recognise that the widely predicted bloodbaths
following the fall of Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul had not happened, despite what might have occurred in previous years. Of
course no one was being complacent about this. However, the reality on the ground was infinitely better than people
could have predicted ten days ago. If we needed to make adjustments to the new reality, the flexibility of our forces
and the way they were configured meant that we could do that. It was not the case that if we reduced the number or even
increased it, it could not change back again. It could. We had some of the best armed forces in the world, if not the
best. He repeated that the way they were configured for rapid reaction deployment was one of their strengths.
Kandahar
Asked for an update on Kandahar and whether British forces would be involved, the PMOS said that Jack Straw had set out
the position this morning. We had not made any announcement on deployments to Kandahar. We had all heard about
deployments on the US side, but it was for the Americans to brief about it, not him. He repeated that we had forces in
the area in theatre post-Saif Sareea who were available to be used if necessary. We remained 100% committed to the
coalition's military objectives. Questioned as to whether we would agree to allow British forces to be involved in the
US military operation in Kandahar were we to be asked, the PMOS said he was not aware we were being asked to provide
further forces at this point, but we stood shoulder to shoulder with the US in seeing this through.
Bin Laden
Asked for a reaction to Dr Abdullah Abdullah's assertion that bin Laden and Mullah Omar were 'contained' together in
Kandahar, the PMOS said we had to tread cautiously in this respect. He underlined that we had very detailed objectives,
one of which was to bring Al Qaida and bin Laden to justice. Bin Laden was clearly an elusive character, was heavily
armed and surrounded by fanatics. We had never been in the business of giving predictions as to how long this could
take, although clearly the sooner the better. Nevertheless, as we had acknowledged on many occasions, it could take some
time. That said, it was clear we were making progress and bin Laden's ability to move was severely restricted as a
result.
Terrorism Bill
Asked whether the Government was determined to see the Terrorism Bill go through it final stages in its current form or
whether it would make concessions, the PMOS said we made absolutely no apology whatsoever for introducing a Bill of this
nature at this current time. We believed the public understood why we had to take additional measures to protect
ourselves. Yes, some of these measures were controversial and some people had difficulties with them. However, were we
not to do this and an individual, who would be dealt with under some of the measures in the Bill, not detained and
subsequently go on to commit terrorist acts, we would be subject to strong criticism - and quite rightly so. David
Blunkett had indicated and demonstrated through the amendments he had taken that we were prepared to listen to concerns,
for example the five year sunset clause and the annual review. Asked whether reports over the weekend suggesting that
incitement to religious hatred would be removed from the Bill were accurate, the PMOS said the proposals on religious
hatred continued to form part of the Bill. He did not know where these reports had come from, but they were wrong.
ENDS