VZCZCXRO0047
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHMR
RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0003/01 0041026
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 041026Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7556
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000003
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PRELGOV PGOV MARR PHUM PREF SU CD
SUBJECT: FORMIN ON CHAD-SUDAN XMAS DIPLOMACY: KHARTOUM
TALKS PRODUCTIVE, BUT MORE TOUGH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE
REF: A. KHARTOUM 003
B. NDJAMENA 621
----------
SUMMARY AND
COMMENT
-----------
1. (SBU) FORMIN Faki told Ambassador Dec 31 that he
considered his "Xmas Visit" to Khartoum last week a success;
that he was encouraged by the frankness and seriousness of
conversations he had with President Bashir, Dr Ghazi, and
others; and that he was satisfied that the GOS had indeed
moved most but not all Chad rebels far from the border. Faki
said that "we have broken a psychological barrier by speaking
so frankly to one another." But the GOC was still not fully
convinced that the GOS was committed to matching the GOC
commitment to a definitive end to the proxy war and that the
GOS must make clear to the Chad rebels still in Sudan that
they must soon renounce armed action against the GOC and
prepare for a different, peaceful future. For its part, Faki
affirmed, JEM was getting a clear GOC message at all levels:
"Make peace in Darfur -- or get out of Chad." Faki made two
other points with more much more emphasis than usual: Deep
GOC appreciation for USG diplomatic and political support
throughout the bilateral detente process; and linked to this
strong USG support, what he described as his own personal
commitment to do everything he could to make the bilateral
detente process succeed and result in a peaceful, "normal,"
and durable Chad-Sudan relationship, reflecting the GOC's
awareness of the necessity of peace between Chad and Sudan
and a definitive end to the "proxy war" as preconditions to
achieving peace in Darfur.
2. (SBU) Faki's take on the latest Khartoum talks tracks
closely with Chad Ambassador Bechir's (Ref B) view, as well
apparently with Dr Ghazi's (Ref A). But Faki was much more
explicit regarding the GOC's readiness to break definitively
with JEM than he has been previously, although he still
conditions it with something like absolute surety that the
Sudanese will have broken equally definitively with the Chad
rebels. Faki's meeting with President Bashir, on which the
Chadians insisted as a condition of the visit, seems to have
been in itself a confidence building measure of major
significance. We support Faki's idea that the GOS should
send Dr Ghazi to NDjamena this month along with its technical
delegation, to continue the "political conversation" even as
the technical implementation of the protocol is discussed.
We should urge the GOS to do so, and we should tell the GOC
that we have done so. President Deby's highlighting of the
GOC's peace efforts both with the GOS and Chad rebels in his
Dec 30 "Liberation Day" speech (Septel) are welcome
confirmation that the GOC is at least as serious as the GOS
in reaching a peaceful solution to their differences. END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.
-------------------
FAKI'S "XMAS VISIT"
TO KHARTOUM
-------------------
3. (SBU) FORMIN Moussa Faki Mahamat told Ambassador Dec 31
that he considered his "Xmas Visit" to Khartoum Dec 24-25 a
success and that he was encouraged by the frankness and
seriousness of conversations he had with President Bashir, Dr
Ghazi, the DEFMIN, and INTEL Chief Atta. Faki said that "we
have broken a psychological barrier by speaking so frankly to
one another." Faki said that Ghazi had asked for the
agreed-on sequence on CBMs to be changed: Instead of a
Sudanese delegation to Chad next, would Faki come to
Khartoum? Faki said the GOC was quite willing to accommodate
Ghazi in this. Faki said that the visit has definitely moved
the bilateral process forward and that the Chadians were
satisfied that the GOS had fulfilled its pledge to move Chad
rebels far (c. 400KMs) from the border, but that there were
still issues to be worked out. Principal among these was the
willingness of the GOS to match GOC commitment to a
NDJAMENA 00000003 002 OF 003
definitive end to the proxy war. This meant, according to
Faki, that the GOS must make clear to the Chad rebels still
in Sudan that they must eventually renounce the goal of armed
overthrow of the GOC and prepare for a different, peaceful
future, either back in Chad or elsewhere.
----------------
PRESIDENT BASHIR
----------------
4. (SBU Faki said that his dialogue with Pres Bashir was
completely frank and open: Bashir reviewed the history of
the Chad-Sudan relationship, with its ups and downs, blamed
Darfur for the downs, said that Sudan was ready for a change
of course; and reaffirmed his approval of the Faki-Ghazi
bilateral track and its agreements. But all actions must be
reciprocal, Bashir emphasized. Faki said he rejected the
"absolute parallelism" of the Chad-Sudan proxy war. Chad was
suffering unfairly for what Khartoum had done in Darfur:
refugees, war, rebellion, instability. All Chad rebels were
in Sudan and all were Sudan's clients and "creatures," having
been "created" by the GOS . Faki argued that JEM was
"tolerated" by the GOC, not created and maintained by
NDjamena. The GOC permitted only a few JEM leaders to stay
for long in Chad; the rest of JEM could only come for short
visits. Faki said that the Sudanese contested all his
arguments, but still showed what he interpreted as a serious
interest in resolving bilateral problems in a bilateral way.
Faki said that this might be because the GOS was playing for
time, or because it wanted an authentic and durable peaceful
settlement, or perhaps both, as the GOS had internal
divisions with different agendas. Faki said he believed that
Ghazi was sincere, but that the DEFMIN and Atta were perhaps
less so.
---------------
THE GOC AND JEM
---------------
5. (SBU) Faki claimed that the GOC had been distancing
itself from JEM for some time and had told JEM that they had
"no future" as an armed group in Chad and that they should be
pursuing peaceful paths to peace in Darfur. The JEM, Faki
intimated, understood that GOC tolerance of them as an armed
group in Chad was not eternal and that the GOC was itself
prepared to break definitively with JEM as soon as it could
be sure of reciprocal action by Sudan. Faki said that JEM
was getting a clear GOC message at all levels: "Make peace
in Darfur or get out of Chad." Faki said that Chadian
intelligence was aware of what the GOS was telling its Chad
rebel clients, and that the GOS had not yet been so clear
with them. This would be the "sticking point" for the GOC,
Faki suggested.
-----------------
GHAZI SHOULD COME
TO NDJAMENA JAN 7
-----------------
6. (SBU) The next step, Faki said, was a Sudanese technical
delegation of military and intelligence officers to Chad to
discuss concrete implementation of the 2006 bilateral
protocol, which called for border monitoring posts and "mixed
border surveillance units," composed of Chad and Sudan
military personnel. Faki said that he had suggested to Dr
Ghazi that Ghazi accompany the technical delegation so that
the Faki-Ghazi "political conversation" could be continued.
"We must keep talking," Faki said. Ambassador said that the
USG supported this idea, to maintain the momentum generated
by the Khartoum talks.
-----------------
STAYING BILATERAL
-----------------
7. (SBU) Faki said that he had always believed that a
bilateral track would be more realistic and more successful
NDJAMENA 00000003 003 OF 003
than any multilateral track, given the deep history and
close relation between Chad and Sudan. As such, the GOC was
not interested in seeking multilateral assistance or support
from "international organizations" for the implementation of
the 2006 bilateral protocol, although the GOC was always
appreciative of diplomatic and political support for its
peace efforts. The GOC and the GOS could at some point
consider asking bilateral partners to play a role in
"witnessing" future agreements, but this was not certain.
----------------
FAKI AND THE USG
----------------
8. (SBU) Faki made two points with more much emphasis than
usual. First, he emphasized that the GOC was deeply
appreciative of USG diplomatic and political support
throughout the bilateral detente process, begun last summer
between himself and Dr Ghazi. Faki said the GOC was grateful
for public, visible USG support, such as the Dec 29 USG press
statement, as well as for more private USG actions in support
of the process, such as SE Gration's efforts and others to
make clear USG goals and expectations for the sub-region.
Second, he linked this USG support to what he described as
his own personal commitment to do everything he could to make
the bilateral detente process succeed and result in a
peaceful, "normal," and durable Chad-Sudan relationship. The
GOC, he said, was fully aware of the necessity of peace
between Chad and Sudan and a definitive end to the "proxy
war" as preconditions to achieving peace in Darfur.
-------
COMMENT
-------
9. (SBU) Faki's take on the latest Khartoum talks tracks
closely with Chad Ambassador Bechir's (Ref B) view, as well
apparently with Dr Ghazi's (Ref A). But Faki was much more
explicit regarding the GOC's readiness to break definitively
with JEM than he has been previously, although he still
conditions it with something like absolute surety that the
Sudanese will have broken equally definitively with the Chad
rebels. Faki's meeting with President Bashir, on which the
Chadians insisted as a condition of the visit, seems to have
been in itself a confidence building measure of major
significance. We support Faki's idea that he GOS should send
Dr Ghazi to NDjamena this month along with its technical
delegation, to continue the "political conversation" even as
the technical implementation of the protocol is discussed.
We should urge the GOS to do so, and we should tell the GOC
that we have done so. President Deby's highlighting of the
GOC's peace efforts both with the GOS and Chad rebels in his
Dec 30 "Liberation Day" (Septel) are welcome confirmation
that the GOC is at least as serious as the GOS in reaching a
peaceful solution to their differences.
10. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO