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DE RUEHC #3930 2530112
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O 100052Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0000
UNCLAS STATE 093930
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IAEA KNNP TRGY AORC PTER IR
SUBJECT: IAEA: GUIDANCE FOR USDEL TO BOARD OF GOVERNORS
(BOG) MEETING ON IRAN
1. PER SEPTEL, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE USDEL FOR AGENDA
ITEM 6(D) ON IRAN ARE INCLUDED IN PARAS 2-3. DEL IS
INSTRUCTED TO USE THE STATEMENT IN PARA 4.
2. U.S. POSITION PAPER
BEGIN ISSUE PAPER
ISSUE:
THE BOARD WILL DISCUSS THE DIRECTOR GENERAL?S LATEST
REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA?S
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH IRAN; IRAN?S COMPLIANCE WITH
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1737, 1747, 1803, AND
1835; AND THE SECRETARIAT'S INVESTIGATION INTO IRAN?S
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES.
BACKGROUND:
IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL (DG) ELBARADEI'S 26TH REPORT ON
THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IAEA'S SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENT IN IRAN MAKES CLEAR THAT IRAN HAS MADE
SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN ITS ENRICHMENT PROGRAM AND WITH
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE ARAK REACTOR, AND THAT IRAN?S
COOPERATION WITH THE IAEA?S INVESTIGATION REMAINS
INSUFFICIENT. CONSEQUENTLY, IRAN HAS, ONCE AGAIN,
FAILED TO FULLY COMPLY WITH ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL
OBLIGATIONS AND IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS (BOG)
REQUIREMENTS TO SUSPEND ITS PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATE FULLY WITH THE IAEA.
THIS LATEST REPORT MARKS THE ELEVENTH TIME SINCE THE
ADOPTION OF UNSCR 1737 IN DECEMBER 2006 THAT THE IAEA
HAS REPORTED IRAN?S NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THESE
OBLIGATIONS.
NUCLEAR PROGRAM STATUS
ACCORDING TO THE IAEA'S AUGUST REPORT, IRAN CONTINUES TO
ENRICH URANIUM USING APPROXIMATELY 4,600 IR-1
CENTRIFUGES AT ITS FUEL ENRICHMENT PLAN (FEP) AT NATANZ
AND, MOST TROUBLING OF ALL, NOW POSSESSES 1,430 KG OF
LOW ENRICHED URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE (LEUF6).
CONSEQUENTLY, IRAN NOW HAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT LEUF6 TO
PRODUCE 1 NUCLEAR WEAPON, IF FURTHER ENRICHED TO
WEAPONS-GRADE. THIS INCREASE IN PRODUCTION SUGGESTS
IRAN HAS SUSTAINED GENERALLY GOOD CENTRIFUGE PERFORMANCE
SINCE NOVEMBER 2008. IN ADDITION, IRAN ALSO CONTINUES
TO INSTALL AND TEST NEW CASCADES AT THE UNDERGROUND FEP
(FOR A TOTAL OF 8,308 CENTRIFUGES INSTALLED OR
UNDERGOING TESTING AS OF 12 AUGUST 2009), AND TO TEST
CENTRIFUGES OF VARIOUS DESIGNS (IR1, IR2, IR2 MODIFIED,
IR3, AND IR4), INCLUDING WITH UF6 GAS, AT THE PILOT FUEL
ENRICHMENT PLANT AT NATANZ. THE REPORT NOTES THAT IRAN
HAS ACCEPTED AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS MEASURES AT NATANZ,
BUT ONLY THOSE THAT THE IAEA REQUESTED IN ORDER TO MEET
THE MINIMUM NECESSARY STANDARD TO PROVIDE ASSURANCE AS
TO THE NONDIVERSION OF DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL. THIS
STEP DOES NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED
WITH IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
THE REPORT ALSO NOTES ONGOING CONSTRUCTION OF THE HEAVY
WATER RESEARCH REACTOR AT ARAK (IR-40), A VIOLATION OF
UNSCR 1737. WHILE IRAN PROVIDED THE IAEA WITH ACCESS TO
THE IR-40 ON 17 AUGUST TO CARRY OUT A DESIGN INFORMATION
VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION, IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER
SUCH ACCESS WAS ONE-TIME OR WILL BECOME ROUTINE. THE
IAEA WAS ABLE TO VERIFY THAT NO REACTOR VESSEL WAS YET
PRESENT; HOWEVER, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL NOTED THAT IRAN
STILL NEEDS TO PROVIDE UPDATED AND MORE DETAILED DESIGN
INFORMATION, IN PARTICULAR ABOUT THE NUCLEAR FUEL
CHARACTERISTICS, FUEL HANDLING AND TRANSFER EQUIPMENT,
AND THE NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY AND CONTROL SYSTEM.
FURTHER, IRAN MUST PROVIDE ROUTINE, REGULAR ACCESS TO
THE ARAK REACTOR IN ORDER FOR SAFEGUARDS TO BE SUSTAINED
AND EFFECTIVE. ONE-TIME ACCESS AT IRAN?S WHIM DEFEATS
THE PURPOSE OF SAFEGUARDS.
TO DATE, IRAN HAS NOT MADE SUCH ACCESS ROUTINE, AND IT
CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO ACKNOWLEDGE ITS CONTINUING
OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT THE MODIFIED CODE 3.1 OF THE
SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENT TO ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, AS
NOTED BY THE IAEA DG IN THIS LATEST REPORT. THIS
PRESENTS THE RISK THAT IRAN COULD BUILD A NEW NUCLEAR
FACILITY AND FAIL TO DECLARE IT UNTIL 180 DAYS PRIOR TO
THE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL INTO THE FACILITY.
IRAN?S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE THE IAEA WITH PRELIMINARY
DESIGN INFORMATION FOR THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IT IS
PLANNING TO BUILD AT DARKHOVIN IS A CASE IN POINT. THE
IAEA (AND THE UNITED STATES) REJECTS IRAN?S UNILATERAL
ASSESSMENT THAT IT IS NOT OBLIGATED TO IMPLEMENT
MODIFIED CODE 3.1.
THE DG FURTHER NOTED THAT, IN ORDER FOR THE AGENCY TO BE
IN A POSITION TO PROGRESS IN ITS VERIFICATION OF THE
ABSENCE OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL AND ACTIVITIES IN
IRAN, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT IRAN TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS
TO ENABLE THE IAEA TO CLARIFY AND BRING TO A CLOSURE THE
OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND IMPLEMENT ITS ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOL.
POSSIBLE MILITARY DIMENSIONS
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL USED A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF HIS
LATEST REPORT TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE MILITARY
DIMENSIONS (PMD) TO IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. HE
EMPHASIZED THAT THERE REMAIN A NUMBER OF OUTSTANDING
ISSUES THAT GIVE RISE TO SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT NEED TO
BE CLARIFIED BY IRAN. SPECIFICALLY, HE NOTED QUESTIONS
RELATED TO THE ALLEGED STUDIES, THE ACQUISITION OF THE
URANIUM METAL DOCUMENT, AND THE PROCUREMENT AND
REASEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (R) ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY-
RELATED INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES THAT COULD BE NUCLEAR-
RELATED, AS WELL AS THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR-RELATED
EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING TO
DEFENSE INDUSTRIES. THE REPORT FURTHER HIGHLIGHTED THAT
THE INFORMATION ON THESE OUTSTANDING ISSUES APPEARS TO
HAVE BEEN DERIVED FROM MULTIPLE SOURCES OVER DIFFERENT
PERIODS OF TIME, AND APPEARS TO BE GENERALLY CONSISTENT.
IT IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED THAT IT
NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED BY IRAN WITH A VIEW TO REMOVING
THE DOUBTS THAT NATURALLY ARISE ABOUT THE EXCLUSIVELY
PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN?S NUCLEAR PROGRAM. MOST
IMPORTANTLY, THE REPORT OFFERED AN EXTENDED RENDITION OF
THE OUTSTANDING ISSUES AND THE LENGTHS TO WHICH THE IAEA
HAS GONE TO ENGAGE IRAN TO NO AVAIL.
END POSTION PAPER
3. U.S. POSITION:
THE U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD DELIVER A STRONG NATIONAL
STATEMENT AND ALSO WORK TO ENSURE THAT NON-P5+1 MEMBER
STATE NATIONAL STATEMENTS ARE FIRM AND DIRECT IN THEIR
INSISTENCE THAT IRAN COMPLY WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. TO THAT END, THE
U.S. DELEGATION SHOULD WORK TO ENSURE THAT AS MANY NON-
P5+1 MEMBER STATES AS POSSIBLE REFLECT THE FOLLOWING
MAIN THEMES IN THEIR NATIONAL STATEMENTS:
--CALL ON IRAN TO COMPLY WITH ITS UNSC, NPT, AND IAEA
SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS, AND ENCOURAGE IRAN TO ENGAGE THE
P5+1 IN GOOD FAITH TO RESOLVE ALL THE OUTSTANDING
CONCERNS ABOUT ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
--CONCERN WITH IRAN?S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE FULLY AND
TRANSPARENTLY WITH THE IAEA'S INVESTIGATION, AS WELL AS
IRAN?S REFUSAL TO COMPLY WITH ITS UNSC OBLIGATIONS. OF
PARTICULAR CONCERN IS IRAN?S FAILURE TO SUSPEND ITS
PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, ITS REFUSAL
TO RATIFY ITS ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL, AND ITS REJECTION OF
ITS CONTINUING OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE EARLY DECLARATION
OF NEW NUCLEAR FACILITIES.
--AFFIRMATION THAT, WHILE IRAN MAY HAVE ALLOWED THE IAEA
ONE-TIME ACCESS TO THE ARAK REACTOR FOR A DESIGN
INFORMATION VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION, THIS ACCESS
MUST BE PROVIDED ON A REGULAR AND ROUTINE BASIS IN ORDER
TO FULFILL IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS OBLIGATIONS AND ENSURE THE
REACTOR IS NOT USED FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS PURPOSES.
SIMILARLY, STATEMENTS SHOULD AFFIRM THAT WHILE IRAN
AGREED TO AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS MEASURES AT NATANZ, THESE
MEASURES ARE THE BARE MINIMUM NECESSARY IN ORDER TO
ENSURE THE NONDIVERSION OF DECLARED NUCLEAR MATERIAL.
THESE STEPS DO NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF
IRANIAN NONCOMPLIANCE AND NONCOOPERATION.
--NEED FOR IRAN TO ADDRESS FULLY AND WITHOUT DELAY ALL
OF THE IAEA'S OUTSTANDING AND SERIOUS CONCERNS
REGARDING: THE EXTENSIVE DOCUMENTATION MADE
AVAILABLE TO THE AGENCY ON IRANIAN WORK ON NUCLEAR
WARHEAD DESIGN; THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ACQUISITION OF
THE URANIUM METAL DOCUMENT; PROCUREMENT AND R
ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY-RELATED INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES
THAT COULD BE NUCLEAR-RELATED; AND THE PRODUCTION OF
NUCLEAR EQUIPMENT AND COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING
TO MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS.
--NOTE THAT UNLESS IRAN COOPERATES WITH THE IAEA AND
FULLY COMPLIES WITH ITS INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS, THE
BOARD CANNOT HAVE ANY CONFIDENCE IN THE EXCLUSIVELY
PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM OR IN ANY
ASSURANCES REGARDING THE ABSENCE OF UNDECLARED NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. THUS, IRAN WILL REMAIN OUT OF
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.
4. STATEMENT. THE USDEL IS INSTRUCTED TO USE THIS
STATEMENT ON IRAN.
BEGIN STATEMENT.
MADAME CHAIR,
THE UNITED STATES APPRECIATES THIS LATEST REPORT ON
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND
COMPLIANCE WITH ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL OBLIGATIONS. WE
THANK THE DIRECTOR GENERAL AND THE SECRETARIAT FOR THEIR
CONTINUED SERIOUS AND PROFESSIONAL EFFORTS IN CONDUCTING
THEIR VERIFICATION MISSION IN IRAN.
THIS IS MY FIRST INTERVENTION ON THE SUBJECT OF
IRAN AT THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS. IRAN REMAINS A
CRITICAL CHALLENGE FOR THE AGENCY AND CONTINUES TO BE A
KEY ISSUE DEMANDING THE ATTENTION OF THIS BOARD.
UNFORTUNATELY, THE SECRETARIAT IS NOT GETTING THE
FULL AND COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION THAT IT NEEDS FROM
IRAN TO RESOLVE THESE LONG-OUTSTANDING ISSUES. THE
IAEA?S INVESTIGATION IS NOW ENTERING ITS SIXTH YEAR, AND
STILL MANY OF THE ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED AS A RESULT
OF IRAN?S REFUSAL TO PROVIDE THE INFORMATION AND ACCESS
NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THE IAEA'S SERIOUS QUESTIONS,
PARTICULARLY REGARDING IRAN'S PAST NUCLEAR WARHEAD
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.
IN FACT, THE LATEST DIRECTOR GENERAL?S REPORT
DESCRIBES THAT, ONCE AGAIN, IRAN HAS MISSED AN
OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE CONCERNS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY WITH RESPECT TO ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM. WE
REGRET THAT NO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THE
IAEA?S INVESTIGATION FOR OVER A YEAR, AND NO PROGRESS AT
ALL HAS BEEN MADE WITH RESPECT TO IRAN?S FULFILLMENT OF
ITS UN SECURITY COUNCIL, NPT, AND IAEA OBLIGATIONS.
THIS INCLUDES IRAN?S OBLIGATION TO SUSPEND URANIUM
ENRICHMENT AT NATANZ PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL. THE MEDIA HAS NOTED IRAN?S ACCEPTANCE
OF AN AUGMENTED SAFEGUARDS APPROACH AT NATANZ. HOWEVER,
THAT ONLY RE-ESTABLISHES THE MINIMUM NECESSARY IAEA
MONITORING AT NATANZ WITHOUT ADDRESSING IRAN?S BASIC
OBLIGATIONS. IN ADDITION, THE PROLIFERATION-SENSITIVE
NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED AT THIS FACILITY SHOULD BE
SUSPENDED PER THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL.
THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF IRAN?S PROVISION OF ACCESS
TO ARAK. THE DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT INDICATED THAT
IRAN PERMITTED THE IAEA TO CONDUCT A DESIGN INFORMATION
VERIFICATION (DIV) INSPECTION AT THE ARAK REACTOR. THIS
DEVELOPMENT IS, OF COURSE, WELCOME. HOWEVER, ACCESS
GRANTED AFTER A YEAR OF DEFIANCE IS NOT SOMETHING TO BE
CONGRATULATED. MOREOVER, IRAN?S CONTINUED REFUSAL TO
IMPLEMENT CODE 3.1 MODIFIED OF ITS SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
TO PROVIDE EARLY NOTIFICATION OF NEW NUCLEAR FACILITIES
DISCONCERTINGLY SUGGESTS THAT THIS ACCESS WILL NOT BE
ROUTINE OR REGULARIZED, AS REQUIRED BY IRAN?S SAFEGUARDS
AGREEMENT AND SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS, BUT RATHER AD HOC
AND LAST-MINUTE WHEN POLITICALLY EXPEDIENT. AS THE
DIRECTOR GENERAL NOTED IN HIS REPORT, IRAN IS THE ONLY
STATE WITH SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES THAT HAS A
COMPREHENSIVE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IN FORCE BUT IS NOT
IMPLEMENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED CODE 3.1.
SIMILARLY, OVER A YEAR AGO, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL
REQUESTED DESIGN INFORMATION VERIFICATION INFORMATION
FOR THE NEW POWER REACTOR IRAN PLANS TO CONSTRUCT AT
DARKHOVIN. AND ONCE AGAIN, IRAN HAS REFUSED TO PROVIDE
SUCH INFORMATION TO THE IAEA. THE FAILURE TO APPLY CODE
3.1 MODIFIED IS A SERIOUS IMPEDIMENT TO THE IAEA?S
ABILITY TO PROPERLY SAFEGUARD AND VERIFY NUCLEAR
ACTIVITIES IN IRAN.
THE LIMITS PLACED BY IRAN EVEN ON THIS ONE
OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT SAFEGUARDS AT THE ARAK REACTOR
REVEALED FURTHER THE LACK OF IRANIAN COOPERATION. THE
REPORT CLEARLY INDICATES THAT, WHILE IRAN CONTINUES TO
MAKE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AT ARAK, IRAN HAS YET TO
PROVIDE CRITICAL, DETAILED DESIGN INFORMATION, IN
PARTICULAR ABOUT THE NUCLEAR FUEL CHARACTERISTICS, FUEL
HANDLING AND TRANSFER EQUIPMENT, AND THE NUCLEAR
MATERIAL ACCOUNTANCY AND CONTROL SYSTEM. THIS
INFORMATION IS FUNDAMENTAL TO SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION
AND SHOULD BE PROVIDED WITHOUT DELAY.
AGAINST THIS BACKDROP OF LIMITED COOPERATION, THE
REPORT DESCRIBES BOTH TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN IRANIAN
URANIUM ENRICHMENT AND A TOTAL STALEMATE IN ADDRESSING
THE IAEA'S SERIOUS CONCERNS ABOUT IRAN?S PAST WARHEAD-
RELATED WORK.
INDEED, THIS LATEST REPORT DESCRIBES THAT IRAN NOW
HAS, AT A MINIMUM, 1,430 KILOGRAMS OF LOW ENRICHED
URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE. IRAN IS NOW EITHER VERY NEAR OR
IN POSSESSION OF SUFFICIENT LOW ENRICHED URANIUM TO
PRODUCE ONE NUCLEAR WEAPON, IF THE DECISION WERE MADE TO
FURTHER ENRICH IT TO WEAPONS-GRADE. THIS ONGOING
ENRICHMENT ACTIVITY, PROHIBITED BY THREE CHAPTER VII UN
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, MOVES IRAN CLOSER TO A
DANGEROUS AND DESTABILIZING POSSIBLE BREAKOUT CAPACITY.
TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH IRAN?S REFUSAL TO ENGAGE
WITH THE IAEA REGARDING ITS PAST NUCLEAR WARHEAD-RELATED
WORK, WE HAVE SERIOUS CONCERNS THAT IRAN IS DELIBERATELY
ATTEMPTING TO PRESERVE A NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION - AT A
MINIMUM. WHILE THE AGENCY CONTINUES TO REQUEST
CLARIFICATION ON THE ALLEGED STUDIES, THE URANIUM METAL
DOCUMENT, AND THE PROCUREMENT AND NUCLEAR-RELATED R
ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY INSTITUTES AND COMPANIES, AS WELL
AS THE PRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR-RELATED EQUIPMENT AND
COMPONENTS BY COMPANIES BELONGING TO DEFENSE INDUSTRIES,
IRAN CONTINUES TO REFUSE TO COOPERATE. THIS IS
REGRETTABLY UNPRODUCTIVE. IT IS ALSO DISAPPOINTING THAT
OVER TEN MONTHS HAVE GONE BY AND IRAN HAS FAILED TO TAKE
WHAT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL CALLS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP
IN ADDRESSING THESE LONG-OUTSTANDING ISSUES BY PROVIDING
SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS TO THE IAEA?S QUESTIONS. WHAT
CONCLUSION SHOULD THE BOARD DRAW FROM IRAN?S REFUSAL TO
PROVIDE SUBSTANTIVE ANSWERS TO THE IAEA?S QUESTIONS?
MADAME CHAIR,
IT HAS BEEN NEARLY SIX MONTHS SINCE THE UNITED
STATES JOINED ITS P5+1 PARTNERS IN OFFERING TO NEGOTIATE
WITH IRAN BASED ON MUTUAL INTERESTS AND MUTUAL RESPECT,
WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. THE UNITED STATES AND OUR P5+1
PARTNERS HAVE MADE A GOOD-FAITH EFFORT TO REACH OUT TO
IRAN AND FIND A DIPLOMATIC RESOLUTION TO THIS ISSUE.
AND WHILE WE HAVE SEEN PRESS REPORTS THAT IRAN HAS A NEW
PROPOSAL, WE HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED ANY OFFICIAL,
SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE FROM OUR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS.
NONETHELESS, WE WOULD REVIEW ANY PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY IN
THE SPIRIT OF MUTUAL RESPECT AND WOULD WELCOME THE
IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE P5+1'S
APRIL 2009 INVITATION TO MEET FACE-TO-FACE. MOVING
FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD
BEGIN TO BRING IRAN INTO COMPLIANCE WITH ITS
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS AND CREATE CONFIDENCE IN THE
EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL NATURE OF ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM.
THIS IS A FRESH, NEW OPPORTUNITY FOR IRAN TO TURN
THE PAGE, COME BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, AND PROVE
THAT IT IS A RESPONSIBLE, TRUSTWORTHY MEMBER OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. THE PATHWAY TO A NEGOTIATED
SOLUTION REMAINS ON THE TABLE FOR IRAN AND WE CONTINUE
TO CALL ON IRAN'S LEADERS TO DEMONSTRATE GENUINE
COMMITMENT TO PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
TO THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.
WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT WE DO NOT DISPUTE IRAN?S RIGHT
TO A CIVILIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, BUT WITH THAT RIGHT COMES
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE IN THE
EXCLUSIVELY PEACEFUL NATURE OF IRAN'S ACTIVITIES AND
PROGRAM. WE WELCOME CONSTRUCTIVE, HONEST ENGAGEMENT
WITH OUR IRANIAN COUNTERPARTS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE ONCE
AND FOR ALL.
MADAME CHAIR,
IRAN CLAIMS THAT ALL OF THE IAEA'S CONCERNS HAVE
BEEN ADDRESSED. UNFORTUNATELY, THIS IS FAR FROM THE
CASE, AS THE LATEST REPORT AND ITS MANY PREDECESSORS
DEMONSTRATE. WE, AS MEMBERS OF THE BOARD, HAVE A
RESPONSIBILITY TO DEMAND THAT THE SECRETARIAT'S
QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED, AND TO ENSURE THAT WE CAN OBTAIN
CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACEFUL INTENT OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR
PROGRAM. WHEN A STATE SUCH AS IRAN HAS VIOLATED ITS
SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT FOR DECADES AND IS KNOWN TO HAVE
ENGAGED IN WEAPONS-RELATED WORK, IT MAKES THIS TASK ALL
THE MORE VITAL. WHEN A STATE SUCH AS IRAN CONTINUES TO
VIOLATE ITS OBLIGATIONS, WE MUST RESPOND.
MADAME CHAIR,
MY GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO A DIPLOMATIC
RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS OVER IRAN'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM AND THE P5+1 DUAL-TRACK APPROACH. WE CONTINUE
TO CALL ON IRAN TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY AND TO RESPOND
CONSTRUCTIVELY TO THE P5+1 OFFER ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM
MADE IN APRIL 2009. WE ARE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN DIRECT
DIPLOMACY BASED ON MUTUAL RESPECT AND INTERESTS AND SEEK
A WILLING PARTNER. HOWEVER, AS I HAVE ALREADY STATED,
WITH RIGHTS COME RESPONSIBILITIES.
WE URGE IRAN TO FULFILL ITS INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
OBLIGATIONS AND ACCEPT THE PROMISE OF A NEGOTIATED AND
COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT THAT IS IN THE INTEREST OF ALL
IRANIANS. WE HOPE THAT IRAN WILL NOT MISS THIS
OPPORTUNITY, AND WILL TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO RESTORE
INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE. WE LOOK FORWARD TO
A TIME IN WHICH IRAN IS GREETED BY THIS BOARD AS AN IAEA
MEMBER STATE IN GOOD STANDING AND URGE IRAN TO DO WHAT
IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THAT A REALITY.
THANK YOU, MADAME CHAIR.
END STATEMENT.
CLINTON