VZCZCXYZ0018
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHC #5455 2291603
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171546Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 9679
RUEHIT/AMCONSUL ISTANBUL 3173
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 085455
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2034
TAGS: PINR PGOV PINS TU
SUBJECT: (C) REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON TURKISH POLITICAL AND LEGAL VIEWS ON ERGENEKON (C-RE9-01306)
Classified By: MICHAEL P. OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).
1. (C) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE ERGENEKON PROCESS AS THIS REMAINS AN ISSUE OF HIGH POLICYMAKER
INTEREST AND APPRECIATE ANY FURTHER INFORMATION POSTS CAN PROVIDE REGARDING BOTH TURKISH POLITICAL AND LEGAL VIEWS AND
ACTIVITIES RELATED TO ERGENEKON, AS TIME, RESOURCES, AND PRESENT WORKLOAD PERMIT. ANALYSTS ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED
IN ANY ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS POSTS CAN PROVIDE ON THE QUESTIONS BELOW. THANK YOU.
A. (SBU) TURKISH POLITICAL VIEWS ON ERGENEKON:
1) (C) WHAT ARE THE JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT PARTY'S (AKP) MOTIVATIONS FOR THE INVESTIGATIONS AND ARRESTS? HOW SOLID IS
THE EVIDENCE OF A CREDIBLE PLOT TO OVERTHROW THE AKP GOVERNMENT? WHAT INDICATIONS, IF ANY, BEYOND PARTISAN ACCUSATIONS
IN THE PRESS OR ELSEWHERE, WOULD SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT AKP IS USING THESE INVESTIGATIONS TO REMOVE POLITICAL ENEMIES?
2) (C) HOW MUCH INFLUENCE DOES THE PRIME MINISTRY WIELD OR SEEK TO IMPOSE ON THIS PROCESS, DIRECTLY OR OTHERWISE?
3) (C) WHAT INDICATIONS EXIST, IF ANY, THAT PM ERDOGAN WILL TRY TO RESTRAIN THE INVESTIGATION?
4) (C) WHAT INDICATIONS EXIST, IF ANY, THAT ERDOGAN WILL
PURSUE THE INVESTIGATION UNTIL IT IS COMPLETED? WHAT IS THE LIKELY TGS RESPONSE TO THIS COURSE OF ACTION?
B. (SBU) TURKISH LEGAL VIEWS ON ERGENEKON:
1) (C) WHAT ARE THE VIEWS OF THE JUDICIARY PROSECUTORS ON THESE INVESTIGATIONS AND THEIR PROGRESS?
2) (C) WHAT MEANS DO KEMALIST-ORIENTED AND/OR PRO-AKP
JUDICIAL BUREAUCRATS HAVE AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO PRESSURE THE ERGENEKON PROSECUTORS? TO WHAT DEGREE HAVE THESE BUREAUCRATS
ATTEMPTED TO COMPLICATE, INTERFERE WITH, OR OTHERWISE COUNTER
THE ERGENEKON PROSECUTORS' EFFORTS?
3) (C) WHO MAKES UP THE PROSECUTORIAL TEAM? TO WHOM DO THEY ANSWER, DIRECTLY AND ULTIMATELY? WHAT ARE THE DYNAMICS IN
THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE? TO WHAT EXTENT, IF AT ALL, DOES THE JANUARY 2009 APPOINTMENT TO THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IN
ISTANBUL OF RASIM ISIKALTIN--A PROSECUTOR WITH NO FORMAL RESPONSIBILITIES ON THE ERGENEKON CASE, BUT WHO IS SENIOR TO
ERGENEKON PROSECUTOR ZEKERIYA OZ AND WHO HIMSELF HAS LAUNCHED
A CASE AGAINST ERDOGAN--REFLECT AN EFFORT TO COMBAT THE CASE THROUGH OTHER MEANS?
4) (C) TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES IN THE CASE ALLOW POLITICAL MOTIVATION, PERSONAL AMBITION, THREATS
AND RISK, OR UNDER-THE-TABLE FINANCIAL GAIN TO INFLUENCE THEIR LEGAL EFFORTS AND JUDGMENT?
5) (C) HOW DO JURISTS AND LAW PROFESSORS ASSESS THE LEGAL METTLE OF THE ERGENEKON INDICTMENTS?
6) (C) IN JANUARY 2009, THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
(YARGITAY) RULED THAT WIRETAPPING EVIDENCE ALONE IS
INSUFFICIENT FOR A CONVICTION. HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT IT WILL BE SEEN AS PRECEDENT IN OTHER CASES LIKE ERGENEKON, WHICH
HAS RELIED HEAVILY ON WIRETAPS?
7) (C) WHAT ARE THE VIEWS OF THE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, SUCH AS MUSTAFA BUMIN OR HASIM KILIC, OR OTHER LEADING JURISTS, ON THE ERGENEKON CASE?
2. (U) PLEASE CITE C-RE9-01306 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF
REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON