Cablegate: Preview of Unamid's 2008-2009 Budget Framework

Published: Fri 7 Dec 2007 12:28 PM
DE RUEHKH #1940/01 3411228
O 071228Z DEC 07
E.O. 12958: N/A
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: UN HQ's budget team presented its initial
framework for UNAMID's 2008-2009 budget to JSR Adada December 5.
This strategic document lays out goals and outputs for achieving
UNAMID's mandate but does not yet include funding requirements.
Although a first step in the budget process, the framework provides
valuable insights into UNAMID's priorities and hoped-for
achievements. END SUMMARY.
2. (SBU) A six-person team from UN HQ spent a week in Darfur meeting
with UN partners and senior UNAMID and AMIS leaders to help prepare
UNAMID's 2008-2009 budget request. On December 5, they presented
their framework paper to Joint Special Representative (JSR) Rodophle
Adada. The framework lays out a strategic blueprint for the JSR to
use in achieving UNAMID's mandate. Adada's team will have a week to
review and modify the document and then submit it formally to DPKO
for consideration. An ABACQ team is expected to come out to Darfur
January 7-14 to put figures to the framework activities (although
UNAMID staff is requesting a later visit due to the holidays).
3. (SBU) The paper breaks UNAMID's mission into five categories,
reflecting UNAMID's UNSCR 1976 (2007) mandate: peace process;
security; governance, rule of law and human rights; humanitarian
assistance, recovery and reintegration; and support. Various
highlights under each category include:
- Peace: UNAMID will provide assistance and support to the
Transitional Darfur Regional Authority (TDRA), periodically consult
with parties to review DPA implementation and convene monthly Joint
Commission meetings.
- Security: UNAMID hopes to decrease serious violations of the DPA
by 50% (from 203 in 2007/2008 to 100 for 2008/2009 - NOTE: it is not
clear where the 2007/2008 figure comes from since the CFC has not
been keeping track of such violations for several months), reduce
the number of civilians killed by UXO by 50% as well (30 in 2007),
and increase the number of refugees/IDPs returning to their homes
from 0 in 2007/2008 to 200,000 in 2008/2009). It will do this by
increasing the number of patrols (3 patrols a day for each of the 38
team sites - NOTE: AMIS, with 6,000 personnel, is often able to
mount only 3-4 patrols a day for the entire Darfur region). It
anticipates holding weekly CFC meetings at HQ and twice-monthly CFC
meetings at the Sector level. It also plans for 3 convoys a day for
mission/military operational and logistics transports convoys and in
support of humanitarian convoys. (COMMENT: AMIS now provides
logistics re-supply by air. With 38 team sites to supply by ground
as well as humanitarian and operational convoys to provide for, this
planning number looks woefully low. END COMMENT.) UNAMID
anticipates increasing demining activity as well as
disarmament/demobilization/reintegration activities where UNAMID's
mandate is greater than AMIS's was. It will also emphasize reform
of security institutions, like the police.
- Rule of Law, Governance and Human Rights: Focusing on
capacity/institution building, UNAMID will hold numerous workshops
on good governance, assist the Darfur state Land Commissions address
land use and land tenure issues, facilitate dialogue between local
communities, the TDRA and state governments on the planning and
budget process, patrol jointly with police and hold training courses
for prison guards. UNAMID also plans 8 human rights monitoring
mission per month by regional offices and 6 per month by each of the
38 military posts.
- Humanitarian Assistance, Recovery and Reintegration: Currently,
UNAMID's mandate calls for it only "to facilitate the effective
provision of humanitarian assistance and full access to people in
need." The UN HQ team recommends the mandate be changed to give
UNAMID the lead in humanitarian coordination efforts.
- Support: UNAMID is planning to support 19,555 military, 2,620
police, 5,621 civilian (1,435 international, 3,490 national, and 581
UN Volunteer) staff. It will build and maintain 1 Mission HQ, 3
Sector HQ, 2 logistics bases (El-Obeyd, Nyala), 1 Customs clearance
facility, 1 radio station and 54 other locations. It will construct
4 level-1, 2 level-2 and 1 level-1 hospitals. It will maintain and
renovate 1000 km of roads and 35 bridges as well as 3 airfields and
50 helicopter landing sites. It will operate 4,500 vehicles and 19
fixed wing and 39 rotary wing aircraft. It will need 7 million
litres of petrol, oil and lubricants for generators, 12.5 million
litres for the vehicles and 33 million litres for the aircraft.
4. (SBU) These projections are based on the assumption there will be
a comprehensive and all-inclusive peace agreement by July 2008.
(NOTE: Accordingly, the framework does not provide for any support
for the Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST). If there is an
agreement, its activities will be folded into UNAMID's
Political/Civil Affairs Units. If not, the UN will have to find
ways to support it, according to the UN HQ team.) It does not
anticipate any significant progress in the disarming or
KHARTOUM 00001940 002 OF 002
neutralization of the janjaweed. It assumes the HQ structure will
be fully operational by July 2008 with 14 of the 18 infantry
battalions deployed (remainder by the end of 2008).
5. (SBU) The UN HQ team urged Adada and the UNAMID staff to review
the framework to make sure all mandated activities were covered.
They stressed that indicators had to be measurable and UNAMID should
quantify their activities as much as possible. UNAMID needed to
make sure there were no duplications (internally or with the work of
other UN agencies in the field). The UN HQ team noted it was
important the document disclose who does what and what is expected
to be accomplished.
6. (SBU) There was general concern by JSR Adada and UNAMID staff
about the team's assumption of a peace agreement by July 2008.
Since the budget document will be public in March or April, they
were worried the public would expect an agreement if a deadline is
put in the framework and would then blame UNAMID if there wasn't
one. Furthermore, the staff thought the timeframe was unreasonable.
With no contingency built into the framework, they assumed
continued support for the negotiation process and JMST would have to
come out of UNAMID's budget. The HQ team admitted the peace
agreement assumption was a political decision. The world community
expected some sort of agreement by mid-year. The staff also raised
doubts about the deployment schedule, noting any deployment would be
affected by a peace agreement. JSR Adada said he would have to
build more uncertainty and flexibility into the framework and would
discuss with UNSG Special Envoy Jan Eliasson, arriving in El Fasher
December 6, how UNAMID should support his efforts.
7. (SBU) COMMENT: Although a preliminary document, the framework
provides an inside view into UNAMID's mission, how it plans to
accomplish its goals and the material resources needed. UNAMID
staff raises legitimate concerns about the peace agreement
assumption, since any agreement will impact their mission. The
document also assumes full UNAMID deployment in 2008, which is
optimistic and far from assured, especially if the TCC issue is not
resolved and helicopter units are not identified.
8. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
View as: DESKTOP | MOBILE © Scoop Media