VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHEG #3126 2980847
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 250847Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0223
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7285
Cable dated:2007-10-25T08:47:00
S E C R E T CAIRO 003126SIPDISSIPDISE.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV EG IQ
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR AMBASSADOR CROCKER’S VISIT TO CAIROClassified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION STUART JONES.
REASONS: 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (S) Welcome to Cairo.
2. (S) Cairo-Baghdad Relations: The Egyptian leadership wants assurances that the USG will not withdraw from Iraq
precipitously. The Egyptians were also taken aback by Senate resolution on sectarian division, which got broad press
play here. The GOE has played a constructive role in the expanded neighbors forum. Mubarak hosted the group in Sharm el
Sheikh in May and Aboul Gheit will join the Istanbul meeting. The GOE dislikes and distrusts PM al Maliki, but stops
short of calling for his removal, so far, even in private. Vice President Abdel Mahdi was received warmly in September
and made a positive impression.
3. (S) The best thing the Baghdad can do now to improve relations with Cairo is appoint a full-time Ambassador. The GOE
is still stung by the August 2005 assassination of its emissary, Ihab el-Sharif, but has made noises about appointing an
Ambassador to Baghdad resident in Cairo.
4. (C) Egypt has a strong record on intelligence liaison and blocking foreign fighters en route to Iraq. This has
included several arrests here. You may wish to praise Egypt’s help and also ask how the Egyptians regard the problem of
Syria transit. Egyptian has not experienced the huge refugee influx of Iraq’s neighbors but the approximately 200,000
displaced Iraqis are a source of anxiety and concern. The Egyptians want to be involved in any refugee solution.
4. (C) DEBT: The Egyptians are not accustomed to forgiving other countries’ debts and regard the Iraqis as oil-rich. MFA
reportedly has the portfolio to negotiate the debt issue, but most of the debt is held by MOD, which is not engaged. The
parties have discussed a compromise that the GOE would forgive official debt -- approximately $700m -- if the Iraqis
paid off their private debt, owed mainly to Egyptian workers who had worked in Iraq, estimated at approximately $400m.
But there is considerable dispute over the figures and the Iraqis seem no more eager than the Egyptians to close a deal.
We expect this process to drag on for some time.
5. (S) IRAN: The Egyptians dismiss news reports that the GOE is moving towards normalization with Iran. Aboul Gheit met
with his Iranian counterpart on the margins of UNGA. Omar Soliman takes an especially hard line on Tehran and frequently
refers to the Iranians as “devils.” But bilateral contacts are on the rise. Soliman will press you for an assessment of
Iranian activity in Iraq and also of al Maliki’s ties to Tehran. Mubarak and Soliman are furious about Bashar Al Assad’s
collaboration with Iran. They want the USG to improve relations with Damascus to lure Bashar back to the Arab fold. But
Egyptian influence is very limited and Cairo is out of ideas.
6. (S) Arab League Secretary General Amre Moussa is one of the few Arab leaders to serially visit Baghdad. (Aboul Gheit
will not go). The Arab League has exchanged ambassadors with Baghdad. You may wish to enlist Moussa in efforts to
increase Arab diplomatic representation in Baghdad.
7. (C) Moussa met with Turkish Foreign Minister Ali Babacan October 18, and reportedly advised against Turkish
intervention in northern Iraq, taking the view that Iraq had enough issues to deal with already. A key Arab League
contact told us October 18 he was confident that the Turks will not enter northern Iraq, but noted the idea (apparently
proposed by Maliki) of a joint Turkish-Iraqi force to address Turkish concerns would not be unreasonable so long as the
two governments agreed to it. RICCIARDONE