Moody's changes outlook to negative on Germany
Moody's changes the outlook to negative on Germany,
Netherlands, Luxembourg and affirms Finland's Aaa stable
rating
Global Credit
Research - 23 Jul 2012
London, 23 July 2012 -- Moody's Investors Service has today revised to negative from stable the outlooks on the Aaa sovereign ratings of Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In addition, Moody's has also affirmed Finland's Aaa rating and stable outlook.
All four sovereigns are adversely affected by the following two euro-area-wide developments:
1.) The rising uncertainty regarding the outcome of the euro area debt crisis given the current policy framework, and the increased susceptibility to event risk stemming from the increased likelihood of Greece's exit from the euro area, including the broader impact that such an event would have on euro area members, particularly Spain and Italy.
2.) Even if such an event is avoided, there is an increasing likelihood that greater collective support for other euro area sovereigns, most notably Spain and Italy, will be required. Given the greater ability to absorb the costs associated with this support, this burden will likely fall most heavily on more highly rated member states if the euro area is to be preserved in its current form.
These increased risks, in combination with the country-specific considerations discussed below, have prompted the changes in the rating outlooks of Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. In contrast, Finland's unique credit profile, as discussed below, remains consistent with a stable rating outlook.
RATIONALE FOR OUTLOOK CHANGE
Today's decision to change to negative the outlooks on the Aaa ratings of Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg is driven by Moody's view that the level of uncertainty about the outlook for the euro area, and the potential impact of plausible scenarios on member states, are no longer consistent with stable outlooks.
Firstly, while it is not Moody's base case, the risk of an exit by Greece from the euro area has increased relative to the rating agency's expectations earlier this year. In Moody's view, a Greek exit from the monetary union would pose a material threat to the euro. Although Moody's would expect a strong policy response from the euro area in such an event, it would still set off a chain of financial-sector shocks and associated liquidity pressures for sovereigns and banks that policymakers could only contain at a very high cost.
Should they fail to do so, the result would be a gradual unwinding of the currency union, which Moody's continues to believe would be profoundly negative for all euro area members. The rating agency has reflected this risk by raising the score for the "Susceptibility to Event Risk" factor in its sovereign rating methodology from "very low" to "low" for these three countries.
Secondly, even in the absence of any exit, the contingent liabilities taken on by the strongest euro area sovereigns are rising as a result of European policymakers' continued reactive and gradualist policy response, as is the probability of those liabilities crystallising (as Moody's already observed in a recent Special Comment, entitled "Moody's: EU Summit's Measures Reduce Likelihood of Shocks but at a Cost", published on 5 July 2012). Moody's view remains that this approach will not produce a stable outcome, and will very likely be associated with a series of shocks, which are likely to rise in magnitude the longer the crisis persists. The continued deterioration in Spain and Italy's macroeconomic and funding environment has increased the risk that they will require some kind of external support. The scale of these contingent liabilities is of a materially larger order of magnitude for these countries due to their size and their debt burdens; for example, the size of Spain's economy and government bond market is around double the combined size of those of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Although the rising likelihood of stronger euro area members needing to support other sovereigns has not yet affected Moody's assessment of these sovereigns' "Government Financial Strength" in its rating methodology, the rating agency nevertheless believes that it needs to take some account of the impact that additional financial commitments would have on the assessment of their financial strength, given the material deterioration in these countries' fiscal metrics since 2007. Over the long term, Moody's believes that institutional reforms within the euro area have the potential to strengthen the credit standing of most or all euro area governments; however, over the transitional period (which could last many years), the additional pressure on the strongest nations' balance sheets will increase the pressure on their credit standing.
Accordingly, Moody's now has negative outlooks on those Aaa-rated euro area sovereigns whose balance sheets are expected to bear the main financial burden of support -- whether because of the need to expand the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the need to develop more ad hoc forms of liquidity support. These countries now comprise Germany and the Netherlands, in addition to Austria and France whose rating outlooks were changed to negative on 13 February 2012. The credit profile of these sovereigns is most affected by the policy dilemma described above.
Finland, with its stable outlook, is now the sole exception among the Aaa-rated euro area sovereigns. Although Finland would not be expected to be unaffected by the euro crisis, its net assets (Finland has no debt on a net basis), its small and domestically oriented banking system, its limited exposure to, and therefore relative insulation from, the euro area in terms of trade, and its attempts to collateralise its euro area sovereign support together provide strong buffers which differentiate it from the other Aaas.
Today's actions on the four sovereigns' outlooks incorporate the implications of certain euro area developments, such as the rising risk of a Greek exit, the growing likelihood of collective support for other euro area sovereigns, and stalled economic growth. By the end of the third quarter, Moody's will also assess the implications of these developments for Aaa-rated Austria and France, whose rating outlooks were moved to negative from stable in February. Specifically, Moody's will review whether their current rating outlooks remain appropriate or whether more extensive rating reviews are warranted.
***
MOODY'S CHANGES OUTLOOK ON GERMANY'S Aaa
RATING TO NEGATIVE
In the context of today's rating
actions, Moody's has changed the outlook on Germany's Aaa
government bond ratings to negative from stable. The Aaa
rating itself remains unchanged.
The key drivers of
today's action on Germany are:
1.) The rising uncertainty
regarding the outcome of the euro area debt crisis given the
current policy framework, and the increased susceptibility
to event risk stemming from the increased likelihood of
Greece's exit from the euro area, including the broader
impact that such an event would have on euro area
members.
2.) The rising contingent liabilities that the
German government will assume as a result of European
policymakers' reactive and gradualist policy response, which
comes on top of a marked deterioration in the country's own
debt levels relative to pre-crisis levels.
3.) The
vulnerability of the German banking system to the risk of a
worsening of the euro area debt crisis. The German banks'
sizable exposures to the most stressed euro area countries,
particularly to Italy and Spain, together with their limited
loss-absorption capacity and structurally weak earnings,
make them vulnerable to a further deepening of the crisis.
In a related rating action, Moody's has today changed
the outlook to negative from stable for the long-term Aaa
rating and short-term P-1 rating of FMS Wertmanagement. Like
Germany's Aaa rating, the ratings of this entity remain
unchanged.
FMS Wertmanagement is a resolution agency or
"bad bank" scheme for 100% state-owned Hypo Real Estate
(HRE) Group created under the Financial Market Stabilisation
legislation in Germany
("Finanzmarktstabilisierungsfondsgesetz" -- FMStFG). The
German government has a loss compensation obligation via the
government's Financial Market Stabilisation Fund (SoFFin)
who owns FMS Wertmanagement. Moody's views FMS
Wertmanagement's creditworthiness as being linked to that of
the German government because the government remains
generally responsible for any losses and any liquidity
shortfalls of FMS Wertmanagement.
--RATIONALE FOR
NEGATIVE OUTLOOK
As indicated in the introduction to this
press release, the first rating driver underlying Moody's
decision to change the outlook on Germany's Aaa bond rating
to negative is the level of uncertainty about the outlook
for the euro area and the impact that this has on the
country's susceptibility to event risk. Specifically, the
material risk of a Greek exit from the euro area exposes
core countries such as Germany to a risk of shock that is
not commensurate with a stable outlook on their Aaa rating.
The elevated event risk in turn increases the probability
that the contingent liabilities will eventually crystallise,
with Germany bearing a significant share of the overall
liabilities.
The second and interrelated driver of the
change in outlook to negative is the increase in contingent
liabilities that is associated with even the most benign
scenario of a continuation of European leaders' reactive and
gradualist approach to policymaking. The likelihood is
rising that the strong euro area states will need to commit
significant resources in order to deepen banking integration
in the euro area and to protect a wider range of euro area
sovereigns, including large member states, from market
funding stress. As the largest euro area country, Germany
bears a significant share of these contingent liabilities.
The contingent liabilities stem from bilateral loans, the
EFSF, the European Central Bank (ECB) via the holdings in
the Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the Target 2
balances, and -- once established -- the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM).
The third rating driver is based on the
German banking system's vulnerability to the risk of a
worsening of the euro area debt crisis. German banks have
sizable exposures to the most stressed euro area countries,
particularly to Italy and Spain. Moody's cautions that the
risks emanating from the euro area crisis go far beyond the
banks' direct exposures, as they also include much larger
indirect effects on other counterparties, the regional
economy and the wider financial system. The German banks'
limited loss-absorption capacity and structurally weak
earnings make them vulnerable to a further deepening of the
crisis.
--RATIONALE FOR GERMANY'S UNCHANGED Aaa
RATING
Germany remains a Aaa-rated credit as its
creditworthiness is underpinned by the country's advanced
and diversified economy and a tradition of
stability-oriented macroeconomic policies. High productivity
growth and strong world demand for German products have
allowed the country to establish a broad economic base with
ample flexibility, generating high income levels. Germany's
current account surplus supports the resiliency of the
economy. Moreover, Germany enjoys high levels of investor
confidence, which are reflected in very low debt funding
costs, leading to very high debt affordability.
--WHAT
COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN
Germany's Aaa rating could
potentially be downgraded if Moody's were to observe a
prolonged deterioration in the government's fiscal position
and/or the economy's long-term strength that would take debt
metrics outside scores that are commensurate with a Aaa
rating. This could happen if (1) the German government
needed to use its balance sheet to support the banking
system, leading to a material increase in general government
debt levels; (2) any country were to exit the European
monetary union, as such an event is expected to set off a
chain of financial-sector shocks and associated liquidity
pressures for sovereigns that would entail very high cost
for wealthy countries such as Germany, and cause contingent
liabilities from the euro area to increase; (3)
debt-refinancing costs were to rise sharply following a loss
of safe-haven status.
--WHAT COULD MOVE THE OUTLOOK BACK
TO STABLE
Conversely, the rating outlook could return to
stable if a benign outlook for the euro area, reduced stress
in non-core countries and less adverse macroeconomic
conditions in Europe in general were to ease medium-term
uncertainties with regard to the country's debt
trajectory.
***
MOODY'S CHANGES THE OUTLOOK ON THE
NETHERLANDS' Aaa RATING TO NEGATIVE
Moody's Investors
Service has today changed the outlook on the Netherlands'
Aaa government bond rating to negative from stable. The Aaa
rating itself remains unchanged.
The key drivers of
today's action on the Netherlands are:
1.) The rising
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the euro area debt
crisis given the current policy framework, and the increased
susceptibility to event risk stemming from the increased
likelihood of Greece's exit from the euro area, including
the broader impact that such an event would have on euro
area members.
2.) The rising contingent liabilities that
the Dutch government will assume as a result of European
policymakers' reactive and gradualist policy response, which
comes on top of a marked deterioration in the country's own
debt levels relative to pre-crisis levels.
3.) The
Netherlands' own domestic vulnerabilities, specifically the
weak growth outlook, high household indebtedness, and
falling house prices, whose impact is amplified by this
heightened event risk.
--RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE
OUTLOOK
As indicated in the introduction of this press
release, the first driver underlying Moody's decision to
change the outlook on the Netherlands' Aaa bond rating to
negative is the level of uncertainty about the outlook for
the euro area and the impact that this has on the country's
susceptibility to event risk. Specifically, the material
risk of a Greek exit from the euro area exposes core
countries such as the Netherlands to a risk of shock that is
not commensurate with a stable outlook on their Aaa ratings.
The elevated event risk in turn increases the probability
that further contingent liabilities will eventually
crystallise, with the Netherlands bearing a significant
share of the overall liabilities.
The second and
interrelated driver of the change in outlook to negative is
the increase in contingent liabilities that is associated
with even the most benign scenario of a continuation of
European leaders' reactive and gradualist approach to
policymaking. The likelihood is rising that the strong euro
area states will need to commit significant resources in
order to deepen banking integration in the euro area and to
protect a wider range of euro area sovereigns, including
large member states, from market funding stress. As a large,
wealthy euro area country, the Netherlands bears a
significant share of these contingent liabilities. The
contingent liabilities stem from bilateral loans, the EFSF,
the European Central Bank (ECB) via the holdings in the
Securities Market Programme (SMP) and the Target 2 balances,
and -- once established -- the European Stability Mechanism
(ESM).
The third factor underpinning this outlook change
is that domestic vulnerabilities are being amplified by the
stress that is emanating from the euro area. The Dutch
growth outlook is relatively weak, both in relation to
Aaa-rated peers and to its own track record. In fact,
according to the Dutch central bank, the country's growth
performance between 2008-14 will be its lowest for any
seven-year period since the Second World War. Some of the
reasons for this are unrelated to developments in the euro
area such as declining real disposable incomes (which are
expected to fall by nearly 4% in total in 2012-13), the
Netherlands' high degree of household leverage (over 200% of
disposable income, though household assets are also
substantial) and falling house prices. However, negative
developments at the euro area level are amplifying these
negative trends, which are in turn contributing to weak
confidence and an overall contraction in domestic demand.
This dynamic creates additional fiscal headwinds and means
that the Dutch government's debt burden will begin to fall
later and from a higher level.
--RATIONALE FOR
NETHERLANDS' UNCHANGED Aaa RATING
The Netherlands' Aaa
sovereign rating is underpinned by very high levels of
economic, institutional and government financial
strength.
The Netherlands is a large, wealthy and open
economy that is highly developed and diversified. Although
the growth outlook over the forecast period is quite weak
relative to the country's historical experience, the Dutch
economy remains highly competitive, a fact that is reflected
in the sizeable current account surplus. Moreover, unlike
some of its fellow euro area countries, the Netherlands has
already pursued substantial labour market reform, which has
translated into a highly productive labour force whose
participation rate is above the EU average.
In view of
the country's strong tradition of building consensus on key
economic policy changes, Dutch institutions have built a
robust and highly transparent institutional framework to
facilitate this process. The country also has a strong
tradition of relying on independent institutions at key
points in the fiscal policymaking process.
The
Netherlands also enjoys a broad, long-standing consensus on
fiscal discipline. In 1994, the Dutch introduced trend-based
budgeting with expenditure ceilings (expressed in real
terms) for a government's entire term. Under Dutch fiscal
rules, revenue windfalls cannot be used to finance
expenditures and, in general, departments need to compensate
for any overspending themselves. Within a few days of the
collapse in April 2012 of the governing minority coalition
over budget negotiations, the outgoing coalition was able to
reach agreement with three opposition parties on additional
fiscal consolidation measures. The speed with which
agreement could be reached illustrates that the consensus in
favour of fiscal discipline remains in place.
--WHAT
COULD MOVE THE RATING DOWN
The Netherlands' Aaa rating
could potentially be downgraded if Moody's were to conclude
that debt metrics are unlikely to stabilise within the next
3-4 years, with the deficit, the overall debt burden, and/or
debt-financing costs on a rising trend. This could happen in
one of three scenarios, all of which imply lower economic
and/or government financial strength: (1) a combination of
significantly slower growth over a multi-year time horizon
and reduced political commitment to fiscal consolidation,
including discretionary fiscal loosening or a failure to
respond to a deteriorating fiscal outlook; (2) the exit of
any country from the European monetary union, as such an
event is expected to set off a chain of financial-sector
shocks and associated liquidity pressures for banks and
sovereigns that would entail very high cost for countries
such as the Netherlands, and cause contingent liabilities
from the euro area to increase; or (3) a sharp rise in
debt-refinancing costs following a loss of safe-haven
status.
--WHAT COULD MOVE THE OUTLOOK BACK TO
STABLE
Conversely, the rating outlook could return to
stable if a combination of less adverse macroeconomic
conditions, a more benign outlook for the euro area and
deficit reduction measures were to ease medium-term
uncertainties with regard to the country's debt
trajectory.
***
MOODY'S CHANGES THE OUTLOOK ON
LUXEMBOURG'S Aaa RATING TO NEGATIVE
Moody's Investors
Service has today changed the outlook on Luxembourg's Aaa
rating to negative from stable. The Aaa rating itself
remains unchanged.
The key drivers of today's action on
Luxembourg are:
1.) The rising uncertainty regarding the
outcome of the euro area debt crisis given the current
policy framework, and the increased susceptibility to event
risk stemming from the increased likelihood of Greece's exit
from the euro area, including the broader impact that such
an event would have on euro area members, including
Luxembourg.
2.) The rising contingent liabilities that
the Luxembourg government will assume as a result of
European policymakers' reactive and gradualist policy
response, although the country's level of gross indebtedness
is markedly lower than that of the other Aaa-rated euro area
sovereigns.
3.) Concerns about the country's economic
resilience in view of its significant reliance on financial
services industry for employment, national income, and tax
revenue.
--RATIONALE FOR NEGATIVE OUTLOOK
As indicated
in the introduction of this press release, the first driver
underlying Moody's decision to change the outlook on
Luxembourg's Aaa bond rating to negative is the level of
uncertainty about the outlook for the euro area and the
impact that this has on the country's susceptibility to
event risk. Specifically, the material risk of a Greek exit
and the broader impact that such an event would have on euro
area members exposes core countries such as Luxembourg to a
risk of shock that is not commensurate with a stable outlook
on their Aaa ratings. In Luxembourg's case, Moody's
particular concern is over the impact that this development
could have on the financial services industry, which
directly accounts for 25-30% of Luxembourg's GDP. In
addition, Luxembourg is exposed to a potential rise in
contingent liabilities if additional euro area support is
needed for banks and sovereigns in financial distress. In
the case of Luxembourg, this concern is mitigated by its
relatively low level of sovereign indebtedness.
In light
of Luxembourg's interdependence with the euro area's real
economy and the global financial sector, Moody's has broader
concerns about the country's economic resilience.
Luxembourg's direct dependence on its financial services
industry is substantial, both due to its contribution to
government taxes and social security contributions (23% of
the total) and to the country's employment (12% of
employees). Of course, problems in the sector would
inevitably generate second-order impacts on the national
economy. While Moody's notes that Luxembourg's economy has a
track record of being relatively resilient to shocks or
crises, the above factors have prompted Moody's to examine
whether this resiliency has gradually
weakened.
--RATIONALE FOR LUXEMBOURG'S UNCHANGED Aaa
RATING
Luxembourg's Aaa rating is underpinned by the
country's position as one of the wealthiest countries in the
world on both a GDP per capita and purchasing parity power
basis. The rating also reflects the country's solid track
record of economic growth, mainly driven by the financial
services industry. In the past, the national authorities
have been able to leverage their first-mover advantage in
implementing EU directives by improving the business
environment, being able to attract a highly skilled labour
force and preserving some advantages related to bank secrecy
legislation. Although the total assets of the banking sector
and financial services' overall impact on the Luxembourg
economy are very large, Moody's acknowledges that contingent
liabilities emanating from it remain low. The domestic
retail banking sector is dominated by three banks (Banque et
Caisse d'Epargne de l'Etat, BGL BNP Paribas, BIL) and has
assets that equate to just over 200% of GDP. These banks
have, in aggregate, maintained strong, double-digit core
Tier 1 ratios, thus capping the potential liabilities that
could crystallise on the government's balance sheet. The
off-shore part of the financial system is much larger and is
composed of the investment fund industry (with assets under
management that equate to 50x GDP) and the offshore banking
operations (with assets that are 20x GDP). Moody's assesses
the contagion risk between and within these different
segments of Luxembourg's financial industry to be low due to
minimal balance sheet linkages between the different
segments of the financial sector (excluding intra-group
exposures in the off-shore banking system which account for
around 40% of the aggregated balance sheet of the
system).
The Aaa rating is supported by the very high
fiscal flexibility, characterised by the low fiscal
inertness of the government and its ability to adjust tax
rates (especially VAT considering the structure of economy),
capital expenditures (4% GDP) and social security
parameters. Luxembourg still exhibits sound fiscal metrics,
relative to other Aaa-rated countries, in spite of the fact
that the government had to use its balance sheet to support
both the economy and the banking sector during the financial
crisis, which caused debt levels to increase to a
still-modest 18.2% of GDP in 2011 from 7% in 2007. In
addition, the government has significant financial buffers
in the form of national pension fund assets that are
equivalent to 27% of GDP.
--WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING
DOWN
Luxembourg's Aaa rating could potentially be
downgraded if Moody's were to observe a large increase in
the government's debt burden. Luxembourg's debt level is
still low relative to rating peers, but the country's small
size probably means that it is limited in its ability to
take on large quantities of additional debt. More broadly,
if events in the euro area develop in a way that undermines
the resilience of the Luxembourg financial sector or
economy, that could also result in a downgrade of the
sovereign.
--WHAT COULD MOVE THE OUTLOOK BACK TO
STABLE
Conversely, the rating outlook could return to
stable if a benign outlook for the euro area, reduced stress
in non-core countries and less adverse macroeconomic
conditions in Europe in general were to ease medium-term
uncertainties with regard to the country's debt trajectory
and economic resilience.
***
MOODY'S AFFIRMS FINLAND'S
Aaa RATING AND STABLE OUTLOOK
Moody's has today affirmed
the Aaa rating and stable rating outlook on Finland's
government bond rating.
--RATIONALE FOR
AFFIRMATION
The key drivers of the rating affirmation
are: (1) the Finnish government's net creditor position,
with accumulated government pension assets exceeding the
government's gross financial liabilities; (2) its fiscally
conservative budgetary policies that never deviated from
strict compliance with the Maastricht Treaty criteria; (3)
the country's relatively healthy and domestically oriented
banking system; (4) its diversified export markets, with a
comparatively small share of exports (close to 33%) sold to
the euro area, indicating a limited exposure to and
therefore relative insulation from the euro area in terms of
trade; and (5) the government's efforts to reduce its
exposure to potential losses on its loans to other euro area
countries through collateral agreements.
Moody's
nonetheless believes that Finland's economy and public
finances will continue to be challenged as long as the euro
area crisis persists, in particular due to the structural
problems facing its key economic sectors.
--WHAT COULD
MOVE THE RATINGS DOWN
Finland's Aaa stable rating could
potentially be downgraded if the country were to experience
a serious deterioration in public finances over a lengthy
period of time that would worsen debt affordability
significantly and endanger economic stability. Although
Finland is in a better position than its euro area peers to
shield itself from any adverse developments in the euro area
debt crisis, should its economy and banking system prove
less resilient than expected, this could also put downward
pressure on the rating.
The principal methodology used in
these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in
September 2008. Please see the Credit Policy page on
www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.
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