Responding to Drought and Famine in the Horn of Africa
Testimony
Don Yamamoto
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs
Washington, DC
August 3, 2011
Good morning, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and members of the Committee. Thank you for holding this hearing
on the drought and famine in the Horn of Africa. We share your grave concern about the ongoing humanitarian crisis in
the Horn of Africa.
The eastern Horn of Africa is currently experiencing one of the worst droughts since the 1950s. More than 12 million
people—mainly in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia—are severely affected and in need of humanitarian assistance. In Somalia,
drought conditions have exacerbated a complex emergency that has continued since 1991. The information coming out of the
Horn of Africa, especially the dire situation of refugees from Somalia, is devastating. In cooperation with our
international and regional partners, we will continue to work to address this humanitarian crisis while continuing to
support long-term political and food security in the region.
Somalia is at the center of the crisis, but the crisis is affecting the entire Horn of Africa. Ethiopia has issued an
appeal indicating 4.5 million Ethiopians need food assistance. In Kenya, the government and a consortium of NGOs have
placed 10 districts in the north and east under alert for increased food insecurity and malnutrition. The crisis has hit
hardest in Somalia, where failed or poor rains combined with conflict have left 3.7 million people in need of immediate,
lifesaving assistance. Two areas of southern Somalia, the Lower Shabelle Region and areas of the Bakool region, are
currently facing famine conditions, and the remaining regions of southern Somalia are projected to meet the threshold
for famine unless humanitarian assistance is significantly increased.
The number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) across the region has increased the challenges of drought
response. There are approximately 620,000 Somali refugees in the eastern Horn region, according the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), with 200,000 of these fleeing in the past year alone. Reports from inside Somalia indicate the
combined arrival rate of 2,000 new refugees per day in Ethiopia and Kenya could rise dramatically as the situation in
Somalia grows increasingly desperate. The current flows threaten to overwhelm the existing refugee assistance structure
in Kenya and Ethiopia.
Moreover, there are reports of over 400,000 IDPs in Mogadishu alone. A large-scale multidonor intervention—my colleagues
will go into greater depth on this—is underway to prevent the further decline of an already dire situation, but there
will be no quick fix. The United States is one of the largest donors of emergency assistance to the region, helping more
than 4.5 million of those in need in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Djibouti and providing nearly $459 million in
humanitarian assistance to date. Our assistance includes food, treatment for severely malnourished people, health care,
clean water, proper sanitation, and hygiene education and supplies. Our assistance also includes $69 million for refugee
assistance in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. The U.S. Government has previously supported the expansion of the Dadaab
camps, and we understand that the Government of Kenya has agreed to allow new refugees to begin occupying the new areas.
Our Embassy in Nairobi is actively engaged with the Kenyans to ensure the best possible emergency response. I know my
colleagues Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Reuben Brigety and Assistant Administrator Nancy Lindborg will go into
greater detail about these conditions in their testimony; I would like to turn now to the political complications of the
drought in Somalia.
The response to the drought has been complicated by the continuing instability in Somalia—especially due to the actions
of al-Shabaab. Those most seriously affected by the current drought are the more than two million Somalis trapped in
al-Shabaab-controlled areas in south central Somalia. Since January 2010, al-Shabaab has largely prohibited
international humanitarian workers and organizations from operating in the areas it controls. Al-Shabaab’s continued
refusal to grant humanitarian access has prevented the international community from responding to the drought in south
central Somalia, which precipitated the famine we are seeing now. The United States is pressing all parties to
immediately restore unimpeded humanitarian access to all parts of Somalia.
During the last week of July, major fighting began again in Mogadishu between the African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces against al-Shabaab and its affiliates. With more than
400,000 IDPs now residing in and around Mogadishu, this renewed fighting is an area of concern. We are confident that
AMISOM and the TFG understand the threat this fighting places on the civilian population and call on all parties to do
everything in their power to protect civilians, particularly those displaced due to recent famine and drought
conditions. We continue to support AMISOM and the TFG in their efforts to bring stability to Mogadishu in the face of
continuing threats from al-Shabaab.
Al-Shabaab is a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization and has also been sanctioned by the United Nations for
its role in threatening the peace, security, and stability of Somalia including disrupting the Djibouti Peace Process;
and for obstructing humanitarian assistance into Somalia. As we seek to take advantage of any current openings to expand
aid distribution, we are also working with our partners in the international community to counter al-Shabaab’s ability
to threaten our interests or continue to hold the Somali people hostage. At the same time, we are taking the necessary
steps to support the flow of urgently needed humanitarian aid to those who need it in south central Somalia while
working to minimize any risk of diversion to al-Shabaab. We have worked closely with the Department of Treasury to
ensure that aid workers—who are partnering with the U.S. Government to help save lives under difficult and dangerous
conditions—are not in conflict with U.S. laws and regulations. To be clear, however, the U.S. sanctions against
al-Shabaab do not and never have prohibited the delivery of assistance to Somalia, including to those areas under the de
facto control of al-Shabaab. The presence of Al-Shabaab means that U.S. persons must adhere to U.S. legal requirements
in the course of providing assistance in Somalia.
In the long term, regional security in the Horn of Africa requires political stability in Somalia. The United States
already has in place a long-term process to stabilize Somalia. Last year we announced the Dual Track approach to broaden
our efforts by taking into account the complex nature of Somali society and politics, as well as to be more flexible and
adaptable in our engagement. On Track One, we continue support for the Djibouti Peace Process, the TFG, and AMISOM as a
first line of effort to stabilize Somalia and expel al-Shabaab from Mogadishu.
Since 2007, the United States has supported stabilization efforts by obligating approximately $258 million to support
AMISOM’s training and logistical needs, as well as approximately $85 million to support and build the capacity of TFG
forces. Recent security advances by AMISOM and the TFG in Mogadishu have taken back significant portions of the city
from al-Shabaab control.
On Track Two, we are deepening our engagement with the regional governments of Somaliland and Puntland, as well as with
local and regional administrations throughout South Central Somalia who are opposed to al-Shabaab, but who are not
affiliated with the TFG. In FY 11, the United States plans to provide approximately $21 million to support development
efforts in support of the Dual Track policy. We are reviewing how best to adapt our travel policy for Somalia to execute
our Dual Track approach most effectively without compromising on our obligation to protect the security of U.S.
personnel when they travel inside Somalia. Our long-term efforts will continue to focus on security, governance, and
humanitarian and development assistance.
In addition to working towards political stability in Somalia, the U.S. Government is also focusing its efforts to help
provide long-term food security in the eastern Horn of Africa region. We recognize that emergency assistance alone
cannot solve the underlying long-term problems in the region. That is why President Obama’s innovative and
forward-looking Feed the Future initiative is so critical. Feed the Future is already at work in the region with local,
regional, and multilateral partners improving agricultural production, improving markets, building infrastructure,
bringing innovation, and addressing the entire value chain—from seed to market.
As I noted when I began, we are extremely concerned about the drought and famine in the Horn of Africa. We are working
hard with our interagency and international partners to deliver quickly the life-saving short-term relief critical to
those suffering its effects. U.S. Government and U.S.-funded assistance has prevented the loss of millions of lives. We
recognize that both the food security problem in the region and the political instability problem in Somalia are linked,
and that both demand long-term solutions. Our Dual Track approach to Somalia provides an effective mechanism for us to
grapple with the challenges of political stability in Somalia. Our Feed the Future initiative will help create food
security in the eastern Horn of Africa region. The United States will continue to monitor and respond to the
humanitarian crisis and work with host governments on long-term solutions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome your questions.
ENDS