Palestine Papers: Post-Annapolis Security Session
Meeting Minutes: Post-Annapolis Security Session
Summary
Minutes of Security Session Post-Annapolis among Livni, Gilad, Erekat, Qurei, Attallah and others, dated February 28, 2008. The parties debate the effectiveness of security forces and mechanisms, including the situations and examples in surrounding Arab states. Israelis show skepticism at international third-party involvement. They also debate a "demilitarized" state vs. one with "limited" arms. Gilad makes reference to Hamas acts of torture against Palestinians. Erekat tells Livni he does not expect the Palestinian state to have an army.
Full
text
Minutes from Secuity Session
Post
Annapolis
Thursday, 28th February 2008,
5:30pm
Office of Ms. Tzipi Livni, Tel Aviv
Attendees:
Palestinian
•
Ahmed Querei (AA)
• Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
• Brig.
Gen. Hazem Atallah (HA)
• Salah el-Alayan (SA)
• Rami Dajani (RD)
Israeli
• FM Tzipi Livni
(TL)
• Gen. (ret.) Amos Gilad (AG)
• Tal Becker
? (TB)
• Udi Dekel (UD)
Meeting
Summary (not verbatim):
TL:
• [On Gaza] If
rocket attacks continue, more will be killed. We were forced
to leave Gaza, but maybe will have to go back. Our public is
demanding we do something about the situation.
• How
does Gaza affect the West Bank street?
AA:
•
People are worried: Where will this lead? But Hamas does not
have a problem with it.
TL:
• For them its
resistance … so giving them more power?
AA:
• Steadfastness resistance. All this is
promoted by TV channels, and stories of conspiracies against
them.
TL:
• This [present situation] is going
to be continued. Effectiveness of measures is not the
question. Some will need to be taken into consideration, but
impossible to just do nothing and hope that nothing
happens.
AA:
• Are you ready for a real
ceasefire?
TL:
• Hamas will strengthen and
build its forces more. Speaking openly, what we do in Gaza
is because they target Israel. They know the equation. Once
they stop we stop and they know it. When there is quiet,
they build up power. So we need not only to stop the rockets
but also smuggling of weapons. Negotiating with Hamas
strengthens them and weakens you.
AA:
• But to
continue with this situation?
AG:
•
Negotiating with “Hamastan” will harm both of us. They
will continue smuggling military and terror, building
power.
• Even if we accept ceasefire, it cannot
include West Bank because we need freedom to act to prevent
suicide attacks.
• Rockets are aimed not only to
murder, but also to terrorize so even one is not
acceptable.
• Hizbollah is involved in Gaza, and
Egypt is doing what it is doing. They are sensitive to
Muslim Brotherhood at home so they are feeding the monster.
There is coordination with Egyptian government officials
not only corruption. They are riding the tiger but the tiger
bites. When Aljazeera reported everyone cheered against the
great Egypt.
AA:
• But this is like a
childrens game attacks and counterattacks.
AG:
• But we have stopped a spectacular act of
terror. We are trying our best not to hurt civilians, using
better technology.
• Hamas is not only a terror
organization, they are using prisons, torture. They want to
establish Hamastan and extend it to the West Bank.
TL:
• What are Hamas parameters for success in
Gaza?
AA:
• Steadfastness in the face of the
occupier with no peace process working. They invest in
events like massing at the border and demonstrations when
people are killed. They know how to use this.
SE:
• Yesterday I asked a question about
tahdia. We need to stop the killing on both sides.
Sure that Hamas wont respond. The idea was to bring Omar
Suleiman here to work on a complete ceasefire. Now he is not
coming because of events.
• The major problems on a
regional scale, between Iran and Europe play a role. Arab
summit may not be held. Situation with Syria and Iran
precludes attack in the North. Only options are inside
Lebanon and from Gaza.
AG:
• Regarding Omar
Suleiman, maybe he delayed because he is afraid we will
attack while he is here. It will hurt him would look like
collaborator. It is significant that Hamas can delay visit
of Egypts Number Two.
AA:
• We are here to
discuss the future: security after establishment of a
Palestinian state not the present.
AG:
•
But we are inspired by the present… to understand the
future.
TL:
• One way or another we have to
address the situation in Gaza.
SE:
• You
dont need to worry about Gaza in this discussion. You are
protected by Annapolis. Implementation is subject to …
TL:
• Yes
AG:
• You find a solution
in international force, but we believe in partnership
between us in security, as for example we have with Jordan.
Such partnership cannot exist without reliable security
forces. There are two main lessons from the past: the Jordan
Valley in the 1970s, and the Philadelphi corridor in hands
of Palestinians.
• It is difficult to understand why
Egyptians are acting this way now supporting strategic
threats to the peace camp. They need to manage Hamas,
together with Muslim Brotherhood, these are their strategic
rivals with agenda to radicalize and destabilize and take
over the region. So the Egyptians conclude to live with the
threat by feeding the monster with weapons.
•
Situation in Gaza is changing constantly because Iran is
investing heavily. Iran has a new line of product: simple
missiles with 17km range that are easy to assemble (they
come in 4 parts). These will widen the belt of terror, so
the GoI wont tolerate it. Like in the Jordan Valley in the
70s, open to all gangs of terror.
HA:
• They
are primitive home-made rockets.
AG:
• No. The
range is most important. Assembled not home-made.
•
Jordanians almost lost the kingdom… you know well that in
Jordan things can change quickly. Jordan needs a stable
cooperative counterpart on the western side.
• You
ask to take control. This will be problematic for Israel
to give it to you or an international force. International
force lacks both intelligence and capabilities these are
not parades in Rome. They need to be able to investigate,
arrest, run courts, which runs well in Jordan. But Jordan
may not be able to continue with it if situation changes
dramatically on the western side..
TL:
•
Question is how can we keep the same effectiveness under new
arrangements …
AG:
• It [Jordan Valley] is
one security entity as we witnessed in the 70s.
AA:
• Times are different now.
AG:
•
Security is the same.
• Our assessment is that Iran
is eager to open channels: through Hizbollah to Gaza, and
through southern Iraq to Jordan and the West Bank. They have
established infrastructure in south of Iraq. In Jordan it is
difficult because it is strong, but still contacts are
developing. So we need to prepare for these threats.
TL:
• So we need effectiveness on future
Palestinian-Jordanian border, and in Gaza, effectiveness on
Egypt border.
AG:
• It is not only Iran, there
are others in Iraq al Qaeda.
AA:
• It is
not their priority.
SE:
• So they can put
bombs in Amman hotels and not be able to touch you because
of border arrangements?
AG:
• [mentions name
of suspect as case in point] We gave the name to Dahlan and
he refused to act. So we took him by force. Al Qaeda is
eager to penetrate. Dughmush are their representatives …
Jabal Hilal. They try in Jordan if there is no sense of
deterrence they will keep trying.
TL:
• So at
the crossings, you need effective supervision of what and
who is coming and going. You dont want Al Qaeda
coming.
AA:
• This is our responsibility.
AG:
• Cooperation is needed and should be based on
real criteria and real security. Now we dont have that.
Your agencies are penetrated. If present capabilities
continue …
AA:
• Please think differently.
Situation will be different after end of the occupation.
Right now everyone is suffering. In the future we can deal
with each other as equals.
• But if you continue to
think of tomorrow like today, we wont be able to
agree.
• So we need a strong agreement with strong
support, respect and implementation.
• We have no
objection to having a third party to give you confidence,
and we will build our own strong police, with mechanisms to
be supported.
• If you maintain arrangements that
keeps it like the occupation, this will create problems, for
example if you control our crossings.
• The situation
today is different from 20 years ago. Threats are more
sophisticated. You can easily fire missiles from Tehran.
HA:
• In a future independent state, people will
have something to protect and die for they will have to
protect their dream.
TL:
• We need a
prescription, which like any medicine, is not fool-proof and
will have some negative side effects. Like when you treat a
patient, you expect side effects.
• So some of the
things we discuss can affect the feeling that you describe.
But we need efficiency, while respecting your need for
freedom and dignity. On the other hand, some things we need
because we cannot just rely on peoples perception.
•
I was optimistic during the disengagement. I remember the
discussions with Wolfensohn on greenhouses, infrastructure,
prosperity etc. Instead we got a slap all of us so I
am trying to learn from the past.
• We have certain
needs. Maybe in the future they wont be needed. It is
problematic because there is a period of time before the
creation of the state (which we all support), but the
situation will not change the day after.
• Some
Palestinians hate us, and maybe they have reasons.
•
Effectiveness of your forces now is not reliable
• We
can give list [unclear]. AG will address this.. Some aspects
you will say this affects independence and sovereignty but
this is a question of feeling the difference between what
is agreed and what is forced.
• I know the importance
of symbols and can think of ways of doing what is needed
without affecting the symbols.
• Some of these
parameters can also be removed after the creation of the
state they are transitional arrangements.
• You may
say this is putting us in a vicious cycle of anger and
mistrust, but lets refer to each need and see how
problematic it is.
• On international forces: Israel
does not have an answer yet, but we know they are not
effective and dont want to have a situation of another
war.
AA:
• Why do you say they are not
effective?
TL:
• Europeans are not going to
come the Middle East to die for our peace.
AA:
• They have been effective elsewhere in
Bosnia for example.
TL:
• We can talk about
air strikes …
AA:
• Who gave independence
to Kosovo?
SE:
• [To TL] Your assumptions are
not true they are not objective and tested against
reality. Your truth is that failure in Gaza was because
of us. It was unilateralism that destroyed us it was the
Israeli mistakes. But you dont admit your mistakes. You
blame me for everything.
TL:
• Unfortunately,
I blame myself … AG said we need cooperation and I agree
…
AG:
• Not exactly. I said cooperation
between reliable, effective, credible partner, but right now
we dont consider you a partner.
SE:
• We are
speaking about the future. We have Dayton, EU BAM and others
helping us improve performance. We are trying to get there.
However, I know that you will protect yourself and wont
need me to protect you.
• But, dont make assumptions
about Jordan and security. If your assumption is that we
failed Gaza so you cant trust us in the West Bank, that
you dont want to gamble with Jordan …
TL:
• Since you are not good to take care of
security now, the West Bank can be a threat to me. So we
need to take measures; we can do them before
statehood.
• Since I believe that at the end of the
day the government on the other side needs to be effective,
legitimate and able to fight terror (which is lacking in the
region Gaza, Lebanon) we need to address this
issue.
• We can work in different ways: for example,
here are parameters on what you are strong enough or not to
do now, or, put on the table issues that can help the
process. We are willing to take some risk.
• So, I
said “no army” a demilitarized state. You said
“internal security”
AA:
• We are willing
to consider limited arms.
SE:
• This is a
contradiction. Why did we differentiate between the Road Map
and permanent status. You have a guarantee that building the
forces comes before implementation. So dont tell me at the
same time to put parameters.
TL:
• You were at
Camp David. Do you expect the state to have an army?
SE:
• No.
TL:
• Without these
measures we cannot afford another state between Jordan.
AA:
• It is not clear what we are talking about.
We are supposed to be discussing the future concept, this is
an open discussion no agenda. This is important for both
sides. We both agree that we need a comprehensive and
detailed agreement satisfactory to both. So, let us ask what
are the issues. We can explore these issues. AG and HA and
others can do this.
TL:
• They can have a
meeting next week …
AA:
• Then come back.
[internal discussion between TL and AG]
AG:
• No problem to have the meeting, but since SE thinks
there is contradiction it is better to discuss here before
making a list.
AA:
• Give me titles. What do
you want? Enough with general concept.
TL:
•
Next weeks meeting will have concrete expression of the
concepts and will explore disagreements, but AG still feels
we need to discuss the concepts here.
• [To HA] You
will share your vision. I hope you dont believe that we
will just have borders … and thats it.
HA:
• No. These misunderstandings cause problems.
I will talk about the past before the future.
•
Before the intifada, the forces worked well. The officers
had discipline, they had a reason to work well.
TL:
• But can you explain Gaza? I cant
understand … the mood of the people. We left. How come
they continue to fight? Its not about whether there was
coordination which is something technical.
HA:
• Hamas used the withdrawal for propaganda:
signs comparing results of 10 years of negotiations with
those of struggle.
TL:
• I heard this and used
this point internally to argue that unilateralism was a
mistake.
HA:
• At the same time, I cannot
forget what happened to the security forces during the
intifada. They were destroyed. It was clear until then that
the fight was against Hamas and Jihad. With Israeli attacks
came infiltration of the services by Hamas.
• We are
now cleaning the services. Its a campaign for the future.
We are recruiting and training young people who will work
according to the law to maintain law and order.
TL:
• We can take care of our security but do not
want a failed state next to us. How do you see the role of
the international force? To help with the construction?
HA:
• The internationals are already doing this.
It is moving slowly but we are training in Jordan with help
of Dayton. Third party can definitely help building the
forces.
TL:
• Regarding Philadelphi whether
or not it was a mistake to leave it. If indeed it was a
mistake, since Egypt is not effective like Jordan, can our
agreement provide for Israeli presence in Philadelphi?
AA:
• Palestine will be independent but can
coordinate. Agreement should reflect that with a commitment
to security.
• Therefore regarding parameters I
believe security is part of regional vision. Other
neighbours dont have a problem -- regional security is
interconnected.
TL:
• What is the idea of
working with Gen. Dayton?
HA:
• Building up
and improving the NSF, police and Presidential Guard.
TL:
• What is their role?
HA:
• Law
enforcement. Problem was due to delays, but now it is going
well. We are building new units and carrying out the program
of retirement, the target being a young organization. So
right now, if we want to deploy 2 battalions, the capacity
is becoming available with newly trained people. There are 4
more battalions to be completed.
• At the same time
EU COPSS is training the police force.
• Let me talk
about the future shape of Palestinian security.
TL:
• So youve talked about the present, now the
future.
HA:
• Plan to develop the security
services is based on a defensive security strategy. The main
function will be to protect the population and the
territory.
TL:
• What does territory mean?
AA:
• Palestine 67 borders.
HA:
•
Protection requires knowing where the borders are first …
and preventing smuggling and infiltration.
TL:
• This means an army.
HA:
• No.
It can be done in different ways. Army is only one way.
Border guards and international force are other ways.
TL:
• Guarding from what?
HA:
•
From everything, like infiltration like the problem in
Gaza now. We are talking about sovereignty. Every country
needs to protect its borders.
• Another function of
the security forces will be maintaining law and order and
carrying out law enforcement duties.
• This is
something we are testing ourselves with right now in Nablus
next it will be Hebron.
• Again functions are to
defend borders and to fight crime and terrorism.
TL:
• We have an understanding of threats, so when
you talk about borders, smuggling is fine, but external
threats .. are you talking about a foreign army? If it is to
defend against foreign attacks, then we have a big gap.
HA:
• No one is thinking of building an army to
fight Israel. We are talking about something more than
police and less than an army.
TL:
• This is
something you can discuss later with AG.
AA:
•
Im afraid we are going into details that may not be
necessary in a peace agreement.
• You need to say a
strong police…
TL:
• Demilitarized
state.
HA:
• There is no such thing. There is
no example of it anywhere in the world. There are
demilitarized zones, not states.
TL:
• We live
in a small space.
SE:
• So Palestine will be a
buffer zone? A demilitarized zone?
HA:
• We
need strong security forces, as AA said. With enough ability
to carry out their functions.
• Now we have serious
problems just bringing in bullet proof vests.
•
Security forces need appropriate weapons. So for example,
not tanks, but armoured scout cars.
AA:
• Not
demilitarized but limited.
TL:
• [discusses
“limited” with AG] “Limited” seems to be no tanks,
no airforce, no artillery, no missiles…
AG:
• Demilitarization is a meaningful term. It is
not an NSU term. Limited: Mahdud. Regarding NSF the
1995 Interim Agreement limited them to 45,000. Now after
fall of Saddam, may seem like less threat, but including
Iran in the equation, the chances of destabilization,
nuclear threat have increased. Now there is Shiite-stan in
south Iraq, Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Hostile
military coalitions are possible given geographic
data.
• So it is understood that demilitarization must
be a pillar, especially as it related to hostile
alliances.
HA:
• Can any country maintain
security by itself without any regional cooperation?
AG:
• Consider the Dayton plan. It took two years
to send one battalion to one country with real training.
Egypt training was a real problem.
HA:
• That
was a shame.
SE:
• There is an Arabic proverb:
You dont cut the snakes tail, rather you cut the
head.
AG:
• About Dayton: it is a good idea.
We should test it. We are watching carefully, testing the
future by beginning in the present.
HA:
• Then
why dont you help us?
AG:
• We have
facilitated Daytons work.
HA:
• There are
still problems for example with funding.
AG:
• You want money from us?
TL:
•
You got 7 billion in Paris.
HA:
• That is all
on paper.
AG:
• Regarding the future, there is
the possibility of hostile alliances we need
demilitarization and no hostile alliances.
AA:
• You want a Palestinian state or a military
base …
TL:
• So next week you [HA and AG]
meet. Sunday or Monday?
• [To HA] This work is
important. As decision-makers we have problems that are
historical. Our publics are not supportive because of risks
to our security. Some risks we can take, but some things we
must
address.
ENDS