Latin America and State Recognition: Palestine, the Caucasus, Kosovo, and Taiwan
by COHA Research Fellow Alex Sanchez
• Venezuela and Nicaragua recognize breakaway South Ossetia and Abkhazia
• Taiwan and Kosovo, recognized by a number of Latin American states more likely due to national economic interest rather
than abstract concepts of goodwill and friendship
• Recognition of Palestine seen as latest example of Latin American divergence from U.S. influence
In 2008, Russia fought a five-day war with Georgia, an independent nation in the southern Caucasus, which gained its
independence following the breakup of the Soviet Union. While the details of the incident remain controversial, it is
generally agreed that Georgia was the aggressor. One critical consequence of the conflict was that two Georgian
separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, were recognized relatively quickly as independent states by four
countries: Russia, the Pacific island of Nauru and the Latin American countries of Venezuela and Nicaragua.
Why were Venezuela and Nicaragua persuaded to recognize the two separatist states and what is the likelihood of a
subsequent Latin American wave of recognition taking place? The experience of South Ossetia and Abkhazia may help
highlight two distinct factors involved in the recognition process:
1. Although there is no recognition policy in effect, Latin American states tend to extend recognition to states outside
the hemisphere principally based on a closely-felt geopolitical sense of national interest as opposed to a clear
understanding of the merits and facts of a given conflict or transition; and
2. Due to forces of globalization, Latin American countries are now extending ties to areas of previously little
interest.
Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay decided to recognize Palestine as an independent state based on its 1967 borders, much to
the distress of U.S. and Israeli policy makers. Paraguay is now expected to follow in the wake of its fellow MERCOSUR
members. Reasons for this decision are largely economic in nature. Nevertheless, the decision to recognize Palestine is
somewhat surprising in Argentina’s case, given its foreign minister, Hector Timerman’s, Jewish background.
Latin America and the recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
That two of the four countries recognizing the breakaway regions are Latin American may reflect a growing trend in the
region’s diplomacy. Recognition seems to be in the air: Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have likewise recognized
Palestine. Delegations from South Ossetia and Abkhazia have recently visited several Latin America countries in order to
attract more attention, particularly focusing on Russia-friendly states like Cuba, Ecuador, and Bolivia. It would not be
inconceivable if, in the coming months, other Latin American states recognize the two separatist entities.
It could be argued that recognition of the two tiny territories by Venezuela and Nicaragua was due less to any
particular sympathy for their cause (or even some fundamental understanding of the conflict’s roots), than to Caracas
and Managua wanting to court Moscow as a possible source of weapons sales and client for their commodity exports. In the
past several years, Venezuela has purchased several billions of dollars worth of Russian armaments, with President Hugo
Chávez becoming a frequent flier to Moscow. In 2008, a visit to Caracas by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev was
arranged to coincide with the arrival of Russian naval units to carry out naval exercises with their Venezuelan
counterparts. This marked the first time since the advent of the Cold War that the Russian navy had entered Latin
American waters. As for Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega has been an ally of Moscow dating back to the 1970s when the
Cold War was in its ascendency. While its current policies have not included a particularly effusive rapprochement with
Moscow, Nicaragua, Venezuela, and Bolivia are among the three hemispheric countries that today are committed to being in
Russia’s good graces in order to receive trade benefits, market access, and privileged financial and military sales
opportunities.
Will an upcoming change in the Peruvian Presidency signal important shifts in Lima’s recognition policies?
Peruvian Presidential candidate Ollanta Humala is known to be close to Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. During Peru’s 2006
presidential race, the Venezuelan leader made no effort to conceal his support for the retired Peruvian army officer and
left-leaning political figure. If Ollanta Humala is elected to the presidency in 2011, he may well decide to recognize
the independence of the separatist states, thereby emulating Chávez’ example. Though this could give Washington
dyspepsia, it could put the Andean country in line to obtain some military aid from Russia on concessionary terms. It
should be recalled that during the period of military rule, the Peruvian Armed Forces depended upon Moscow as an
important supplier of aircraft and tanks.
As a retired army officer, Humala knows very well that much of Peru’s current military equipment obtained from the
Soviet Union is now over 30 years old. This includes Mi helicopters, and T-type tanks, as well as MiGs and Sukhois
aircraft. Peru is now in the process of refurbishing or replacing them with updated weaponry. For example, in recent
years Russian engineers have been upgrading Peru’s Mi helicopter fleet. Ollanta Humala would certainly want to ensure
Peru’s access to top of the line and affordable Russian military equipment. Bolivia, Peru’s southeastern neighbor, has
in fact received credit lines from Moscow to buy new weaponry and a new presidential plane; since La Paz has not
recognized the South Caucasus states, this certainly looks like a dangling carrot. Military aid from Russia could prove
to be of great importance to Lima in view of Peru’s recently revived encounters with the narco-terrorist movement
Shining Path, as well as its ongoing maritime border` dispute with its historical nemesis, Chile.
It should be noted that Ollanta Humala has already expressed an interest in recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
During an April 2009 visit to Russia, he declared to the local media that since Lima had recognized Kosovo’s
independence, it had no major justification not to do so with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He explained that the reason
behind President García’s delay in recognizing them appeared to be the position that due to Washington’s engagement with
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Caucasus is now one of the United States’ key areas of interest. Later, on November 11, 2009,
seven Peruvian deputies (all members of Humala’s Nationalist Party) presented a motion (#08928) to recognize the two
states, though, ultimately, the initiative did not make it to the floor of Congress.
Latin America and recognizing “controversial” states
Within the hemisphere, recognition regarding the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia has been driven by Nicaraguan and
Venezuelan self-interests as much as by anything else. This would be nothing new for Latin America. Neither would it be
a strange phenomenon that a Latin American state would move quickly to recognize a country that has declared
independence, even if most areas were holding their decision in obeisance. Latin America’s recognition of Kosovo and
Taiwan, as well as the more recent action on Palestine, are all cases in point that the recognition process is in
ferment.
The recognition of Palestine
In recent days Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay have recognized Palestine as an independent state. Paraguay is expected to
follow suit. Both Washington and Tel Aviv have expressed their disappointment, if not to say their consternation. The
State Department was quick to call the move “counter-productive.” This development highlights a number of recent trends.
First, Latin America continues to ease out of Washington’s sphere of influence, with Bolivia and Venezuela pursuing a
growing relationship with Iran, while Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay have just recognized Palestine. State Department
officials as well as both Republican and Democratic members of Congress have openly criticized the move. Second, the
direction of Latin America’s recognition policy is not that surprising since Latin America has a growing commercial and
political link with the Muslim world, hence recognizing Palestine is as much a political gesture an economic move aimed
to please Islamic leaders in order to cement strong trade relations. President Mahmoud Abbas of Palestine, visited
Brazil in 2005 and 2009, and outgoing Brazilian president Lula da Silva made the first-ever trip by a Brazilian head of
state to Palestine and Israel in March of this year. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs’ director, Larry Birns, has
stated that “in a way this move isn’t surprising; the Arab world is big but there is only one Israel.” In terms of
policy, Latin America apparently feels free to thumb its nose at Israel, regardless of U.S. pressure to the contrary.
Nevertheless, it is surprising that Buenos Aires decided to recognize Palestine. In June, the country named its first
foreign minister of Jewish origin, Hector Timerman, who replaced Jorge Taiana in the post. Argentina has had a mixed
relationship with Israel and its own large and prosperous Jewish community, in great part due to the 1994 terrorist
attacks against the Israeli-Argentine Mutual Associate building. A van filled with explosives drove into the complex,
killing 89 and injuring more than 200. The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah and Iran have been implicated in
perpetrating the attack. Buenos Aires has carried out several initiatives with the Arab world in recent years, including
an agreement with Algeria over nuclear cooperation. An August 2010 article by the Global Arab Network quotes Egyptian
Minister of Trade and Industry Rasheed Mohamed Rasheed, as maintaining that Cairo wants to strengthen its ties with
Argentina, especially in the fields of medicine, textiles, and IT. The article explains that “the volume of trade
exchange between Egypt and Argentina rose from 616 million dollars in 2007 to 1.2 billion dollars in 2008, but receded
to 643 million dollars in 2009 due to the financial crisis.” Argentina is Egypt’s second largest trade partner in Latin
America. The region’s growing ties with the Arab world comes at a time when Washington seems to be increasingly
frustrated by developments with the West Bank settlement standoff (the Obama administration has decided to end its
efforts to achieve direct talks between the sides).
The recognition of Kosovo
Kosovo gained its independence from Serbia in 2008 and so far it has been recognized by approximately 70 states,
including most of Europe as well as the U.S. and Canada. Countries that are threatened by the possible flare-up of
separatist issues of their own, like the Russian Federation, China, Turkey, and Spain, understandably have been slow to
move on the issue. Two of Washington’s major allies, Colombia and Peru, have recognized Kosovo. Other Latin states that
have recognized Kosovo are Panama, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Belize. Honduras is the latest Latin American
state to recognize the country, doing so last September. The Central American state has been a regional pariah since the
2009 coup in which the democratically-elected president, Manuel Zelaya, was taken from his bed in pajamas and flown out
of the country. It is unclear if the recognition of Kosovo is an attempt by Porfirio Lobo, (Honduras’ de facto president
elected to office under cloudy circumstances after Zelaya’s ousting) did this in order to be appreciated by Washington.
In March of this year, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton carried out a five-day tour of Latin America in which she
tried to persuade regional states to recognize the Lobo government. Matters were not helped when WikiLeaks made public
that U.S. ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Llorens, acknowledged in a cable to the State Department that “there is no doubt
that the military, Supreme Court, and National Congress conspired on June 28 in what constituted an illegal and
unconstitutional coup against the Executive Branch.” Clinton’s trip was not very successful, as exemplified by the
recently concluded IX conference of defense ministers in Bolivia, to which Honduras was not invited. Lacking substantial
regional allies, Lobo may very well have concluded that the otherwise improbable recognition of Kosovo would strengthen
his ties to Washington and its vote in regional forums.
The recognition of Taiwan
Taiwan is becoming increasingly perturbed that Chinese economic assistance to Latin America will erode some of the
support it has found in regional leaders. Just over 20 states worldwide currently recognize Taiwan as an independent
state, separate from mainland China. Besides Vatican City, most of these countries are located in relatively
underdeveloped regions like Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America.
Regarding the Western Hemisphere, the countries that recognize Taiwan are: El Salvador, Belize, Guatemala, Nicaragua,
Honduras, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis,
as well as Paraguay. While some of these states may have genuine sympathy for Taiwan, others have switched from
recognition of the island to now recognizing the mainland as the official Chinese state. Currently, there are deep
concerns emanating from Taipei after Beijing announced in October that it will give USD 462 million in financing to
construct a tourism complex in the eastern resort of Punta Cana, Dominican Republic. Dominican tourism minister,
Francisco Javier Garcia, visited Shanghai in October, and he was quoted by the BBC as saying that his country was hoping
for “complete” relations with China “sooner [rather] than later.”
Latin America meets the rest of the world
The recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as Muslims from these aspirant nations to Latin America, may
produce one additional consequence. The Caucasus is one of the world’s last regions with which Latin America has not
established close contacts; the recognition of these separatist states may actually be the catalyst that could bring
them into a more regularized relationship with the previously neglected region.
Today, Latin America participates in conferences with parts on the globe that have historically not been in its
political or economic focus, such as the Middle East and Africa. This development would become even more fixed if a
given Latin American country develops a strong economic relationship with the Caucasus states. For example, the now
increasingly effective rapprochement between Latin America and the African continent has Brazil as its principle
catalyst, since that country already has strong political links with South Africa, as well as historical and ethnic ties
with Portuguese-speaking nations such as Angola. Gilberto Carvalho, a close advisor to Brazilian President Lula da
Silva, has observed that after the President steps down from power, “Lula da Silva’s task will be to help with the
political reforms the country needs. Overseas, his target is helping Africa.”
With respect to Latin America and the Muslim world, Brazil and Venezuela are building strong ties with countries like
Libya and Iran. Additionally, Argentina has signed a nuclear agreement with Algeria. Another emerging trend is the
growing friendship between Bolivia and Iran, with Tehran offering La Paz technical expertise to help construct nuclear
energy power plants in the Andean state. Most recently, the two states have formed a partnership to exploit Bolivia’s
lithium deposits. South America and Arab countries have held two summits so far, in 2005 and 2009.
It’s a small world after all
The recognition by four states of the separatist regions of Ossetia and Abkhazia is regarded by some regional
specialists as a threat to the national integrity of Georgia. General parallels can be made with Kosovo and Taiwan, two
other comparable separatist states carved out of Serbia and China respectively, which may prove instructive. Certainly,
the issues in Georgia, the Middle East, Serbia, and China are complex and have their own unique arguing points. Most
likely, while some Latin American states may hold out some sympathy towards the separatist areas, recognition has, and
will continue to be, extended in accordance with their own national interests.
ENDS