Is Mexican Crime And Violence Merely Structural?
Obama Set To Duck Challenge Of A Close,
Premature Engagement With Mexico. Is Mexican Crime And
Violence Merely Structural, Or Is It Systemic?
The most middling of ties are scheduled to develop in the early stages of the relationship between the incoming U.S. president and his Mexican counterpart, Felipe Calderon Hinojosa: Luke warm ties with Washington not scheduled to grow under a Barack Obama relationship.
• A long-troubled relationship in the
fields of trade, immigration and drug policy in regards to
Mexico will not be galvanized by a few choice words and
warmed by a firm handshake.
• Mexico not likely to be a
priority issue, but will be framed as a second-tier
matter.
• Rising crime rate a peril to Mexican and
Central American tourism.
President Calderon’s current trip to Washington to meet with Barack Obama is not destined to reveal great results; this follows in the tradition of episodic and photo-op symbolic scenarios involving the U.S. and Mexico, which inevitably do nothing better than sputter in their results. This was the fate of U.S. policy under George Bush toward Vicente Fox, which eventually ended in near-total failure. According to local boosters in both countries, the equivalent of the new world relationship between the U.S. and Mexico would emulate the bilateral ties between Washington and London yielding yet another special relationship. But what came almost naturally between the two self-perceiving Anglo-Saxon nations never quite came off between the Rio Bravo partners. Just days before Barack Obama was to be inaugurated in Washington, Calderon came to town to wish him well and claim the right of primacy in Mexico’s connection to Washington. It will most likely be a lost cause.
A brutal war on the
streets
When Felipe Calderon was chosen as president
in 2006 in one of Mexico’s most controversial recent
elections, one of his vows was to make Mexico more secure.
Since then he has mobilized an unprecedented 45,000 troops
and 5,000 federal police personnel to confront the felonious
conflicts occurring throughout the country. The troops and
the federal police were sent to serve as back-up and support
for the under equipped and chronically corrupted security
forces. The mission of Calderon’s offensive was to
apprehend the various leaders of the money-laundering and
drug trafficking groups, as well as to dismantle the
delivery networks the cartels were increasingly using with
expert skill. Parallel to the anti-drug war, the
increasingly explosive battle over control of strained
smuggling franchises have pitted Mexico’s largest cartels
against one another, namely the Arellano-Felix, the Juarez,
and the Sinaloa cartels as well as the Gulf cartel and its
increasingly independent paramilitary wing, Los Zetas. But
the bottom line here is that Calderon’s anti-drug strategy
did not work as is evident by the drug wave continuing to
flow to the U.S. without abatement.
Meanwhile, the long agenda and brief amount of time will not allow for anything approaching extended dialogue. Immigration will not be advanced as an issue due to its situation and complexity, as well as the harsh prevailing economic conditions existing in the U.S. Nor will much be said about revising NAFTA over how consideration since Mexico City looks upon the issues as a veritable red zone. At most, the meeting will reflect Obama’s wish not to offend Mexico’s important and highly vocal community, as well as U.S. Latinos—issues will be sent on sabbaticals and not rejected.
Death for
Sale
Drug-related violent deaths peaked in Mexico at
a distressing rate of 5,500 in 2008, more than double last
year’s total tally of 2,700 and nearly four times more
than in 2006. The two separate fronts of the larger
conflict, the turf war and the anti-narcotics operations,
continue to produce grisly episodes of violence. The cartels
employ nightmarish displays of violence as a means to send a
message to those who would dare interfere. To those serving
the interests of the state or a rival cartel, the message is
clear: a brutal death will be the likely reward. The drug
forces have sadistically tortured, brutally executed and
displayed in public areas the grisly remains of cartel
enemies. Journalists, political officials, police officers
and soldiers have been specifically targeted. Mexican and
U.S. officials have taken to dubbing the traffickers’
activities as episodes of unabashed
“narco-terrorism”
Adding to the script guiding the
complexity of Mexico’s violent crime and drug upheaval is
the question of state corruption that infects all levels of
the government. The municipal police have been mostly
excluded from the loop of drug-related investigations due to
suspicion of their engagement in bribery or directly
colluding with the cartels. The federal police and the
40,000 troops Calderon has mobilized since he took office in
2006, have often turned out to be the uncertain keepers of
the peace, who frequently become immured in the very war on
corruption they are supposed to suppress. The poorly
equipped local police, more often than not, are faced with
the bleak prospects of either being made to accept a bribe,
acquiescing to cartel pressure, or of being bushwhacked for
refusing to cooperate. This act of intimidation is
colloquially known as plata o plomo, or silver or lead. Even
some of those closest to President Calderon have been
corrupted by the cartel’s seemingly endless resources and
skewed personnel.
Profiles of Violence
Army
Major Arturo Gonzalez, a member of Felipe Calderon’s
presidential guard, was purportedly put on the pad for
$100,000 a month to report the President’s movements to a
splinter group made up of former Sinaloa cartel leaders, the
Beltran-Leyva brothers. The intelligence community also has
been compromised; Noe Ramirez Mandujano, head of the
country’s anti-organized crime task force (SIEDO), was
caught receiving $450,000 a month in bribe money from the
Beltran-Leyva brothers in exchange for classified
information that could threatened the core of the cartel’s
operation. Ricardo Gutierrez, director of Mexico’s
Interpol branch, also has been accused of colluding with the
Beltran-Leyva organization in providing sensitive
information in exchange for large sums of money. This
revelation was hugely embarrassing to the Mexican
authorities
The growth of insecurity in Mexico has begun to bulge out the country’s borders and into the region, particularly those to countries found lying between Colombia, where most of the cocaine is produced, Mexico, the main distributor and second largest producer of illicit drugs, and the United States, the prime consumer for all of them. Central America’s unique geographic position, caught between a producer and distributor functions, and its vulnerability and flawed civic virtues have allowed for high levels of corruption and crime, making it an ideal smuggling corridor that eventually will replace the traditional maritime routes which have become very costly to operate and gravely dangerous to use. By escaping Calderon’s periodic crackdown and extending their tentacles into Central America, the Mexican cartels have begun to tap into the networks of feral criminal youth gangs, known as maras, in order to carry out their non-drug related activities, such as extortion, assassination and kidnapping. The invasion of Mexican syndicates into surrounding countries and locales could further degrade regional stability and security; something that already has been burgeoning forth in the Guatemalan drug scene.
One consideration cannot be exaggerated: violence and rising crime rates can have an immensely injurious impact on Mexico’s tourism industry, which is one of the nation’s prime dollar earners. There are few factors that Calderon fears more than permanent damage being done to the sector by the reality or perception of unremitting crime.
Part II will follow
tomorrow
In this section, COHA will dwell on implementing
drug enforcement strategy, weeding out corruption and
restoring security in contemporary Mexico. What will the
regional consequences of an expanded drug war in 2009 be?
Can common ground be found in generating a harmonious
understanding in relation to trade, crime, immigration and
drug policies? Is drug legislation a way out for both
producing and consuming
nations?
ENDS