The Blitz is On
Part I
The Colombia Card is Being Played, with Chávez Scheduled to be Taken to the Cleaner. Meanwhile, Rice heads today to
Medellin with Democratic legislators in tow, to win approval of controversial FTA with Bogotá
• A prime weapon in the U.S. inventory to reduce Chávez to size and build up Colombia’s President Uribe is a recent
government-funded report produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), which claims that the
South American nation, Colombia, is safely “back from the brink of crisis.” But in terms of its conceptualization and
implementation, the contracted document and the campaign surrounding its publication raises serious questions. These
include the conservative organization’s objectivity due to its longtime advocacy of Plan Colombia, and its vigorous
support of the pending free trade pact with Bogotá.
• The CSIS Colombia project is more about being part of a well-timed public relations campaign than about bona fide
research.
• The CSIS report represents an important component in the lobbying effort by Bogotá and the Bush administration to
convince Capitol Hill to approve the pending Free Trade Agreement with Colombia, and is based as much on half truths and
strategic omissions as it is on value-neutral research.
• If anything, it could be argued that Colombia’s prospects for modernization and stability and its credentials as a
voracious foe of regional drug trafficking have at best stagnated, and at worst have suffered grave attrition, under the
Uribe administration. The discarding of extradition for demobilized paramilitaries is an example of this.
• Uribe is lionized by State Department, but is a doubly tainted figure.
• Bush administration relates a fading tale to Democrats over Colombia’s demure virtues.
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, on her way to Medellin, Colombia today, leading a delegation of ten Democratic
House members, has the mission of rewarding one of Latin America’s most hardline leaders who has had direct links to
some of the country’s most prominent right-wing death squad leaders and has indirectly sanctified the possible
assassination of prominent labor and human rights leaders. Even though U.S. legislators are well aware of the impunity
for such crimes that exist.
In spite of multiple legislative delegation that have been ferried to Colombia and several trips of Uribe to Washington,
the Congressional leadership has not been persuaded that President Uribe is not the soaring paladin of democracy as the
Bush administration tires to present him.
The trip to Medellin to boast the flagging prospects of the Colombia FTA culminating months of initiatives aimed at
convincing the American public and members of Congress that the FTA was a “win-win” situation. Actually, the FTA with
Colombia is meant as a gesture of good will to Bogotá for being one of the relatively few South American countries which
haven’t taken steps to reduce their dependency upon the U.S.
Part of the salvo of public relations initiatives meant to convince Americans to adopt the Colombian FTA and reminiscent
of President Clinton’s hype over NAFTA in 1994, is a juxtaposed document produced by Washington’s Conservative research
group, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Just like Washington’s evaluation of Colombia’s drug performance which always has been heavily politicized and reflected
more what the White House has wanted to see than what was there to be seen, the November 2007 CSIS report titled “Back
from the Brink: Evaluating Progress in Colombia, 1999-2007” was more art than meat. The Washington think tank labels
Colombia’s emergence from its decades-long tainted anti-drug policy, rampant corruption and successive governance crises
as “a success story.” While Uribe has, to an extent, somewhat improved bureaucratic predictability within the government
regarding its internal affairs and public administration, this sometimes has been at a heavy cost. He at first restored
optimism among a majority of Colombians, partially as a result of a recuperating economy. But much of this achievement
has been accompanied by ongoing charges of corruption against government insiders, which almost certainly has reached up
to the presidential office. His erratic behavior also tolerated a high level of violence, particularly against labor
figures that are being gunned down with disturbing regularity. This phenomenon has infuriated a now informed leadership
of the U.S. labor movement which has focused its anger on attempting to persuade the Democratic leadership of both
Houses of the U.S. Congress against enacting a free trade agreement with Bogotá at this time. Arguably, Uribe’s relative
popularity today is in part a function of the FARC’s lack of popularity, leaving the public with few viable
alternatives.
President Bush insists that if the Democrat-controlled Congress does not pass a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with
Colombia, “it will be a destabilizing moment.” Some would argue that this claim is something of a stretch, and it is
more reflective of Bush’s abjuration of any role for the Latin American left, rather than a careful calculation of the
trade factors at play in the region, and the balance and legitimacy of the foreign policy goals of the area’s various
actors, including the large number of left-leaning governments and other critics of Washington’s various regional
policies. While the White House’s justification for seeking an FTA is in part based on national security grounds, such
an explanation is of dubious merit. Rather, it is more reasonable to see Washington’s close links to Colombia as just
one more outcropping of Bush’s intense personal odium for the legacy of Fidel Castro throughout Latin America. This
hostility especially extends to Hugo Chávez and is reflected in the present soured relationship between Washington and
Caracas.
A Most Odd Couple
Nevertheless, in spite of Washington’s persistent pressure on Bogotá throughout much of this decade to lend itself to
being used as a countervailing force against Chávez, Uribe usually has tried to contain his differences with his
neighbor and not permit the State Department to indiscriminately use his government as a battering ram against the
Venezuelan leader. Much of the causation behind Uribe’s cautious approach has been economic—namely upwards of almost $6
billion a year in bilateral trade between the two countries, much of it of recent vintage and a good percent of it made
up of non-traditional products. The terms of trade are overwhelmingly in Colombia’s favor. Until Chávez was
unceremoniously sacked from the job as mediator for the release of FARC-held hostages to which Uribe previously had
assigned him, the Colombian leader had repeatedly thwarted Washington’s efforts to promote his country as a gladiatorial
state. He rebuffed the State Department’s efforts for him to pick up its cudgel and use it to neutralize Chávez’s
hemispheric potency.
The CSIS study on the country ebulliently catalog’s Colombia as “a success story,” even at the risk of seriously
distorting the country’s present realities. Its critics find that rather than a legitimate research finding, the CSIS
report reflects an unseemly tactic of searching for purse seining evidence to justify its preordained conclusions. Since
1999, Colombia may have witnessed some progress as far as some economic and trade indicators are concerned, but
shortcomings in its democratic operations and the absence of public rectitude at least should furnish an equal gauge to
measure the government’s success, or lack of it. A good deal of yardage in those key areas has been lost under Uribe,
even though some of those sectors were not even mentioned in the study.
Colombia remains perched for a genuine social crisis to severely buffer it. Countermanding that premise would best be
served by a working skepticism other than the wild optimism of the CSIS report. Otherwise, a dangerous message would be
sent to Colombian officials who are fully convinced that, while they may not have entirely achieved a particularly lofty
ethical path or prevented corruption from infecting political transactions, Washington is not likely to go out of its
way to insist that these discrepancies need be immediately addressed. In terms of orthodox academic virtues, far more
traditional results are required from such outside contractors like the CSIS, and higher research standards must be set,
if such research projects, like the Colombia study, deserve to have any weight.
CSIS Carries the Ball
The “Back from the Brink” Report by CSIS was financed by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), part of the
Executive Office of the President. After being contacted twice by COHA, the USTR confirmed that the office at least
partially financed the study by CSIS, but maintained that the actual costs of the project were not available. COHA also
made comparable inquiries to USAID and CSIS, but no further information about the financing of the report was divulged.
Someone in the administration repeated a rumor that the 60 page report was budgeted at $40,000 at tax payers’ expense.
COHA’s researchers estimate that the report could have been done on a one thousand dollar budget, with plenty left over
for pizzas, since it was apparently viewed as tantamount to being the product of a patriotic mission.
It should be noted that CSIS formerly was a unit of Georgetown University, which ultimately dissolved its ties with the
institution in part because of prevailing charges at the time that CSIS and the CIA had a de facto revolving
relationship in terms of recruitment and facilitated projects. The Colombian weekly news magazine, Semana, recently
asked CSIS whether the federal funding of its Colombia study would somehow possibly cloud the objectivity of the
analysis, but its spokesperson for that group quickly dismissed that notion, arguing that “the government’s idea was
precisely to find an independent and reputable organization such as [CSIS].” The answer did somewhat beg the question:
reliable for what and for whom? To produce a report aimed at buttressing what the world already knew was what the USTR
wanted to see.
A USTR representative told COHA that the CSIS “Back from the Brink” report is an “independent study” despite the fact
that it was funded by the government. Yet, that position has to be considered somewhat naïve, given that there was no
mystery surrounding the fact that President Bush and his trade officials and State Department personnel have been
consistent in aggressively calling for the enactment of a free trade arrangement with Colombia. Without doubt, getting
Congress’ approval for the trade pact would represent a major political win for the White House. To achieve that,
administration efforts have taken pains to conceal, or give a highly deceptive reading to, recent Latin American
economic experiences with free trade deals, such as NAFTA, which at best have brought about mixed results, but never a
win-win outcome. The fact that the CSIS report was funded by an arm of the Executive Office of the President raises very
legitimate questions about the transparency of the project.
Meanwhile, Bogotá has been on a crusade to get the trade deal approved by the U.S. Congress, especially now that it
would mark a badly needed political accomplishment for the Uribe administration as well as the Colombian president
himself, whose deportment is becoming almost as raffish as that of Hugo Chávez. Uribe’s trade quest has been translated
into a very impressive and complex lobbying effort by Bogotá, which has poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into
hiring U.S. public relations and law firms in order to ensure quick passage of the FTA, as well as to alter the blotched
image of Colombia’s otherwise grim human rights situation.
Lobbying Washington
The Foreign Agents Registration Unit of the U.S. Department of Justice details a $300,000 contract between the Colombian
government and Burson-Marsteller, one of the world’s larger public relations firms. Its mission is to lobby Washington
opinion makers for the passage of the FTA with Colombia. Other U.S. firms which were contracted to work to advance
Bogotá’s interests in the U.S. were the lobbying firm Glover Park Group ($40,000 per month) and Johnson, Madigan, Peck,
Boland & Stewart (who have been paid $35,000 per month). Regarding Burson-Marsteller, this international public relations firm
was a favorite Washington feed bag for some of the worst human rights violators in the Americas who visited the U.S.
Capital during the 1970s and 1980s. Of all the military juntas that seized power during this period, demonstrably, the
very worst was Argentina (which became one of Burson-Marsteller’s prime clients). It is estimated that the ruling
military state killed upwards of 30,000 innocent civilians during its period of rule (1976 -1983). Even though
Burson-Marsteller, along with its co-equal during this era (when it came to nurturing brutal hemispheric regimes) –
Patton Boggs – high ethical standards were not their trademark. This was the case even after Burson was repeatedly
informed of the butcheries being routinely performed by the ruling Argentine military junta against a variety of the
nation’s social sectors, including liberal Catholic priests, as well as Jewish students and faculty members at major
Argentine universities. Rather than acknowledge the unsavory nature of their clients, Burson scornfully rejected such
claims that their clients were little better than psychopaths, and enthusiastically fulfilled the terms of their
representational contract with the Argentine military authorities, with their American account supervisors accusing the
firm’s critics of being “Marxist agitators.”
Lobbying in favor of the Colombian FTA has been both intensive and expensive and has spawned a bulldog effort to
enthrone half truths on the part of Bogotá and U.S. authorities. The current campaign includes high officials of the
U.S. State Department, as well as hired lobbying sources working to enact the FTA project, even though Colombia today
demonstrably one has of the worst human rights violation records in the entire hemisphere. These providers can be
counted on to supply the U.S. Congress with highly questionable ex parte, if not entirely self-serving evidence, about
the situation in Colombia in order to advance the prospects that the FTA eventually will be approved. On April 24, 2007,
Charles Shapiro, principal deputy assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, told the House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere that the Escuela Nacional Sindical (ENS), a major Colombian NGO, reported
a decline to 38 murders in recent months. Nevertheless, what Mr. Shapiro did not bring to the attention of the U.S.
legislators was that the same organization previously had reported that 72 trade union figures had been murdered in
2006, which marked an increase over the previous year.
High Rates of Political Assassinations
President Uribe has used a different custom set of tailored figures to argue that only 25 trade unionists were killed in
Colombia in 2006, but Human Rights Watch (HRW) maintains that the number is considerably higher. According to HRW, “the
only way to create [Uribe’s] artificially low numbers is by excluding unionized teachers from trade unionist categories.
In fact, according to official Colombian statistics, if you include unionized teachers, 58 trade unionists were killed
last year, a substantial increase over the 40 murdered the previous year.” It is shocking that with so many statistics
coming from respectable organizations, CSIS, echoing its client’s previously cited figures, states that a “positive
trend continued in 2006,” without even bothering to acknowledge HRW’s objection to this manipulation of numbers. At this
point, the question can be seriously posed whether the Justice Department’s Foreign Agents Registration Unit should
consider adding CSIS to its list of those prepared to do checkbook research for their clients and require it to list its
name and officers with that office.
CSIS Contradictions
On November 14, 2007, a short excerpt from the CSIS was published on the editorial page of the Washington, D.C.
conservative tabloid, The Examiner, titled “U.S. saved Colombia.” In this section, which abstracted a handful of
sentences from the “Back from the Brink” report, CSIS informs the public that U.S. support for Colombia (through Plan
Colombia) constitutes “a foreign policy success,” a finding which exactly mirrors the viewpoint of the Colombian
government, but not the conclusion of what must be a sizable number of Latin American specialists who are prepared to
challenge CSIS’ upbeat findings. This conclusion is even somewhat inconsistent with remarks by longtime CSIS senior
staffer, Armand Peschard, who on an October 23, 2007 NPR newscast about the drug war, observed that “Plan Colombia, that
was built as an antinarcotics effort, […] didn’t meet the expectations.” It is somewhat surprising that CSIS now sees
Plan Colombia under a distinctly different and rosier lens.
It is also noteworthy that Phillip McLean, who is one of several co-authors of the 2007 report, stated in an earlier
paper issued on April 2006 that “Colombia remains a country on the brink of crisis.” Yet since mid-2006 (right after
Uribe won reelection), Colombia’s democracy has suffered from a series of visceral attacks of a president who, despite
some initial constructive steps, has publicly tried to intimidate the judicial branch, verbally lacerated opposition
leaders, and jeopardized the safety of human rights exponents by accusing them of being confederates of FARC insurgents.
Curiously enough, Uribe’s repeated interferences with ongoing investigations by the Supreme Court threaten the rule of
law he so insistently claims to defend, just as he maintains close ties with some of the notorious officials tied to the
rightist vigilante band, the AUC, which has been labeled a “terrorist” organization by the State Department. Moreover,
on the eve of Colombia’s 2007 local elections, Uribe openly interfered in the electoral process, stating that Bogotános
should not vote for candidates who are supported by the guerrillas—indirectly referring to Samuel Moreno from the
opposition party, Polo Democrático, who has no proven connections with any guerrilla group. President Uribe’s lack of
respect for his country’s democratic institutions and processes is appalling. Thus, it is shocking to see how in the
passage of only two years (especially regarding stepped-up recent internecine political strife in Colombia) CSIS, in a
publicly-funded project, handed out by the Bush administration, can claim that what is probably the most violent country
in Latin America can be properly described as being “back from the brink.”
Freedom of the press?
Robert Dahl has argued that “democracy and its fundamental institutions presuppose the existence of certain fundamental
rights, such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press.” But Colombia is apparently falling behind its peer nations
in terms of freedom of expression, as the current administration has failed to allocate sufficient resources, let alone
capable leadership, to protect these basic rights. Freedom House’s 2006 Report on Colombia states that “Colombia remains
the most dangerous country for journalists in continental South America, and violence and harassment of journalists by
state and non-state actors are the primary impediments to a free media.”
What is more remarkable is that in 2002, (the year in which President Uribe assumed office on August 7) Freedom House,
an established conservative group, which to a large degree is publicly funded, categorized Colombia’s freedom of the
press as “partly-free,” but in subsequent years (2003-2006) the organization lowered its status to “not free” in order
to reflect “the worsening impact of the armed conflict on journalists.” The International Press Institute’s 2006 Review
on Colombia has found that “the groups involved in Colombia’s civil war single out journalists or media outlets as
‘military targets,’ using intimidation and violence to ensure they are portrayed favourably by the press.” Moreover, the
Bogotá-based watchdog, Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (FLIP), registered 140 violations of press freedom in 2006.
FLIP states in its 2006 press release that “this represents a 37% increase when compared to 2005 figures.” Out of these
140 records, right-wing paramilitary groups were found to be responsible for 38 cases; government forces for 21; FARC
for 18; and public officials for 15.
Yet the CSIS’ “Back from the Brink” report, which is supposed to evaluate progress in Colombia, makes no mention
whatsoever of the country’s aberrant de facto free press situation.
No Justice, No Peace
Uribe’s Justice and Peace Law, which sharply reduces jail time for paramilitary members who wish to demobilize after
confessing and doing penance for their crimes, itself undermines the country’s democracy due to the largely cosmetic
nature of its punitive demands. The fact is that criminals responsible for thousands of assassinations and massacres
could be out of prison in far less than the wonted eight years. Former paramilitaries basically can now choose what
crimes they wish to confess in order to reduce their jail time even further. With this state of affairs, it is far from
guaranteed that the complete truth will be entirely exhibited to Colombian society, and in fact, it has rarely been.
These former combatants still control important areas of the country, and undoubtedly still have access to illicit funds
either as a result of ongoing drug-trafficking enterprises or by engaging in street crime syndicates. Most of all,
Uribe’s demobilization plan guarantees to confessed paramilitaries that they will not be extradited to the U.S. for
crimes against U.S. nationals and violators of U.S. law, which has previously been the bedrock of U.S. policy toward
Colombian drug traffickers. The fact that the White House has now acquiesced as veritably a co-conspirator in
liquidating to what had been the main dish in its anti-drug strategy, is an indication of the disarray in which U.S.
drug policy now finds itself.
Former high-level ex-paramilitaries will not only have the means to potentially buy elections in Colombia, but also they
will be among those who are likely to reap many of the benefits of an eventual free trade agreement with the U.S. former
Colombian Minister of Defense. Rafael Pardo shockingly reveals in his recent book Fin del Paramilitarismo, that, out of
the 32,000 demobilized paramilitaries, 29,000 have been pardoned or have had their charges otherwise dropped. Only 270
out of 2,695 ex-combatants thought to be responsible for major human rights violations are in prison, while the
whereabouts of the rest are unknown. In other words, Uribe’s “Justice and Peace” program couldn’t be closer to being
described as a fraud. For the tens of thousands of innocent citizens who have been brutally murdered by AUC
paramilitaries—classified a “terrorist” organization even under this administration’s lax standards—less than 300 of
those who have perpetrated crimes have been visited by any form of punishment, and most of these are likely to be
pardoned by Uribe or his successor at some near future date.
Uribe’s law also fails to prioritize fair treatment of the paramilitaries’ victims in the ongoing Colombia conflict, in
fact, trivializing their plight. In July 2007, victims of the internal conflict were scheduled to testify before the
Colombian Congress. But only 5 out of 35 members of Uribe’s two major parties (the “U” Party and Radical Change) found
the requisite time to remain in the legitimate chambers to hear the testimonies of the victims. In contrast, nearly all
of the senators from the opposition parties managed to fill their seats. Neither the Uribe majorities, nor the President
himself, have accorded the victims anything near the minimal respect that common decency would seem to require. There is
no prospect whatsoever that the Justice and Peace Law, ardently pushed forward by Uribe and his legislative majorities,
will bring about even a semblance of justice or peace for Colombia, and is only a crude caricature of reality.
What remains on “the brink of crisis” is Colombia’s democracy. Plan Colombia could have possibly produced something like
a “foreign policy success” if the U.S.’ mission in that country was sincerely aimed at helping to restructure the
country’s institutions. In particular by strengthening a judiciary that supposedly has to deal with making amends to war
victims and hunting down the perpetrators of repugnant human rights violations, and which Uribe insists will be housed
in his pocket. Moreover, policymakers need to be aware of the unique characteristics of the country’s internal war and
how a free trade agreement could accentuate it. Paramilitary forces hardly have been brought to justice in any
respectable numbers and continue to exercise plenary influence within the country, especially in places far from Bogotá,
as well as with their seedy ties to unscrupulous members of Uribe’s legislative coalitions.
Regarding agricultural issues, Colombian farmers could be easily outperformed by competing U.S. products, potentially
providing leeway for even more of the country’s farmers to make the fateful decision to move from growing conventional
crops into the far more lucrative coca cultivation business. What is more, Congressional Democrats should be reminded
that the Colombian trade union movement, whose three major confederations represent nearly all of the country’s
unionized workers, have vigorously rejected the FTA, because the one predictable beneficiary of it will be
U.S-subsidized multinational agro-industries.
“Applauding CSIS’ Good Work”
The pending vote on a FTA with Colombia involves more than a trade deal. Bush and Uribe’s efforts to push the measure
through the U.S. Congress are calculatedly based on misinformation, some of which has been financed by the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative. Because of the importance of the CSIS report as one factor in achieving its sought after
victory on the Colombia Free Trade measure, the Bush administration’s Trade office was certainly not interested in
having to speculate whether the CSIS paper would hopefully come in with a pro-FTA finding— it simply waited for a sure
thing to come through. Peter DeShazo, the most senior member of the team and the head of CSIS’ Americas’ section, had
come to CSIS several years before, leaving his position as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemispheric
Affairs, where he helped formulate the policy he was now being called upon to evaluate—that is, to assess a policy whose
critics were saying was based on distorted information. Essentially what came forth was a para-propaganda piece that
ended up softening Colombia’s record of violence and which brushed aside instances of malfeasance in office, which make
up much of that country’s contemporary history under the Uribe government.
Colombia’s commerce minister, Luis Guillermo Plata, who attended CSIS’ presentation of its “Back from the Brink” report,
enthused that he would use the CSIS document as a tool to convince the U.S. Congress to approve the FTA with Colombia.
The Democratic majority in the U.S. congress has been closely scrutinizing the details of the agreement and they haven’t
been inspired by what they have been seeing so far. In contrast to credible research groups who value their independence
and wouldn’t, as was the case with the CSIS, accept U.S. government funds to research a project where the narrow
interests of only one sector of the U.S. national security community was being well served, was not likely to produce a
compendium of objective quasi-scientific data on the subject. With this report, the CSIS has placed itself in a position
where its bona fide on the subject of Colombia have been significantly compromised, deservedly so.
Part II
COHA will shortly publish the concluding portion of its assessment of CSIS’ recent paper presenting an optimistic
assessment of Colombia under the Uribe administration.
This analysis was prepared by COHA Staff
January 24th, 2008
ends