Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families
Gaza/Jerusalem/Brussels: As Hamas seeks to consolidate its rule and restore stability to Gaza, it must deal with powerful clans and families
with which it has been at loggerheads since its June 2007 seizure of power.
Inside Gaza: The Challenge of Clans and Families, (See Below)* the latest report from the International Crisis Group,
examines the role of Gaza's traditional alternative power centres and how Hamas has responded during the past six
months. Influential families, along with political movements and militias, filled the void left by the Palestinian
Authority's collapse over recent years. They are now one of the most significant obstacles for Hamas, and although they
probably lack the unity or motivation to form an effective opposition, this could change should popular dissatisfaction
in Gaza grow. There are as yet inconclusive indications that Hamas understands this and is moderating its approach.
"Clans and families provide sustenance, protection, power and patronage and have shown the capacity to resist central
authority whenever cornered and seek revenge when nursing grievances", says Nicolas Pelham, Crisis Group's Senior
Analyst in Jerusalem.
Six months after its takeover, Hamas wants to show it can govern and restore order despite Israel's siege and continued
conflict with the Ramallah-based government. The role of clans and families is essential in this, as their growing
influence has both prevented Gaza's total collapse and fuelled its mounting disorder. Some powerful families have
furthered their own interests, forming militias and turning their leaders into warlords, establishing near autonomous
zones with informal justice and welfare systems.
After a period of tremendous chaos, Hamas dramatically reduced Gaza's internal turmoil. While the Islamists have cracked
down on the most unruly clans and those most strongly affiliated with their Fatah rivals, they risk blowback by pushing
core constituencies to the sidelines. As the struggle for diminishing resources intensifies, powerful clans and families
could emerge as magnets for dissent, which on repeated occasions has turned violent.
Hamas retains strong support in Gaza but its popularity has diminished due to the dire economic situation and often
brutal methods which have alienated important segments of the population. There are signs, early and insufficient, that
it recognises this and has begun to acknowledge that families, with manpower, loyalty and arms, are there to stay.
"Ultimately, effective governance and a resolution of the crisis in Gaza necessitate political reconciliation between
Fatah and Hamas and territorial unity with the West Bank, as well as a ceasefire with Israel and an end to its siege",
says Robert Malley, Crisis Group's Middle East Program Director. "In the meantime, Hamas could help preserve order and
improve prospects for stability by taking steps to cease brutal measures, broaden participation in its rule and reach a
workable arrangement with Gaza's families".
MIDDLE EAST REPORT N°71 *
Throughout Gaza's history, its powerful clans and families have played a part whose importance has fluctuated with the
nature of central authority but never disappeared. As the Palestinian Authority (PA) gradually collapsed under the
weight of almost a decade of renewed confrontation with Israel, they, along with political movements and militias,
filled the void. Today they are one of the most significant obstacles Hamas faces in trying to consolidate its authority
and reinstate stability in the territory it seized control of in June 2007. Although they probably lack the unity or
motivation to become a consistent and effective opposition, either on their own or in alliance with Fatah, they could
become more effective should popular dissatisfaction with the situation in Gaza grow. There are some, as yet
inconclusive, indications that Hamas understands this and is moderating its approach in an attempt to reach an
It has been six months since Hamas took control of Gaza, and, despite recent suggestions of possible reconciliation
talks with Fatah, the geographic split of Palestinian territories risks enduring. Israel's tightening siege and
continued conflict between Hamas and the Ramallah-based government have imposed exceptional hardship on Gazans,
seriously crippling the Islamists' ability to govern and fostering popular dissatisfaction. As a result, Hamas is
focused on more achievable priorities, including restoring law and order after a period of tremendous chaos.
The role of clans and families is central to this task. Over recent years, their growing influence has been a
double-edged sword. By providing a social safety net to numerous needy Gazans in a time of uncertainty, they helped
prevent a total collapse, yet they simultaneously contributed to the mounting disorder. Although they have filled the
void resulting from the judiciary's breakdown, they have done more than most to promote lawlessness.
Many observers have likened Gaza to a failed state. A number of powerful clans have formed militias, and some of their
leaders have become warlords. The symbiotic relationship between clans and rival movements (Fatah, Hamas and the Popular
Resistance Committees) escalated conflict among the latter by adding the dimension of family vendetta. In the final
years of Fatah's rule and during the turbulent national unity government from March to June 2007, such clans established
near autonomous zones with their own militias and informal justice and welfare systems - a process facilitated by
Israel's unilateral withdrawal in 2005.
Since its takeover, Hamas has dramatically reduced the chaos. It introduced measures designed to restore stability,
banning guns, masks and roadblocks. Those steps won praise from much of the population and, under different political
circumstances, might even have garnered international support, since donors had strongly urged many of them in the past.
The belief by some that the siege somehow will lead to Hamas's overthrow is an illusion. The Islamists in many ways have
consolidated their rule, and the collapse of the private sector has increased dependence on them. They also benefit from
a substantial reservoir of popular support.
Still, economic deprivation, Hamas's virtual monopoly on power and its harsh methods have generated discontent, which,
in the absence of alternatives, finds a principal and natural focal point in the clans and families. They provide
sustenance, protection, power and patronage and have shown the capacity to resist central authority whenever necessary
and fuel conflict whenever needed. In recent months, they have lowered their profile but they have also established red
lines: they will neither be disarmed by Hamas nor lose control over their neighbourhoods without putting up a fight.
For Hamas, this presents a straightforward dilemma. Determined to impose order and consolidate its rule, it has sought
to crack down on unruly clan- and family-based networks - all the more so since some have rallied to Fatah's side. But
facing popular dissatisfaction as well as an effective boycott from other international, regional and local forces, it
cannot afford to risk blowback by pushing core Gazan constituencies to the sidelines. There are signs - early and
insufficient - that Hamas is getting the message, recognising it has alienated important segments of the population and
acknowledging that families, with arms, numbers and loyalty, are there to stay.
Ultimately, effective governance and any sustainable resolution of the crisis in Gaza will require political
reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas and territorial unity with the West Bank, as well as a ceasefire with Israel
(including an end to the firing of rockets from Gaza and Israeli military operations) and an end to the siege. In the
meantime, however, Hamas could do much to preserve order and improve ultimate prospects for stability by taking steps to
cease brutal measures, broaden participation in its rule and - beginning by compensating for their losses in vendettas
and factional warfare - reach a workable arrangement with Gaza's families.
(c) International Crisis Group