Force for Good? 60 Yrs of Australian Peacekeeping

'The ADF and Peacekeeping', By Lieutenant General K.J. Gillespie, AO, DSC, CSM

Good afternoon distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. It is a great privilege to speak at this conference today on behalf of the Australian Defence Force. As you are aware this conference is timed to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the first Australian Defence Force contribution to peacekeeping in Indonesia in 1947.

That first mission consisted of just four personnel, and since that somewhat humble entrée into peacekeeping the Defence Force has contributed over 30 000 personnel to subsequent missions all around the globe. I've been privileged to have served in two such missions, in Namibia in the late 1989/90 in a Chapter 6 UN Mission, and in East Timor in 2000/01 in a Chapter 7 mission.

Today, in my present job as Vice Chief of the Defence Force and Chief of Joint Operations I Command all ADF operations, including the 5 United Nations and 3 multi-lateral peace keeping operations that the Defence Force is currently conducting.

I have recently been held accountable for the Defence Force's conduct of Peace Keeping by the Senate Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in their inquiry into Australia's involvement in Peacekeeping Operations.

In my presentation today I will explore the major lessons the Defence Force has learned from its peacekeeping operations, and how, based on these lessons, the Defence Force has adapted to the challenges of contemporary peace operations.

Increasingly, these contemporary peacekeeping operations are about more than simply achieving military objectives. They are also concerned with ensuring political stability, promoting good governance and human rights, providing humanitarian assistance and laying the groundwork for sustainable economic development. So how well has Australia and its Defence Forces adapted to this broader objective, and what have we learned from our peacekeeping experiences?

The Australian Defence Force has participated in 39 peace operations under the command of the United Nations and 16 non-United Nations peacekeeping operations, many of which were sanctioned by the UN. Our troops have been deployed as peacekeepers, peace-builders and peace enforcers. More than ever, the Australian Defence Force is being asked to support complex peace operations that include tackling internal instability within integrated missions that are comprised of military, police, civilian, and humanitarian organisations.

BACKGROUND

Sixty years ago Australia was one of the first countries to respond to what is now referred to as "traditional peacekeeping", when four officers were deployed as part of the UN Good Offices Commission to Indonesia. In this form of peacekeeping, the soldier's task was to observe, monitor, and report on compliance with ceasefire or truce agreements. This early model gave rise to the oft-quoted phrase by the then Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld that "peacekeeping is not a soldiers job, but only a soldier can do it". The world has certainly moved on, and now there are very few examples of a peacekeeping force being deployed into a situation that could be described as post-conflict, and increasingly less under Chapter 6 mandates. The most common scenario is a Chapter 7 mandate where consent by all parties is not assured, and with peacekeeping forces deployed into an operation area that may be characterised as a fragile or failed state. It is most likely that a variety of operational roles will be required from peace making to peace building, sometimes simultaneously.

Additionally, the complexity of modern peacekeeping operation requires a broader range of skills from Australian Defence Force peacekeepers. Winning the trust and confidence of the local people requires personnel that are not only well trained and equipped, but also sensitive and respectful of the local customs and culture. It also requires an inherent understanding of the role of the peacekeeper in the broader context of the mission.

CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING - MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED

The Mandate

Early mandates for Peacekeeping Operations demanded consent of the opposing parties under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. Most, if not all, recent Peace Keeping operations have been, or are being conducted, without the full consent of all stakeholders in the region. These missions often do not occur in the context of a truce arrangement and this results in the missions being constituted under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter.

Within this reality, should the United Nations ask Australia to commit to a peace keeping operation, it will likely be under a Chapter 7 mandate. It follows that to be capable of responding to a broader spectrum of threats expected on such missions, the Australian Defence Force will utilise its preparedness and capabilities necessary for the Defence of Australia to participate in complex UN or coalition Peace keeping operations. Further we will need to retain an agility to be able to adapt our capability to evolve with the changing character of peace operations in increasingly complex emergencies.

The Australian Defence Force's experience in East Timor confirms the need for a clear, credible and achievable mandate. In the case of UNTAET, the violence and cruelty of the militia were such that there was no hesitation to react forcefully - first by offering the possibility to members of the militia to give themselves up, and second by pursuing them. The simplification of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) - i.e. 'shoot to kill' if there was a threat to the mission was also a deterrent to the militia. It is still not clear whether this modus operandi could, or should, be adopted for other missions. Some commentators worried that the action of UNTAET might have stretched the definition of self-defence, and blurred the line between Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, whilst some United Nations operations in recent times have demonstrated how the strength or weakness of a mandate, Status of Force Agreement and mission-specific Rules of Engagement, can influence the success, or otherwise, of a peace operation.

The UN Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM 1, 1992-93) was established by the UN Security Council to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, provide protection and security for UN personnel, their equipment and supplies at the seaports and airports, and for the escort of deliveries of humanitarian assistance (HA) supplies to distribution centres. The mission was unsuccessful because its initial mandate under Chapter 6 was not robust enough, and it did not allow the mission to provide adequate protection for the convoys. Consequently, UNOSOM 1 had to be replaced by a US-led coalition (the Unified Task Force, UNITAF) which had a robust mandate and adequate ROE. UNITAF was then succeeded by UNOSOM 2 (1993-95), which was a Chapter 7 UN mission authorised to use enforcement measures to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia for Humanitarian Assistance operations. This mission included civilian police, who assisted with implementing judicial processes and re-invigorating the local police force.

UN mandates generally do not provide for security force activity outside the boundaries of the host nation, This complicates planning and security considerations. For example, in September 2000, a series of armed militia attacks against East Timorese people in refugee camps in West Timor culminated in the murder of three UN staff members in Atambua, which resulted in Humanitarian Assistance efforts in the region being suspended. In this case the Peacekeeping Force of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor was restricted to operations east of the border and was therefore powerless to intervene. Fortunately, the Government of Indonesia intervened in West Timor by taking immediate steps to re-establish safety and security in the refugee camps and for humanitarian workers.

In contrast, the deployment of the International Force in East Timor acknowledged the lessons learned from previous Peace Keeping missions. INTERFET's authority for deployment was timely and robust with host government consent, and it created a highly desirable environment for security and humanitarian operations. There was also a strong coalition of international support, involving some 22 countries that committed troops, equipment and essential strategic lift while other support was provided by the United States.

Even so, the decision to deploy will often hinge on Australia's national objectives and the Government's satisfaction with the proposed mandate. To get to this point some key questions must first be answered:

* Are the provisions of the Security Council mandate clear?

   – Does it support the peace process?

* Will the tasks assigned to the military force lead to the achievement of the mission's political objectives and the accomplishment of the mandate?

   – Are the tasks appropriate for peacekeepers to perform and are the rules of engagement appropriate?

   – Are the tasks realistically achievable by the military force, given the state of the conflict; or

   – are the tasks too ambitious for the conditions on the ground?

   – Can the peacekeeping force establish a safe and secure environment so as to instil trust (via confidence-building measures) between the warring factions?

   – Does the peacekeeping force have the credibility to maintain the consent of the parties?

* Is the proposed force appropriate in size and composition to accomplish the mandate?

   – Is the peacekeeping force adequately commanded, especially if there is a need for peace enforcement operations?

   – Are the operational strategy and force deployments appropriate to achieve stated objectives?

   – Does it have the required capabilities--for example, staff planning, command leadership, intelligence collection, operational mobility, communications, logistic support, force protection, demobilisation, de-mining, etc.?

   – Is the force mix of national contingents appropriate and conducive to unity of effort?

Without a clear understanding of all these issues the Government will be unlikely to commit Australian troops to an operation.

Responsibility to Protect

In late 2001 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan observed:

Today's real borders are not between nations, but between powerful and powerless, free and fettered, privileged and humiliated. Today, no walls can separate humanitarian or human rights crises in one part of the world from national security crises in another.

This observation encapsulates the reality of dealing with trans-national issues that are not neatly contained within borders. This reality adversely effected UN sponsored peace keeping operations in the 1990's namely Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. The scale of the human tragedy in these countries resulted in the UN being soundly criticised for failing to provide security to the local population or a failure to achieve a mandate. Disenfranchisement with the UN process was a factor in Australia's decision to form INTERFET outside the UN banner.

However since that time the principle of "Responsibility to Protect" espoused by Secretary General Annan was endorsed by the general Assembly in 2005, and by the Security Council in 2006. Responsibility to protect requires nations to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes and wholesale human rights violations. Should they fail to do so, the Security Council may sanction a Chapter 7 intervention with the primary aim to protect the local population. This can be done without the consent of the host government. One can only hope that this new development will ensure for the security and protection of all affected parties, not just the force protection of the deployed UN force as has often been the case in the past. But, this is by no means an assured outcome, and the need to ensure the protection of the population, not just the UN effort, was behind the Australian Government's decision to work with regional countries to mount the International Security Force in Timor Lest last year. The ISF was, like INTERFET, outside the UN Banner.

Force Structure

The structure of the Australian Defence Force is based on the national tasks articulated in the Defence White Paper which requires the Defence Force to protect Australia and its National Interests. Australia's Military Strategy has resulted in the development of a modern and agile conventional force capable of high end military tasks. However, most of the operations currently undertaken by the Defence Force are not against conventional enemies. We increasingly find ourselves operating in complex war fighting operations, against illusive enemies, which use asymmetric tactics in an attempt to nullify our technological superiority. This new paradigm has been neatly encapsulated by the United Sates Marine Corp in their Three Black concept:

In one block, a Marine will provide food, care and comfort an emaciated child. In the next block, you will see this Marine with outstretched arms, separating warring tribes. Then in the third city block, this same Marine will engage in intense house-to-house fighting with hostile forces . . . all on the same day, all within three city blocks

The Australian Defence Force's force structure continues to provide forces that are adaptable to peace operations. In the immediate future we are likely to undertake a range of operations other than conventional war, both in our region and beyond. As a result, preparing for peace operations will take a more prominent place in our defence planning than it has in the past. Although equipment procured for Defence of Australia will continue to suit peace operations, the demanding nature of contemporary peace operations may involve adjustments to our individual and collective training regimens. We have already seen evidence of this in our biannual exercise with the United States, Exercise Talisman Sabre, the most recent of which was conducted in Queensland in the middle of this year. We expect that many future exercises, while having elements of the continuum of conventional war; will include strong components of stabilisation and peace operations.

In peacekeeping operations the boundary between a benign situation and open conflict, either against local irregulars or more capable armed forces, can become blurred. Therefore, a visual deterrent that is commensurate with the mandate is required. Even in benign situations, a clearly evident capability to use force can help to keep complex emergencies peaceful. This implies that the capabilities we need for these types of 'complex emergencies' will have much in common with those we develop for more conventional conflicts.

The Australian Defence Force aims to continually develop and maintain high levels of war fighting skills, and this has allowed our forces to adapt to the challenges of lower level peace operations with relative ease. But we don't assume that high end war fighting skills make us naturally capable of conducting peace operations. These contemporary roles are continually supported by the efforts of the Defence Force's centres for training and doctrine development. This includes our own Peacekeeping Centre, which prepares peace operations training material, contributes to the development of relevant doctrine, and provides seminars for selected personnel from within the Australian Defence Organisation, external agencies and foreign nations. In this way we stay current and agile. Additionally, lessons learned from the deployment to East Timor indicated that some elements of doctrine and training for personnel engaged in peace operations, particularly those operating at the strategic, or Whole of Government level, may require supplementation. The recent initiative to place three Australian Federal Police officers in our Joint Operations Centre and at the Australian Defence Force Warfare Centre is a direct result of the lessons learned from both East Timor and Solomon Islands. Greater understanding and liaison between the "whole of government" agencies involved in peace keeping can only improve interoperability and ultimately our performance on operations.

The Defence Force is again reviewing the suitability of its existing training regime for peace operations, noting again that such training is supplementary to our primary war fighting roles and combat related training. A primary consideration in this review is the UN's strengthened resolve to formally standardise and evaluate the level of training achieved by Troop Contributing Nations. In addition to its pursuit of more consistent standards of core military skills, the UN also stresses the need for personnel in the field to have appropriate mission specific training.

A particular focus of the UN is also to ensure that Troop Contributing Nations demonstrate respect for local norms, culture and practices, and to achieve designated standards of training in human rights issues. These issues include those relating to gender, children, refugees and international displaced persons. As a consistent and well respected contributor to peace operations, it is in the Defence Force's interests to demonstrably achieve and train to these standards. But we are not doing this simply to be good international citizens. Such training makes good sense, and can potentially be a force multiplier. Mission rehearsal exercises and formal pre-deployment training are routine features of all ADF operational deployments.

Regional Arrangements

Australia has a long history of working closely with its traditional allies. Increasingly we have been encouraged by the willingness of our regional neighbours to join with us in peace keeping missions closer to home. The success of the missions in East Timor, Bougainville and Solomon Islands were in no small part due to the close cooperation between the contributing nations of South East Asia and the South West Pacific. Indeed, regional arrangements are becoming more favoured by the UN as That institution struggles to mount, manage and sustain the myriad of Peace Keeping Operations around the globe, and in particular, Africa.

So what advantages has the ADF seen resulting from regional arrangements such as the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands? Well, we are normally familiar with the history of the conflicts we face, and we are broadly aware of the cultural sensitivities of the situation under consideration. But we don't always know it all, and we've found great benefit in being able to leverage off the knowledge and experiences of our regional partners. As a consequence we have been able to apply a better and more balanced perspective to our appreciations of the nature of local conflicts, and in providing more fulsome advice to Government as our leaders have consider the need to commit troops.

Because of the shorter distances involved, a regional coalition is better placed to respond more rapidly and it removes the need for protracted Security Council considerations. Regional countries have a greater stake in the security situation and therefore are more inclined to provide a stronger focus on solutions. So too are they more inclined to stay the longer course, particularly through the vital post-conflict reconstruction phase. Finally, our increasingly close military contacts with our neighbours has seen our levels of transparency, trust and interoperability improve dramatically. This contributes greatly to successful early planning and subsequently the better conduct of Peace Keeping Operations.

We now have regular contact with most of the ASEAN countries through annual peacekeeping exercises such as Pirap Jabiru, a biennial exercise we conduct with Thailand. Exercise Pirap Jabiru has gone from strength to strength and now includes observers from Indonesia, The Philippines, Cambodia, Vietnam, Mongolia, Malaysia, Singapore and the United Kingdom. We are also developing standard operating procedures in partnership with the Indonesian Military. In turn, this close cooperation with our regional partners in peace keeping operations has further strengthened the military to military relationships with consequential spin-offs in other areas of Defence Cooperation.

Culture

Australia is a successful, long time, multi-cultural society; we have learned to be respectful of different cultures, and with the multitude of off shore military operations of the past decade this is particularly in the military. This respect, and anxiousness to understand the cultures of the Nations in which we operate, has borne considerable success in peace keeping operations in countries as diverse as Somalia, Cambodia Bougainville and Afghanistan. That's not to say that there isn't more to do. We must remain vigilant, and our training and force preparation must continue to ensure that our peacekeepers are fully aware of the differing cultures they may encounter during operations. In preparing our troops, we now understand it is not just the culture of the host country we must be cognisant of, but those of other nations' peacekeepers, the institutional cultures of the UN agencies and increasingly Non Government Organisations, even how our own cultural behaviours may impact on others.

For example, our egalitarian approach to life, does not always sit well in some cultural environments. We have learnt that no matter how successful the military operation, it can all be brought down like a house of cards through a small, seemingly innocuous, incident of cultural insensitivity.

A positive outcome of the integration of women in the Australian Defence Force is the added influence women peacekeepers have in engaging the most tragically affected group in any post conflict situation, the women and children. Winning the trust of this vulnerable group can also be vital in some cultures, because it often the women in a society that play the key role in conflict resolution and reconciliation.

Intelligence

Intelligence provides commanders and their staffs with the fullest possible understanding of the belligerents operating within a theatre. Moreover, intelligence at all levels supports the planning and execution of an operation by delivering timely and accurate information about belligerents and their influences, aims and objectives, courses of action, intentions, centres of gravity, and vulnerabilities.

Because of the nature of UN operations and the UN culture, Member States and the UN Security Council for many years did not see a need for nor endorse the need for 'intelligence operations' as an integral role of the UN military component. This was due to a combination of factors, including the sensitivity of the information collected, the UN perception that intelligence collection may result in the military component not being considered impartial, and a desire to avoid competing stakeholder interests. However, recent developments in peace operations have had significant ramifications for the safety of personnel and the conduct of operations. An unfortunate example is the targeting of the UN Compound in Iraq in 2003. There is now a clear understanding in the UNDPKO of the need for adequate intelligence assets and appropriate force capabilities in each new mission.

Joint Mission Analysis Cells are now regularly established in Peace Keeping missions. These cells are staffed with civilian and military analysts who provide centralised direction, collection, processing and dissemination of information for the mission. The role of the Analysis Cell is to provide the expertise to handle information, conduct and present analysis, build databases, and provide advice at a level that will ensure that decisions are made with awareness of all available and relevant factors. The analysis cell is the focal point for the fusion of information from all sources. It undertakes in-depth current and longer term analysis of issues affecting the mission and draws on information that is available from open sources as well as that gathered by all elements of the mission.

The strategic intent of the Analysis Cell is to harness information from multiple sources and services in order to provide the mission leadership with the ability to deter and defeat threats posed by armed groups and other spoilers within the area of operations. However, for it to work, it is essential that all parties within the mission are willing to cooperate and share information for the common good of the mission. Therefore, it is important that communication and liaison are established from the beginning to engender good working relations between all the components of a peace mission. The same principle applies for the liaison with external agencies such as Non Government Organisations and with other intelligence bodies in the region. The ADF and the wider Defence organisation expend a lot of effort in ensuring that the intelligence architecture for multi-national missions if sound and that each element of the force has the information it needs to survive and succeed. We do however, have some way to go in changing our own cultures to do more intelligence sharing with non-military participants, such as NGO's. We're working on this.
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)

Complex peace operations environments demand international and Non Government Organisation humanitarian agencies to work alongside, or with the assistance of, the military peacekeeping force. Some of these 'partners' are unwilling or are vehemently opposed to cooperating with the military. Its a matter of culture and outlook. In general, humanitarian Non Government Organisations and other international agencies are guided by three principles when they respond to a humanitarian crisis. These are humanity, impartiality and neutrality. Non-Government Organisations' perceptions of impartiality and neutrality are sometime compromised if operating cooperatively with the military.

Although the military and international humanitarian organisations may find themselves working side-by-side in complex emergencies, each operates differently. As a consequence, they each tend to regard their activities and information as proprietary, believing their respective organisational integrity and therefore mission, are at stake should they appear to be 'co-opted' by the military on one hand, or for the military to 'mission creep' more into the humanitarian space on the other. Collaboration, even if only perceived, can spell danger for Non Government Organisation's that are bound by a mandate based on the principle of neutrality. Military participants on the other hand, are not involved through any discretionary process of their own, and once deployed will work exhaustively at meeting the full range of effects demanded by their mission statement.

From a military commander's perspective, coordination, and cooperation with the host nation(s) and humanitarian agencies is aimed at developing an environment that achieves the military end state and minimises any adverse effects on the civil population. In this way they support wider humanitarian relief and peace building operations. We need to do more to ensure that military and wider humanitarian efforts are coordinated so as to achieve a wider outcome than just security or humanitarian aid. So important do we see the need for better understanding between the military and non government organisations, that last year an extra exercise was added to the curriculum of the Australian Command and Staff Course at the Australian Defence College. This exercise involves military planners working side by side with representatives of other government agencies, and non government agencies to resolve complex scenarios in a peace keeping and stability operation exercise environment. The practical benefits of this training will not only show that we're serious about working more harmoniously and effectively with non-military agencies, but it will produce better results in our next operational deployment.

The key task of the military contribution to a peace operation will normally be the establishment and maintenance of a secure environment within which humanitarian and governance functions can be undertaken without fear of intervention by third parties. This is not to say that the military will not be intimately involved in the provision of early humanitarian aid and other assistance. But we will always attempt to hand over responsibility of these assumed tasks to the appropriately and more often better equipped and trained civil agencies as soon as possible. Failure to establish some level of civil-military relations and coordination has proven to have adverse consequences for the humanitarian community and the overall success of the mission. It is clear to us that early engagement, the establishment of close working relationships, and joint training must be made more robust. We would like to see that process happen in Australia and before we have our next deployment. I look to many of you sitting in the audience to help us get this going as a matter of priority.

Moreover, from a purely military perspective effective Civil military cooperation has already proven to be an essential tool for deployed commanders. Where used effectively it can be as effective, or more effective, than a range of more kinetic effects.

Command and Control

Ultimately, the key to any successful peace operation is achieving, not only efficient command and control within the military force, but also effective cooperation and coordination between the military and all the civilian agencies involved.
Questions about the effectiveness of the UN command and control arrangements have been around for a long time. The UN has learned, sometimes painfully, that when a unified command approach is not adopted risks increase, and the risks of casualties and escalating mission costs become a reality. It is clear to us in the military that all agencies within a peacekeeping mission need to function in a unified fashion and that the mission is conducted in a way that reflects the will, and solidarity, of the international community and the needs of the nation being assisted. In short, contemporary peacekeeping operations require a clear authoritative mandate, clear accountabilities and collective and cohesive whole of force planning. This is not as easily achieved as I've made it sound, and it will certainly require some cultural change, and perhaps further structural change in the UN.

The Integrated Approach

In the twenty-first century, peacekeeping operations need to be part of a more comprehensive and long-term approach to stabilisation. World Bank research published in 2003 indicates that 44% of countries return to conflict within five years of the completion of a Peace Keeping mission. Thus, success in the future must be measured, not only in terms of halting the violence, but in addressing the root causes of the conflict in such a way that security and becomes enduring. This will require nations, individually or collectively through the UN or regional arrangements, to take a far more strategic approach to peace operations and re-construction. There will need to be a wider application of national and international power - not just military power or humanitarian assistance - and terms describing effort as whole of government, or whole of nation, or whole of UN, become more than clichés.

To meet the multi-dimensional nature of peace keeping operations, Defence now routinely finds itself engaged in consultation and planning with a variety of agencies such as Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Attorney General's Department, Aus AID, the Australian Electoral Commission and the Australian Federal Police. Recent Australian experiences in Bougainville, East Timor and Solomon Islands have proven that this approach works. Most recently in Solomon Islands, a DFAT lead mission saw the primary operational responsibility fall to the Federal Police with the Defence in a support role. We've started down the whole of government path, but there is some distance yet to travel.

The Need for Integrated Common Training

The principal government agencies that contribute to training for peace operations are the ADF Peacekeeping Centre, the 39th Personnel Support Battalion, the Australian Federal Police International Deployment Group and the Asia Pacific Centre for Military Law. These four centres combine to prepare Australian personnel to work overseas on Peace Support/ Stabilisation Operations. All centres use input from the same domestic and international agencies and actors to update their materials. But, once again, I believe that we can do better. Some integration and perhaps the establishment of a united Whole of Government peace operations training establishment, or at least a research institute, would seem to be logical, and both cost and operationally effective. Such a development, in my opinion, should be looked at sooner rather than later.

Interoperability with the AFP

Operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands signalled a new phase in Australia's involvement with peacekeeping operations due to the extensive use of law enforcement agencies coupled with a military commitment. The extensive and increasing use of Civilian Police, and the executive powers that the police have been granted, have impacted greatly on the conduct of operations.

Peacekeepers are frequently deployed into areas in which local law and order has ceased to function. The re-establishment and maintenance of Law and Order is not a military task and our troops are not trained for such operations. It is far more appropriate that these duties be performed by police.

Defence and the Federal Police have worked alongside each other on many missions and we've learned many lessons on the interoperability and interdependence of the two agencies. Until recently, the Federal Police was not structured for deployment and the capacity of the Federal police to quickly and in strength was limited. This often drew soldiers uncomfortably into the law and order environment and their success was somewhat patchy.

The creation of the International Deployment Group has been a boon to the ADF and we have seen a rapid closing of the capability gap which existed between the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Federal Police. There is still much to be done, particularly in the areas of doctrine, training, logistic support and operational planning, but the sense of purpose, and the mutual desire of both organisations to be better prepared for our next challenge is outstanding.

CONCLUSION

Over the past 60 years the Australian Defence Force has had a proud history of supporting peace keeping operations. The nature of peace operations has to evolve and has become much more complex. Similarly the Australian Defence Force has continued to evolve in order to stay relevant and able to succeed, regardless of the level of complexity. I believe that we can demonstrate a learning culture and our undoubted success across so many different types of operation in so many different parts of the globe is a testament to our people, their professionalism and their adaptability.

Complexity, and the need for peace operations to more than simply re-establish short term security for populations does demand that our national approach changes. If we are to provide for long term stability and progress in fragile nations, we have to bring more than just military, police and humanitarian power to the table. A more focussed whole of government, whole of nation, whole of region approach is required. We have a proud record of success, we have a firm foundation on which to build and the logic of the way ahead is clear. We need to get on with it, and Defence stands ready to work with you. Thank you.

ENDS

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