Africa Action Talking Points on How to Stop Genocide in Darfur, Sudan
Last Updated April 2007
Nothing short of an international intervention will stop the genocide in Darfur. Africa Action calls on the U.S. to do
everything necessary to secure the deployment of a United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force, authorized by UN Security
Council Resolution 1706, to stop the genocide and protect civilians and humanitarian efforts in Darfur.
What is Genocide?
The international legal definition of the crime of genocide is found in Articles II and III of the 1948 Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Article II describes the two elements that constitute the crime of genocide:
(i) The mental element, meaning the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious
group, as such", and
(ii) The physical element, which includes five types of violence described in sections [a] though [e] as follows: [a]
Killing members of the group; [b] Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; [c] Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; [d]
Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [e] Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
What is Happening in Darfur is Genocide
(i) Genocidal Intent: The intent of the Sudanese government to destroy, in whole or in part, three African ethnic
communities (the Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit), is clear from at least four categories of evidence: [a] Documentary
evidence; [b] Legal inference based upon the systematic perpetration of culpable acts directed against specific targeted
groups; [c] Testimony of witnesses who are survivors of the genocide; and [d] Government efforts to eliminate all traces
of mass graves.
[a] Documentary evidence: Sudanese government documents obtained by Human Rights Watch make clear government intent
through its actions of arming, equipping and transporting Arab militias to destroy targeted groups. In violation of UN
Security Council Resolutions, the government has withheld other documents requested by the UN, such as flight logs for
aircraft used by the government in Darfur, as well as the minutes of meetings of government security officials on
Darfur. Such documents would likely provide further documentary evidence of genocidal intent. According to The New York
Times on February 23, 2005, African Union observers have also uncovered a document indicating a policy of genocide on
the part of the government.
[b] International legal precedent (from the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) holds
that genocidal intent can be inferred from the context of the perpetration of culpable acts when they are systematically
directed against a group. For four years, the government of Sudan has established a pattern of atrocities including mass
killings and rapes, bombings, burning and pillaging villages, and destruction of water wells and crops, systematically
directed against the targeted groups.
[c] The testimony of survivors of genocide in Darfur consistently reports that the perpetrators of the atrocities
frequently and clearly stated their intent to destroy these groups as part of a broader government-inspired effort.
Attackers’ statements, such as “we will kill all the black,” are documented in an International Criminal Court report
from June 2006.
[d] According to witnesses and documentary evidence, the government of Sudan has sought to erase all trace of large mass
graves of executed civilians in Darfur. It has prevented researchers from obtaining forensic evidence from such sites.
(ii) Genocidal Actions: In Darfur during the past four years, the physical acts of violence that have been
systematically directed against the targeted groups have included all five categories of violence listed in the Genocide
Convention. These acts have resulted in the deaths of nearly 500,000 people1:
The following letters correspond to the five categories of genocidal violence listed under the legal definition of
genocide at the beginning of this document:
[a] more than 200,000 people have been killed by government forces and militias from 2003 to the present time, and the
killing continues, particularly as the government now masses its armed forces for escalated attacks in Darfur;
[b] bodily and mental harm has been inflicted upon thousands of women and young girls raped by soldiers and militias.
[c] at least an additional 200,000 lives have been lost through the deliberate destruction of homes, crops and water
resources and the physical displacement of more than two million people which have resulted in conditions of famine and
disease epidemics;
[d] the killing of pregnant women; and
[e] the use of rape as a weapon of genocide as many perpetrators have stated that their intent is to change the ethnic
identity of the child conceived by rape.
1 Accurate estimates of the death toll in Darfur have been difficult to ascertain because of obstruction on the part of
the Sudanese government and because of UN unwillingness to offer an official estimate. The best regular estimates of
mortality rates in Darfur have been provided by Prof.
Eric Reeves of Smith College (among others), who makes use of extensive data and scientific formulae for projecting
death rates in comparable conditions. The Coalition for International Justice also released a report in April 2005, confirming that the death toll in Darfur
was then close to 400,000.
3. The Humanitarian Crisis • Genocide in Darfur has created the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. As the violence
worsens, recent estimates from the UN, compiled by Eric Reeves, place the number of conflict-affected people in Darfur
and eastern Chad at almost 4.5 million. A UN statement from the beginning of April 2007 reports that almost 250,000
people have been displaced in the past six months, due primarily to government-sponsored militia attacks. Currently,
over one-third of the Darfuri population is displaced.
• The growing number of people dying each month could rise significantly if humanitarian operations continue to be
obstructed by violence. Oxfam and other aid agencies announced in April 2007 that they would suspend their activities in
Western Darfur, a move that will affect access to vital humanitarian assistance for 100,000 people. A continued collapse
of aid operations would jeopardize additional hundreds of thousands of lives in Darfur.
• The Khartoum government cannot be trusted to address the humanitarian crisis. Across the region, government tactics
such as import restrictions on fuel and routine harassment of aid workers stand in the way of effective relief efforts.
A leaked UN document revealed that the government of Sudan has painted Sudanese military planes used in attacks to
disguise them as UN or African Union (AU) aircraft. UN Secretary- General Ban Ki-moon warned that, “such actions would
be in clear violation of international law.”
• Security is Essential for Humanitarian Efforts: Adequate humanitarian assistance cannot be provided to vulnerable and
displaced groups in Darfur without military protection. This reality is particularly evident as relief workers are
increasingly targeted, forcing restrictions in aid operations and emergency evacuations of international staff. As
instability grows, five AU soldiers were also recently killed in Darfur.
4. The U.S. Acknowledges Genocide, But Fails to Take Necessary Action • The U.S. is the only government to have publicly
acknowledged that what is happening in Darfur constitutes genocide. On September 9, 2004, then-Secretary of State Colin
Powell declared that, "genocide has been committed in Darfur, and that the government of Sudan and the Janjawid bear
responsibility." The White House issued a statement the same day confirming this determination.
• At the same time as he acknowledged that genocide was being carried out in Darfur, Powell also defied logic, stating,
"no new action is dictated by this determination." • President Bush has failed to prioritize the genocide in Darfur. His
stated support for an international peacekeeping force has not been matched by concrete actions to stop the genocide and
provide protection for the people of Darfur.
• U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, Andrew Natsios, has engaged in discussions with Khartoum and with other international
stakeholders, but has yet to overcome the obstacles to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to Darfur. Vague
threats by the U.S. of a “Plan B” offer no substitute for a clear strategy to break the current deadlock on Darfur.
• U.S. policy towards Sudan is marked by three competing policy priorities: (1) support for the government of national
unity as part of the North-South peace process, (2) intelligence-sharing with the Sudanese government as part of the
so-called 'war on terror', and (3) ending the genocide in Darfur. The U.S.’ inability to stand firm on a clear message
of action against genocide has undermined the global response on Darfur and contributed to the stalling of the Sudanese
government.
• The U.S. has a clear moral and legal obligation to prevent and punish genocide as a signatory to the Convention on the
Prevention & Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
• The U.S. has provided generous humanitarian aid in Darfur, and it has engaged in efforts to support the peace process.
But its actions remain wholly inadequate in response to genocide, and it has failed to articulate or pursue a successful
strategy to protect people in Darfur.
5. The UN Acknowledges Crimes Against Humanity, But Fails to Protect • The United Nations’ International Commission of
Inquiry on Darfur delivered its report to UN Secretary-General Annan in January 2005. The report found that the Sudanese
government has committed major crimes under international law, including a pattern of mass killings, rape, pillage and
forced displacement and that these constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.
• Although the report provided ample evidence of genocidal intent and actions on the part of the Sudanese government,
the commission concluded that it did not find a government policy of genocide in Darfur. This hearkens back to the time
of the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, when the international community dodged the term “genocide” to avoid the obligations
that such a serious charge would invoke.
• The first conclusion of the report states that the people of Darfur “have been living a nightmare of violence and
abuse” and that “they need protection,” but the report fails to recommend any measures to provide such protection.
Subsequent monthly reports by the Secretary-General on the crisis in Darfur emphasize the protection needs of the people
of Darfur and the growing violence they face.
• The passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1706 in August 2006 marked an important step, authorizing more than
20,000 UN peacekeepers for Darfur. But the deployment of this force has been stalled in the face of Sudanese government
opposition. The members of the UN have continued to allow the Sudanese government to dictate the terms of the
international response to this crisis and have recently shown a disturbing willingness to abandon the implementation of
Resolution 1706.
• In April 2007, Khartoum announced its agreement to accept a “heavy support package” of more than 3,000 UN personnel,
characterized as a step towards a larger peacekeeping mission. This announcement, though celebrated by some, comes after
months of delays and with no guarantee of implementation, and does not achieve the necessary numbers to provide adequate
protection, as detailed in Resolution 1706.
• Khartoum still has allies on the Security Council, who accept its opposition to a UN peacekeeping mission. China is
the single largest investor in Sudan’s oil sector, while Russia is Khartoum’s major arms supplier. The Security Council
now faces a deadlock in determining how to proceed on Darfur. This deadlock will not be broken without new and strategic
diplomatic efforts from the U.S. and other powerful nations.
6. The African Union Cannot Respond Alone • The AU-sponsored peace talks between the Sudanese government and the rebel
groups in Abuja, Nigeria culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on May 5, 2006. However, only one
faction of the main rebel groups and the Sudanese government signed this deal. This cease-fire and similar subsequent
agreements have had no effect in deterring violence on the ground, and attacks against civilians have increased.
Violence is also increasingly spilling across the border into neighboring Chad.
• The AU has 7,000 troops on the ground in Darfur, but it has no mandate to protect civilians. Its mission clearly lacks
the troop strength, and the financial and logistical support necessary, to stop the ongoing genocide. As the AU mission
has struggled to perform with few resources, troop-contributing countries such as Senegal and Rwanda have warned that
they may soon be compelled to withdraw their forces.
• The AU has expressed its support for a transition from its current mission to a larger UN peacekeeping force, but the
Sudanese government opposes such a transition. The AU mandate has been repeatedly renewed by the AU Peace and Security
Council, most recently extending through June 2007. But the status quo cannot provide security on the ground. There is
an urgent need for a transition to a larger and better-equipped international force that can stop the violence and
protect the people of Darfur.
• Genocide is not an African problem, it is an international problem and, as such, it requires an international
response. The African Union is a young organization (established in 2002) and it is not yet equipped to respond to a
crisis of this magnitude. Faced with such a grave challenge, the international community cannot allow the AU to fail,
but rather must support, reinforce and expand upon its efforts in Darfur.
7. A Robust International Peacekeeping Force is Urgently Needed • As the genocide continues in Darfur, stopping the
genocide & protecting the people of Darfur must be the first priority of the international community. There is a clear
international consensus that a robust UN peacekeeping force is needed in Darfur.
• A peacekeeping intervention would serve four critical purposes: (1) Stop the killings, rapes and pillaging in Darfur
and enforce a cease-fire; (2) Provide security to facilitate urgent humanitarian assistance programs; (3) Create stable
conditions conducive to political negotiations (4) ultimately facilitate the voluntary return of displaced people to
their land by providing a secure environment.
• In September 2005, member states of the UN affirmed an international “responsibility to protect” civilians from
genocide and crimes against humanity. The response to Darfur now tests this principle. The Sudanese government cannot be
granted veto power over the international response to this genocide. The Security Council must act now and deploy a
force to Darfur immediately.
• The African Union troops must be supplemented as soon as possible with an international peacekeeping force of more
than 20,000, as authorized in UN Resolution 1706, and with a robust mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian
workers in Darfur. Unless the Security Council acts on Resolution 1706, the African Union will continue to be left to
bear the brunt of this growing catastrophe, and it will likely be blamed for failing to act sufficiently and in time to
save hundreds of thousands of lives.
8. What the U.S. Should Do:
• As the genocide continues in Darfur, the U.S. must use its leverage with the government of Sudan to overcome its
opposition and pave the way for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force for Darfur.
• In May 2007, the U.S. will hold the presidency of the UN Security Council, and it must take the lead in ensuring the
rapid deployment of a peacekeeping mission to Darfur. The U.S. must expend the necessary diplomatic capital to overcome
any Chinese and Russian objections, and to galvanize international action to protect the people of Darfur.
• Many UN member states remain skeptical about U.S. intentions given its un-sanctioned intervention in Iraq, and
Khartoum continues to manipulate these suspicions. But the U.S. must convince the members of the UN Security Council
that the genocide in Darfur requires urgent international action to protect the people of Darfur.
• If Khartoum’s consent cannot be achieved, the U.S. must assert leadership in the international community to identify
the nature and composition of a peacekeeping force that can implement Resolution 1706 and protect civilians in Darfur.
• Thirteen years ago, the U.S. blocked UN action as genocide unfolded in Rwanda. Now, the Bush Administration faces
growing public pressure for action to stop the genocide in Darfur. By achieving the deployment of a UN peacekeeping
mission in Darfur, the U.S. would demonstrate its commitment to protecting the people of Darfur and fulfill those calls
for leadership in the face of the first genocide of the 21st century.
ENDS