Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Terrorism in the Maritime Supply Chain
Thomas Lehrman, Director, Office of Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism
Remarks at Maritime Security Expo
New York, New York
September 20, 2006
Introduction Five years after 9/11, who among us cannot remember where they were on that day? We harbor no illusions
that those who attacked us five years ago cease to threaten us now. We have been assured by the same terrorists who
planned the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that they will use nuclear and biological weapons against
us, should they find a way to acquire them. We also know that the enemy we face adapts to our defenses; while aircraft
may have served as the preferred weapon of choice five years ago, tomorrow they may seek to slip a weapon of mass
destruction into a container ship headed for one of our ports and then onto the streets of our cities.
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) -- chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear -- in the hands of a terrorist pose
the single gravest threat to international peace and security today. The United States government is determined to work
with its foreign partners, both in government and in the private sector, to strengthen our national and collective
defenses against this preeminent threat.
Our Strategic Approach since 9/11
Since 9/11, the United States has taken a strategic and comprehensive approach to combating WMD and terrorism and
protecting the maritime domain from these and other twenty-first century threats. Let me briefly summarize the elements
of the various strategies that touch on these areas.
In 2002, the President announced the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, which established a
comprehensive approach for preventing the world's most dangerous weapons from falling into the hands of the world's most
dangerous actors. Our National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction establishes the following three pillars:
* Robust Counterproliferation Policies and Capabilities
* Strengthened Nonproliferation Measures
* WMD Consequence Management Preparedness
To integrate these pillars effectively, the strategy also called for strengthened intelligence capabilities, research
and development, targeted strategies against proliferants, and enhanced international cooperation. It also emphasized
the importance of bringing to bear all three pillars -- counterproliferation, nonproliferation, and consequence
management -- against the WMD terrorist threat.
In 2005, the President announced the National Strategy for Maritime Security which outlined a strategic approach to
protecting the maritime domain, including from the threats of both WMD and terrorism. This strategy set forth four
strategic objectives:
* Prevent Terrorist Attacks and Criminal or Hostile Acts
* Protect Maritime-Related Population Centers and Critical Infrastructure
* Minimize Damage and Expedite Recovery
* Safeguard the Oceans and Their Resources
The National Strategy for Maritime Security specifically identifies the important connection with the National Strategy
to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and outlines a vision for bringing together federal government maritime security
programs and initiatives into a comprehensive approach involving all appropriate federal, state, local, and private
sector entities. Equally important, it contains a strategy for cooperating and coordinating our efforts with key allies
worldwide. Most recently, the President signed a new National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, which identifies the central
importance of combating WMD terrorism by integrating our counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and nonproliferation
tools to confront and defeat the nexus of WMD and terrorist actors. This new strategy emphasizes the following six areas
as critical elements in a comprehensive approach to combating the WMD terrorist threat:
* Determining terrorists' intentions, capabilities, and plans to develop or acquire WMD
* Denying terrorists access to the materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities required to develop WMD
* Deterring terrorists from employing WMD
* Detecting and disrupting terrorists' attempted movement of WMD-related materials, weapons, and personnel
* Preventing and responding to a WMD-related terrorist attack
* Defining the nature and source of a terrorist-employed WMD device
The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the
National Strategy to Combat Terrorism demonstrate the comprehensive approach the President has outlined to ensure that
our government harness all elements of national power and that the United States works closely with allies and partners
to protect and defend the maritime domain from today's most serious national and international security threats.
Turning Strategy into Capabilities
The United States government has not rested on strategy alone; it has taken numerous proactive steps to implement these
new strategies, establishing new initiatives, programs, and partnerships to protect the global maritime supply chain
from the threat of WMD terrorism. Let me cite just a few examples of the various initiatives the Department of State is
working to advance.
The Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has taken a leadership role in protecting the
global maritime supply chain through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), a program that places U.S. officers
overseas to detect and inspect high risk containers in ports abroad. CBP has steadily expanded this program and has also
established the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a public-private partnership that strengthens
supply chain security practices among private sector actors. The Department of Energy has established the Megaports
Initiative to install radiation detection equipment at foreign seaports to enhance host governments' capabilities to
detect, deter, and interdict illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. The Megaports Initiative
also works in close partnership with CBP to strengthen our ability to detect nuclear and radiological threats in global
container traffic. And, more recently, the Department of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO),
established in 2005 by National Security Presidential Directive, was charged with developing an effective global nuclear
and radiological detection architecture to protect the homeland, an effort that offers an excellent opportunity to
strengthen our partnerships with our friends and allies abroad.
U.S. efforts to strengthen maritime supply chain security have extended beyond port security and radiation detection. In
2003, the President launched the Proliferation Security Initiative, or (PSI), to strengthen our capabilities to
interdict shipments by land, air, and sea of WMD, related materials, and their delivery systems. The PSI now includes
more than 75 nations and PSI participants have helped stop more than 30 high risk shipments, including centrifuge parts
bound for Libya's nuclear program. That interdiction in cooperation with the U.K., Germany, and Italy helped lead Libya
to make its historic decision to abandon its chemical and nuclear weapons programs and helped unravel and dismantle the
A.Q. Khan network. The State Department has worked closely with a variety of federal agencies to advance the PSI. The
Department of Defense has played an active leadership role in hosting and coordinating PSI Operational Experts Group
exercises and developing new concepts of operation for interdicting WMD, including in the maritime domain.
Financial enforcement has also played a critical role in protecting the maritime supply chain from WMD and terrorist
threats. The Department of State is working closely with the Treasury Department to deter, detect, and disrupt the
financial flows that underpin trade in WMD and which can aid and abet terrorist and organized crime activities in the
maritime supply chain. In support of these strategies, the United States has worked with a wide range of international
partners, both government and private sector, to block the assets of entities engaged in illicit activities and
highlight the risks they pose to the integrity of our international financial system upon which our global supply chain
relies.
Reducing WMD Terrorism Risk through a Layered Defense-in-Depth
Defending the United States and our international partners from a covert nuclear or biological attack by terrorists
presents many operational and technical challenges. Since we cannot afford to fail in this mission, we must embrace a
strategic approach capable of reducing this risk to its absolute minimum. We also know that no matter how effective, no
single capability can provide a fail-safe protection from a WMD terrorist attack.
To reduce our collective risk from WMD terrorism, we must develop with our partners a layered defense-in-depth. A
layered defense, or defense-in-depth, is a strategic concept employed in a diverse range of security-related fields,
from missile defense to cybersecurity. Its central premise, especially applicable to combating WMD terrorism, is that no
single layer, or capability, can provide us with sufficient protection against a determined and adaptable terrorist
adversary. However, a terrorist or a terrorist facilitator who has to overcome multiple defenses in the course of his
attack plan is more likely to be detected or deterred, or to fail during the attempt.
An effective layered defense should focus not merely on preventing terrorists from linking up with those facilitators
that would provide them with WMD and related enabling capabilities; it should also take active defensive measures to
detect and disrupt existing linkages between terrorists and those that might facilitate a WMD attack. Working with our
international partners will be essential to deploy and sustain a layered defense-in-depth against WMD terrorism, since
terrorist plots and conspiracies have often involved multiple jurisdictions, with the terrorist attackers, weapons
designers, transport agents, financiers, and other facilitators all operating in different countries. The Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism: Securing the Maritime Supply Chain from Nuclear and Radiological Threats
To confront the growing risk of nuclear terrorism, President Bush and President Putin announced together on July 15 of
this year the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, a new effort whose purpose is to bring together a growing
network of like-minded partner nations to accelerate the development of partnership capacity to combat this threat in a
determined and systematic fashion. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism takes a strategic and comprehensive
approach to combating all aspects of the nuclear terrorism challenge, from strengthening physical protection of nuclear
material, to detecting and disrupting its movement by or to terrorists, to consequence management in the aftermath of a
dirty-bomb or nuclear attack.
The first meeting of initial partner nations participating in this new initiative will take place this October, and both
Presidents Bush and Putin have called for outreach to industry and the public to secure full implementation of the
initiative's objectives. As the Global Initiative develops, we look forward to working more closely with many of you
here today to strengthen our national and global capabilities to combat the most serious security threat we face today:
a nuclear weapon in the hands of a terrorist.
Public-Private Partnerships: An Emerging Global Best Practice
In a post-Cold War era, as Secretary Rice has articulated, the gravest threats we face increasingly result not only from
nation-states, but also from the activities of non-state actors, either terrorist, criminal, or groups otherwise engaged
in destabilizing, transnational illicit activity. Our terrorist adversaries seek not only to kill innocent civilians,
but they have also targeted our economic infrastructure with the goal of reducing our capacity and will to continue the
fight. Since over 90% of global trade in goods is transported in containers through the maritime supply chain, ports and
related infrastructure are an inviting target. We also know illicit non-state WMD traffickers, such as A.Q. Khan, have
used the maritime supply chain to transport WMD materials and delivery systems, and the PSI is an important initiative
that our government has taken to confront this threat.
Continuously strengthening our capabilities to confront and defeat terrorists and non-state actors operating in the
seams of the global maritime supply chain and outside the rule of law will demand new and adaptive public-private
partnerships. The partnerships must be capable of detecting illicit and terrorist activity at an earlier stage of
development and enable governments to accelerate the appropriate enforcement response. As the work of many agencies has
already shown, many public-private partnerships are already in place and have worked well. We must strengthen and extend
these partnerships in new directions to deter, detect, and take confident and effective action against terrorists and
non-state actors involved in the WMD trade. The private firms that own, operate, and insure ports and the shipping and
logistics providers that work with them recognize that promoting best security practices across the global supply chain
not only protects our national security, it protects their individual corporate reputations, enhances their bottom
lines, and promotes our collective economic security. Public-private partnerships have in a short period of time become
a new "best practice," benefiting both government and industry, and we invite private sector entities to consider new
ways in which such partnerships can protect the maritime supply chain, and more broadly the global supply chain, from
emerging 21st century threats.
Deploying Emerging Technologies to Reduce WMD Terrorism Risk
Reducing WMD terrorism risk in the maritime supply chain depends on more than just partnerships, strategic clarity, and
bigger security budgets. It requires the research and development of new technologies, the application of those new
technologies into tested systems, and the incorporation of those systems into innovative concepts of operation which
interoperate seamlessly with the security capabilities of our trading partners abroad. So let me commend the many
contractors, engineers, and suppliers here today who are working hard to translate security innovations in fields such
as enterprise risk management, WMD detection systems, biometric identity verification tools, GPS location technology,
RFID technologies, and wireless networking into holistic systems that governments and port operators can use on a daily
basis to increase our situational awareness, reduce security risk, and keep our citizens safe from even the most
adaptive adversaries we might face.
Let me also take a moment to emphasize the importance of researching, developing, and deploying technologies and systems
that can facilitate the real-time sharing of information among and between international partners. If 9 /11 taught us
only one lesson, it was that connecting the dots among and between those involved in a terrorist plot requires agencies
across our federal, state, and local governments to share information more rapidly and to enable confident action before
terrorists can achieve their goals. As the recent terrorist attempt in the U.K. showed, averting the next attack against
the United States or against one of our allies may well depend on our ability to share information in real-time not only
within our own government, but also with our foreign partners, either in government or in the private sector. Securing
the maritime supply chain in the 21st century will also depend to a large degree on our ability to identify threats and
share that information rapidly with those domestic and foreign partners in a position to respond most effectively.
Meeting the Security Challenges of Globalization
We marvel today at the communications and transportation innovations of the last ten years, as well as the international
legal and regulatory frameworks that have enabled what we commonly refer to as "globalization." We recognize that the
maritime supply chain forms just one element of an increasingly seamless intermodal and global supply chain. This global
supply chain reaches well beyond the maritime domain and interconnects with land, air, cyber, and financial domains,
weaving its way, often unnoticed, through our international, national, state, provincial, and local jurisdictions.
As this increasingly global and interdependent supply chain has come into form, governments have often played catch-up
to ensure that terrorists, WMD traffickers, and others engaged in transnational illicit activity are denied access to
this precious global resource on which our national and economic security increasingly depends. As we reflect on this
challenge, let us remember that this resource will not secure itself; it will require energy and innovation to develop
the transformational partnerships between governments and with the private sector to ensure that market-based incentives
are aligned, best practices are rewarded, and protective measures are in place to deny bad actors access to both a
target and a safe haven they have shown a clear intent to exploit. This conference, in this great city, is surely the
place to build on and sustain this all-important work.
Released on September 27, 2006
ENDS