The Fight For Fallujah - March-April 2005 Field Artillery
TF 2-2 IN FSE AAR:
Indirect Fires in the Battle of Fallujah
By Captain James T. Cobb,
First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour
and Sergeant First Class William H. Hight
Task Force 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry’s (TF 2-2 IN’s) fire support element (FSE) operated as a mini-brigade FSE during
the Battle of Fallujah. The FSE coordinated the combat effects of Army, Air Force and Marine assets more autonomously
than the traditional, doctrinal battalion- level FSE—a model of joint interdependency.
Although the FSE did not have joint personnel assigned to it, it worked closely with the brigade air liaison officer
(BALO), who was chopped to TF 2-2 IN, and functioned as a “Joint FSE,” if you will.
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: FSE, TF 2-2 IN, 3d Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 1st ID, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, Forward
Operating Base (FOB) Normandy, Muqdadiyah, Iraq APO AE 09392 (AETV-BGR-FSE), 1 December 2004.
Subject: After-Action Review (AAR) for the Battle of Fallujah
1. Background and Mission. The Battle of Fallujah was conducted from 8 to 20 November 2004 with the last fire mission on 17 November.
The battle was fought by an Army, Marine and Iraqi force of about 15,000 under the I Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF),
sweeping from north to south. The joint and combined force cordoned the city and searched door-to-door, clearing
buildings and engaging insurgents in the streets—reputedly the most fierce urban fighting for Marines since the Battle
of Hue City in Vietnam in 1968.
Fallujah is roughly 40 kilometers west of Baghdad on the Euphrates River.
Its population before the battle was about 250,000 people; however, TF 2-2 IN encountered few civilians in its attack
TF 2-2 IN’s mission initially was to attack south to Phase Line (PL) Fran (Highway 10) from the northeastern edge of the
city to protect our eastern flank and destroy the anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF), keeping the lines of communications open. For
the attack, the city was sliced north and south into six areas of responsibility (AORs): TF 2-2 IN on the northeastern
slice of the city with TF 1-3 Marines on our western flank followed (east to west) by TF 1-8 Marines, TF 2-7 Cav, TF 3-5
Marines and, finally, TF 3-1 Marines in the northwestern AOR along the Euphrates River.
During the attack, many fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) were issued, which pushed TF 2-2 IN south of PL Fran to the southern
edge of the city. TF 2-2 IN’s rear tactical operations center (RTOC) and two M109A6 Paladin howitzers were at Camp
Fallujah (22 kilometers southwest of Fallujah) from which the Paladins fired during the Battle of Fallujah.
The city is about five kilometers wide and five kilometers deep. It is divided east and west by Highway 10 with
residential neighborhoods to the north and the industrial sector in the south. In the most southern sector of the city
is a poor neighborhood that was filled with foreign fighters, dubbed the “Martyr’s District.” This was the sector in
which we encountered the heaviest resistance.
2. Enemy Forces. In TF 2-2 IN’s AOR, the AIF had emplaced many obstacles and fortified buildings as strongpoints, dug
trenches and established fighting positions and bunkers.
Additionally, the enemy had rigged buildings and vehicles with explosives.
Along the southeastern portion of the city, the AIF emplaced rockets as remotely controlled direct fire weapons against
any Coalition Forces that attempted to attack from the south or east of the city. The enemy also emplaced improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and mines along key routes and at intersections to impede and funnel Coalition Forces’
Vast caches of AIF munitions had been positioned throughout the sector for tactical resupply.
3. Friendly Forces. TF 2-2 IN deployed to Camp Fallujah under the operational control (OPCON) of Marine Regimental Combat Team-7 (RCT-7),
1st Marine Division. TF 2- 2 IN’s task organization consisted of one mechanized infantry company, one armored company,
the brigade reconnaissance troop (BRT), one Iraqi Intervention Forces (IIF) Battalion (-), one engineer platoon, two
M109A6 Paladins (positioned on Camp Fallujah), four organic 120- mm mortars and two 81-mm mortars.
Four Air Force joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs) were attached from the 3d BCT headquarters and sliced out to
the maneuver companies with one BALO and an enlisted driver in the task force tactical command post (TAC).
4. Artillery Fires. As part of TF 2- 2 IN, the M109A6 Paladins and a platoon fire direction center (FDC) were attached in direct support
(DS) to the TF. For most of the fight, this was their only role. Later, after TF 2- 2 IN had reached its limit of
advance (LOA) at PL Fran, it also was tasked to support RCT-7.
The Paladins were in a position area (PA) in Camp Fallujah adjacent to the Marine Corps and a battery of Paladins from
the 1st Cavalry Division, A/3-82 FA, that was attached to the IMEF. This facilitated the FA’s sharing meteorological
(Met) data and survey and relieved the platoon of self-security.
a. Organic to the TF. As an organic part of the TF, the howitzers provided accurate, timely fires throughout the fight,
delivering 925 rounds, mostly in danger-close fires. As dedicated assets to the TF, Paladin fires were greatly expedited
in a 360-degree fight with fluid targets and a rapidly advancing maneuver force.
Fire missions took less than two minutes from the initial call-for-fire (CFF) to rounds down range.
b. Responsibilities of TF FSE. The TF FSE assumed responsibility for coordinating with the TF 2-2 IN S4 for Class V
resupply, positioning the platoon and selecting shell-fuze combinations.
The TF FSE cleared fires at the TAC along with the TF battle captain or S3. Clearance of fires was executed by demanding
accurate company frontline traces and forward observer (FO) locations at regular intervals and battle tracking in
c. Role of the Artillery. The artillery was used in doctrinal roles, such as screening the initial point of penetration,
preparatory fires, close fire support and disruptive deep fires, as well as in non-doctrinal roles, such as clearing
routes of IEDs and breeching minefields.
Using Paladins directly attached to the TF gave us a tremendous advantage in the fight. Our tactics, techniques and
procedures (TTP) were effective and lethal and gave maneuver TFs greater flexibility, firepower and mobility.
The overall performance was outstanding.
By using FOs and accurate intelligence- driven targeting, the artillery was a driving force in the TF’s ability to
attack through a large city with minimum casualties in six days.
d. Massing Fires. The only drawback was our inability to mass fires on targets due to having only two guns. While we did
have general support reinforcing (GSR) assets, they were slow, cumbersome and more difficult to coordinate with than our
organic systems. Trust was also an issue as the vast majority of our fires were danger-close, and we did not know the
proficiency level of the supporting guns.
While it did not impact our operations overall, at times the physical and psychological effects of massed artillery
fires were the preferred effects. We could use our 120-mm mortars when we wanted to mass fires, but additional 155-mm
howitzers would have been more effective.
5. Mortars. The Thunder Mortar Platoon that is organic to 2-2 IN proved to be the equal of the artillery in this fight in terms of
accuracy and responsiveness and was an integral part of the indirect fires used.
When provided the five requirements for accurate predicted fires, mortars were every bit as accurate and deadly as
artillery. The firepower of the 120-mm munitions allowed us to respond quickly with overwhelming firepower when needed.
During the course of the battle, mortars fired 942 rounds of timely, accurate fires.
a. Mortar Challenges. Our mortar platoon received two M252 81-mm mortars before deploying to the Fallujah AOR. These
were useful indirect fire weapons when close fires were required.
The only drawback was they had no sights. To use them, we had to take sights from the 120-mm tubes and use the sights
with the 81-mm mortars, taking two 120-mm tubes out of the fight.
The mortars’ high angle of fire was preferable for military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), but there were times
when the mortars’ maximum ordinate (MAXORD) exceeded the close air support (CAS) ceiling, limiting mortar fires.
b. Platoon Security. The mortar platoon operated outside of Camp Fallujah at various firing points and had to pull
self-security. It was manned to do so with no degradation of fires. The platoon received enemy indirect fires frequently
during the fight and was forced to displace. But due to superior training and good maneuverability, it quickly
displaced, reset and resumed operations.
6. Danger-Close Fires. Dangerclose missions were the rule, not the exception. 2/A/1-6 FA, our Paladin platoon, and Thunder Base, our 120- mm
mortar platoon, quickly earned our confidence in their abilities to deliver timely and, more importantly, accurate
fires. We routinely had 155- mm and 120-mm fires within 200 meters of friendly forces. Less frequently, 81-mm mortars
fired within 100 meters.
a. Walking Fires In. We could deliver fires in various ways. The nature of MOUT actually helped us mitigate the risk of
danger-close missions because the houses and structures served as buffers for effects between friendly forces and the
The most widely used method when bringing fires in was to “walk” the fires in close, using adjustments sent from an
observer. Before going into the fire-foreffect (FFE) phase, friendly companies about to receive danger-close fires were
alerted and given time to button up or take cover.
b. Danger-Close Redefined. Per doctrine, the smallest munitions were used closest to the frontline traces of the
maneuver element and larger munitions at greater distances. Although this technique was used, rarely were any fires
outside of the doctrinal danger-close 600 meters. That was the “deep fight” in this environment, and to have considered
it as danger-close and followed all of the existing procedures for adjustment would have decreased the effectiveness of
7. FOs. The FOs played a key role in this fight. We placed a fire support team (FIST) with A/2-2 IN, an FO with the BRT and a
fire support officer (FSO) with A/2-63 AR. The FIST with A/2-2 IN included a sergeant (promotable) as the FSO, a private
first class as radiotelephone operator (RTO) and a sergeant of our team chiefs, a sergeant who was an experienced FO,
became the BRT FO. We did not have the manning to deploy full FISTs but compensated by deploying leaders where they were
most effective; the FSE platoon was at 50 percent strength.
a. BRT FO Positioning and Reconnoitering.
A/2-2 and A/2-63 were deployed in the city for most of the fight with the BRT screening to the east. Due to the BRT’s
position outside the city, the BRT FO Sergeant Raymond Sapp had excellent observation from dominant terrain and was
decisive in the early fight. He was in position very early before the attack. This was excellent TTP that allowed us to
adjust the preplanned smoke fires for breeching operations and destroy enemy observation posts (OPs).
As any combat training center (CTC) fight tells us, he who wins the reconnaissance fight will do well. Sergeant Sapp
could destroy enemy OPs early and refine target locations as well as confirm or deny that targets we had planned were
viable, such as AIF targets or buildings that did not appear to have been recently inhabited. His location with the BRT
outside the city looking in enabled him to see the entire battlefield and service targets throughout.
He used the BRT’s long-range advanced scout surveillance system (LRAS3), an excellent piece of equipment that allowed
him to accurately locate targets, day or night, with 10- digit grids. LRAS3 is superior to the ground/vehicular laser
locator designator (G/VLLD) in both optics and target location, has night-vision optics and can be mounted on vehicles.
If scout and BRT elements have this equipment, fire supporters also should have it.
b. City FOs Kept Moving. The other observers were not as fortunate during the early phases of the fight because they
were down in the city and could not readily occupy OPs on dominant terrain.
The platoons that included FOs could not afford the time or manpower to establish an OP while they were conducting the
However, during halts or while the platoons occupied strongpoints, the observers established OPs and destroyed targets.
The platoon FOs came into play mainly before the task force crossed the line of departure (LD) when they could occupy
OPs on rooftops and adjust preparatory fires. Sergeant Randall Laird was very effective at adjusting rounds onto
specific houses and destroying them before we crossed the LD.
c. FO Vehicles. The FOs had to ride in the back of Bradley fighting vehicles (BFVs) or M113s to move around the
battlefield, degrading both their communications and ability to observe fires.
The TF FSO chose not to bring our two FIST vehicles (FISTVs) to the fight for the following reasons: they are
mechanically unreliable; we could not man them, given our personnel strength; and they cannot stay abreast of maneuver
forces in Bradleys.
Instead we had M1114 up-armored high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) with all related equipment in them
although they often were left in the combat trains with the FSO’s riding in the company commander’s Bradley.
We could have used the new Bradley fire support team vehicles (BFISTVs) with the personnel to man them.
d. Attached Companies with No FISTs.
One of the biggest issues for FOs and manning was attached companies from other battalions that did not bring their FIST
personnel. A/2-63 AR brought only one second lieutenant for fire support— no other FISTers. This severely degraded its
ability to use fires during the battle, especially when its FSO was wounded in action (WIA).
A company attached as part of a TF must bring its entire FIST, particularly in a MOUT fight. If not, the ability to
support that company with fires is extremely difficult.
8. Other Equipment. Before deploying to Fallujah, we made deliberate choices about what equipment to bring and what to leave behind, and
there was equipment we should have had but did not have.
a. Fire Support Gear. The FOs had single-channel ground and airborne radio systems (SINCGARS) manpacks, binos, a
compass, Viper-2 night-vision goggles and precision lightweight global positioning system receivers (PLGRs).
Communications were adequate.
They were degraded when moving, but once OPs were established, they worked well.
The Viper-2 is an excellent tool for FOs. In conjunction with the PLGR, it reliably provided accurate target location.
The Blue Force Tracker was a good tool to use at the TF FSE. It provided a good picture of forces on the battlefield,
but could not give friendly unit locations consistently enough to clear fires.
It is useful for targeting when imagery is loaded.
The flash, immediate, priority and routing (FIPR) messaging function of Blue Force Tracker was a good tool we did not
use fully. It could have been very effective in communicating and passing fire support products from TOC to TAC and
b. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS). We used JSTARS as a targeting tool. The assistant FSO and
S2 collected JSTARS data at the TOC and passed it to us as targeting data to be serviced with indirect fires.
c. Advanced FA Tactical Data System (AFATDS). We did not have AFATDS in the FSE, although 2/A/1-6 FA’s platoon
operations center (POC) did. The battalion- level FSE has only one AFATDS, and it was at FOB Normandy to support
We need two AFATDS at the task force level.
Twice we’ve had to execute split operations and leave the AFATDS behind (Najaf, April 2004).
Fires were controlled at the TAC. With the vehicle available, we could not have used AFATDS, although with a BFIST, we
would have been able to.
We did not use the lightweight forward entry device (LFED); it was too time-consuming to input targets of opportunity,
and there was no AFATDS at the battalion FSE.
9. Munitions. The munitions we brought to this fight were 155-mm highexplosive (HE) M107 (short-range) and M795 (long-range) rounds,
illumination and white phosphorous (WP, M110 and M825), with point-detonating (PD), delay, time and variable-time (VT)
fuzes. For the 120-mm mortars, we had HE, illumination and WP with PD, delay and proximity fuzes. We also carried 81-mm
HE with the same fuzes.
a. Range of Munitions. The munitions at our disposal gave us excellent flexibility.
The 81-mm munitions allowed us to deliver extremely close fires to friendly forces while we used larger caliber
munitions to engage and destroy heavily fortified houses and bunkers.
The standard table of organization and equipment (TOE) for a mechanized battalion does not include 81-mm mortars,
something the Army should examine and correct.
b. White Phosphorous. WP proved to be an effective and versatile munition.
We used it for screening missions at two breeches and, later in the fight, as a potent psychological weapon against the
insurgents in trench lines and spider holes when we could not get effects on them with HE. We fired “shake and bake”
missions at the insurgents, using WP to flush them out and HE to take them out.
c. Hexachloroethane Zinc (HC) Smoke and Precision-Guided Munitions. We could have used these munitions. We used improved
WP for screening missions when HC smoke would have been more effective and saved our WP for lethal missions.
We had several important targets, often reinforced houses that FOs had eyes on, that would have been more effectively
engaged with a precision-guided munition, such as Copperhead with its shaped charge or the developmental Excalibur
Unitary round that is concrete piercing (to be fielded in 2006).
Barring the use of such precision-guided munitions, concrete-piercing (CP) fuzes would have been more effective than
delay and PD fuzes were, but the latter were satisfactory.
d. Ammo Resupply. The biggest challenge we had was ammunition resupply.
The amount of munitions expended was surprising, and we had to struggle to keep our cannons and tubes supplied.
The targeting officer at the TOC and the S4 did a fantastic job of obtaining ammunition, but in the future, it would be
easier to over-anticipate ammunition needs before the fight and stockpile it.
The Marines gave us what they had, and the location of the Paladin platoon on FOB Fallujah helped greatly. The fact that
the Paladin platoon brought a palletized loading system (PLS) was a huge plus. It allowed the S4 to coordinate for
ammunition and the Paladin platoon to pick it up.
In the final analysis, it all worked, but I recommend we not put ourselves in that position again. We never ran out of
ammunition, but we came close several times.
10. CAS. We used CAS well in this fight, dropping more than 15 guided-bomb unit-12s (GBU-12s), which are laser-guided
500- pound bombs; four 2,000-pound joint direct attack munition (JDAMs) penetrators; and one Maverick. We also had more
than six hours of AC-130 Specter gunship support.
a. CAS Effectiveness.
We had problems with the GBU-12s. At least five duds were dropped, all from F/A-18s. The AC-130 was an awesome weapon,
operating at night and prepping our deep battlespace with outstanding accuracy.
The four JDAM penetrators were dropped on a bunker complex with excellent results. The bunker and more than 20 AIF were
Initially, we had difficulty working with Marine air. However, once our JTACs learned the system, it worked rather well.
An air liaison officer (ALO) from the Marines at the TOC would have helped in the early stages and facilitated the use
of more Marine CAS.
b. Pulling Timely Air Assets. While the Air Force JTACs were useful on the ground, they had limited success pulling
timely air assets. A TOC ALO is a must for two reasons: first, a Marine ALO with direct access to higher will pull air
assets more quickly and be able to disseminate their fires faster than an Air Force JTAC on the ground. Second, you need
an officer who understands the Marine system attached to the FSE for better coordination.
Air assets are requested through a different system than indirect lethal fires.
An ALO with two radios tied in to higher and the battalion is a must and will cut air request times in half. Although
air was planned, it often was difficult for the battalion JTAC to talk to the RCT-7 ALO and get air when needed.
c. CAS and Other Indirect Fires. A big lesson is that CAS was not a substitute for responsive artillery and mortars.
CAS was most effective in the deep fight, particularly when used on intelligence- driven targets.
11. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Tactical UAVs (TUAVS). UAVs were an integral part of this fight and should be included in any future planning. The UAVs in this fight—the
Predator, Shadow, Hunter and Pioneer— were very effective for precision, intelligence-driven targeting. Their targets
often were built-up strongpoints being fortified or occupied before our attack.
a. Targets in the Deep Fight. The UAVs gave us a great advantage in the deep fight, usually beyond the coordinated fire
line (CFL). We engaged what the AIF considered safe areas well in advance of the forward line of troops (FLOT),
destroying the AIF’s command, control and communications (C3) nodes and denying them any respite from the fight, a
tremendous psychological advantage.
Except for the Raven TUAV, the UAVs provided 10-digit grids and accurate target descriptions, allowing us to choose the
most appropriate weapon for the targets. The Raven also did not have enough loiter time to obtain the information we
b. Targets of Opportunity. We attempted to initiate and adjust fire missions against targets of opportunity using UAVs
as observation platforms and were unable to do so in a timely and accurate fashion. It was difficult to coordinate with
the platform operators who were great distances away (some stateside) to give us the viewing angles needed for
The TF TOC used UAVs for targeting and as observers for fire missions several times. But unless the UAVs were looking
straight down, the grid received usually was off by several hundred meters. When adjusting from the Predator, the delay
on the feed is about 20 to 30 seconds. The Shadow or Scan Eagle is a better platform for battalion indirect fires as
they are more responsive and more easily adjusted.
We displayed the UAV feed in the TOC on a projector so the FSE could coordinate and call for fires. The easiest way to
call for fires is to create a fictitious observer and adjust through cardinal directions (the operators flying the UAVs
are not trained in calling for fires). We need to develop TTP for adjusting fires with UAVs.
The way to use a UAV is for the TF FSE to have this asset under its control.
It was an almost insurmountable task to coordinate for and adjust fires accurately using UAVs because the controlling
element had to describe the rounds’ impact.
12. Personnel Manning. Big problems in this fight were lack of fire support personnel with concurrent operations in two separate geographical
The TF 2-2 IN FSE had 14 of 30 authorized personnel before the tactical road march to Fallujah.
a. Fire Support Personnel. TF 2-2 IN forward deployed with a 10-man FSE, including FIST personnel, leaving four
personnel behind as part of the S5 and operations sections.
Even when the TF fire support NCO was able to join the FSE, the shortage of personnel stretched the FSE. At the TOC, the
targeting officer and RTO literally slept next to the radios. Until the TF FSNCO arrived, the TF FSO was forced to
maintain 24-hour operations for three days.
The company FSO for A/2-63 AR was WIA on Day +3, leaving that company with no organic FSE to facilitate fires,
effectively taking them out of the indirect fire fight.
b. Manning Effects on the Fight. The shortage of fire support personnel put unnecessary strain on maneuver elements and
damaged our ability to detect, engage and destroy targets. In future combat deployments, it is imperative for the Army
to ensure fire support personnel are at or near 100 percent strength to avoid the problems we faced in this fight.
13. Training. The training that platoon, company and battalion personnel received at the various CTCs paid off richly. Our fire
supporters could handle any mission presented to them.
TF 2-2 IN FSE conducted dangerclose training several times in Iraq that paid huge dividends in the Battle of Fallujah.
a. Confidence in Fires for the Force.
FOs were confident in their ability to call for and adjust close fires and often did so. Training with our organic
mortar platoon facilitated our fire missions in Fallujah. We often worked with them, knew their capabilities and were
supremely confident in them.
Although we had not worked with 2/A/ 1-6 FA before deploying to Fallujah, the battery’s performance early in the fight
quickly won our confidence.
b. Importance of Danger-Close Live- Fire Training. In our time in the Army, we have had limited live-fire training for
danger-close missions until last summer in Iraq. The typical training of initiating and adjusting rounds on targets at
great distances is vastly different from training for danger-close fires. The results of our missions clearly indicate
this type of training must be implemented across the board for fire supporters.
c. Training for MOUT. We also learned that corrections in MOUT are much smaller, often smaller than the doctrinal
minimum of add/drop 50 and left/right 30 that we are trained on. We often found it necessary to make adjustments smaller
than these values to get rounds on target, particularly when engaging fighting positions, fortified houses, trench lines
and spider holes. The artillery and mortars showed outstanding flexibility in applying these corrections.
The bottom line is that before engaging in offensive operations in a MOUT environment, it is imperative that all fire
support personnel are highly trained on call-for-fire and adjustment procedures and their equipment. The MOUT
environment is extremely fast-moving, and there is no time to waste. Fires must be initiated, adjusted and brought to
the FFE phase rapidly.
Paladins and mortars are an integral part of this process, and must move as rapidly as the observers. Combined livefire
training for observers, the FDC and the guns is the answer.
14. Conclusion. The contributions of indirect fires were a decisive part of the Battle of Fallujah and contributed tremendously to the
outcome of the fight.
They allowed the maneuver forces to rapidly move through the city with minimum casualties and demonstrated what a joint
and combined arms team can do.
The effects were physically and psychologically devastating. Not only did indirect fires destroy AIF personnel, but they
also destroyed their will to stand and fight. Indirect fires also positively influenced our forces by demonstrating to
commanders on the ground that overwhelming firepower was at their disposal.
The Paladin platoon greatly increased the TF’s firepower, timeliness and flexibility, allowing us to move at an
unprecedented pace through a fortified city.
We learned to use indirect fires early and often in large volumes. During the course of the battle, more than 2,000
artillery and mortar rounds were fired and more than 10 tons of precision Air Force munitions were dropped.
However, as successful as we were, had the battle lasted longer it would have been difficult to sustain fire support
operations. We must learn from this fight to prepare for the future.
At the end of the fight we thought back on some of the things we were the proudest of. What jumped to the forefront was
infantry and tank platoon sergeants, platoon leaders and company commanders telling us that the artillery and mortars
were awesome. At the end of the day, that is what it is all about: our maneuver brethren recognizing why we are called
the “King of Battle.”
Captain Jason M. Bender, Senior Fire Support Instructor, was named the Officer Instructor of FY04 at the Aviation
Warfighting Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama. He received a plaque for his performance from the Commanding General of the
Aviation Center and Fort Rucker, Brigadier General E.J. Sinclair, in ceremonies at the Museum of Army Aviation in
December 2004. He also received a statue from the Army Aviation Association of America (AAAA).
Captain Bender is the Chief of the Fires Branch at the Aviation Center and has been a Fire Support Instructor at the
Center since December 2002. In his previous assignment, he was a Task Force Fire Support Officer assigned to the 1st
Battalion, 10th Field Artillery, part of the 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Benning, Georgia. During his
career, he has deployed to Operation Allied Force as part of Task Force Hawk in Albania and Operation Desert Spring in
Captain James T. (Tom) Cobb has been assigned to 1st Battalion, 6th Field Artillery (1-6 FA), 1st Infantry Division,
and served as the Fire Support Officer (FSO) for Task Force 2d Battalion, 2d Infantry, (TF 2-2 IN) in Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) II, including during the Battle of Fallujah. He also deployed with Kosovo Force (KFOR) 4B.
First Lieutenant Christopher A. LaCour, assigned to 1-6 FA, has been the Targeting Officer for TF 2-2 IN in OIF II,
including during the Battle of Fallujah. Also in OIF II, he was a Platoon Leader for 2/C/1-6 FA and, previously, a Fire
Direction Officer in the same battery.
Sergeant First Class William H. Hight, also assigned to 1-6 FA, has been TF 2-2 IN’s Fire Support NCO since September
2003, deploying in OIF II and fighting in the Battle of Fallujah. He also deployed to Bosnia as part of the
Implementation Force (IFOR) and to Kosovo as part of KFOR 4B.