Regional Issues Relating to the NPT
Andrew K. Semmel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Bureau of Nonproliferation
Statement to the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons
New York, New York
May 23, 2005
Mr. Chairman, our discussion today presents an opportunity to review and assess regional developments as they relate to
the NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons]. My remarks will focus on the response to cases of
noncompliance -- the primary challenge facing the Treaty. In his March statement of this year, President Bush called for
strong action to confront noncompliance in order to preserve and strengthen. the NPT's nonproliferation undertakings. To
enhance our mutual security, the international community must work together to tackle the dangers of nuclear
proliferation. Over recent years, NPT parties have faced significant challenges, particularly from states that have
cheated on their obligations and defied the international community.
Thankfully, there has been progress in some areas. Libya s strategic decision to eliminate its nuclear weapons program
and verifiably meet its international nonproliferation obligations recognized that pursuit of WMD [weapons of mass
destruction] detracted from, rather than increased, its security. It is a recent example of how states can rebuild
confidence in their nonproliferation credentials. A newly elected government is leading Iraq in a new direction, away
from the Saddam Hussein era of pursuing nuclear and other WMD capabilities. Regrettably, North Korea and Iran retain
nuclear ambitions and have been found to have violated the Treaty.
These cases have a direct impact on NPT universality, an issue on which many colleagues here have focused their
remarks. The United States shares the view that the Conference should reinforce the goal of universal NPT adherence.
That goal is for Israel, India, and Pakistan to eventually join the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States. We recognize
that taking this step is a sovereign decision. In order to achieve universal adherence, the NPT must provide a viable
security framework that ensures compliance. Here, I would like to recall the remarks made by the Secretary General
during his opening plenary remarks. He said, "the more we work to resolve regional conflicts, the less incentives states
will have to go nuclear. The more confidence states have in our collective security system, the more prepared they will
be to rely on a strengthened nonproliferation regime, rather than deterrence. And thus the nearer we will be to the
vital goal of universal membership to the Treaty." The United States welcomes and encourages all nonparties to accede to
the NPT as soon as possible, and we continue to support this goal by insisting that all NPT parties comply with their
obligations. Ultimately, a rigorous approach to compliance will help promote NPT universality by demonstrating to
non-parties that the Treaty can provide meaningful and enduring security benefits.
MIDDLE EAST
In that regard, achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East remains a key U.S. foreign policy
goal. We are committed to a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and continue to advance the Road
Map to realize President Bush's vision of two states -- Israel and Palestine -- living side by side in peace and
security.
Within the context of a stable, comprehensive regional peace, the United States supports the objective of an
effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction. A comprehensive peace would likely hasten
the end of WMD programs in the region, which might facilitate Israel's accession to the NPT. However, progress toward
this goal requires the creation and cultivation of a political environment in the Middle East that will reduce the
causes of hostility in the region and gradually move states toward a regional situation that is conducive to a
verifiable WMD free zone. Peace will also contribute to regional security by generating the confidence and trust needed
to address the complex issues associated with establishing a WMD free zone.
In September 2000, the 44th IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] General Conference asked the Director General to
"make arrangements to convene a forum in which participants from the Middle East and other interested parties could
learn from the experience of other regions, including the area of confidence building relevant to the establishment of a
nuclear weapon free zone." We support regional aspirations to hold this forum and hope that a way forward can be found
to hold discussions.
Mr. Chairman, there is little hope of establishing an agreement to create a regional WMD free zone unless nations of
that region implement and uphold existing agreements to which they are parties. Countries must be held accountable to
their commitments.
Let me now return to my government's concerns about noncompliance that bear directly on the prospects for a Middle East
free of WMD. In seven reports beginning in 2003, the IAEA has now confirmed that Iran pursued a covert nuclear program
for nearly two decades. Working covertly, Iran aimed to develop uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and other
technologies used in making nuclear weapons. Iran's desire for these sensitive technologies, even in the face of strong
international concern, is inconsistent with Iran's energy and economic interests, squanders money better spent on
pressing economic and social needs of the Iranian people, destabilizes the region, and is a serious cause for
international alarm.
Iran insists that its program is transparent and solely peaceful. These claims are contradicted by the facts. IAEA
Director General ElBaradei told the IAEA Board in February, "in view of the past undeclared nature of significant
aspects of Iran's nuclear program, a confidence deficit has been created, and it is therefore essential that Iran work
closely with the Agency in a proactive manner ... to build necessary confidence." At that same Board meeting, IAEA
Deputy Director General (DDG) Goldschmidt described the latest Iranian attempts to hide, mislead, and delay the work of
IAEA inspectors. I refer my colleagues to DDG Goldschmidt's March 1 report to the IAEA Board for the details on this,
but I want to emphasize that rather than take steps to bolster confidence, on the eve of the opening of this Conference,
Iran announced that it is considering resuming uranium conversion work, despite Iran's commitment in the November 2004
Paris agreement with the EU-3 to fully suspend that work.
While Iran trumpets its belated and incomplete cooperation, the IAEA reports that Iran still denies inspectors the
transparency and cooperation they need to fully fulfill their duties. Moreover, Iran continues to defy explicit requests
from past IAEA Board resolutions. Iran continues to disregard the IAEA Board's calls not to proceed with the
construction of a heavy water research reactor at Arak -- a reactor well suited to production of plutonium that Iran
does not need for peaceful purposes. Iran has failed to provide a credible explanation for its rush to complete this
destabilizing project, which the IAEA confirmed in March is still ongoing. In addition, Iran's cooperation falls far
short of the standard and expectations set forth in IAEA Board resolutions. Those resolutions called on Iran to extend
"full and prompt cooperation to the Director General" and "to provide any access deemed necessary by the Agency in
accordance with the Additional Protocol." Iranian refusals to allow full and prompt access to locations of concern, to
Iranian experts, or to nuclear related documentation, are unacceptable. The IAEA will be unable to resolve the questions
raised by Iran's longstanding clandestine nuclear program and breaches of its Safeguards Agreement unless Iran provides
full cooperation. Iran has also yet to ratify and officially implement the Additional Protocol for strengthened IAEA
safeguards.
Mr. Chairman, my government feels strongly that the IAEA Board should have reported, pursuant to the IAEA Statute,
Iran's violations of its safeguards obligations to the United Nations Security Council when that noncompliance was first
confirmed to the IAEA Board. This would have reinforced the IAEA's essential role in investigating Iran's past and
ongoing nuclear activities and in monitoring both its safeguards obligations and its most recent suspension pledge.
The Security Council has the necessary international legal and political authority that may be required to bring this
issue to a successful and peaceful diplomatic resolution. Today, we join with the international community in supporting
the ongoing efforts of the "EU-3," the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue through
diplomacy. Should Iran withdraw from that engagement and break its pledge to the EU-3 to suspend all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities, then the U.S. would join the EU-3 in supporting an immediate report to the UNSC [UN
Security Council].
Mr. Chairman, the challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program must be a central concern to all of us. That is why the
United States is focusing the Conference's attention on this problem. Iran violated its NPT Article III safeguards
obligations by pursuing a secret program aiming to acquire the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. The
only plausible explanation for this longstanding pattern of deception is that Iran has been pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability in violation of Article II. Given its history of clandestine nuclear activities and documented efforts to
deceive the international community, Iran must now demonstrate that it no longer seeks to acquire a nuclear weapons
capability.
Only the full cessation and dismantling of Iran's fissile material production efforts can begin to give us any
confidence that Iran is no longer pursuing a nuclear weapons capability. We are not attempting to rewrite the NPT, as
Iran has claimed in an attempt to divert attention from its own violations. Nor do we aim to deny NPT compliant states
the exercise of their legitimate rights. On the contrary, our position stems from our commitment to uphold the goals and
rules of the NPT -- and to its central nonproliferation undertakings. Iran has deliberately circumvented its NPT
obligations for almost two decades, and must be held accountable. This is not just a United States position. We know
from our discussions with many countries represented here today that there is a strong international consensus that Iran
must not possess a nuclear weapons capability. Toward this end, we, like many others, support the ongoing European
efforts to provide objective guarantees against Iran obtaining such a capability. For the sake of regional and global
security, including the integrity of NPT and hopes for future NPT universality, we look forward to working with the
entire international community to convince Iran to finally forgo the nuclear path it has so far chosen.
NORTHEAST ASIA
North Korea's nuclear weapons program also presents a threat to regional and global security and an urgent challenge to
the global nonproliferation regime. North Korea has repeatedly violated international nonproliferation obligations and
announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. It could produce and then export fissile material or weapons to other
rogue states or terrorists. These dangers affect us all. They must not and will not be ignored.
North Korea's noncompliance with its NPT obligations surfaced more than a decade ago. Indeed, North Korea has never met
its obligations under the NPT and related IAEA safeguards. Despite a good faith effort by many countries and the IAEA,
North Korea consistently refused to comply with its obligations. In 2002, as the United States was prepared to launch a
comprehensive diplomatic approach that might have improved relations between our two countries, it became clear that
North Korea was pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment program in addition to a plutonium-based weapons program.
North Korea acknowledged such a program to the United States in October 2002. North Korea's subsequent denials of its
uranium enrichment program are contradicted by A.Q. Khan's confession of the uranium enrichment assistance his network
rendered to North Korea, as well as other reports. In January 2004, North Korea showed a group of U.S. scientists that
the spent-fuel storage building at Yongbyon was empty of the almost 8,000 spent fuel rods previously stored there and
presented material that it claimed was plutonium separated from those fuel rods. North Korea also stated in February
2005, that it had manufactured nuclear weapons and most recently said that it shut off its five megawatt reactor in
order to increase "its deterrent." Today, we believe that North Korea's plutonium-based and its uranium-based weapons
programs are both still ongoing.
North Korea's nuclear programs have deepened its isolation. While all options remain on the table, the United States
has made clear repeatedly, and at the highest levels of our government, that we seek a peaceful, diplomatic end to North
Korea's nuclear program. This multilateral problem requires a multilateral solution and, in the wake of North Korea's
admission to a U.S. delegation visiting Pyongyang that it had a uranium enrichment program, and after the IAEA Board
reported North Korea's safeguards noncompliance to the UN Security Council, we and other concerned states in the region
have taken steps to address these problems. Since August 2003, the United States has engaged in three rounds of Six
Party Talks; the most recent took place in Beijing in June 2004. All parties to the Talks, including North Korea, agreed
that our common objective is the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Although all parties agreed in June to hold a
fourth round of talks before the end of September 2004, North Korea has refused to return to the table. North Korea must
understand that resolution of the problem it created by violating its obligations can only come about through the
complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its entire nuclear program, including both plutonium
reprocessing and uranium enrichment.
SOUTH ASIA
The situation in South Asia also poses unique challenges. Let me reiterate that the United States remains committed to
NPT universality. We recognize, however, that India and Pakistan may not join the Treaty for the foreseeable future. We
remain deeply concerned by the dangers posed by nuclear weapons and their delivery systems in South Asia and do not
believe they enhance regional security. We welcome recent signs of improved relations between India and Pakistan. We
continue to urge both countries to end their nuclear and missile competition, and to discuss and implement
confidence-building measures designed to reduce regional tensions and diminish risks that nuclear weapons could be used,
either intentionally or accidentally, in a crisis.
As part of our active bilateral dialogues with India and Pakistan, we continue to urge these countries not to conduct
nuclear tests, to bring an early end to the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons -- and in that context to
support the immediate start of negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty -- to prevent onward proliferation, and
to bring their export controls in line with international standards.
We also remain cognizant of our nonproliferation commitments and objectives when considering how to improve our
bilateral relations with each country. Our actions with both India and Pakistan continue to be consistent with our NPT
obligations and with our commitment to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, as President Bush said, the NPT is a key legal barrier to nuclear proliferation. It makes a critical
contribution to international security. Concerted international action is needed to tackle noncompliance. If we
collectively are not able to address the critical cases of noncompliance now confronting the Treaty, we risk undermining
its credibility, as well as the global nonproliferation regime and the security upon which we depend. For these reasons,
we must stress the importance of strict compliance with NPT obligations and create the conditions that reinforce and
advance regional stability and security, and thus improve conditions for genuine NPT universality.
Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Released on May 24, 2005
ENDS