Full Text: The Taguba Report On Iraq Prison Abuse

HEARING

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION

OF THE

800th MILITARY POLICE

BRIGADE

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

References .......................... 3

Background ......................... 6

Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism

Interrogation and Detention Operations

In Iraq (MG Miller's Assessment).................. 8

IO Comments on MG Miller's Assessment.............. 8

Report on Detention and Corrections

In Iraq (MG Ryder's Report).................. 9

IO Comments on MG Ryder's Report.................. 12

Preliminary Investigative Actions .................. 12

Findings and Recommendations

Part One (Detainee Abuse). .................. 15

Findings ...................... 15

Recommendations .................. 20

Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) ............... 22

Findings ...................... 22

Recommendations. ................... 31

Part Three (Command Climate, Etc.). ............... 34

Findings ...................... 36

Recommendations .................. 44

Other Findings/Observations ................... 49

Conclusion ........................ 50

Annexes ......................... 51

References

1. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of

Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949

2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition

of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12

August 1949

3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition

of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces

at Sea, 12 August 1949

4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of

Refugees, 1967

5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees,

1951

6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12

August 1949

7. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of

Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949

8. DOD Directive 5100.69, "DOD Program for Prisoners of

War and other Detainees," 27 December 1972

9. DOD Directive 5100.77 "DOD Law of War Program," 10 July

1979

10. STANAG No. 2044, Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners

of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June 1994

11. STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW)

(Edition 6), 6 December 1994

12. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,

Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

13. AR 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996

14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for

Law Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993

15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992

16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and

Explosives, 12 February 1998

17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September

1993

18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30

September 1993

19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988

20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security,

31 September 2000

21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and

Insignia, 5 September 2003

22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993

23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and

Boards of Officers, 11 May 1988

24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000

26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June

2002

27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996

28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002

29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998

30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29

October 1999

31. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement

Operations, 1 August 2001

32. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001

33. FM 3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March

2002

34. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000

35. FM 33-1-1, Psychological Operations Techniques and

Procedures, 5 May 1994

36. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992

37. FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25 November 1985

38. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001

39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May

1984

40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001

41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003

42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military

Police Battalion (IR)

43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military

Police Guard Company

44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military

Police Escort Guard Company

45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier's Manual, MOS 95B, Military

Police, Skill Level 1, 6 August 2002

46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's

Guide for MOS 95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill

Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March 1999

47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill

Level 1, Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003

48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist,

Skill Levels 2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30

September 2003

49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and

Detention Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller,

Commander JTF-GTMO, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003

50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in

Iraq, (MG Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6

November 2003

51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 &

3.C.8.A.1, Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for

the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November

2003

52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence-

Led Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August

2003

53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement,

26 December 2003

54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-

Resistance Policy, 12 October 2003

55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting

Operations, 13 December 2003

56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts

Martial, 2002 Edition

ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE

800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

BACKGROUND

1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo

S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven

(CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, US Central

Command, appoint an Investigating Officer (IO) in the

grade of Major General (MG) or above to investigate the

conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police

(MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of

detention and internment operations by the Brigade from 1

November 2003 to present. LTG Sanchez cited recent

reports of detainee abuse, escapes from confinement

facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated

systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack

of clear standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG

Sanchez requested a comprehensive and all-encompassing

inquiry to make findings and recommendations concerning

the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.

(ANNEX 2)

2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central

Command (CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of

the CENTCOM Commander, directed that the Commander,

Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), LTG

David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the

800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations

from 1 November 2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that

the investigation should inquire into all facts and

circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected

detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the

investigation inquire into detainee escapes and

accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain

a more comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into

the fitness and performance of the 800th MP Brigade.

(ANNEX 3)

3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed

MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support,

CFLCC, to conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was

directed to conduct an informal investigation under AR 15-

6 into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and internment

operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:

a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances

surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse,

specifically allegations of maltreatment at the Abu

Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility

(BCCF));

b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability

lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations

concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison;

c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment,

command policies, internal procedures, and command

climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate;

d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all

aspects of the investigation, and make any

recommendations for corrective action, as appropriate.

(ANNEX 4)

4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the 800th MP

Brigade followed the initiation of a criminal

investigation by the US Army Criminal Investigation

Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of detainee

abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th

MP Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th

MP Brigade. The Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON

to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC at the time this

investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had

several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition

Confinement Facilities in Iraq over the past several

months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu

Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex/Camp

Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities.

In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion

had been formally charged under the Uniform Code of

Military Justice (UCMJ) with detainee abuse in May 2003

at the Theater Internment Facility (TIF) at Camp Bucca,

Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)

5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to

the actual appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I

assembled subject matter experts from the CFLCC Provost

Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate (SJA). I

selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to

be my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted

the Provost Marshal General of the Army, MG Donald J.

Ryder, to enlist the support of MP subject matter experts

in the areas of detention and internment operations.

(ANNEXES 4 and 19)

6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment

of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention

Operations in Iraq conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller,

Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From

31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of

personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ,

CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current

Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for

actionable intelligence. MG Miller's team focused on

three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization,

and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention

operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures

and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)

7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-

depth analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections

in Iraq, dated 5 November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and

a team of military police, legal, medical, and automation

experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had

previously requested a team of subject matter experts to

assess, and make specific recommendations concerning

detention and corrections operations. From 13 October to

6 November 2003, MG Ryder personally led this

assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)

ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND

DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)

1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller's team was on

the strategic interrogation of detainees/internees in

Iraq. Among its conclusions in its Executive Summary

were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures

in place to affect a unified strategy to detain,

interrogate, and report information from

detainees/internees in Iraq. The Executive Summary also

stated that detention operations must act as an enabler

for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller's Team

recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention

guard force subordinate to the Joint Interrogation

Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets the

conditions for the successful interrogation and

exploitation of internees/detainees." Regarding

Detention Operations, MG Miller's team stated that the

function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe,

secure, and humane environment that supports the

expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also

stated "it is essential that the guard force be actively

engaged in setting the conditions for successful

exploitation of the internees." (ANNEX 20)

3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint

Strategic Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are

hampered by lack of active control of the internees

within the detention environment. The Miller Team also

stated that establishment of the Theater Joint

Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib

(BCCF) will consolidate both detention and strategic

interrogation operations and result in synergy between MP

and MI resources and an integrated, synchronized, and

focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)

4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also observed that the

application of emerging strategic interrogation

strategies and techniques contain new approaches and

operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a

legal review and recommendations on internee

interrogation operations by a dedicated Command Judge

Advocate is required to maximize interrogation

effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)

IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT

1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team recognized that they were using

JTF-GTMO operational procedures and interrogation

authorities as baselines for its observations and

recommendations. There is a strong argument that the

intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo

(GTMO) is different than that of the detainees/internees

held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and other detention facilities

in Iraq. Currently, there are a large number of Iraqi

criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are not

believed to be international terrorists or members of Al

Qaida, Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international

terrorist organizations. (ANNEX 20)

2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller's team that the

"guard force" be actively engaged in setting the

conditions for successful exploitation of the internees

would appear to be in conflict with the recommendations

of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police "do

not participate in military intelligence supervised

interrogation sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that

the OEF template whereby military police actively set the

favorable conditions for subsequent interviews runs

counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.

(ANNEX 20)

REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS

IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)

1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a

comprehensive review of the entire detainee and

corrections system in Iraq and provided recommendations

addressing each of the following areas as requested by

the Commander CJTF-7:

a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management

b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee

movement, segregation, and accountability

c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention

and corrections system

d. (U) Integration of military detention and

corrections with the Coalition Provisional Authority

(CPA) and adequacy of plans for transition to an Iraqi-

run corrections system

e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management

f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required

health, hygiene, and sanitation standards

g. (U) Court integration and docket management for

criminal detainees

h. (U) Detainee legal processing

i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including

integration with law enforcement and court databases

(ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG

Ryder's team are beyond the scope of this investigation.

However, several important findings are clearly relevant

to this inquiry and are summarized below (emphasis is

added in certain areas):

A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement,

segregation, and accountability)

1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and

approaches at the various detention facilities.

Several Division/Brigade collection points and US

monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently

detailed use of force and other standing operating

procedures or policies (e.g. weapons in the facility,

improper restraint techniques, detainee management,

etc.) Though, there were no military police units

purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices.

(ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi

facilities, Iraqi criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi

crimes) are detained with security internees (generally

Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same

facilities, though segregated in different

cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of

detained people in a single location by members of the

same unit invites confusion about handling, processing,

and treatment, and typically facilitates the transfer

of information between different categories of

detainees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive

Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific

training during their mobilization period. Corrections

training is only on the METL of two MP (I/R)

Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one

currently serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the

other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting

JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention

facility operations, to include two days of unarmed

self-defense, training in interpersonal communication

skills, forced cell moves, and correctional officer

safety. (ANNEX 19)

B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and

Corrections System

1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task

organized with eight MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of

both MP Guard and Combat Support companies. Due to

force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two

Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion

and the 324th MP Battalion. In December 2003, the

400th MP Battalion was relieved of its mission and

redeployed in January 2004. The 724th MP Battalion

redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is

scheduled to redeploy in March and April 2004. They

are the 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 530th

MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The units that

remain are generally understrength, as Reserve

Component units do not have an individual personnel

replacement system to mitigate medical losses or the

departure of individual Soldiers that have reached 24

months of Federal active duty in a five-year period.

(ANNEX 19)

2. (U) The 800th MP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC

asset, TACON to CJTF-7 to conduct

Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq. All

detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO;

Camps Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a

separate High Value Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)

3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges

adapting its task organizational structure, training,

and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct

standard EPW operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait).

Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee

population ratio and facility layout templates are

predicated on a compliant, self-disciplining EPW

population, and not criminals or high-risk security

internees. (ANNEX 19)

4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the

full protections of the Geneva Conventions, unless the

denial of these protections is due to specifically

articulated military necessity (e.g., no visitation to

preclude the direction of insurgency operations).

(ANNEXES 19 and 24)

5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained

Personnel, Civilian Internees, and other Detainees, FM

3-19.40, Military Police Internment and Resettlement

Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations,

require military police to provide an area for

intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities.

Military Police, though adept at passive collection of

intelligence within a facility, do not participate in

Military Intelligence supervised interrogation

sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of

Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby

military police actively set favorable conditions for

subsequent interviews. Such actions generally run

counter to the smooth operation of a detention

facility, attempting to maintain its population in a

compliant and docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has

not been directed to change its facility procedures to

set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor

participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and

21-23)

6. MG Ryder's Report also made the following, inter

alia, near-term and mid-term recommendations regarding

the command and control of detainees:

a. (U) Align the release process for security

internees with DoD Policy. The process of

screening security internees should include

intelligence findings, interrogation results, and

current threat assessment.

b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that

will occur at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast

Compound to separate the screening operation from the Iraqi

run Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Establish

procedures that define the role of military police Soldiers

securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the

guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.

c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee

Operations, except the MEK security mission, under

a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters for

OIF 2.

d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate

into the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) to

conduct internment and confinement operations in

support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)

IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S REPORT

1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder's Team was to observe

detention and prison operations, identify potential

systemic and human rights issues, and provide near-term,

mid-term, and long-term recommendations to improve CJTF-7

operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system from

US military control/oversight to the Coalition

Provisional Authority and eventually to the Iraqi

Government. The Findings and Recommendations of MG

Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should be

implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)

2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that

surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very

same issues that are the subject of this investigation.

In fact, many of the abuses suffered by detainees

occurred during, or near to, the time of that assessment.

As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions

of this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG

Ryder's Team in one critical aspect, that being its

conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade had not been asked

to change its facility procedures to set the conditions

for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade

and its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for

detainees for subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious

from a review of comprehensive CID interviews of suspects

and witnesses that this was done at lower levels. (ANNEX

19)

3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding

the effect of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at

passive collection of intelligence within a facility,

should not participate in Military Intelligence

supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military

Police should not be involved with setting "favorable

conditions" for subsequent interviews. These actions, as

will be outlined in this investigation, clearly run

counter to the smooth operation of a detention facility.

(ANNEX 19)

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS

1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder's Report and MG

Miller's Report, my investigation team immediately began

an in-depth review of all available documents regarding

the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in detail the

voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee

abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the

Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed

approximately fifty witness statements from military

police and military intelligence personnel, potential

suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and

videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention

facility personnel, which are now in the custody and

control of the US Army Criminal Investigation Command and

the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and videos are

not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies

of the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and

assorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions

involving that command for the past several months. (All

ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)

2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers

from the CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the

services of two individuals who are experts in military

police detention practices and training. These were LTC

Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP Battalion,

United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth,

and SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US

Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also

requested and received the services of Col (Dr) Henry

Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist assigned to

assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)

3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports,

the team reviewed numerous reference materials including

the 12 October 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-

Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6 Investigation on Riot and

Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003, the 205th MI

Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE),

facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR

15-6 investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs)

on detainee escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters

from the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and

94)

4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a

one-day inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and

the High Value Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become

familiar with those facilities. We also met with COL

Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal Investigation

Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP

Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade,

and COL Ed Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7

February 2004, the team visited the Camp Bucca Detention

Facility to familiarize itself with the facility and

operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February

2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive

training sessions on approved detention practices. We

continued our preparation by reviewing the ongoing CID

investigation and were briefed by the Special Agent in

Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on the

applicable reference materials within each team member's

area of expertise, and practiced investigative

techniques. I met with the team on numerous occasions to

finalize appropriate witness lists, review existing

witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect

potential evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to

arrange witness attendance, force protection measures,

and general logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8

February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)

5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority

on 1 February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the

upcoming demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command,

I directed that several critical witnesses who were

preparing to leave the theater remain at Camp Arifjan,

Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX 29). My

team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted

a series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX

30). We returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February

2004. On 14 and 15 February we interviewed a number of

witnesses from the 800th MP Brigade. On 17 February we

returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete interviews of

witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28

February we collected documents, compiled references, did

follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed analysis

of the volumes of materials accumulated throughout our

investigation. On 29 February we finalized our executive

summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we submitted

the AR 15-6 written report with findings and

recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark

Johnson, for a legal sufficiency review. The out-brief

to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took place on

3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(PART ONE)

(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts

and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee

abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu

Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).

1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID),

led by COL Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained

professional agents have done a superb job of

investigating several complex and extremely disturbing

incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison.

They conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential

criminal suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered

numerous photos and videos portraying in graphic detail

detainee abuse by Military Police personnel on numerous

occasions from October to December 2003. Several

potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions

regarding their personal involvement and the involvement

of fellow Soldiers in this abuse. Several potential

suspects invoked their rights under Article 31 of the

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)

2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review

of all of these statements and documentary evidence, we

also interviewed numerous officers, NCOs, and junior

enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade, as well as

members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade

working at the prison. We did not believe it was

necessary to re-interview all the numerous witnesses who

had previously provided comprehensive statements to CID,

and I have adopted those statements for the purposes of

this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and 45-91)

REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE

FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF)

provides security of both criminal and security detainees

at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, facilitates

the conducting of interrogations for CJTF-7, supports

other CPA operations at the prison, and enhances the

force protection/quality of life of Soldiers assigned in

order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to

secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)

2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence

Brigade, was designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB

Abu Ghraib (BCCF) effective 19 November 2003. That the

205th MI Brigade conducts operational and strategic

interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19 November 2003

until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004, COL

Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI

Brigade and the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

(ANNEX 31)

3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the

800th MP Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at

Camp Ganci, Camp Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu

Ghraib (BCCF). That from February 2003 to until he was

suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC Jerry

Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th

MP Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was

suspended from his duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald

Reese served as the Company Commander of the 372nd MP

Company, which was in charge of guarding detainees at FOB

Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP

Battalion and the 372nd MP Company were located within

the confines of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)

4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L.

Karpinski was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade.

(ANNEX 45)

5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu

Ghraib Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of

sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses were

inflicted on several detainees. This systemic and

illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated

by several members of the military police guard force

(372nd Military Police Company, 320th Military Police

Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in Tier (section) 1-A of

the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of abuse

were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX

26) and the discovery of extremely graphic photographic

evidence. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these

photographs and videos, the ongoing CID investigation,

and the potential for the criminal prosecution of several

suspects, the photographic evidence is not included in

the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos

are available from the Criminal Investigative Command and

the CTJF-7 prosecution team. In addition to the

aforementioned crimes, there were also abuses committed

by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI Brigade,

and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).

Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer,

205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having

him strip and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and

53)

6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by

military police personnel included the following acts:

a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees;

jumping on their naked feet;

b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and

female detainees;

c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various

sexually explicit positions for photographing;

d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and

keeping them naked for several days at a time;

e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's

underwear;

f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate

themselves while being photographed and videotaped;

g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and

then jumping on them;

h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box,

with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his

fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture;

i. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a

detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year old

fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked;

j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked

detainee's neck and having a female Soldier pose for a

picture;

k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female

detainee;

l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles)

to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in at least

one case biting and severely injuring a detainee;

m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.

(ANNEXES 25 and 26)

7. (U) These findings are amply supported by written

confessions provided by several of the suspects, written

statements provided by detainees, and witness statements.

In reaching my findings, I have carefully considered the

pre-existing statements of the following witnesses and

suspects (ANNEX 26):

a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect

c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company -

Suspect

d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp.,

Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade- Suspect

e. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company

f. (U) SGT Neil A. Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical

Battalion

g (U) SGT Samuel Jefferson Provance, 302nd MI

Battalion

h (U) Torin S. Nelson, Contractor, Titan Corp.,

Assigned to the 205th MI Brigade

j. (U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 372nd MP

Company

k. (U) SPC Mathew C. Wisdom, 372nd MP Company

l. (U) SSG Reuben R. Layton, Medic, 109th Medical

Detachment

m. (U) SPC John V. Polak, 229th MP Company

8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the

following acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I

find credible based on the clarity of their statements

and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses

(ANNEX 26):

a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the

phosphoric liquid on detainees;

b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;

c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;

d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a

chair;

e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;

f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the

wound of a detainee who was injured after being slammed

against the wall in his cell;

g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and

perhaps a broom stick.

h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and

intimidate detainees with threats of attack, and in one

instance actually biting a detainee.

9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided

by the following detainees, which under the circumstances

I find credible based on the clarity of their statements

and supporting evidence provided by other witnesses:

a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365

b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee #

13077

c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446

d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108

e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307

f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542

g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422

h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425

i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529

j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787

k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427

l. (U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362

m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470

(ANNEX 26)

10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8,

and the findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military

Intelligence (MI) interrogators and Other US Government

Agency's (OGA) interrogators actively requested that MP

guards set physical and mental conditions for favorable

interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of

MG Ryder's Report, I find that personnel assigned to the

372nd MP Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to

change facility procedures to "set the conditions" for MI

interrogations. I find no direct evidence that MP

personnel actually participated in those MI

interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).

11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven

abuse that I find was inflicted on detainees and by the

following witness statements. (ANNEXES 25 and 26):

a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in

her sworn statement regarding the incident where a

detainee was placed on a box with wires attached to his

fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was to keep

detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL

Grainer. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk.

It is Grainer and Frederick's job to do things for MI

and OGA to get these people to talk."

b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in

his sworn statement as follows: "I witnessed prisoners

in the MI hold section, wing 1A being made to do various

things that I would question morally. In Wing 1A we

were told that they had different rules and different

SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP

for that section just word of mouth. The Soldier in

charge of 1A was Corporal Granier. He stated that the

Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but

nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic)."

When asked why the rules in 1A/1B were different than

the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated: "The rest of

the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are Military

Intelligence (MI) holds." When asked why he did not

inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis

stated: " Because I assumed that if they were doing

things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines,

someone would have said something. Also the wing

belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of

the abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI

insinuate to the guards to abuse the inmates. When

asked what MI said he stated: "Loosen this guy up for

us." Make sure he has a bad night." "Make sure he gets

the treatment." He claimed these comments were made to

CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis

stated that (sic): "the MI staffs to my understanding

have been giving Granier compliments on the way he has

been handling the MI holds. Example being statements

like, "Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They

answer every question. They're giving out good

information, Finally, and Keep up the good work . Stuff

like that."

c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked

if he were present when any detainees were abused. He

stated: "I saw them nude, but MI would tell us to take

away their mattresses, sheets, and clothes." He could

not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this, but

commented that, "if they wanted me to do that they

needed to give me paperwork." He was later informed

that "we could not do anything to embarrass the

prisoners."

d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract

translator was questioned about several detainees

accused of rape. He observed (sic): "They (detainees)

were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP were

there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT

Granier and SGT Frederick ordered the guys while

questioning them to admit what they did. They made them

do strange exercises by sliding on their stomach, jump

up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet,

called them all kinds of names such as "gays" do they

like to make love to guys, then they handcuffed their

hands together and their legs with shackles and started

to stack them on top of each other by insuring that the

bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt."

e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical

Battalion, a medic testified that: "Cell 1A was used to

house high priority detainees and cell 1B was used to

house the high risk or trouble making detainees. During

my tour at the prison I observed that when the male

detainees were first brought to the facility, some of

them were made to wear female underwear, which I think

was to somehow break them down."

12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the

372nd MP Company had received no training in

detention/internee operations. I also find that very

little instruction or training was provided to MP

personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva

Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,

FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that

few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever

made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-

24, 33, and multiple witness statements)

13. (U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership

not communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their

tactical proficiency concerns the incident of detainee

abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca, Iraq, on May 12, 2003.

Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to the 800th

MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military

Police Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a

number of detainees during inprocessing at Camp Bucca.

An extensive CID investigation determined that four

soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked and

beaten these detainees following a transport mission from

Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)

14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred

against these Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation

conducted by LTC Gentry. He recommended a general court

martial for the four accused, which BG Karpinski

supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no

evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th

MP Soldiers of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions

regarding detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure

that such abuse was not repeated. Nor is there any

evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the commander of the

Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident, took

any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly

trained regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and

62)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated

multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of

subject matter experts in internment/resettlement

operations, international and operational law,

information technology, facility management,

interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques,

chaplains, Arab cultural awareness, and medical practices

as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to

oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects

of detainee and confinement operations.

2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence

personnel involved in any aspect of detainee operations

or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate

units, be immediately provided with training by an

international/operational law attorney on the specific

provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10,

specifically the Geneva Convention Relative to the

Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War,

Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other

Detainees, and AR 190-8.

3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for

overall detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater

of Operations. I also recommend that the Provost Marshal

General of the Army assign a minimum of two (2) subject

matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7

in coordinating detainee operations.

4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation

facility commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners

of War and notice of protections be made available in

both English and the detainees' language and be

prominently displayed in all detention facilities.

Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should

be given the full opportunity to read the Convention.

5. (U) That each detention facility commander and

interrogation facility commander publish a complete and

comprehensive set of Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs)

regarding treatment of detainees, and that all personnel

be required to read the SOPs and sign a document

indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.

6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG

Ryder's Assessment Report, and my findings and

recommendations in this investigation, all units in the

Iraq Theater of Operations conducting

internment/confinement/detainment operations in support

of Operation Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to

include action under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.

7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for

detainee operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area

(JOA). (MG Tom Miller, C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by

COMCJTF-7).

8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be

conducted to determine the extent of culpability of

Military Intelligence personnel, assigned to the 205th MI

Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center

(JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee

operations is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate,

with specialized training and knowledge of international

and operational law, to assist and advise on matters of

detainee operations.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(PART TWO)

(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and

accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically

allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib

Prison:

REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,

I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide

Internment and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45

and 95)

2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked

with detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex

during the time period covered in this investigation.

(ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)

3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked

with detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB)

Operations at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on

26 February 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 52)

4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked

with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD

Detention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41

and 55)

5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked

with detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK

holding facility until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and

97)

6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care,

and well being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person,

Civilian Detainees, and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi

criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)

7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an

MP task IAW FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)

8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge,

implementation, and emphasis of basic legal, regulatory,

doctrinal, and command requirements within the 800th MP

Brigade and its subordinate units. (Multiple witness

statements in ANNEXES 45-91).

9.

(U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after

in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to

detention facility, compound to compound, encampment to

encampment, and even shift to shift throughout the 800th MP

Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)

10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had

a "Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP" and a "Training

Outline" for transferring and releasing detainees, which

appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)

11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being

documented in the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS)

and Biometric Automated Toolset System (BATS) as required by

regulation at all detention facilities. However, it is

underutilized and often does not give a "real time" accurate

picture of the detainee population due to untimely updating.

(ANNEX 56)

12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of

detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP

Battalion used a self-created "change sheet" to document the

transfer of a detainee from one location to another. For

proper accountability, it is imperative that these change

sheets be processed and the detainee manifest be updated

within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this process

would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-

time resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial

Number (ISN) counts, gross differences in the detainee

manifest and the actual occupants of an individual compound,

and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP

Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ David

DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack

of manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner.

(ANNEXES 39 and 98)

13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee

accountability at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib.

However, a detailed review of their operational journals

revealed that these accounts were often not done or not

documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication

that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the

accounting process triggered any immediate corrective action

by the Battalion TOC. (ANNEX 44)

14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the

320th MP Battalion conducted physical counts of their

detainees. Each compound within a given encampment did

their headcounts differently. Some compounds had detainees

line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in rows, and some

moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and

counted them as they passed to the other end of the

compound. (ANNEX 98)

15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100%

ISN band checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this

check only 2 times per week. Due to the lack of real-time

updates to the system, these checks were regularly

inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)

16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted

non-doctrinal terms such as "band checks," "roll-ups," and

"call-ups," which contributed to the lapses in

accountability and confusion at the soldier level. (ANNEXES

63, 88, and 98)

17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and

the 320th Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional

entries and flippant comments, which highlighted the lack of

discipline within the unit. There was no indication that

the journals were ever reviewed by anyone in their chain of

command. (ANNEX 37)

18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and

standing TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did

exist were not trained on, and were never distributed to the

lowest level. Most procedures were shelved at the unit TOC,

rather than at the subordinate units and guards mount sites.

(ANNEXES 44, 67, 71, and 85)

19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked

specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks

and balances to ensure compliance. (ANNEXES 76 and 82)

20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or

utilized to develop the accountability practices throughout

the 800th MP Brigade's subordinate units. Daily processing,

accountability, and detainee care appears to have been made

up as the operations developed with reliance on, and

guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian

corrections experience. (ANNEX 21)

21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to

conduct I/R operations prior to deployment, at the

mobilization site, upon arrival in theater, and throughout

their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)

22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation

identified 27 escapes or attempted escapes from the

detention facilities throughout the 800th MP Brigade's AOR.

Based on my assessment and detailed analysis of the

substandard accountability process maintained by the 800th

MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more

unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off"

as administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT

Lewis Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported

knowing about at least two additional escapes (one from a

work detail and one from a window) from Abu Ghraib (BCCF)

that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander,

744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at

the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and

then outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis

Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade, stated that there

were more than 32 escapes from her holding facilities, which

does not match the number derived from the investigation

materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)

23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities

are significantly over their intended maximum capacity while

the guard force is undermanned and under resourced. This

imbalance has contributed to the poor living conditions,

escapes, and accountability lapses at the various

facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities also limits

the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the

detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots

within the facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)

24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees

who should not be in custody takes too long and contributes

to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention facilities.

There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the

theater-wide internment operations. First, the apprehending

unit can release a detainee if there is a determination that

their continued detention is not warranted. Secondly, a

criminal detainee can be released after it has been

determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and

that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG

Karpinski had signature authority to release detainees in

this second category. Lastly, detainees accused of

committing "Crimes Against the Coalition," who are held

throughout the separate facilities in the CJTF-7 AOR, can be

released upon a determination that they are of no

intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat

to Coalition Forces. The release process for this category

of detainee is a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate

Cell and a review by a Detainee Release Board consisting of

BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara

Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the "Detainee Release

Authority" for detainees being held for committing crimes

against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this

category of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total

detainee population, and is the fastest growing category.

However, MG Fast, according to BG Karpinski, routinely

denied the board's recommendations to release detainees in

this category who were no longer deemed a threat and clearly

met the requirements for release. According to BG

Karpinski, the extremely slow and ineffective release

process has significantly contributed to the overcrowding of

the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45, and 46)

25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being

conducted after an escape or other serious incident. No

lessons learned seem to have been disseminated to

subordinate units to enable corrective action at the lowest

level. The Investigation Team requested copies of AARs, and

none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)

26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations

from various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and

accountability lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and

ordered implemented by BG Karpinski. There is no evidence

that the majority of her orders directing the implementation

of substantive changes were ever acted upon. Additionally,

there was no follow-up by the command to verify the

corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and

recommendations contained within their own investigations

been analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many

of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases

of abuse may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)

27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the

detention facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to

be improved to illuminate dark areas that have routinely

become avenues of escape. (ANNEX 6)

28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the

Geneva Conventions are posted in English or in the language

of the detainees at any of the detention facilities in the

800th MP Brigade's AOR, even after several investigations

had annotated the lack of this critical requirement.

(Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations

of the Investigation Team)

29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate

questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a

potentially dangerous contingent within the Hard-Site.

These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal inmates with

contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they

have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee.

(ANNEX 8 and 26-SPC Polak's Statement)

30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan

Corporation, CACI, etc.), third country nationals, and local

contractors do not appear to be properly supervised within

the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During our on-site

inspection, they wandered about with too much unsupervised

free access in the detainee area. Having civilians in

various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the

detainee area causes confusion and may have contributed to

the difficulties in the accountability process and with

detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple Witness Statements,

and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP

Battalion, contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement

(DROE) and the general principles of the Geneva Convention

were briefed at every guard mount and shift change on Abu

Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor our personal

observations, support his contention. I find that SGM

Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and

the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI

Soldiers at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on

the basics of detainee operations; however, they have been

unable to produce any verifying documentation, sign-in

rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content of this

training. (ANNEXES 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training

Records)

33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by

the 800th MP Brigade have routinely held persons brought to

them by Other Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting

for them, knowing their identities, or even the reason for

their detention. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing

Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these detainees "ghost

detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP

Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainees"

(6-8) for OGAs that they moved around within the facility to

hide them from a visiting International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC) survey team. This maneuver was deceptive,

contrary to Army Doctrine, and in violation of international

law. (ANNEX 53)

34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have

been documented and reported to this Investigation Team.

Although there is no data from other missions of similar

size and duration to compare the number of escapes with, the

most significant factors derived from these reports are

twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked critical

data needed to evaluate the details of each incident.

Second, each investigation seems to have pointed to the same

types of deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done

to correct the problems and to implement the recommendations

as was ordered by BG Karpinski, nor was there any command

emphasis to ensure these deficiencies were corrected:

a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6

Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and

shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant (320th MP

Battalion). However, no investigation or additional

information was provided as requested by this investigation

team. (ANNEX 7)

b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at

Camp Cropper. (115th MP Battalion) Several detainees

allegedly rioted after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the

115th MP Battalion after striking a guard in compound B of

Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT Magowan (115th

MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee had

acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs

took off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the

detainees, which further escalated the riot. The MPs were

overwhelmed and the guards fired lethal rounds to protect

the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5 detainees were

wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications, no

clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted

guards, the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the

SOP was inadequate and outdated. (ANNEX 5)

c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399,

escape and shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape

of an unidentified detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area

(115th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly made

their escape in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6

investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2)

concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling

under the wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One

detainee was stopped prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP

Battalion search team recaptured detainee # 8399, and

detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier during the

recapture process. Contributing factors were overcrowding,

poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal

detainees at that location. It is of particular note that

the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the

upcoming escape attempt and started doing amplified

announcements in Arabic stating the camp rules. The

investigation pointed out that rules and guidelines were not

posted in the camps in the detainees' native languages.

(ANNEX 6)

d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968

and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)

(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly

attempted to escape at about 1400 hours from the Camp

Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6 investigation

by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the

detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while

the tower guard was turned in the other direction. This

detainee was subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about

1600 the same day, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three

interior MP guards with rocks. One guard was injured and

the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the rioters injuring

7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)

e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and #

10739 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several

detainees allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu

Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP

Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2 criminal

prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of

the Hard-Site. No information on findings, contributing

factors, or corrective action has been provided to this

investigation team. (ANNEX 11)

f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu

Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped

at 1330 from Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib

(BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP

Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicated that a

detainee escaped from the North end of the compound and was

discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but

there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No

information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective

action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX

12)

g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, #

151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu

Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly

escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu

Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ DiNenna (320th MP

Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6 prisoners

escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no

method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on

findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has

been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)

h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees #

150216, #150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399,

#20257, #150348, #152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib

(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly began to

riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the Ganci

encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3

detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers.

A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade,

Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in

protest of their living conditions, that the riot turned

violent, the use of non-lethal force was ineffective, and,

after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed "Golden Spike,"

the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly force was

authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive

training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal

guard-mount conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or

ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal rounds with

lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after

incidents, ROE not posted and not understood, overcrowding,

uniforms not standardized, and poor communication between

the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)

i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib

(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in

his cell and around 1830 an extraction team shot him with

less than lethal and lethal rounds in the process of

recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce

Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that one

of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a

pistol and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in

the encampment. Immediately upon receipt of this

information, an ad-hoc extraction team consisting of MP and

MI personnel conducted what they called a routine cell

search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the

detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard,

inadequate SOPs, the Detention ROE in place at the time was

ineffective due to the numerous levels of authorization

needed for use of lethal force, poorly trained MPs, unclear

lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous relationship between

the MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)

j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into

crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several

detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight

around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu

Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP

Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a

fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-

dispersing round to break up the fight, which was

successful. No information on findings, contributing

factors, or corrective action has been provided to this

investigation team. (ANNEX 14)

k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into

crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several

detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight

around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci encampment, Abu

Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP

Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a

fight in the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots

to disperse the crowd, which was successful. No information

on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has

been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 15)

l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into

crowd at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30-

40 detainees allegedly got into a detainee-on-detainee fight

around 1642 in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment, Abu

Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP

Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there was a

fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-

dispersing round to break up the fight, which was

successful. No information on findings, contributing

factors, or corrective action has been provided to this

investigation team. (ANNEX 16)

m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of

detainee from Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several

detainees allegedly assaulted an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci

Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG

Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated

that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the

use of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No

information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective

action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX

17)

n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp

Bucca (310th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped

between the hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp

Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3)

and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that

the detainee escaped through an undetected weakness in the

wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards,

lapses in accountability, complacency, lack of leadership

presence, poor visibility, and lack of clear and concise

communication between the guards and the leadership. (ANNEX

9)

o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and

#109950 as well as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown

detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility (310th MP

Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around

0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6

Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC

Camp Arifjan Detachment) concluded that three of the

detainees escaped through the front holding cell during

conditions of limited visibility due to fog. One of the

detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and

returned to his holding compound. That same night, 4

detainees exited through the wire on the South side of the

camp and were seen and apprehended by the QRF. Contributing

factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for

emplacement of MPs during implementation of the fog plan,

overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)

p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and

missing Iraqi guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP

Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1335 from the

Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG

Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR

indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape

by signing him out on a work detail and disappearing with

him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing person

had been located. No information on findings, contributing

factors, or corrective action has been provided to this

investigation team. (ANNEX 99)

q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236,

116272, and 151933 from Camp Bucca (310th MP Battalion).

Several Detainees allegedly escaped between the hours of

0440 and 0700 during a period of intense fog. Investigation

by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the

detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was only 10-

15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited

visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper

accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards,

commencement of detainee feeding during low visibility

operations, and poorly rested MPs. (ANNEX 18)

36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation

determined that there was virtually a complete lack of

detailed SOPs at any of the detention facilities.

Moreover, despite the fact that there were numerous

reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq

(in excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations following these

escapes were simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade

Commander with no dissemination to other facilities.

After-Action Reports and Lessons Learned, if done at all,

remained at individual facilities and were not shared

among other commanders or soldiers throughout the

Brigade. The Command never issued standard TTPs for

handling escape incidents. (ANNEXES 5-10, Multiple

Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the

Investigation Team)

RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed

and referenced series of recommendations for improving the

detainee accountability practices throughout the OIF area of

operations.

2. (U) Accountability practices throughout any particular

detention facility must be standardized and in accordance

with applicable regulations and international law.

3. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be

expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real

time updating when detainees are moved and or transferred

from one location to another.

4. (U) "Change sheets," or their doctrinal equivalent must

be immediately processed and updated into the system to

ensure accurate accountability. The detainee roll call or

ISN counts must match the manifest provided to the compound

guards to ensure proper accountability of detainees.

5. (U) Develop, staff, and implement comprehensive and

detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from this

investigation as well as any previous findings,

recommendations, and reports.

6. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and

understood at the lowest level.

7. (U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be held in separate

facilities from any other category of detainee.

8. (U) All of the compounds should be wired into the

master manifest whereby MP Soldiers can account for their

detainees in real time and without waiting for their change

sheets to be processed. This would also have the change

sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the

manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS

system can be utilized for this function.

9. (U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and disturbances

within the detainment facilities must be immediately

reported through both the operational and administrative

Chain of Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The

SIRs must then be tracked and followed by daily SITREPs

until the situation is resolved.

10. (U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation

Rules of Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva

Conventions need to be briefed at every shift change and

guard mount.

11. (U) AARs must be conducted after serious incidents at

any given facility. The observations and corrective actions

that develop from the AARs must be analyzed by the

respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan

of action, shared with the other facilities, and implemented

as a matter of policy.

12. (U) There must be significant structural improvements

at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes

include significant enhancement of perimeter lighting,

additional chain link fencing, staking down of all

concertina wire, hard site development, and expansion of Abu

Ghraib (BCCF) .

13. (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must

be prominently displayed in English and the language of the

detainees at each compound and encampment at every detention

facility IAW AR 190-8.

14. (U) Further restrict US civilians and other

contractors' access throughout the facility. Contractors

and civilians must be in an authorized and easily

identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from

the masses of detainees in civilian clothes.

15. (U) Facilities must have a stop movement/transfer

period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100% detainee roll

call and ISN counts to ensure accurate accountability.

16. (U) The method for doing head counts of detainees

within a given compound must be standardized.

17. (U) Those military units conducting I/R operations must

know of, train on, and constantly reference the applicable

Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The references

provided in this report cover nearly every deficiency I have

enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up for

leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use

them to maintain standardized operating procedures and

efficient accountability practices.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(PART THREE)

(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command

policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the

800th MP Brigade, as appropriate:

Pursuant to Part Three of the Investigation, select members

of the Investigation team (Primarily COL La Fate and I)

personally interviewed the following witnesses:

1. (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

2. (U) COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

3. (U) COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA

Ministry of Justice (Interviewed by COL Richard Gordon,

CFLCC SJA)

4. (U) LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer,

800th MP Brigade

5. (U) LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP

Brigade

6. (U) LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI

Battalion (Tactical Exploitation)

7. (U) LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion

8. (U) LTC Vincent Montera, Commander, 310th MP Battalion

9. (U) LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint

Interrogation and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI

Brigade

10. (U) LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander, 724th MP Battalion

and OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

11. (U) LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

12. (U) MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade

13. (U) MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP

Brigade

14. (U) MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

15. (U) MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

16. (U) MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

17. (U) MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

18. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

19. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

20. (U) CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP

Battalion

21. (U) CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

22. (U) CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

23. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

24. (U) CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

25. (U) CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

26. (U) CPT Michael Anthony Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander,

310th MP Company

27. (U) CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

28. (U) 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP

Company

29. (U) 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-camp to Brigade Commander,

800th MP Brigade

30. (U) 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP

Battalion

31. (U) 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP

Company

32. (U) CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade

33. (U) CSM Joseph P. Arrington, Command Sergeant Major,

320th MP Battalion

34. (U) SGM Pascual Cartagena, Acting Command Sergeant

Major, 800th MP Brigade

35. (U) CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major,

310th MP Battalion

36. (U) 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP

Company

37. (U) SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP

Battalion

38. (U) MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP

Company

39. (U) MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th

MP Battalion

40. (U) SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP

Company

41. (U) SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP

Company

42. (U) SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

43. (U) SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

44. (U) SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler, 42nd MP

Detachment, 16th MP Brigade

45. (U) SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler, 523rd MP

Detachment, 937th Engineer Group

46. (U) MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler, NAS Signal

and Canine Unit

47. (U) Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian Contract

Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade

48. (U) Mr. John Israel, US civilian Contract Interpreter,

Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade

(ANNEXES 45-91)

REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE

FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:

1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the

800th MP Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG

Karpinski has remained in command since that date. The

800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in

the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion,

320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP

Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and

744th MP Battalion.

(ANNEXES 41 and 45)

2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the

800th MP Brigade believed they would be allowed to go

home when all the detainees were released from the Camp

Bucca Theater Internment Facility following the cessation

of major ground combat on 1 May 2003. At one point,

approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp

Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening

process, several thousand detainees were released. Many

in the command believed they would go home when the

detainees were released. In late May-early June 2003 the

800th MP Brigade was given a new mission to manage the

Iraqi penal system and several detention centers. This

new mission meant Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS

when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next few

months there did not appear to have been any attempt by

the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES 45

and 96)

3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of

numerous witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP

Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills,

particularly regarding internment/resettlement

operations. Moreover, there is no evidence that the

command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted

to correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc

training by individuals with civilian corrections

experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and the

Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)

4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately

trained for a mission that included operating a prison or

penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. As the

Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the

800th MP Brigade did not receive corrections-specific

training during their mobilization period. MP units did

not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization

and during the post mobilization training, and thus could

not train for specific missions. The training that was

accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and

implemented at the company level with little or no

direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade

levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law

enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that

the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever

requested specific corrections training from the

Commandant of the Military Police School, the US Army

Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost

Marshal General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary

Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and

76)

5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian

internee detention mission, Brigade personnel relied

heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had

civilian corrections experience, including many who

worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their

civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had

no familiarity with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-

19.40. It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task

List (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever

developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout

the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)

6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder's Team, that the 800th

MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the mission

for which it was tasked. Army Doctrine dictates that an

I/R Brigade can be organized with between 7 and 21

battalions, and that the average battalion size element

should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at

a time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski

and her staff did a poor job allocating resources

throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) normally

housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was

operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD

Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also

run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)

7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual

replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses.

Over time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from

personnel shortages through release from active duty

(REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization.

In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of

life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was

extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or

MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar attacks,

random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to

Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison

complex was also severely overcrowded and the Brigade

lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve

serious logistical problems. Finally, because of past

associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the

Brigade, it appears that friendship often took precedence

over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships.

(ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal

Observations of the Investigation Team)

8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu

Ghraib (BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and

lack of effective communication between the Commander,

205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF)

after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th MP

Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the

FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility

between commands, little coordination at the command

level, and no integration of the two functions.

Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with

little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)

9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was

exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108

issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment

of 205th MI Brigade Commander's Responsibilities for the

Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states as follows:

3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER

205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE

BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS

APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT

ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR

"SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB PROTECTION."

Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made

all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander,

205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer,

rather than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units

conducting detainee operations at that facility. This

is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions

and agendas assigned to each of these respective

specialties. (ANNEX 31)

10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces

(UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as

the detailed direction and control of movements or

maneuvers within the operational area necessary to

accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)

"TACON is the command authority over assigned or

attached forces or commands or military capability made

available for tasking that is limited to the detailed

direction and control of movements or maneuvers within

the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned

missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may

be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any

echelon at or below the level of combatant commander."

11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this

investigation, I find that there was little, if any,

recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade

or the 205th MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence

if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly informed the

Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the

Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib

(BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON

relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness

statements and personal interviews that the 320th MP

Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to function as

if they were responsible for the security, health and

welfare, and overall security of detainees within Abu

Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas

clearly behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES

45 and 46)

13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that

the Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an

extremely ineffective commander and leader. Numerous

witnesses confirm that the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W.

DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a day-to-day

basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P)

Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two

weeks, apparently to give him some relief from the

pressure he was experiencing as the 320th Battalion

Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately

followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the

CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October

2003. BG Karpinski placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of

the 115th MP Battalion, in charge of the 320th MP

Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC

Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion

assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no

orders, either suspending or relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum

from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command

of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication this

removal and search for a replacement was communicated to

the Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to

Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion. Temporarily removing

one commander and replacing him with another serving

Battalion Commander without an order and without

notifying superior or subordinate commands is without

precedent in my military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was

also reprimanded for lapses in accountability that

resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP Battalion was

stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse

which occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater

Internment Facility (TIF), while under the command of LTC

(P) Phillabaum. Despite his proven deficiencies as both

a commander and leader, BG Karpinski allowed LTC (P)

Phillabaum to remain in command of her most troubled

battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of

detainees in the 800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum

was suspended from his duties by LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7

Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and 61)

14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted

a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over

four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation

Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during

much of her testimony. What I found particularly

disturbing in her testimony was her complete

unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of

the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused

or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her

command to both establish and enforce basic standards and

principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45 and the

Personal Observations of the Interview Team)

15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from

the Civil Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance

from either BG John Kern or COL Tim Regan. She blames

much of the abuse that occurred in Abu Ghraib (BCCF) on

MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given the

MPs "ideas" that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she

blamed the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider,

the Company Commander, CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant,

MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems in

Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and LTC Jordan

because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib.

(ANNEX 45)

16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that

the criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF)

might have been caused by the ultimate disposition of the

detainee abuse cases that originally occurred at Camp

Bucca in May 2003. She stated that "about the same time

those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad Central,

the decisions were made to give the guilty people at

Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the

soldiers, the worst that's gonna happen is, you're gonna

go home." I think it important to point out that almost

every witness testified that the serious criminal abuse

of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late

October and early November 2003. The photographs and

statements clearly support that the abuses occurred

during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for

trial in January 2004 and were not finally disposed of

until 29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence

that the decision of numerous MP personnel to

intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was

influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca cases.

(ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)

17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade

S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially

dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complaints,

these officers were not replaced. This had a detrimental

effect on the Brigade Staff's effectiveness and morale.

Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James

O'Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to

accept responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary

Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly supervise the

Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities,

take overt corrective action when needed, and supervise

their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)

18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff

inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP Brigade did not

articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier and Army

standards. I specifically found these examples of

unenforced standards:

a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP

Soldiers assigned detention duties. Despite the

fact that hundreds of former Iraqi soldiers and

officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed

to wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours

while carrying weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on

their helmets and soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)

c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have

been reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during

this period. Those disciplined include; (ANNEXES

43 and 102)

1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP

Brigade

- Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander,

CJTF-7, on 17 January 2004.

2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander,

320th MP Battalion

- GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on

10 November 2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to

take corrective security measures as ordered by the Brigade

Commander; filed locally

- Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,

17 January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction

of duty

3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP

Battalion

- GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on

20 August 2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers.

(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his

vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP

Battalion

- GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May

2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a

violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a subordinate Field

Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he

personally observed; returned to soldier unfiled.

- GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on

10 November 03, for failing to take corrective security

measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.

5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th

MP Brigade

- GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May

2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming

alcohol with an NCO; filed locally.

6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP

Company

- Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming

an Officer and Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in

that he was alleged to have taken nude pictures of his

female Soldiers without their knowledge; Trial date to be

announced.

7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP

Company

- GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on

20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers

(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his

vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major,

800th MP Brigade

- GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski,

Commander 800th MP Brigade, for fraternization and

dereliction of duty for fraternizing with junior enlisted

soldiers within his unit; GOMOR officially filed and he was

removed from the CSM list.

9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant

Major, 400th MP

Battalion

- GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on

20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers

(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his

vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally

10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant,

770th MP Company

- GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on

20 August 2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers

(Soldier had negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his

vehicle, round went into fuel tank); filed locally.

11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP

Brigade,

- GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May

2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming

alcohol; filed locally.

12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th

MP Battalion,

- Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from

BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to

adhere to the guidance/directives given to him by BG

Karpinski; filed locally.

d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not

enforced. LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., Commander of

the 165th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical

Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy

was enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and

that BG Karpinski approached COL Pappas to reverse

the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy as

previously existed. (ANNEX 53)

19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP

Brigade and the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq

had very little contact during their tour of duty with

either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG Karpinski

claimed, during her testimony, that she paid regular

visits to the various detention facilities where her

Soldiers were stationed. However, the detailed calendar

provided by her Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support

her contention. Moreover, numerous witnesses stated that

they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum.

(Multiple Witness Statements)

20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such

as the difference in culture, the Soldiers' quality of

life, the real presence of mortal danger over an extended

time period, and the failure of commanders to recognize

these pressures contributed to the perversive atmosphere

that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility and

throughout the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).

21. As I have documented in other parts of this

investigation, I find that there was no clear emphasis by

BG Karpinski to ensure that the 800th MP Brigade Staff,

Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to standard in

detainee operations and proficiency or that serious

accountability lapses that occurred over a significant

period of time, particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were

corrected. AR 15-6 Investigations regarding detainee

escapes were not acted upon, followed up with corrective

action, or disseminated to subordinate commanders or

Soldiers. Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with

detainees if they existed at all, were not read or

understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult mission

of detainee operations. Following the abuse of several

detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I could find no

evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective

training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers

throughout Iraq clearly understood the requirements of

the Geneva Conventions relating to the treatment of

detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal

Observations of the Investigation Team )

22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished

in writing by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious

deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG Sanchez found that the

performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met the

standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that

incidents in the preceding six months had occurred that

reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and

leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited

the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the

most recent example of a poor leadership climate that

"permeates the Brigade." I totally concur with LTG

Sanchez' opinion regarding the performance of BG

Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the

Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)

RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP

Brigade be Relieved from Command and given a General Officer

Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have

been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

- Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level

detention facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs

for dealing with detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers

had read, understood, and would adhere to these SOPs.

- Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP

Brigade knew, understood, and adhered to the protections

afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to

the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

- Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation

Team as to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate

commands.

- Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG

McKiernan, regarding the withholding of disciplinary

authority for Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer

misconduct.

- Failing to take appropriate action regarding the

ineffectiveness of a subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry

Phillabaum.

- Failing to take appropriate action regarding the

ineffectiveness of numerous members of her Brigade Staff

including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4.

- Failing to properly ensure the results and

recommendations of the AARs and numerous 15-6 Investigation

reports on escapes and shootings (over a period of several

months) were properly disseminated to, and understood by,

subordinate commanders.

- Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards

throughout her command.

- Failing to establish a Brigade METL.

- Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned

tasks for Soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade.

- Failing to ensure that numerous and reported

accountability lapses at detention facilities throughout

Iraq were corrected.

2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI

Brigade, be given a General Officer Memorandum of

Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US

Army Intelligence Activities for the following acts which

have been previously referred to in the aforementioned

findings:

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

command were properly trained in and followed the IROE.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

command knew, understood, and followed the protections

afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to

the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

- Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and

"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

3.(U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP

Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General

Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the

Colonel/O-6 Promotion List for the following acts which

have been previously referred to in the aforementioned

findings:

- Failing to properly ensure the results,

recommendations, and AARs from numerous reports on escapes

and shootings over a period of several months were properly

disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.

- Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations

from various 15-6 Investigations as specifically directed by

BG Karpinski.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement

Operations.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

command knew and understood the protections afforded to

detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment

of Prisoners of War.

- Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and

"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

- Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier

standards, proficiency, and accountability.

- Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and

to task organize to accomplish his mission.

4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint

Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to

205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty

and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for

the following acts which have been previously referred to in

the aforementioned findings:

- Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating

Team, including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

control were properly trained in and followed the IROE.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

control knew, understood, and followed the protections

afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to

the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

- Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct

authority working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at

Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP

Battalion, be Relieved from his position as the Battalion

S-3 and be given a General Officer Memorandum of

Reprimand for the following acts which have been

previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

- Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC,

on 25 May 2003, for dereliction of duty for failing to

report a violation of CENTCOM General Order #1 by a

subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior Noncommissioned

Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was returned to

Soldier and not filed.

- Failing to take corrective action and implement

recommendations from various 15-6 investigations even after

receiving a GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP

Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing to take corrective

security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.

- Failing to take appropriate action and report an

incident of detainee abuse, whereby he personally witnessed

a Soldier throw a detainee from the back of a truck.

6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP

Company, be Relieved from Command and be given a General

Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts

which have been previously referred to in the

aforementioned findings:

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

command knew and understood the protections afforded to

detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment

of Prisoners of War.

- Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and

"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

- Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier

standards, proficiency, and accountability.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement

Operations.

7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP

Company, be Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader

and be given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand

for the following acts which have been previously

referred to in the aforementioned findings:

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

command knew and understood the protections afforded to

detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment

of Prisoners of War.

- Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and

"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

- Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier

standards, proficiency, and accountability.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct

command were properly trained in Internment and Resettlement

Operations.

8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP

Battalion, be Relieved from his duties and given a

General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following

acts which have been previously referred to in the

aforementioned findings:

- Making a material misrepresentation to the

Investigation Team stating that he had "never" been

admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski, when in fact he

had been admonished for failing to obey an order from BG

Karpinski to "stay out of the towers" at the holding

facility.

- Making a material misrepresentation to the

Investigation Team stating that he had attended every shift

change/guard-mount conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and

that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the proper

treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements

contradict this assertion.

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP

Battalion knew and understood the protections afforded to

detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment

of Prisoners of War.

- Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and

"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

- Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier

standards, proficiency, and accountability.

- Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly

trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP

Company, be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of

the 372nd MP Company and given a General Officer

Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have

been previously referred to in the aforementioned

findings:

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company

knew and understood the protections afforded to detainees in

the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners

of War.

- Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and

"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

- Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier

standards, proficiency, and accountability.

- Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly

trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant,

372nd MP Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a

General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive

action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice for the

following acts which have been previously referred to in

the aforementioned findings:

- Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and

understood the protections afforded to detainees in the

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of

War.

- Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and

"visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

- Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier

standards, proficiency, and accountability.

- Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly

trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.

- Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct

control, abused detainees by stomping on their bare hands

and feet in his presence.

11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian

Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,

be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his

employment file, termination of employment, and

generation of a derogatory report to revoke his security

clearance for the following acts which have been

previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:

- Made a false statement to the investigation team

regarding the locations of his interrogations, the

activities during his interrogations, and his knowledge of

abuses.

- Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in

interrogation techniques, to facilitate interrogations by

"setting conditions" which were neither authorized and in

accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly

knew his instructions equated to physical abuse.

12. (U) That Mr. John Israel, Contract US Civilian

Interpreter, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade,

be given an Official Reprimand to be placed in his

employment file and have his security clearance reviewed

by competent authority for the following acts or concerns

which have been previously referred to in the

aforementioned findings:

- Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in

violation of the IROE, which is contrary to several witness

statements.

-

- Did not have a security clearance.

13. (U) I find that there is sufficient credible information

to warrant an Inquiry UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army

Intelligence Activities, be conducted to determine the

extent of culpability of MI personnel, assigned to the

205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and

Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).

Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. Pappas, LTC

Steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, and Mr. John

Israel were either directly or indirectly responsible for

the abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and strongly recommend

immediate disciplinary action as described in the

preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a

Procedure 15 Inquiry to determine the full extent of

their culpability. (ANNEX 36)

OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS

1. (U) Due to the nature and scope of this investigation, I

acquired the assistance of Col (Dr.) Henry Nelson, a USAF

Psychiatrist, to analyze the investigation materials from

a psychological perspective. He determined that there

was evidence that the horrific abuses suffered by the

detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanton acts of select

soldiers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There

was a complex interplay of many psychological factors and

command insufficiencies. A more detailed analysis is

contained in ANNEX 1 of this investigation.

2. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted

a lengthy interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over

four hours, and is included verbatim in the investigation

Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely emotional during

much of her testimony. What I found particularly

disturbing in her testimony was her complete

unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of

the problems inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused

or exacerbated by poor leadership and the refusal of her

command to both establish and enforce basic standards and

principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)

3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many

individual Soldiers and some subordinate units under the

800th MP Brigade that overcame significant obstacles,

persevered in extremely poor conditions, and upheld the

Army Values. We discovered numerous examples of Soldiers

and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of

leadership and accomplishing their assigned tasks.

a. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC Dennis

McGlone, efficiently operated the HVD Detention

Facility at Camp Cropper and met mission

requirements with little to no guidance from the

800th MP Brigade. The unit was disciplined,

proficient, and appeared to understand their basic

tasks.

b. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, commanded by LTC

Stephen J. Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK

Detention Facility at Camp Ashraf. His Soldiers

were proficient in their individual tasks and

adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal

operation.

c. (U) The 165th MI Battalion excelled in providing

perimeter security and force protection at Abu

Ghraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters, Jr., demanded

standards be enforced and worked endlessly to

improve discipline throughout the FOB.

4. (U) The individual Soldiers and Sailors that we observed

and believe should be favorably noted include:

a. (U) Master-at-Arms First Class William J. Kimbro,

US Navy Dog Handler, knew his duties and refused to

participate in improper interrogations despite

significant pressure from the MI personnel at Abu

Ghraib.

b. (U) SPC Joseph M. Darby, 372nd MP Company

discovered evidence of abuse and turned it over to

military law enforcement.

c. (U) 1LT David O. Sutton, 229th MP Company, took

immediate action and stopped an abuse, then reported

the incident to the chain of command.

CONCLUSION

1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious

acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu

Ghraib/BCCF and Camp Bucca, Iraq. Furthermore, key

senior leaders in both the 800th MP Brigade and the 205th

MI Brigade failed to comply with established regulations,

policies, and command directives in preventing detainee

abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bucca during the

period August 2003 to February 2004.

2. (U) Approval and implementation of the recommendations

of this AR 15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in

previous assessments are essential to establish the

conditions with the resources and personnel required to

prevent future occurrences of detainee abuse.

Annexes

1. Psychological Assessment

2. Request for investigation from CJTF-7 to CENTCOM

3. Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM directing investigation

4. Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG Taguba

5. 15-6 Investigation 9 June 2003

6. 15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003

7. 15-6 Investigation 13 June 2003

8. 15-6 Investigation 24 November 2003

9. 15-6 Investigation 7 January 2004

10. 15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004

11. SIR 5 November 2003

12. SIR 7 November 2003

13. SIR 8 November 2003

14. SIR 13 December 2003

15. SIR 13 December 2003

16. SIR 13 December 2003

17. SIR 17 December 2003

18. Commander's Inquiry 26 January 2004

19. MG Ryder's Report, 6 November 2003

20. MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003

21. AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel,

Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997

22. FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement

Operations, 1 August 2001

23. FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September 1992

24. Fourth Geneva Convention, 12 August 1949

25. CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu Ghraib, 28 January

2004

26. CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004

27. 800th MP Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004

28. 205th MI Brigade's IROE, Undated

29. TOA Order (800th MP Brigade) and letter holding

witnesses

30. Investigation Team's witness list

31. FRAGO #1108

32. Letters suspending several key leaders in the 800th MP

Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions annotated

33. FM 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002

34. CID Report on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 8 June

2003

35. Article 32 Findings on abuse of detainees at Camp

Bucca, 26 August 2003

36. AR 381-10, 1 July 1984

37. Excerpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion

38. 310th MP Battalion's Inprocessing SOP

39. 320th MP Battalion's "Change Sheet"

40. Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (JIDC)

Slides, Undated

41. Order of Battle Slides, 12 January 2004

42. Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Actions Armed Forces, 10

July 2001

43. General Officer Memorandums of Reprimand

44. 800th MP Battalion's TACSOP

45. BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade

46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade

47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate, CPA Ministry

of Justice

48. LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Executive Officer, 800th

MP Brigade

49. LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, 800th MP

Brigade

50. LTC Robert P. Walters Jr., Commander, 165th MI

Battalion (Tactical exploitation)

51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Battalion

52. LTC Vincent Montera, Commander 310th MP Battalion

53. LTC Steve Jordan, former Director, Joint Interrogation

and Debriefing Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade

54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Battalion and

OIC Arifjan Detachment, 800th MP Brigade

55. LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion

56. MAJ David Hinzman, S-1, 800th MP Brigade

57. MAJ William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800th MP Brigade

58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 800th MP Brigade

59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion

60. MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP Battalion

61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, 800th MP Brigade

62. CPT Marc C. Hale, Commander, 670th MP Company

63. CPT Donald Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company

64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Battalion

65. CPT John Kaires, S-3, 310th MP Battalion

66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S-2, 800th MP Brigade

67. LTC Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion

68. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company

69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP

Company

70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, 800th MP Brigade

71. 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company

72. 1LT Elvis Mabry, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander,

800th MP Brigade

73. 1LT Warren E. Ford, II, Commander, HHC 320th MP

Battalion

74. 2LT David O. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th MP Company

75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade

76. CSM Joseph P. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320th MP

Battalion

77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP

Brigade

78. CSM Timothy L. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310th

MP Battalion

79. 1SG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP

Company

80. SGM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion

81. MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company

82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 310th MP

Battalion

83. SFC Daryl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company

84. SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company

85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company

86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company

87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler

88. SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler

89. MA1 William J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler

90. Mr. Steve Stephanowicz, US civilian contract

Interrogator, CACI, 205th MI Brigade

91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian contract Interpreter,

Titan Corporation, 205th MI Brigade

92. FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001

93. CJTF-7 IROE and DROE, Undated

94. CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12

October 2003

95. 800th MP Brigade Mobilization Orders

96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004

97. 530th MP Battalion Mission Brief, 11 February 2004

98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Ed Ray, Chief of Military

Justice, CFLCC, 9 March 2004

99. SIR 14 January 2004

100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004

101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2, 320th MP Battalion

102. Memorandum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG

Karpinski, 17

January 2004

103. Various SIRs from the 800th MP Brigade/320th MP

Battalion

104. 205th MI Brigade SITREP to MG Miller, 12 December

2003

105. SGT William A. Cathcart, 372nd MP Company

106. 1LT Michael A. Drayton, Commander, 870th MP Company

ENDS

Full Text: The Taguba Report On Iraq Prison Abuse

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