Cablegate: Osce/Fsc On 2/24: Differences Over Code Of

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000068

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE/FSC ON 2/24: DIFFERENCES OVER CODE OF
CONDUCT; NO MOVEMENT YET ON VD99 PROPOSALS

1. (SBU) Summary: The February 24 Forum for Security
Cooperation focused on the Code of Conduct, which drew out
differences between U.S. and Russian approaches to dealing
with conflict prevention and crisis management. It also
underscored ambiguities within the Code and the tension
between consensus and action by the OSCE in response to a
potential crisis. Russia's proposal for OSCE conflict
prevention was discussed in Working Group "B." Discussion of
the British and Danish Vienna Document Food-for-thought
papers in Working Group "A" made little headway. End Summary.

--------------------------------
Presentations on Code of Conduct
--------------------------------

2. (SBU) The 605th Meeting of the Forum for Security
Cooperation on February 24 focused on the Code of Conduct on
Politico-Military Aspects of Security, fulfilling in part the
third tasking from ministers under the Issues Relevant
decision (MC.DEC/16/09). As part of the Security Dialogue,
the FSC received presentations from Wolfgang Zellner, Acting
Head of the OSCE Center for OSCE Research; Andrei Zagorski,
Lead Researcher at the Moscow State Institute for
International Relations; and David Law, Senior Fellow at the
Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces.

3. (SBU) Zellner's presentation focused on the Code's
"ground-breaking" language that applies the principle of
democratic controls, individual accountability, and the
extension of essentially national norms to international
applicability for all security forces within a State.
Zagorski explored the concept of indivisible security and its
manifestation within a framework of cooperative, external and
internal security. He noted so-called "positive ambiguities"
and the absence of a binding dispute resolution mechanism
that would force participating States to seek common
understanding at critical intervals in their relationships.
With respect to CSBMs, Zagorski emphasized that updating VD99
and taking conventional arms control to the next level would
constitute a first step in considering further measures aimed
at solidarity within the OSCE.

4. (SBU) Law focused his remarks on the need to apply
democratic control principles, including human rights and an
effective division of labor between civilian leadership and
the security forces to extend norms to private security
forces that are outside the Code of Conduct oversight
mechanisms. Besides the importance of incorporating private
and traditional security providers into an agreed set of
standards and norms, Law also underscored the added value of
public-private partnerships in building accountability
mechanisms.

-------------------------------
Responses by States on the Code
-------------------------------

5. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) noted the plenary discussion
demonstrated the consistency between the Russian proposal for
a European Security Treaty and the concept of comprehensive
security. Ulyanov pointed out that the EST ) like the Code
of Conduct - need not be discussed outside the
political-military dimension "as some have suggested." He
then raised the prospect for a Europe-based missile defense
system as an example of the violation of the Code's principle
that no state should strengthen its security at the expense
of another (presumably Russia). Ulyanov said this justified
the need for a legally-binding charter since its absence
created different security spheres in that indivisible
security has a legal character in NATO, but not for the OSCE
Code of Conduct; he referred to the difference as "abnormal."
Ulyanov ended his remarks pleased the U.S. had incorporated
elements of the Russian proposal for conflict prevention but

USOSCE 00000068 002 OF 004

said the U.S. proposal was vague and Russia's was a more
precise elaboration of this concept.

6. (SBU) The U.S. (Neighbour) underscored the Code's
continued relevance for adapting the comprehensive security
concepts of the Helsinki Final Act to addressing 21st century
threats in inter- and intra-state relations. He also posed a
question to Zagorski about the tension between consensus and
the ability to act to avert crisis. Spain (Anson), speaking
for the EU Presidency, emphasized the Code's stipulation
against forces that are "not accountable to or controlled by
their constitutionally established authorities." Switzerland
(Von Arx) noted the Code called for respecting the sovereign
right of states to choose their relationships including
neutrality, but added there was room to develop the concept
of solidarity of action such as how to address a violation of
commitments. Von Arx speculated that a reconfirmation of the
Code of Conduct, including all principles contained therein,
would do much to underscore the basic principles of European
security, and avoid a selective reading of those principles.
Georgia (Giorgazde) questioned Zellner's characterization of
the Russian proposed European Security Treaty as "sharing the
same vision as the Corfu Process," because Georgia sees the
two as incompatible since Russia was not offering a
comprehensive approach to security.

7. (SBU) Germany (Genrich) said the Forum needed to return to
the beginning of the Code, recognizing the tensions among its
principles, and consider how to address those tensions in the
new security environment including review of the capacity for
oversight. As a way to address these tensions, he proposed
that perhaps the OSCE should think about new mechanisms of a
consultative nature. Genrich added that dealing with the
Code in the AIAM was not the best solution. Ireland
(O'Leary) expressed strong support for Austria's proposed
reference list for completing the Code of Conduct
Questionnaire. Not surprisingly, Belarus (Krayushkin)
emphasized that the principles in the Code of Conduct were
only politically binding, which was why a document to ensure
implementation was needed, such as Russia's proposal for a
legally-binding EST. Latvia (Nilsons) called for "faithful
implementation" of current mechanisms and concrete proposals
in the field of CSBMs and Arms Control as a good basis for
furthering cooperation.

-----------------------------------------
"Consensus Minus" and the Code of Conduct
-----------------------------------------

8. (SBU) In their closing remarks, Law advocated for the OSCE
to press for a better dialogue between the armed forces and
the public. In response to a U.S. question about the tension
between consensus and the ability to act to avert crisis,
Zagorski noted that the Human Dimension allowed for consensus
minus one as a way for OSCE to take action, albeit
temporarily and not as a substitute for building consensus.
He added this was important in that the OSCE has other
impediments like no enforcement mechanisms and a dependence
on the political will of the states concerned.

9. (SBU) Zagorski noted the OSCE should be able to act with
the widest possible support but only until consensus was
achieved to ensure all participating states own a decision to
act. Zellner called for exploring tangible proposals on how
to use in a positive way the tensions built into the Code,
including possibly holding a seminar to consider how to
bridge the gulf between consensus, solidarity of action, and
conflict prevention. In response to Georgia, Zellner pointed
out that Russia and the Corfu Process shared a vision for a
security dialogue that supported greater cooperation: "the
vision is agreed but not the path to achieve it."

10. (SBU) Russia, returning to the question of "consensus

USOSCE 00000068 003 OF 004

minus" raised in part by the U.S. intervention, called the
point "crucial" that, although theoretically possible,
consensus minus could only be achieved within a more mature
organization that has codified its institutional mandate.
Ulyanov said, "We would need a European Charter first, with
clear rules of play, before we could take seriously a
'consensus minus' mechanism in conflict prevention."

11. (SBU) Under Any Other Business, Ukraine thanked the CPC
for the report on implementation of cycle one of the melange
removal project, and expressed appreciation to the donor
countries. Russia intervened to note that it was a Russian
company doing the lion's share of the actual melange
disposal, a point which Ukraine graciously acknowledged.
Georgia called for an FSC discussion, which he hoped would
include Heidi Tagliavini and relevant NGOs, dedicated to the
August 2008 conflict with Russia, "not to point fingers but
to examine lessons learned."

--------------------------------------------- -
Working Group "B" ) Russia: "Never say never!"
--------------------------------------------- -

12. (SBU) Following the reintroduction of Russia's proposed
draft decision on conflict prevention
(FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1), Switzerland (Von Arx) raised the
importance of considering the Russian proposal within the
framework of the Corfu Process and looking for common
denominators between the Russian draft and the other
Food-for-thought proposals being circulated on the same
topic. Von Arx also said there was room to consider the role
to be played by other OSCE institutions like the CPC.

13. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) asked Russia for clarification on
whether the last operative paragraph of its FFT excluded the
possibility of the OSCE reaching consensus on a conflict
prevention mechanism that may not need consensus before
triggering an OSCE response to a crisis. While noting he did
not have official instructions on this issue, Russia
(Ulyanov) responded with "never say never!" but the specific
mechanism would need to be discussed along with the rules
associated with that mechanism. He reiterated his belief
that "consensus minus" would be difficult to approve unless
OSCE had a "Charter" (i.e., a legally-binding agreement) that
would make it a well-established, serious, and mature
organization.

14. (SBU) The Greek Chair (Sourani), in support of a
Hungarian comment about the important role for the FSC in
examining a comprehensive approach to early warning, crisis
management and conflict prevention proposals, argued that the
procedures for engagement were less important that reaching
consensus. The U.S. (Ellis) noted "the devil's in the
details" and that adherence to clear procedures is important
for examining the specific mechanisms that can get the OSCE
to consensus. (Comment: there is no consensus in the FSC
regarding the attempt by Russia and Greece to create a joint
FSC-PC decision-making mechanism. Most delegations, however,
are still on the sidelines, observing the exchange on not
just the Russian draft proposal, but also the ongoing
discussion over the procedural questions raised by Russia and
Greece. End Comment.)

--------------------------------------------- ----
Working Group "A" ) No movement on VD99 proposals
--------------------------------------------- ----

15. (SBU) Greece (Kalpadakis) announced Uzbekistan failed to
respond to a VD99 evaluation visit requested on February 9
(CBM/GR/10/003/F36/0), and that a similar request in 2009
also went unanswered. No delegation commented on the
non-compliance by Uzbekistan; the Uzbeks were not present at
the Working Group.

USOSCE 00000068 004 OF 004

16. (SBU) The UK draft on VD99-A Way Forward"
(FSC.DEL/13/10/Rev.1) was revised to reflect Denmark's
co-sponsorship. The revision also reflected adjustments to
the UK's operative paragraph 2 that successful renegotiation
of Chapters V and IX "will supersede corresponding chapters
of VD99," in order to complement the Danish proposal for
"VD-plus," which includes VD Review Meetings
(FSC.DEL/9/10/Rev.1) that would create a routine and targeted
mechanism for incorporating future changes and updates to the
Vienna Document.

17. (SBU) Russia (Geyandov), though still awaiting
instructions from Moscow, underscored that it already
expressed overall Russian support for the paper, but sought
clarification on whether the changes would follow the Danish
Draft for a VD Review Meeting, or would allow for the more
traditional format that incorporates additions at the end of
the year. The UK (Gare) said that procedures were up for
discussion and it would depend on where was the FSC at the
time. Denmark (Petersen) noted there was sufficient
flexibility to having a VD Review Meeting whenever there was
consensus to do so, though it would be preferable to hold
them in conjunction with the Annual Implementation and
Assessment Meetings (AIAM). Ukraine, Belarus, and Finland
said the two proposals were under consideration by their
respective capitals.

18. (U) The next meeting of the FSC plenary and Working
Groups is scheduled for March 10 (the week following the
AIAM).
FULLER

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