Cablegate: Instructions for U.S. Delegation for Nrrc

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RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC 8207

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 017005

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
ASTANA AND ALMATY FOR DTRO AND POL-MIL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BO KACT KZ PARM RS UP
SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC
CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS), 2-4 MARCH 2010

REF: 2009 STATE 120541

1. (U) In accordance with the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center
(NRRC) Agreement, which calls for annual consultations, the
U.S. NRRC will visit the Arms Control and Inspection Activity
Support Center of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of
Kazakhstan. The NRRC Consultations focus on NRRC operational
issues, specifically on the future of the GGCLs in the wake
of the December 5, 2009, expiration of the START Treaty.
Should policy-related issues arise during the consultations,
the U.S. delegation can serve as a conduit to forward views
and report proposals to the Washington policy community. The
delegation has no authority to discuss, or to commit the USG
on, policy matters.

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Background
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2. (SBU) The START Treaty expired on December 5, 2009. The
START follow-on treaty will be a strictly bilateral treaty
between the U.S. and Russia. There will thus be a drastic,
but not complete, reduction in message traffic utilizing the
Government to Government Communications Links (GGCLs) with
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The U.S. and its partner
countries therefore need to discuss the future of the GGCLs.
Terminating the GGCL agreements with Kazakhstan requires
twelve months notice, but such decisions will require policy
guidance.

3. (SBU) The original agreements to establish the GGCLs are
based on both the INF and START treaties. Even with the
expiration of START, the INF Treaty continues in force, and a
small number of notifications are required yearly. The GGCLs
can be maintained in an efficient and cost-effective manner,
and there are significant benefits, both practical and
political in nature, to the U.S. in maintaining direct,
secure connections with Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus and
in encouraging those countries to maintain their current
NRRC-like structures, which help them to fulfill their
obligations under other treaties.

4. (SBU) The US delegation, led by the Staff Director of the
NRRC and consisting of representatives from the Department of
State's Special Message Operations Division of the Bureau of
Information Resources Management (IRM) will discuss with its
counterparts whether they are willing and able to maintain
the current satellite-based configuration, or whether they
wish to explore alternatives, such as an internet-based
system similar to those in use for the notifications required
under the various Organization on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) treaty regimes.

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INSTRUCTIONS -- U.S. AGENDA
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5. (SBU) The following is guidance on the U.S. agenda for
the NRRC Consultations.

Begin Points for Discussion:

- Since 1994, our Continuous Communication Links (CCLs) have
been valuable and productive in providing bilateral
notifications required under the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) Treaty. The CCLs, or Government to Government
Communications Links (GGCLs), as the United States usually
refers to them, have proven to be a reliable and secure means
of communication between our countries, in particular for
exchanging treaty-related notifications.

STATE 00017005 002 OF 003

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC
CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS), 2-4 MARCH 20
- However, with the expiration of the START Treaty on
December 5, 2009, there is now a drastic reduction in message
traffic utilizing the CCLs, and we need to make decisions
about the future of the CCLs.

- The United States believes that the CCLs can be operated in
an efficient and cost-effective manner, and that there are
mutual benefits in maintaining direct, secure connections
between our nations.

- The CCLs have been the core around which our successful
national centers for security and confidence building
communications have developed. These centers now host INF
notifications and the network terminals to support
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
notifications.

- We have devoted years to improving the CCLs to the current
digital circuitry and state-of-the-art technology within a
framework of a highly skilled communications staff, watch
officers and engineers. Both sides of our CCL know how the
links work, how the other end is staffed, and each side's
information-passing capabilities and competencies. The CCLs
provide a reliable and easy way for our two countries to
exchange classified information directly, and an established
backup capability for our senior officials to communicate
with the each other. They serve as an instrument of mutual
trust and cooperation between our respective governments.

- If the CCLs were discontinued, much of this expertise would
be lost and the ability for direct bilateral coordination of
our notification regimes, could have additional negative
impact to the infrastructure and operational capacity of our
national centers.

- Potential uses of the GGCLs: The GGCLs present a capability
to transfer secure, large electronic files between host
governments, and could have potential uses for
communications, information sharing and transparency.

6. (SBU) If raised: If Kazakhstan proposes discontinuing its
GGCL, the United States should urge that the link be
maintained for a provisional period, during which alternative
technologies can be explored and possibly installed. The
proposed provisional period would be 24 months, with a 12
month consultative review.

7. (SBU) If there is agreement to maintain the satellite GGCL:

U.S. can provide technical assistance. The U.S. can not
provide financial assistance.

8. (U) If raised: If Kazakhstan requests to switch to an
Internet-based GGCL: The delegation will bring the Kazakh
proposals back to the U.S. policy community.

9. (U) If the Kazakh side desires to terminate:

A suitable plan for termination of the CCL agreement will be
discussed in Washington, and the U.S. will accommodate
Kazakhstan's request.

10. (U) Plan for GGCL Consultations:

A 12 month consultative review meeting will be discussed.

11. (U) Delegation should seek agreement on a continuation of
watch officer exchanges. If agreement is reached, seek
proposed dates for such exchanges).

12. (U) The delegation will provide a briefing on the
current operations of the U.S. NRRC.

13. (U) The U.S. NRRC delegation should draw on detailed
talking points cleared separately through the Interagency for
each U.S. and Kazakhstan agenda item.

14. (U) Post assistance is greatly appreciated. The U.S.

STATE 00017005 003 OF 003

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. DELEGATION FOR NRRC
CONSULTATIONS IN ALMATY ON THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT TO
GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS LINKS (GGCLS), 2-4 MARCH 20
NRRC also encourages DTRO representatives to attend these
discussions. If there are any questions, please contact NRRC
Senior Staff Officer Dennis Curry at (202) 647 1895 or
currydl@state.gov or dlcurry57@hotmail.com.
CLINTON
CLINTON

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