Cablegate: China's Mfa, Gacc, Caea Press for Greater Nuclear Security

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 000340

USDOE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY/ MCGINNIS, HERCZEG, GILLESPIE
USDOE FOR NNSA/ BLACK, HUIZENGA, WHITNEY, BIENIAWSKI
STATE PASS TO NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (DOANE)
USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL/YOSHIDA, CUTLER, HUANGFU
USDOE FOR INTERNATIONAL
NSC FOR HOLGATE
STATE FOR EAP/CM-BRAUNOHLER, EAP/CM
STATE FOR ISN/NESS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG ECON ETTC TRGY KNNP IAEA KTIA CVIS CH

SUBJECT: CHINA'S MFA, GACC, CAEA PRESS FOR GREATER NUCLEAR SECURITY
COOPERATION WITH DOE/NNSA

BEIJING 00000340 001.2 OF 004

Sensitive but unclassified - please protect accordingly.

SUMMARY
-------
1. (SBU) Assistant Deputy Administrator for the U.S. Department of
Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of
Nonproliferation, Dave Huizenga, visited Beijing China 20-23
January. He participated in the Transportation Security Workshop
with China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) and China Institute of
Atomic Energy(CIAE), met with Hao Chongfu, Director General,
Department of Customs Control and Inspection, General Administration
of China Customs (GACC), met with Wu Chuntai, Deputy Director
General, Dept of External Security Affairs, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA), and Liu Yongde, Director General Department of
International Cooperation, CAEA. A common theme in each of these
meetings was an acknowledgment by the Chinese host that China has a
growing international role in nuclear security and that there is a
strong desire to further collaborate with the U.S. in this important
area. The MFA expressed strong support for going forward with the
joint Center of Excellence (COE) training facility and stated
China's strong support for the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit.
Although when pressed, they would not commit to who would represent
China at the NSS. The State Council has assigned CAEA the
responsibility to work with NNSA to design and construct the nuclear
security training facility. This project was proposed by Deputy
Secretary Poneman last fall on his trip to China. The expectation
is to announce this joint activity at the April Nuclear Security
Summit. To clarify the scope and expectations, the CAEA is
proposing to have a meeting in late March in Washington between
their Vice Chairman/Party Secretary General and the Administrator,
NNSA. The GACC reported their Megaports project milestones are on
track, agreed to joint collaboration efforts to support EXPO 2010,
using the successful formula that was used for the Beijing Olympics,
and identified shared responsibilities for developing a joint
training center in China to train Chinese and regional nations on
the proper planning, operations and conduct of radiation detection
at shipping ports and border crossings and other ports of entry and
departure. End Summary.

Building on Successful Cooperation with China Customs
--------------------------------------------- --------
2. (SBU) In an open and candid meeting with GACC, Huizenga covered
three main topic areas. Project review and status of the joint
US-China Megaports demonstration project at Shanghai, reaching
agreement on the timing, scope and responsibilities for joint
U.S.-China collaboration on radiological detection for EXPO 2010,
and negotiations on the creation of a radiation detection training
facility that would create an indigenous training capability that
could not only support China's needs but that of the Asian region.
In exchange for U.S. support in creating this training facility,
China would provide access to additional ports and border
surveillance areas for the U.S. teams to visit and confirm the

BEIJING 00000340 002.2 OF 004

operational effectiveness of the Chinese equipment and operations to
detect illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. The Megaports
demonstration project is proceeding on schedule with a projected
operational date of 2011. For EXPO 2010, agreement was reached on
the type and quantities of equipment to be provided. NNSA will also
provide training for 60 Chinese customs officials to ensure the
equipment is properly operated and maintained. After Expo 2010, the
equipment will deployed to principal border crossings and sea ports
to enhance the detection of illicit nuclear material trafficking in
and out of China.

3. (SBU) To create an indigenous training capability, similar to
NNSA's Richland HAMMER training site, China has requested DOE/NNSA's
design, construction and "train the trainers" assistance. NNSA has
agreed in principle but on the condition that China provide access
to different ports and border crossing that, to date have not been
open to DOE/NNSA inspectors. A second stipulation is that the
curriculum include dual use equipment training so China is able to
detect nuclear equipment that could be used for terrorist or other
illicit purposes. GACC has accepted these conditions but needs to
complete interagency staffing before reaching final agreement.
Huizenga also extended an invitation for DG Hao Chongfu to visit the
U.S. and to meet US senior officials to further demonstrate advanced
collaboration. DG Hao was receptive to this invitation and went on
to discuss cooperative efforts they are undertaking with the
European Union in the area of second line defense and offered to
better collaborate across all programs in and with China.

CAEA ASSUMES A LEADING ROLE IN THE COE TRAINING CONCEPT
--------------------------------------------- ---------
4. (SBU) The meeting with DG Liu Yongde, CAEA Department of
International Cooperation, addressed three topics. Review and
agreement on the nuclear security work under the Peaceful Use of
Nuclear Technology (PUNT), concept and shared responsibilities for
the Center of Excellence (COE) proposal as conveyed in the USG
non-paper (presented by Deputy Secretary Poneman during his fall
visit to Beijing), and potential future joint statements or
agreements that would recognize the enhanced collaboration between
our two countries as well as the expanded role of CAEA.

5. (SBU) Huizenga and Liu Yongde reaffirmed the positive nature of
U.S.-China nuclear security cooperation and discussed several
different options for designing and operating the COE. Liu expressed
strong Chinese willingness to collaborate on a COE, and stated that
the State Council had designated CAEA as lead agency for negotiating
and implementing the COE with the US. Other agencies involved
include MFA, GACC, MPS, MOFCOM and MEP. Liu expressed his interest
in having the USG name NNSA as its counterpart implementing
organization, and that the USG inform GOC of this decision through
appropriate channels.

6. (SBU) Both sides agreed on several key points about for the

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nuclear security training Center of Excellence:

- It would be necessary to jointly decide on the scope of a Center
or Excellence. For example, should it be a small renovation of
existing CAEA space or a larger center involving substantial new
construction? Liu expressed interest in larger center involving new
construction.

- Liu expressed a desire for an NNSA-CAEA agreement on COE scope,
list of shared responsibilities, and commitment to funding by the
end of March which could be announced at the upcoming Nuclear
Security Summit. He proposed to have CAEA Party General Secretary,
Wang Yiren visit NNSA to finalize the agreement before the summit.
He estimated a 2-3 year implementation schedule would be necessary
to complete COE.

- Liu suggested that the COE could be designed in a manner to not
only accommodate China's domestic nuclear security training needs,
but also noted that it could serve a wider audience - bilateral or
multilateral nuclear security events for the Asia/Pacific region as
well as bilateral and multilateral nuclear security training
involving a broader international audience. Huizenga noted that the
Center of Excellence could eventually serve training needs of
defense complex nuclear security personnel as well. Liu
acknowledged this but made no commitment as to when or if that might
happen.[In follow-up conversation, Liu noted to Huizenga that CAEA
could accept a U.S. Department of Defense supporting role in
implementation of the training Center of Excellence as long as this
was not intended to pressure them into cooperation with their
defense complex. Huizenga assured him that this was not the
intention.]

- Huizenga noted a substantial degree of Chinese funding support
would be needed. Such cost sharing might take the form of land and
labor provision, for example and Liu accepted the principle of
U.S.-China cost-sharing.

7. (SBU) Liu emphasized IAEA's leading role on the nuclear security
front and expressed desire of inviting IAEA to join this
initiative/cooperation.

8. (SBU) Liu expressed a preference for a direct NNSA-CAEA,
agency-to-agency agreement to govern NNSA-CAEA nuclear security
cooperation, given the Chinese government structure changes that
took place in year 2008. The Chinese government reorganization also
resulted in responsibility shifting. CAEA desires a new
agreement/legal document between CAEA and NNSA to clearly
acknowledge CAEA's role in carrying out collaboration on nuclear
security and safeguards and nonproliferation. Huizenga proposed that
CAEA outline key points for such an agreement based on their needs
to continue the cooperation and the NNSA can work on turning it to a
formal proposal. In the meantime, all the on-going cooperation under

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the PUNT should not be stopped.

MFA LOOKING TO UP NONPROLIFERATION COOPERATION
--------------------------------------------- -
9. (SBU) Huizenga met with Wu Chuntai, the Deputy Director General
for the Department of External Security Affairs of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) to discuss nuclear security collaboration with
China and advance preparations for the upcoming Nuclear Security
Summit. Huizenga discussed the enhanced collaboration that was both
ongoing and additional collaboration that was being discussed with
both GACC and CAEA. In opening, while acknowledging the importance
of strengthening bilateral dialogue, deepening our cooperation on
combating nuclear terrorism and making joint efforts to enhance
nuclear security and nonproliferation, DDG Wu called for some
sensitive issues such as arms sale to Taiwan, Tibetan and Xinjiang
related issues to be properly addressed. Wu expressed MFA's
willingness to continue cooperation based on the principle of
equality and mutual benefit. MFA confirmed to work along with other
relevant agencies to promote our cooperation particularly supporting
the idea of reaching broad agreement on these new collaborative
nuclear security efforts in time for them to be announced at the
upcoming NSS. He noted the Joint statement between presidents Obama
and Hu cited increased cooperation in this area and was grateful for
the tangible projects that were being developed. He also noted the
collaboration that took place in the run-up to the Olympics, which
had been very helpful in building China's capacity to prevent
nuclear terrorism and to ensure nuclear security. The MFA said it
agreed in principle to the U.S. proposal to establish a center of
excellence on nuclear security in China and recognized CAEA's lead
role.

10. (U) This cable was cleared by the DOE/NNSA delegation.

HUNTSMAN

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