Cablegate: Daily Summary of Japanese Press 12/18/09

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DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
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CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

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TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA

SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 12/18/09

INDEX:

(1) Why haven't U.S. bases in Japan been reduced? (Asahi)

(2) Postponement of Futenma conclusion makes goal of reducing burden
on Okinawa even more distant (Yomiuri)

(3) Situation of Futenma relocation issue after 13 years of drifting
(Part 2): Improvising Prime Minister, resembling the shogunate's
handling of the arrival of the black ships (Mainichi)

(4) U.S. Embassy dismayed by newspaper reports on Futenma issue
referring to alleged "crisis" in Japan-U.S. alliance (Shukan
Bunshun)

(5) Rift in Japan-U.S. relations (Part 2): Prime Minister Hatoyama
should explain to public the importance of national security
(Yomiuri)

(6) What the "equal alliance" theory lacks (Sankei)

ARTICLES:

(1) Why haven't U.S. bases in Japan been reduced?

ASAHI (Page 3) (Excerpts)
December 18, 2009

Kuniichi Tanida, senior writer; Hirotsugu Mochizuki in Washington

Alarmed by North Korea, China-Taiwan relations in post-Cold War era

It has been three and a half years since the governments of Japan
and the United States reached an agreement focusing on plans to
reduce the burden on Okinawa. The core plan to relocate the U.S.
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan) has hit a snag. In
its manifesto (campaign pledges), the Hatoyama administration
pledged to review the modalities of the U.S. bases in Japan. This
pledge is now faced with the harsh reality of the situation. Why are
there still so many U.S. bases in Japan today, 20 years after the
end of the Cold War? This article discusses how the position of the
U.S. bases in Japan might change under the Obama administration's
new military strategy.

At present, there are U.S. military bases/installations in 85 places
in Japan with 36,000 troops. Their total area is generally
equivalent to half the size of the 23 wards in Tokyo. Of them, there
are 33 bases/installations in Okinawa. Their total area comes to 229
square kilometers, or 75 percent of all U.S. bases in Japan.

In 1990, just after the end of the Cold War, there were 105
bases/installations (325 square kilometers), including 43 in Okinawa
(242 square kilometers). This means the number has decreased
somewhat but not dramatically.

What is more, these facilities are used solely by the U.S. military.
In addition, the U.S. military has been jointly using the
Self-Defense Forces' training ranges and other places since the
1980s. Today the U.S. military uses land area totaling 1,027 square
kilometers (134 places), which is twice the size of 484 square
kilometers (120 places) in 1980.

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One of the reasons why U.S. bases are concentrated in Okinawa is
because the number of bases on mainland Japan has dropped by 60
percent since 1972, the year Okinawa was returned to Japan, compared
to Okinawa's 20 percent.

The numbers of troops and bases in Europe have drastically decreased
since the end of the Cold War. Why not in Japan? Military
commentator Shoji Fukuyoshi explained it this way: "The United
States wanted to deploy its forces in the Asia-Pacific using Japan
as a base, and Japan was aiming for a cheap security system heavily
relying on the U.S. forces. Since their interests matched, they did
not make efforts to reduce the presence of U.S. forces in Japan."

Throughout the Cold War era, U.S. bases in Japan were improved as
bases to replenish military supplies such as ammunition and fuel to
contain the Soviet Union.

The United States has attached importance to the bases in Japan
largely because the U.S. forces withdrew from the Clark and Subic
bases in the Philippines following a major volcanic eruption and the
Philippine Senate's rejection of renewing a treaty in 1991. The new
situation in Northeast Asia in the post-Cold War era is another
factor. North Korea's suspected nuclear programs and the tensions
between China and Taiwan prompted the United States to keep its
troops in the area surrounding Japan.

In 1996 Tokyo and Washington shared the view that the Japan-U.S.
security arrangements were essential for the peace and stability of
the Asia-Pacific region. The two countries issued a joint security
declaration and confirmed to maintain 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia.
"U.S. Forces Japan has now become, both in name and reality, the
base supporting the U.S. forces deployed globally," Fukuyoshi said.

A schoolgirl rape incident occurred in Okinawa in 1995, triggering a
furious anti-base movement. This prompted Japan and the United
States to set up the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to
aim at the realignment and reduction of U.S. bases. But the planned
reversion of the bases has made very little progress because the
majority of them have relocation as a condition.

Since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States,
the U.S. forces have shifted their focus to the war against
terrorism in such countries as Afghanistan and Iraq.

Even so, the United States has not changed its stance of attaching
importance to the bases in Japan. In the realignment of U.S. forces
that started in 2002, the Yokosuka (Kanagawa Prefecture) and Kadena
(Okinawa Prefecture) bases have been positioned as the Main
Operating Bases (MOBs) overseas.

Okinawa still essential for Marine Corps

The hollowing out of the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa has long been
pointed out in the post-Cold War period. That is because the Marine
Division composed of core units, such as the infantry and the
artillery, has only a small number of regular troops, with many
coming from the continental United States on a rotational basis.

Some 12,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Okinawa. Of them, the
2,000-strong 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, which conducts maritime
surveillance aboard assault ships along with helicopters, is the
only unit that is ready to be mobilized in actual warfare. Many

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experts take the view that the regular troops in Okinawa only have
the ability to rescue U.S. citizens in a contingency on the Korean
Peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait and to carry out rescue operations
following a major disaster.

Around 1990, a plan was discussed to totally withdraw the U.S.
Marines in Okinawa to Hawaii amid the trend of reducing the presence
of U.S. forces in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Blocked by
the relocation cost, the plan did not materialize. Since then, the
idea of withdrawing the U.S. Marines from Okinawa and a theory
denouncing the permanent presence of troops have been discussed
repeatedly.

In connection with the planned relocation of Futenma Air Station,
there have been calls from the coalition parties and local
governments for the total shift of the base functions to Guam.

Takushoku University Professor Takashi Kawakami, who is
knowledgeable the U.S. Marine Corps, thinks the theory denouncing
the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa might resurface. This is because
chances of a Taiwan Strait contingency are diminishing due to the
honeymoon-like relationship between Beijing and Taipei. "If the
Obama administration, which attaches importance to China, stops
regarding China as a threat, the meaning of their (the U.S. Marine
Corps) presence (in Okinawa) might be lost," Kawakami said.

According to a former senior Marine Corps officer who has served in
Japan, there is the deep-seated view in U.S. forces that the Army,
Navy, and Air troops in Japan can sufficiently serve as a deterrent
against China and other countries without the Marine Corps.

But it seems that it would not be easy for the United States to
leave Okinawa, where its troops have stationed for more than 60
years. The Marine Corps is becoming visibly discontent over the
relocation of Marine Corps command personnel to Guam which goes hand
in hand with the Futenma relocation plan.

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee this past June, U.S.
Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Conway hinted at the need to
modify the existing plan, saying there are problems with building
training areas on Guam and the area surrounding it. On Okinawa, huge
jungle training and urban warfare facilities have been constructed
over a long period of time. It would be difficult to build similar
facilities on Guam in a short period of time. "It appears that some
in the U.S. Marine Corps in Okinawa are regarding the developments
in Japan as a chance to maintain their presence in the prefecture,"
Kawakami said.

(2) Postponement of Futenma conclusion makes goal of reducing burden
on Okinawa even more distant

YOMIURI (Page 4) (Full)
December 17, 2009

"Of course, relocating the facility out of the prefecture or the
nation is the best option. But I wonder if there is any place that
will accept a new facility." Kenei Yamashiro, 70, grumbled when he
saw a headline in a newspaper saying that "possible relocation sites
other than Henoko will be explored" at a community hall near his
residence. His house is located right under the flight path of
aircraft heading to and from the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air
Station in Ginowan City, Okinawa Prefecture.

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The return of the land to Japan that has been used by the Futenma
airfield is a long-held desire for local residents, because they
have been suffering from the noise of helicopters and transport
planes, as well as the danger of accidents. When Japan and the U.S.
officially agreed to construct an alternative facility for the
Futenma airfield in the Henoko district in Nago City, Okinawa
Prefecture, the words, "congratulations on the return of the
airfield," were printed on the pamphlets that were distributed at a
regular general meeting.

But the Hatoyama administration has pushed the existing plan back to
square one. Yamashiro expressed his anxiety, grumbling: "Will any
progress be made on the Futenma issue during my lifetime?"

In addition to the Futenma plan, the 2006 bilateral accord on the
realignment of U.S. forces in Japan also includes measures to
transfer 8,000 Marines from Okinawa to Guam and to return U.S.
military bases in the southern part of Okinawa to Japan. The accord
gives priority to maintaining the current level of deterrence by
stepping up Japan-U.S. joint training and to reducing the excessive
burden on Okinawa.

The Futenma relocation plan, which took more than ten years to
arrive at after many twists and turns, is the core in the accord.
Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and Nago Mayor Yoshikazu
Shimabukuro approved the existing plan on the condition that the
planned construction site be moved further offshore. Following their
approval, the central government's negotiations on the plan with the
prefectural and municipal governments were about to enter the final
stage.

The Hatoyama administration, however, began to indicate that the
government would try to find ways to move the facility out of the
prefecture or even the nation. This stance has rekindled the once
abated argument against the relocation of the facility within the
prefecture. Ginowan Mayor Yoichi Iha, who is strongly opposed to the
existing plan, has said that he welcomes the government's policy
stance, remarking: "The Futenma issue has begun to move forward
toward a new solution.

But this means that there is no other option available for the
Ginowan mayor. He seemed aloof when he told reporters at the
prefectural government building yesterday: "I will just sit and
watch the situation until the spring. The government can take its
time to look for a possible replacement site."

If the government's conclusion is delayed further, the reduction of
the burden on Okinawa will be delayed further, and the Futenma base
might become a permanent fixture as a result. The U.S. forces have
dealt with proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
missiles, as well as such threats as terrorism. If the overall plan
for the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is delayed, it could
have an adverse effect on Japan's national security.

The Hatoyama administration, however, has little sense of crisis.
Hatoyama has only repeated the words "the feelings of the people in
Okinawa." Some officials at the Foreign Ministry and the Defense
Ministry have criticized the prime minister's stance as trying to
justify the postponement of the issue by highlighting only the
aspects of the feelings of the people in Okinawa that are convenient
for him.

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How does Hatoyama intend to ensure Japan's national security and
reduce the burden on Okinawa simultaneously, in light of national
interests? He has yet to lay out a roadmap.

(3) Situation of Futenma relocation issue after 13 years of drifting
(Part 2): Improvising Prime Minister, resembling the shogunate's
handling of the arrival of the black ships

MAINICHI (Page 2) (Full)
December 17, 2009

Takahiro Hirata, Yasushi Sengoku

The discussion papers presented by the U.S. side to the Japanese
side during the bilateral U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment talks
in autumn 2004 proposed to "relocate the U.S. Marines' air corps
from the Futenma Air Station (in Ginowan City, Okinawa) to Kadena
Air Base (KAB) (straddling the towns of Kadena and Chatan and
Okinawa City in Okinawa), return Futenma to Japan, and scrap the
plan to relocate the Futenma base to northern Okinawa under the 1996
Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) agreement."

These documents also included other proposals, including: relocating
the U.S. Marines' air corps from the Iwakuni base (in Yamaguchi
Prefecture) to KAB; relocating the Marines' housing and troops from
Camp Zukeran (in Okinawa) and Camp Kuwae (also in Okinawa) to KAB;
and relocating one squadron of the U.S. Air Force on Kadena to Guam.
It was evident that the U.S. side wanted to concentrate the Marines'
functions on the KAB, while reducing the Air Force's fighters, in
order to reduce the burden on Kadena.

However, this "Kadena integration plan," like the one Foreign
Minister Katsuya Okada proposed recently, failed in the face of the
opposition of the municipalities adjacent to KAB, which had long
suffered from KAB's noise.

The USFJ realignment talks started as part of the U.S. forces'
transformation on a global scale. While the deadline set in the 1996
SACO agreement for the return of Futenma "in five to seven years"
had lapsed, the plan to construct a replacement facility in waters
off Henoko in Nago City in northern Okinawa (adopted by a cabinet
resolution in 2002) was going nowhere. Then Director General
Fukushiro Nukaga of the Defense Agency described this situation as
"not even one pile could be driven into the seabed for a survey due
to the actions of the opponents to building this base."

In February 2005, Japan and the U.S. identified a number of "common
strategic goals" that they would work together for, including
dealing with international terrorism and the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. In the subsequent realignment talks,
the U.S. shifted to the so-called "Nago lite" option, which would
require only reclamation of the shoals on a smaller scale, while the
(then) Defense Agency, which feared that construction work could not
proceed due to the protest actions at sea, advocated a land-based
facility in Camp Schwab (in Nago City). In May 2006, Japan and the
U.S. reached agreement on a realignment road map which included
building two V-shaped runways in the coastal area of Camp Schwab as
Futenma's replacement facility, the relocation of some 8,000 Marines
in Okinawa to Guam, and the return of U.S. bases south of the KAB.

Looking back on the negotiations, former Vice Defense Minister

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Takemasa Moriya said: "Talking about reducing the burden on Okinawa,
the U.S. would only brush us aside unless we talked about the
strategic issue of what to do with the role and capability of the
Self-Defense Forces (SDF)."

The Hatoyama administration came to power while prospects for
starting the construction work under this agreement remained
uncertain due to difficulties in coordinating with the local
communities. With Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama deciding on Dec. 15
to reconsider the relocation site, it is now possible that the
process for Futenma's return may go back to square one.

A source involved with the Japan-U.S. negotiations expressed grave
concern about the Prime Minister's improvising by deferring a
decision. "This resembles closely the Edo shogunate's handling of
the arrival of the black ships."

The fact that plans for reinforcing cooperation in the military
aspect, such as the consideration of joint operational plans, have
not been discussed along with Henoko relocation is also a source of
frustration on the U.S. side.

Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, who was
responsible for the USFJ realignment talks on the U.S. side, has
been involved with the study of the Japan-U.S. alliance at a think
tank in Washington after leaving his post. He wrote a report in
November recommending that there should be no excessive expectations
for Japan in such areas as the SDF's overseas missions, but the SDF
should take responsibility for Japan's defense. This paper, which
openly admits the U.S.'s disappointment with the bilateral alliance,
has created a stir among Japanese officials concerned with foreign
affairs and defense.

The troop structure of the USFJ may change and options for Futenma
relocation may broaden depending on the SDF's role. Officials
concerned about the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance all agree that
"the only way forward is to start anew from strategic discussions."
Yet, the Hatoyama administration's security strategy remains a
mystery.

(part two of three-part series)

(4) U.S. Embassy dismayed by newspaper reports on Futenma issue
referring to alleged "crisis" in Japan-U.S. alliance

SHUKAN BUNSHUN (Page 48) (Full)
December 24, 2009

Sankei Shimbun says: "U.S. Ambassador flies into a rage"; Yomiuri
Shimbun reports: "U.S. postpones talks on alliance"; and Asahi
Shimbun claims: "Futenma issue deadlocked, casts shadow on
alliance." Both leftist and rightist newspapers toe the same line in
claiming that "the alliance is in peril" in their reporting on the
issue of the relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma Air Station.

However, the U.S. Embassy is dismayed by such reporting. A U.S.
Embassy official says: "Sankei sensationally wrote 'U.S. Ambassador
flies into a rage,' but that is absolutely untrue. We are
diplomats."

According to a U.S. diplomatic source, American diplomats are
strictly prohibited from criticizing other countries, so nothing

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like that could have happened.

The same source says: "As for the report that the alliance talks
were postponed, no schedule had been drawn up in the first place.
It's impossible to postpone something that has not been scheduled.
The Japanese newspapers seem to want to stir up a crisis, but the
alliance relationship is broad and wide. The Futenma issue has no
impact at all on the alliance, and there is no crisis. This would be
quite clear if they would ask the U.S. side..."

A U.S. expert on the bilateral relationship also laughs about it,
saying "reports by the Japanese newspapers on the U.S.in general,
not only on the Futenma issue, are full of mistakes, so I am not
surprised."

It is said that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has
repeatedly pointed out discrepancies with the facts at news
conferences.

However, according to a MOFA official, "We have not seen any
corrections. As a result, the mistakes are being circulated as
facts."

What does the United States think of the present state of the
alliance relationship? Prominent international political scientist
Patrick Cronin, senior advisor at the think tank, the Center for a
New American Security, says:

"During a time of major political change, there is bound to be an
agonizing review of policy and a period of uncertainty. However, a
time like this is an excellent opportunity to reinforce the alliance
with the broad support of public opinion. Fortunately for Japan,
President Obama understands the situation in Japan and has said that
'the U.S. government should not create a source of a crisis' and
'should be patient'."

While the Japanese newspapers really like President Obama, they are
getting in his way in this case.

A Japanese expert on diplomacy expresses his concern: "I hope that a
real crisis will not come about as a result of such sensational
reporting..."

(5) Rift in Japan-U.S. relations (Part 2): Prime Minister Hatoyama
should explain to public the importance of national security

YOMIURI (Page 1) (Full)
December 17, 2009

Former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama should have resolved the issue of
relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station before the end
of the year, by persuading the Social Democratic Party (SDP). I
understand that the Prime Minister has been undergoing hard times in
allying with the SDP. However, he must not make any concessions on
national security. He must be tough in carrying out foreign policy.
In order to keep faith with the United States, the current
administration should follow and implement the previous government's
policy. The administration needs to show its consistent position at
home and abroad, through thorough discussions in the ruling
parties.

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Former Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama, the grandfather of Yukio
Hatoyama, clearly displayed his government's policy course to the
public and fought against militarists. He had a strong ideological
faith. However, Yukio Hatoyama's management of the coalition
government seems like "soft serve ice cream."

The Prime Minister said to U.S. President Barack Obama in their
meeting in November, "I want you to trust me," with the aim of
strengthening Japan-U.S. ties. The President must have completely
trusted the Prime Minister's words. But the U.S. side found there
was inconsistency between his words and actions.

I cannot see the Hatoyama administration's attitude toward national
basic policies, including the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The
administration has bowed to the international situation and people's
opinion. I cannot see its clear stance to preserve the basis of
national security. It is impermissible for the government to make
its position unclear toward fundamental national policies under the
pretext of the coalition government.

Going back to the time when he was an opposition party member, the
Prime Minister appears to have thought that the LDP governments'
U.S. policy and security policy excessively relied on the United
States. However, such thinking was the "wishful thinking" of an
opposition party member. In reality, politics is inseparable from
military affairs. The Prime Minister fails to understand that. At
the time when I formed my cabinet, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki of
the previous government stated, "The Japan-U.S. alliance has no
militaristic meaning." His comment stained the Japan-U.S.
relationship. So, I clearly said in the United States, "The
Japan-U.S. alliance is a military alliance." The papers front-paged
my comment. I think this awakened the whole Japan regarding the U.S.
Japan Security Treaty, and the Japanese people recognized the
significance and role of security.

Next year is a historic year to celebrate the 50th anniversary of
the reversion of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It is an important
year for the Hatoyama government to clarify its basic attitude
toward the security treaty.

Amid the changing international situation, the government should
examine how the bilateral security treaty has contributed to Japan
and stability in Asia and its importance and merits and demerits.
The government can then let the public know how it will manage and
determine Japan's security. It should issue a formal statement at
the beginning of next year. For the government, issuing a statement
would be an important and adequate task for the 50th anniversary.

I hope Prime Minister Hatoyama comes up with a clear basic security
policy through an in-depth discussion in the cabinet of the
coalition government. If the cabinet fails to unite, Japan would be
unable to respond to a contingency situation.

(6) What the "equal alliance" theory lacks

SANKEI (Page 7) (Abridged)
December 16, 2009

Masamori Sase, Professor Emeritus, National Defense Academy

Although no one has pointed it out, the Democratic Party of Japan's

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theory to build a "close and equal Japan-U.S. alliance" has an
interesting feature. Because this relationship is called an
"alliance," it is clear that Japan and the United States are tied
together by the bilateral security treaty. But one would be
hard-pressed to find any mention of the "Japan-U.S. Security Treaty"
in DPJ documents or comments by Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada. The prime minister's policy speech
that discussed his intention to build a close and equal Japan-U.S.
alliance and the foreign minister's speech before the House of
Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that discussed his
determination to forge a strong Japan-U.S. relationship that can be
sustained for the next 50 years are no exception. It seems almost as
if the two ministers are trying to keep the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty under cover.

Under the treaty, the United States is required to defend Japan, but
Japan is not required to defend the United States. As such, some
people call the treaty one-sided. I, however, call it asymmetrically
bilateral because Japan is required to provide the United States
with military bases. In any case, Japan and the United States are
not required to perform the same kind of duties, so they can hardly
be called equal under the treaty.

Is the idea of shifting the one-sided or asymmetrically bilateral
system to a purely bilateral setup compatible with the equal
Japan-U.S. alliance theory?

Of course it's compatible. In order to realize an equal Japan-U.S.
alliance, the Hatoyama administration must consider specific ways to
achieve it.

Japan and the United States concluded the security treaty 50 years
ago when there was a huge difference between them in terms of
national strength, and that can explain to some extent why the pact
had to be asymmetrically bilateral. Japan grew into a major economic
power during the mid-1970s, and Japan's position of being a
"free-rider" in the security treaty became an issue between the two
countries. Taking that seriously, many Japanese controversialists
pointed out the need to turn the one-sided security treaty into one
that is purely bilateral, creating a considerable impact on the
government and the Liberal Democratic Party. However, the government
did not take a step toward a constitutional revision even though the
matter was closely connected to the Constitution. The constitutional
revision argument eventually sank into oblivion. This was followed
by the emergence in the 1980s of the world's incredulity at the
second largest economy heavily relying on the largest economy in
terms of national security. But there were few people in Japan who
raised questions about such a fact.

The DPJ recently criticized the former LDP administration as being
subservient to the United States, declaring that the party will say
what it needs to say to Washington. I do not think that Japan's
diplomacy blindly followed in America's footsteps, as seen in the
fact that Tokyo succeeded in making Washington accept the ex post
facto interpretation of the right to collective self-defense. In any
event, the point is that Japan should have made independent efforts
for its own security even under the one-sided treaty but that was
difficult due to the constitutional interpretation and as a result
that made Japan appear to be subservient to the United States.
Saying what must be said is good in the context of an equal
Japan-U.S. alliance. The question is, what do the prime minister and
the foreign minister think about making independent efforts?

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Exemplified by calls for revising the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces
Agreement and Okada's statement before becoming foreign minister
urging the United States to abandon the preemptive use of nuclear
weapons, DPJ lawmakers have been sticking to the motto of saying
what they have to say. If Japan makes independent efforts even under
the one-sided pact, that will help reduce the country's dependence
on the United States for its national security, pushing it closer to
an equal alliance with the United States. But neither the prime
minister nor the foreign minister has expressed their resolve to do
so - not even once.

The previous LDP administration had at least a sense of guilt about
the one-sidedness of the existing security treaty with the United
States. But today, for the prime minister and the foreign minister,
it is like a vested interest They are taking it for granted. It is
questionable whether the Japan-U.S. alliance can be sustained over
the next 50 years and can be strengthened further.

Just between the security treaty concluded in 1951 and the existing
one of 1960, then Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama declared in his
policy speech that the government's basic defense policy was to
swiftly establish an autonomous national defense system to realize
the early withdrawal of the occupation forces, while maintaining the
policy of a close and cooperative relationship with the United
States, taken by the previous Yoshida administration. He attached
importance to both the alliance and independent efforts for national
defense. I would like to tell the prime minister, who loves and
respects his grandfather, that the equal Japan-U.S. alliance theory
with no regard to independent efforts is a sloppy idea that is
disrespectful toward his grandfather.

ROOS

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