Cablegate: Chad Poised for Credible Legislative and Municipal

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O 071820Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7491
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000586

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EAID EU FR US CD
SUBJECT: CHAD POISED FOR CREDIBLE LEGISLATIVE AND MUNICIPAL
ELECTIONS IN 2010: AN AUGUST 13 ACCORD PROCESS UPDATE

REF: A. NDJAMENA 458
B. NDJAMENA 441
C. NDJAMENA 410

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SUMMARY AND COMMENT
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1. (SBU) Chad is now poised to hold credible legislative and
municipal elections in 2010. The process of implementing the
August 13, 2007 Accord has produced positive results, and
many of the essential building blocks for elections are in
place. On December 4 President Deby put the full weight of
the GoC and his personal prestige on the line behind the goal
of credible 2010 contests. Nothing, however, is guaranteed,
and much still needs to be done as time grows short. But
there is no objective reason why credible elections cannot be
held here within a year. The obstacles are political,
including opposition party reticence, institutional
incapacity and lack of leadership, and legislative and
bureaucratic lethargy. The potential for violence as the
electoral campaign itself unfolds will grow, reinforced by
the conflictual nature of Chadian politics and the society it
reflects. The Chadians have managed to get as far as they
have thanks to the willingness of their democratic partners
-- the USG, France, Germany, Switzerland, the EU, AU, UN and
OIF -- to advise and support them, politically and
financially. Continued commitment on the part of these
partners will be essential to reaching the goal of credible
legislative/municipal elections before the end of 2010.

2. (SBU) The USG has assisted the process thus far by
funding this summer's demographic census; sponsoring ongoing
conflict mitigation and resolution projects in wide areas of
the country; encouraging journalist professionalism and
"community radio stations"; and producing radio spots on
electoral awareness and voter responsibility. Promotion of
democracy and good governance is the primary non-crisis
strategic goal of USG policy in Chad (ranking along with
humanitarian assistance in Eastern Chad as long as the Darfur
crisis continues). We intend to remain engaged both
bilaterally and in harness with our international partners to
advance Chad,s progress toward the goal of credible
elections in 2010. We play a leading role in the informal
assistance and support group of Chad's international partners
(see para 10 below) and USAID experts are here now to advise
us on how to program USDOLS five million for elections and
conflict mitigation over the coming electoral cycles.

3. (SBU) The strong personal and very public commitment of
President Deby to the electoral process is particularly
significant because although his constitutional position will
be not affected by the 2010 polling (whatever the result),
his political position will definitely impacted by the
results of local and legislative elections. We believe that
President Deby seeks credible 2010 elections both to burnish
his democratic credentials with the international community,
and to solidify his own political position within Chad. This
means not only strengthening his ability to win another
presidential run in 2011 (if he chooses to run) or to
hand-pick a successor (if he does not), but also reinforcing
his position within his own Zaghawa ethnic group, Bidayet
Clan, and Itno family, from which he draws his influence but
from which could come the most serious threat to his own hold
on power. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

---------------------------
CREDIBLE ELECTIONS IN CHAD:
POSSIBLE BUT NOT GUARANTEED
---------------------------

4. (SBU) The Chadian government and political parties have
announced that they intend to hold legislative and municipal
elections in 2010. The long and slow process of implementing
the August 13, 2007 Accord aimed at electoral and political
reform has produced positive results. Many of the essential
building blocks of the electoral edifice are in place -- an

NDJAMENA 00000586 002 OF 004

Electoral Reform Committee (ERC); a new Government of
National Unity open to opposition parties; enabling
legislation; a demographic census; and an Independent
Electoral Commission (CENI). President Deby has put the
weight of the GoC and his personal prestige behind the goal
of the 2010 contests, for his own political ends, by
convoking all political parties December 4 to forge a general
consensus in favor of credible, non-biometric legislative and
municipal elections before the end of 2010. The President
expressed his concern that delaying elections would create a
legal void and deny the "legitimate aspirations" of the
Chadian people. Leading opposition figures welcomed the
President's remarks and said they believed that with the
support of the body politic, there would be a credible vote.
They urged public support for the CENI and efforts to improve
of the security and media environment relating to the
elections. The CENI President expressed his thanks for the
President's leadership and said he looked forward to moving
the electoral process forward toward a vote.

5. (SBU) Nothing is guaranteed, however, and much still
needs to be done: a Permanent Board of Elections must be
formed; an electoral census must be conducted and
constituencies drawn up; voter registration and vetting of
lists of candidates are needed, among other prerequisites.
These tasks will not be easy to accomplish and time is
running short. Still, there is no objective reason why
credible elections cannot be held here within a year. The
obstacles to holding them as scheduled are political,
including continued reticence on the part of some in the
opposition to participate because they fear they will lose;
lack of capacity, especially lack of leadership, on the part
of Chad's nascent electoral infrastructure, in particular the
CENI; as well as legislative and bureaucratic lethargy. The
potential for violence as the electoral campaign itself
unfolds will grow, reinforced by the conflictual nature of
Chadian politics and the society it reflects.

6. (SBU) The Chadians have managed to get as far as they
have thanks to the willingness of their democratic partners
-- France, Germany, Switzerland, the EU, AU, UN and OIF, in
addition to the U.S. -- to advise, support, finance, and
accompany them politically. Continued commitment on the part
of these partners will be essential to reaching the goal of
credible legislative/municipal elections before the end of
2010. The U.S. has assisted thus far by funding the 2009
demographic census, conflict mitigation/resolution projects
and initiatives to promote professionalism among journalists.
Encouragement of democracy and good governance is the
primary non-crisis goal of the USG in Chad. We intend to
remain engaged, both bilaterally and in harness with our
international partners, to advance this goal with respect to
elections.

---------------------------------
IMPLEMENTING THE AUGUST 13 ACCORD
---------------------------------

7. (SBU) The August 13 Accord, signed between the GOC,
President Deby's majority Patriotic Salvation Movement (MPS)
party coalition and a group of opposition parties in 2007,
aimed to encourage reconciliation between the government and
its various opponents and to lay out formal processes for
future elections. (The current Chadian constitution calls
for presidential elections five years from the previous vote,
which occurred in 2006.) Many of the goals of the August
Accord have now been achieved, starting with the formation in
late 2007 of a multi-party steering committee, called the
Electoral Reform Committee (ERC), to oversee the political
reform process laid out in the Accord. In May 2008, based on
requirements in the Accord, President Deby named a new
government, which brought opposition figures into key cabinet
positions, including that of the Prime Minister. In the
summer of 2009, a population census was held -- a precursor
to an electoral census -- and an Electoral Code was passed by
the National Assembly, along with a charter on entitlements
and responsibilities of political parties, and legislation to

NDJAMENA 00000586 003 OF 004

limit proliferation of splinter parties. Later in the
summer, an Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) was named,
15 of whose members represent the MPS and 15 the opposition,
with the Chair able to cast deciding votes.

-----------------------
WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE
-----------------------

8. (SBU) The CENI, composed of party activists rather than
impartial individuals competent to organize an election, has
been prone to deadlock since it began meeting this September.
Its efforts to develop electoral timelines and consider
modalities for an electoral census broke down along party
lines very early, with many opposition members calling for a
delayed timetable. President Deby convoked party leaders
December 4 to spur action, and the CENI met the following day
to declare that all of its membership was committed to
legislative and municipal elections in 2010 and that the
group had adopted, by consensus, the notion of a
"computerized electoral census," thus ending a protracted
debate on whether to use an expensive biometric process
favored by the opposition as a means of postponing a vote.
Conducting the computerized census will have to be done
fairly soon so that a voter registration campaign can begin.
Other outstanding tasks include formation of a Permanent
Bureau of Elections, vetting of candidates and establishment
of candidate lists, and improvements in the media climate for
elections.

9. (SBU) The ERC continues to meet to encourage achievement
of the last outstanding element of the August 13 Accord:
promotion of general political dialogue. The body, which
includes MPS and opposition figures as well as observer seats
for international reps, has been going about this task by
undertaking "sensitization campaigns" in the countryside on
citizens' entitlements and responsibilities, particularly
with regard to voting. Although the ERC might arguably be
viewed as redundant were the CENI able to function more
effectively, the ERC's success at acting as a bipartisan
champion of political dialogue has earned it support from the
international community.

----------------------------------
INTERNATIONAL FRIENDS GROUP FORMED
----------------------------------

10. (SBU) International players from democratic nations and
entities (the USG, UN, EU, AU, OIF, France, Germany, and
Switzerland) have constituted themselves as an informal
assistance and support group to advance the election process
in Chad. We have been meeting regularly in recent weeks to
plan our common effort. The French are extremely engaged and
proactive, and are playing a leadership role in getting
others in the international community to endorse and support
our aims. The EU, which was the main mover behind the August
13 Accord, has provided the bulk of financial assistance to
the electoral process thus far, and is deeply committed to
helping Chad meet minimal standards for electoral
credibility. The OIF has much expertise to offer, given the
similar legal underpinnings of Chadian political arrangements
and those in French-speaking nations with longer democratic
traditions. The UN, despite concerns that elections may
prove difficult to stage in locations where neither the GoC
nor traditional leaders are able to ensure security, has
already provided several teams of technical experts and will
place additional personnel on the CENI and other bodies in
need of advice. The AU says it wants to give Chad a chance
to become an African electoral success.

---------------------
AS FOR THE OPPOSITION
---------------------

11. (SBU) It is important to bear in mind that the political
class here is highly fractious, with opposition having become
a lifestyle (and livelihood) for some. More than 80

NDJAMENA 00000586 004 OF 004

political parties are registered in Chad. Loyalty still
tends to develop around local and tribal leaders. Opposition
figures range from those like the Prime Minister, who have
accepted cabinet positions, to those like the non-MPS members
of the ERC and CENI, who have accepted formalized
"opposition" slots on government organs, to elected
representatives of opposition parties in the National
Assembly, to political dissidents in Chad (often associated
with the media or legal profession), to dissidents who have
felt the need to become exiles abroad, to armed rebels. Many
opposition parties joined in a boycott of Chad's 2006
elections, and some key figures are already threatening to
boycott elections in 2010 and 2011.

12. (SBU) Dissident groups have a tendency to stage
electoral activities to which they invite the international
community at meeting times of the CENI and ERC, in an effort
to force Chad's partners to choose between supporting
government-sponsored initiatives and rival efforts. There is
consensus among the international observers group that we
should offer advice and technical assistance so that the CENI
can function more effectively; that we should help the ERC
remain viable and encourage its efforts at civic education;
that we should continue to press for the lifting of formal
restrictions on press freedom so that more public debate can
occur as elections approach; that we should encourage
compromise and coalition-building on the part of the
opposition; and that we should support continued
reintegration of returning rebels and members of the Chadian
Diaspora into political life.

-------
COMMENT
-------

13. (SBU) The strong personal and very public commitment of
President Deby to the electoral process is particularly
significant because although his constitutional position will
be not affected by the 2010 polling (whatever the result),
his political position will definitely impacted by the
results of local and legislative elections. We believe that
President Deby seeks credible 2010 elections both to burnish
his democratic credentials with the international community,
and to solidify his own political position within Chad. This
means not only strengthening his ability to win another
presidential run in 2011 (if he chooses to run) or to
hand-pick a successor (if he does not), but also reinforcing
his position within his own Zaghawa ethnic group, Bidayet
Clan, and Itno family, from which he draws his influence but
from which could come the most serious threat to his own hold
on power. END COMMENT.
14. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO

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