Cablegate: Promoting Support for Unscr 1540 Voluntary Fund

VZCZCXYZ0011
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #2725 3350033
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 010027Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0000
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0000

UNCLAS STATE 122725

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL AORC KPAO PTER UNSC EUN RS CA UK FR NO
SUBJECT: PROMOTING SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1540 VOLUNTARY FUND

REF: A. EXPERTS INPUT -- VOLUNTARY FUND
B. USUN 769
C. BERLIN 1412
D. EMAIL 9/16 WUCHTE/GORDON -- REPLY LAVROV PROPOSAL

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED -- PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

1. (U) This is an action request for Moscow, P3 Embassies
(London and Paris), the European Union Council and
Commission, which participate in the G8 Nonproliferation
Directors Group (NPDG), as well as Norway -- see paras 7 and
10 to be left as non-papers. For USUN, see para 12, for
Ottawa, see para 13, and Moscow see also para 14.

----------
BACKGROUND
----------

2. (U) United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)
1540 was adopted in April 2004, and has served as an
important new international standard for all States regarding
the establishment of controls on chemical, biological, and
nuclear weapons, related materials, and their means of
delivery. UNSCR 1540 has thus become a critical component of
international efforts to prevent terrorists and other actors
from obtaining WMD-related materials. Much of the initial
effort of the Security Council's 1540 Committee was
organizational, e.g., agreeing on rules of procedure,
selecting its eight independent experts, and agreeing on how
it should carry out its mandate. Since then, the Committee
has spent much of its time encouraging States to submit
country reports detailing the steps they have taken or intend
to take to implement the myriad provisions of UNSCR 1540 and
reviewing such reports.

3. (SBU) UNSCR 1810 extended the 1540 Committee's mandate to
2011, requested the 1540 Committee consider options for
developing and making more effective existing funding
mechanisms, and directed the Committee report to the Council
no later than December 31, 2008. The report was delivered on
March 31, 2009, to the UN Security Council. But for a lack
of funding, the Committee is now well positioned to fulfill
its mandate.

4. (SBU) To date, the United States, European Union, and
Norway are the primary states that have offered to donate
funds to resource 1540 Committee activities. There have been
5 other less significant donors (Denmark, Andorra, Spain, UK,
and New Zealand) to the current UN Office of Disarmament
Affairs Trust Fund, the identified source of funds to support
1540 Committee activities, despite efforts to generate more
robust resourcing as the scope of activities increased.

5. (SBU) Many States have requested assistance to enable
them to implement (and report on) Resolution 1540. While
many other States and international organizations have come
forward to offer such assistance, the overall response has
been slow in meeting the capacity building needs identified
through contributions and outreach. Since this process began,
the 1540 Committee has reported on the need to intensify
assistance efforts and has participated in a series of
workshops to understand emerging assistance needs. Based on
discussions with Committee member states during deliberations
on the Committee's renewal in 2008, the United States
proposed that the Committee have access to funds it could
deploy to: 1) help states ascertain their own needs with
regard to identifying proliferation risks; 2) help states
create mechanisms to prevent and/or interdict the transfer of
WMD in or through their territories; and 3) help states with
bilateral or multilateral programs designed to stem attempted
transfers and capture and punish violators.

6. (SBU) On September 30, the U.S. proposed at the UN
establishing a 1540 Voluntary Fund to assist with the
resolution's implementation. Such a fund would complement
existing U.S. efforts to combat proliferation by facilitating
the provision of direct technical assistance by the Committee
to states that have the will but not the capacity to
implement 1540 and are not receiving assistance from the U.S.
or other donors, thereby helping close loopholes that
encourage attempts to move prohibited WMD and associated
delivery system items through weak links in the global export
control architecture.

----------
OBJECTIVES
----------

7. (U) Washington requests action Posts emphasize the
following objectives and leave as a non-paper the following
points. Post is also requested to provide a copy of Ref A,
which are possible projects the 1540 Committee Experts Panel
has identified for a new 1540 voluntary fund:

-- The United States believes a strengthened 1540 regime must
include increased stakeholder participation in the 1540
Committee by a broad community of assistance-providers.

-- In furtherance of this goal, the United States has
proposed a 1540 Voluntary Fund be established under UN
auspices to 1) help states ascertain their own needs in
regard to identifying proliferation risks; 2) help states
create mechanisms to prevent and/or interdict the transfer of
WMD in or through their territories; and 3) help states
sustain mature bilateral or multilateral programs designed to
stem attempted transfers and capture and punish violators.
We are informally providing more detailed ideas on the
proposed fund's modalities.

-- We recognize from the Comprehensive Review that the
existing 1540 assistance mechanism needs better alignment
with both providers of assistance and those seeking to build
capacity, but we must stress that only a new voluntary fund
will permit the broad political buy-in to overcome the myth
of &western8 or &northern8 imposition of terms regarding
nonproliferation. Moreover, only a new voluntary fund will
permit the flexibility necessary to implement the
nonproliferation goals specified in 1540 in a timely fashion.
By definition, the fund currently maintained by the Office
of Disarmament Affairs is slotted, in part, for
'disarmament8 issues. This creates unnecessary confusion
that detracts from the implementation of resolution 1540,s
nonproliferation goals.

-- The United States is prepared to make an initial
contribution to a 1540 voluntary fund and to encourage other
countries, Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs), and
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) to offer matching,
robust contributions.

-- We recognize that &robust8 contributions will vary
case-by-case, but will encourage all member states to
participate, particularly those located in Latin America, the
Middle East, and Asia, along with the traditional Western
European and Others Group (WEOG) donor countries.

-- Establishing such a fund with global donor participation
would empower the 1540 Committee with appropriate resources
to assist requester states in implementing the resolution.
As Pakistan noted at the recent ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)
meeting on Nonproliferation and Disarmament, some countries
prefer to work more directly through the multilateral
framework of the UN rather than bilaterally. The fund
provides such a mechanism for developing and carrying out
appropriate projects.
-- The 1540 Voluntary Fund is not intended to duplicate
ongoing capacity-building programs, whether bilateral or
multilateral. Instead, it would allow the UN to have a
complementary ability to facilitate and organize assistance.
The fund is not intended to develop more workshops and
outreach, but to address individual country needs.
Eventually, the fund could enable larger-scale projects
through UN)led coordination, an extended G8 Global
Partnership, or other means.
-- Once we receive your input, we plan to introduce the
attached draft letter and illustrative list of Committee
Experts Panel inputs as a joint U.S.-Russian proposal for
achieving a voluntary fund consistent with Russia's proposal
for bilateral cooperation on UNSCR 1540. Support for
establishing this fund is consistent with our recommendation
to Russia to promote multilateral cooperation through
U.S.-Russia bilateral efforts.

-- For Moscow only: Underscore with Moscow that we would
welcome joint U.S.-Russian cooperation in achieving a
voluntary fund consistent with Russia's proposal for
bilateral cooperation on UNSCR 1540 as suggested in the March
2009 Lavrov-Clinton letter. Support for establishing this
fund is consistent with our recommendation to promote
multilateral cooperation through our bilateral efforts.
Ultimately, we wish to introduce the voluntary fund among the
G-8 as a U.S.-Russia bilateral initiative.

--For P3 and EU Council/Commission only: We wish to hold
consultations on long-term Committee outreach funding before
the end of the year as discussed in Berlin regarding the next
EU Joint Action to support UNSCR 1540 (see Ref A para 7). We
are introducing this proposal simultaneously with Russia as
we seek inputs.

-- For Paris only: France's suggestion to hold a 1540 donor
conference in proximity to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
Review Conference has merit and would be helpful in focusing
on more funding. We will work with France to make this a
success. Also, we draw attention to the complementary
relationship between G-8 Global Partnership commitments and
the 1540 Voluntary Fund as explained in the attached
nonpaper.

-- For Oslo: As proposed in March 2007, we are prepared to
work further with Norway on its suggestion to establish a
like-minded group of friends on UNSCR 1540. Our emphasis
would be to build on the Norwegian recommendation to
encompass both assistance providers as well as those
requesting assistance.

------------------
REPORTING DEADLINE
------------------

8. (U) Posts are requested to deliver the above points NLT
the week of December 4 and report results NLT December 11,
2009.

----------
NON-PAPERS
----------

9. (SBU) Please provide the texts in para 10 below as a
non-paper draft letter from U.S. and Russia for recipients,
comments. (Note to Posts -- please underscore. Once we hear
back from recipients, and receive agreement from Russia with
whom we are consulting separately, we intend to share this
non-paper as a U.S.-Russia initiative with all G8 countries,
the European Union, and Norway. End note to Posts) This is
not intended to be an exclusive group. Rather, these are the
major stakeholders who have contributed either directly or
in-kind to the 1540 Committee infrastructure and/or outreach
to date.

10. (U) BEGIN TEXT OF NON-PAPER: EXPLAINING THE VOLUNTARY
FUND

As you know, on 28 April 2004, the Security Council
unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004) under Chapter VII
of the United Nations Charter, obliging States to refrain
from supporting by any means non-State actors from
developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing,
transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons and their delivery systems. To this end,
Resolution 1540 imposes binding obligations on all States to
establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of
delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over
related materials. Recognizing the extent of the effort that
implementing the resolution requires, the Security Council
invited States &to offer assistance, as appropriate, in
response to specific requests to the States lacking the legal
and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience
and/or resources8 in order to fulfill the provisions of the
resolution.

Many States have requested such assistance, and while many
other States and international organizations have come
forward to offer such assistance, the overall response needs
better alignment among both providers of assistance and those
seeking to build capacity. Since this process has begun, the
Committee established pursuant to UNSCR 1540 has participated
in a series of meetings to understand emerging assistance
needs. The United States is strongly committed to
establishing a voluntary fund to help provide the technical
support and expertise to support implementation of Resolution
1540. We will seek to make a meaningful contribution to such
a trust fund once it is established, provided it contains
effective transparency and accountability mechanisms. We are
prepared to work with the 1540 Committee and others to make
that happen.

The 1540 Committee agreed March 27, 2009 on a Chairman's
paper (available on the UN 1540 Committee homepage) that
outlines how to use the existing UN funding mechanisms and
the current basis for coordinating donor fund activities.
The United States believes the low number of contributors to
the &UN Trust Fund for Global and Regional Disarmament
Activities8 stems from its broad focus and lack of direct
ties to UNSCR 1540. An entirely separate 1540 Voluntary Fund
was proposed at the Comprehensive Review. The United States
sees this fund as the best complement to fully support the
role of the 1540 Committee. The 1540 Committee and all
contributors to the Fund could provide input into the choice
of projects supported by such a Voluntary Fund and their
implementation. While the 1540 Voluntary Fund would seek to
work on the basis of consensus, no State or other contributor
could veto the use of any funds other than its own. The
United States has determined that this would be a more
effective mechanism than the UN Trust Fund for Global and
Regional Disarmament Activities managed by UN Office of
Disarmament Affairs. That latter fund is suitable for
coordinating outreach, but is not structured or staffed for
the representative projects aimed at facilitating assistance
outlined in inputs from the Committee Experts Panel ) this
list is attached.
Although the specific operation of any such 1540 Voluntary
Fund would require careful discussion by the Committee, the
principles to guide that discussion should include: 1) all
contributions would be voluntary; 2) any State or other body
may submit a proposal or contribute to the fund; 3) the Fund
would consider the proposals on a case-by-case basis and use
its existing tools, such as the matrix and assistance
template, or other mechanisms it deems appropriate, in its
deliberations on the proposed projects; 4) all contributors
and representatives of the Fund with the 1540 Committee could
provide input into the choice of projects supported by the
Voluntary Fund and their implementation as appropriate; 5)
while the Committee would seek consensus, no State or other
contributor could veto the use of any funds other than its
own; 6) projects identified through the Voluntary Fund for
further consideration could focus on increasing the capacity
of States to build their infrastructure to implement the
obligations of the resolution, particularly in areas not
covered by existing assistance projects and that, where
appropriate, also promote economic and social development of
the project participants; 7) the Committee would encourage
first projects that come from those offering and those
requesting assistance as already identified to the 1540
Committee; 8) the Committee would emphasize transparency,
inclusion, and fairness in its deliberations and
decision-making in supporting projects for the fund; and 9)
the Committee would look to existing UN financial mechanisms
and requirements, such as those used by other UN Trust Funds,
to manage financial and other administrative aspects of the
fund, permitting the Committee to focus on strategic and
other policymaking matters for the fund.
The United States and Russia believe that by working
together, contributors and those seeking assistance can avoid
duplication and other inefficiencies, while devoting more
time and resources to their most critical concerns.

Below are frequently asked questions about various aspects of
the issue that perhaps are not fully understood.

1. Why are a more robust Committee role and resources needed
as States more finely tune requests for assistance?

A: From existing 1540 work, Committee Experts estimated that
there are about 15 non-Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD)/developing states with a biological
infrastructure of interest, 50 with chemical infrastructure,
about 50 with a nuclear infrastructure, and about 100 with
some relevant trade infrastructure. These states would be
most in need of capacity-building through the Committee's
assistance mechanisms. The cost to move a typical lower
middle income country with an extant export control
infrastructure to a sustainable and enforceable system is
several million dollars and frequently outstrips its
dedicated national budget resources. This estimate does not
include associated requirements for border security programs
and related equipment. Given the disproportionate impact of
the global economic crisis on lower middle income countries,
additional resources are required to conduct the required
activities in terms of customs, physical security, and
legislation, as well as other critical areas.
2. How will the Voluntary Fund be structured to complement
the current UN Office of Disarmament Affairs (ODA) fund?
A: We view the Piracy Fund, Counterterrorism Executive
Directorate (CTED) Fund, and/or Democracy Fund as relevant
models for aspects of the structure of the 1540 fund and will
quickly verify the most appropriate vehicle, as proposed in
the 1540 Comprehensive Review. Building on our existing G8
coordination, we will reach out to interested countries to
create a like-minded group to focus on issues regarding
establishment, management, and coordination as originally
proposed by Norway in 2007. We envision that the fund will
be established and managed under UN auspices but with a board
outside of the Committee itself. The 1540 Voluntary Fund
would be a &multi-donor trust fund.8
3. How much money would the U.S. provide to the Voluntary
Fund? For how long?

A: We have stated that we will provide a &meaningful
contribution8 for the Fund's start-up from the United States
in the coming year. We expect the fund would exist so long
as the 1540 Committee continues to exist.

4. What is the difference between the G-8 Global Partnership
and the 1540 Voluntary Fund?

A: The G-8 Global Partnership (GP) is a ten-year, $20
billion initiative in which 22 countries and the European
Union seek to limit the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. In its initial years, the GP focused on
chemical weapons destruction and nuclear submarine
dismantlement in Russia and Ukraine. In 2008, the GP agreed
to expand its focus to WMD issues worldwide. The United
States believes that under an expanded G-8 Global
Partnership, partners should count any funds spent on any
activities supporting the principles established at the 2002
G-8 Kananaskis Summit, including 1540 Voluntary Fund
commitments, toward their GP pledges. In 2010, the partners
expect to discuss extending the GP beyond its current 2012
mandate, and the United States believes 1540 Voluntary Fund
commitments should be included as part of any pledges for GP
extension as well.

END TEXT OF NON-PAPER

11. (SBU) USUN only. The Committee only reached consensus
on a robust Program of Work and the commitment to conduct a
Comprehensive Review by the end of 2009 because of USG
intervention during our Presidential Inauguration Weekend to
insist on working groups to get delegations more involved
beyond the panel of experts. Both agreements finally provide
the basis to implement a funding plan for assistance. The
four Committee-led working groups on the monitoring of
implementation, the provision of assistance, cooperation
among regional and intergovernmental organizations, and the
coordination of transparency and outreach have been very
successful. The 1540 Committee, however, is still not well
positioned to obtain new funding streams quickly; there are
staffing shortages in New York (both in national delegations
and in the Secretariat) that have delayed full-time
implementation solely through UN delegations. See Ref B.

12 (U) Requested USUN action:

-- Indicate that, as a next step, the Committee (along with
the 8 experts) should review the current program of work to
address integration of greater long-term funding. (Note:
Per Ref B we do not believe that a sufficiently detailed cost
analysis has been provided by USUN on the staffing shortages
addressed by UN ODA. End note.)

-- Please submit to Washington recommendations on integrating
long-term funding.

13. (SBU) For Ottawa only: (Per Ref C) We are committed to
an effective G8 1540 process with a follow on expert-level
meeting among G8 1540 referents before the Nuclear Security
Summit in April 2010. We plan to introduce to the G8 the
fund proposal as a joint U.S.-Russian cooperation in
achieving a voluntary fund consistent with Russia's desire
for bilateral cooperation on UNSCR 1540. Joint support for
establishing this fund is consistent with our recommendation
to Russia to promote multilateral cooperation through
U.S.-Russia bilateral efforts. The United States looks
forward to cooperating with Canada.

14. (SBU) For Moscow only: Per Ref D, we responded to FM
Lavrov,s March 2009 letter proposing bilateral cooperation
on UNSCR 1540 by indicating our desire to promote
multilateral cooperation through our bilateral efforts. Post
should seek Russia's agreement on introducing the voluntary
fund among the G-8 as a U.S.-Russia bilateral initiative,
seek Russian inputs to our draft letter in para 10, and pulse
the GOR,s willingness to make a contribution to the
voluntary fund if and when it is established.

15. Further questions or information on UNSCR 1540 can be
directed to Tom Wuchte, U.S. 1540 Coordinator, at
(202-736-4275, WuchteTA@state.gov). Department appreciates
Post's assistance.
CLINTON

© Scoop Media