VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBR #1314 3172101
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 132101Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5353
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0345
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001314
SIPDIS
STATE FOR DRL-MLGA AND IO-RHS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2014
TAGS: PHUM PREL UNGA BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE ON COUNTRY-SPECIFIC
RESOLUTIONS AT THE UNGA
REF: A. SECSTATE 116264
B. BRAZIL 1280
Classified By: POL Counselor Stephen Liston, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)
1. (C) On November 13, Charge d'Affaires delivered reftel
demarche to Carlos Abreu, minister responsible for the United
States in the Ministry of External Affairs (MRE), and poloff
simultaneously delivered the demarche to Nathanael Souza e
Silva of the MRE's Human Rights Division. Charge gave Abreu
copies of nonpapers on no-action motions, Iran, Burma and the
DPRK taken from IO's Intranet site. (Comment: Abreu will be
visiting Washington the week of November 16 with Brazilian
U/S for Political Affairs Vera Machado, who is responsible
for both the UN and human rights at the MRE, to consult on
Brazil's upcoming rotation onto the UNSC. Post recommends
raising these points with Machado when she meets with IO A/S
Brimmer. End comment.)
2. (C) In poloff's conversation with Silva, he noted that
Silva had previously told him that Brazil opposed no-action
motions (ref B), yet Brazil abstained, rather than voting no,
on the Iran and Burma no-action motions. Silva said that
although Brazil was against such motions on principle, Brazil
believed that discussion of human rights issues in the Third
Committee and Plenary tended to politicize such issues and
undermined the authority of the Human Rights Council (HRC).
He said the HRC had the expertise and the appropriate
mechanisms, specifically the universal periodic review, to
deal with human rights cases in an even-handed way. He noted
that universal periodic reviews had already been scheduled
for the DPRK on December 7, Iran next February and Burma in
2011. Poloff asked how Brazil squared its abstention on the
Burma no-action motion with its vote in favor of the
substantive resolution on Burma. Silva answered that the
international community was unanimous on Burma, in particular
because of the case of high-profile political prisoner Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi.
3. (C) Poloff asked Silva why Brazil was willing to take a
position on Burma, but not on Iran or the DPRK. Silva
explained that Burma had taken a less cooperative stance with
the HRC than had Iran or the DPRK.
4. (C) Comment: Silva's explanation notwithstanding, we
believe that the discrepancy between Brazil's position on
Burma, on the one hand, and the DPRK and Iran, on the other,
has much to do with Brazil's efforts to deepen relations with
the latter two countries over the last several months. In
this regard, we note that Brazil opened a diplomatic mission
in Pyongyang in July and that Iranian President Ahmadinehad
is scheduled to make an official visit to Brazil November 23.
KUBISKE