Cablegate: Goc "Intra-Chadian Diplomacy" Scoring Continued

VZCZCXRO2902
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0457/01 2931118
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201118Z OCT 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7323
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000457

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C AND S/USSES
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF PHUM MARR SU LY CD
SUBJECT: GOC "INTRA-CHADIAN DIPLOMACY" SCORING CONTINUED
SUCCESS IN OUTREACH TO CHAD REBELS AND OPPONENTS

REF: A. NDJAMENA 438
B. NDJAMENA 429
C. NDJAMENA 406
D. NDJAMENA 401
E. NDJAMENA 355
F. NDJAMENA 214
G. NDJAMENA 102
H. 08 NDJAMENA 571
I. 08 NDJAMENA 494
J. 08 NDJAMENA 396
K. 08 NDJAMENA 149

NDJAMENA 00000457 001.2 OF 003

--------
SUMMARY
-------

1. The Deby Government's outreach to Chad rebels and former
regime opponents, which we have long characterized as
"intra-Chadian diplomacy," to distinguish it from classic,
"Westphalian" intra-state diplomacy, has played a major role
in ensuring Chad's national security by dividing and
weakening the rebellion aimed at overthrowing the current
government by force of arms. A tour d'horizon given by
Chad's National Mediator to the Ambassador October 19
highlights the accomplishments of the GOC's long and patient
effort to woo rebels and other opponents, resulting in their
return to Chad to participate in the broader process of
national reconciliation in which the Deby regime is engaged.

2. "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" has its own rules and
protocols, rooted in Chad's distinct, indigenous political
culture, whose dynamics are different from classic
Western-style diplomacy. It is highly personal, exploits
family, clan and ethnic ties, and provides incentives in the
form of position for rebel elites and financial benefits for
the rank and file. "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" is patient and
persistent in its pursuit of incremental results. The recent
return of prominent rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane and former
President Goukouni Oueddei to Chad, along with significant
numbers of their followers, are just the latest victories in
the GOC's intra-Chadian diplomatic effort: Recall that the
current Prime Minister is a former regime opponent and that
the decisive GOC victory over the last rebel invasion was led
by former rebel warlord Hassan Al-Djinedi.

3. (SBU) The notion that "intra-Chadian diplomacy" as
practiced by the National Mediator and others in the Deby
regime is not a valid method for reaching out to rebels and
opponents ignores the dynamics of Chadian political culture
and the realities of the GOC's success in reducing the
virulence of the Chad rebellion over the past 18 months. A
review of reftels will reveal the nature, workings, and
consistent incremental successes of "intra-Chadian diplomacy"
since the events of February 2008 concentrated the Deby
regime's mind on how to end the existential threat presented
by the Chadian rebellion. END SUMMARY.

---------------------
THE NATIONAL MEDIATOR
---------------------

4. (SBU) Ambassador met October 19 with Chad's National
Mediator, Abderamane Moussa, who gave him a tour d'horizon of
his activities that underlined the consistent success of the
GOC's ongoing efforts toward national reconciliation through
outreach to Chad rebel groups and leaders and former regime
opponents, as well as prospects for an improved Chad-Sudan
relationship.

----------------------
TWO RECENT KEY PRIZES:
SOUBIANE AND GOUKOUNI
----------------------

5. (SBU) Moussa claimed that President Deby's "extended
hand" policy continued to successfully attract rebel groups
and leaders, as well as former non-violent regime opponents,
back to Chad.

-- The legal basis for rebel return to Chad was the 2007
Sirte Accord, which continued to function well and was clear

NDJAMENA 00000457 002.2 OF 003

and fair to all sides.

-- The two biggest recent prizes, Moussa said, were Ahmat
Hassaballah Soubiane and Goukouni Oueddei.

6. (SBU) Former rebel leader Ahmat Hassaballah Soubiane, who
had just returned "definitively" from Sudan and Libya on
October 17, was intent on helping Deby improve the general
political environment, including the GOC's relationship with
Chadian rebels and the Khartoum Government.

-- Moussa said that Soubiane's troops were already at the
GOC's reception center and that Soubiane and his staff were
seeking accommodations in town. (NOTE: The semi-official
daily Le Progres headlined October 19 that "Soubiane Returns
Definitively," and that 1600 of his troops were in Moussoro.
END NOTE.)

-- At the Ambassador's request, Moussa said that he would
arrange for him to meet with Soubiane shortly.

7. (SBU) Former President Goukouni Oueddei planned to settle
in Chad permanently, as soon as the GOC could provide him
with an official residence appropriate to a former chief of
state, which the GOC was happy to do.

-- Moussa said that Goukouni's commitment to national
reconciliation would be a powerful tool to accomplish that
end, especially in his home region of the far-north Tibesti,
where his Toubou fellow-tribesmen, who suffered from
perceived neglect by the GOC and had problems, like
landmines, resulting from the Chad-Libyan wars of the 1980s,
were liable to be attracted to dissident movements.

-- Moussa asked for USG development assistance to focus on
the Tibesti, claiming that the region was falling victim to
illegal trafficking, including a Nigeria-to-Egypt drug
trafficking route, that the GOC was still powerless to stop.

-- At the Ambassador's request, Moussa said that he would
arrange for him to meet with Goukouni as soon as possible
after his return to Chad.

-------------------
NOURI AND ERDIMI:
PERSONAE NON GRATAE
-------------------

8. (SBU) Moussa underscored that rebel leaders Timan Erdimi
and Mahamat Nouri remained personae non gratae in Chad.

-- He said the two leaders were "traitors to President Deby
and to Chad" and that the two would have to find another
country in which to live, because they could never be sure of
their security in a country they had betrayed.

-------------------
CHAD-SUDAN DETENTE?
-------------------

9. (SBU) Moussa, who was twice Chadian Ambassador to Sudan,
said that he was encouraged by Sudanese Presidential
counselor Ghazi Sallah Eddin's recent visit to Chad and the
talks the latter had with the GOC and with UN/AU Special
Mediator Bassole here.

-- Moussa said that he understood that Ghazi had talked about
a "congress" that rebel leaders remaining in Sudan would be
organizing soon, perhaps at the behest of the Khartoum
Government.

-- Moussa said that the GOC hoped that this "rebel congress"
would result in the remaining rebels deciding either to make
peace and return to Chad; or stay in Sudan as refugees; or to
give up armed struggle and "retire" to third countries, such
as Mahamat Nouri to Saudi Arabia and Timan Erdimi to join his
brother Tom in Texas. (NOTE: We discouraged the latter
course of action. END NOTE.)

-- Moussa said that the best way for the Chad-Sudan "proxy
war" to end would be by putting a joint GOC-GOS force to

NDJAMENA 00000457 003.2 OF 003

control the border, after which Chad could permit
international and Sudanese monitors the opportunity to verify
that there were no "JEM military bases" in Chad.

-- Moussa said that the GOC was continuing to press JEM to
participate in efforts for a negotiated peace in Darfur and
that President Deby was always ready to assist bringing the
different Darfur sides together, in so far as he was able to
do and in so far as the Khartoum Government permitted him to
act.

-------
COMMENT
-------

10. (SBU) The Deby Government's outreach to Chad rebels and
former regime opponents, which we have long characterized as
"intra-Chadian diplomacy," to distinguish it from classic,
"Westphalian" intra-state diplomacy, has played a major role
in ensuring Chad's national security by dividing and
weakening the rebellion aimed at overthrowing the current
government by force of arms. This tour d'horizon by the
National Mediator highlights the accomplishments of the GOC's
long and patient effort to woo rebels and other opponents,
resulting in their return to Chad to participate in the
broader process of national reconciliation in which the Deby
regime is engaged.

11. (SBU) "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" has its own rules and
protocols, rooted in Chad's distinct, indigenous political
culture, whose dynamics are different from classic
Western-style diplomacy. It is highly personal, exploits
family, clan and ethnic ties, and provides incentives in the
form of position for rebel elites and financial benefits for
the rank and file. "Intra-Chadian diplomacy" is patient and
persistent in its pursuit of incremental results. The recent
return of prominent rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane and former
President Goukouni Oueddei to Chad, along with significant
numbers of their followers, are just the latest victories in
the GOC's intra-Chadian diplomatic effort: Recall that the
current Prime Minister is a former regime opponent and that
the decisive GOC victory over the last rebel invasion was led
by former rebel warlord Hassan Al-Djinedi.

12. (SBU) The notion that intra-Chadian diplomacy as
practiced by the National Mediator and others in the Deby
regime is not a valid method for reaching out to rebels and
opponents ignores the dynamics of Chadian political culture
and the realities of the GOC's success in reducing the
virulence of the Chad rebellion over the past 18 months. A
review of reftels will reveal the nature, workings, and
consistent incremental successes of "intra-Chadian diplomacy"
since the events of February 2008 concentrated the Deby
regime's mind on how to end the existential threat presented
by the Chadian rebellion. END COMMENT.

13. (U) Minimize considered.
NIGRO

© Scoop Media