Cablegate: Daily Summary of Japanese Press 09/22/09

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 19 TOKYO 002208

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA

SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 09/22/09

INDEX:

(1) Editorial: Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.: Consider revision
of campaign pledges to maintain the alliance (Sankei)

(2) Many obstacles to "rebuilding the Japan-U.S. relationship"
(Mainichi)

(3) PM Hatoyama hopeful, excited about playing leading role in
achieving "world without nuclear weapons" (Mainichi)

(4) The Hatoyama administration's foreign, security policies: How to
rebuild the Japan-U.S. relationship (Nikkei)

(5) Interview with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada - I will say what
must be said (Mainichi)

(6) Editorial: Investigation into Japan-U.S. secret accords; Take
advantage of change of government (Mainichi)

(7) Work to uncover secret pacts moves into full swing:
Investigative team to be launched on the 25th (Tokyo Shimbun)

(8) Editorial: Russia should respond to U.S. scrapping of missile
defense deployment (Nikkei)

(9) Editorial: Countries should use U.S. decision to suspend
deploying MD system in Eastern Europe as a springboard for further
negotiations on nuclear disarmament (Asahi)

(10) Profiles of new senior vice ministers (Nikkei)

(11) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Yomiuri)

(12) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Mainichi)

ARTICLES:

(1) Editorial: Prime Minister's visit to the U.S.: Consider revision
of campaign pledges to maintain the alliance

SANKEI (Page 2) (Full)
September 22, 2009

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is visiting the U.S. to attend the UN
General Assembly and participate in other meetings, thus kicking off
the new administration's diplomacy. In New York he will be meeting
U.S. President Barack Obama after meeting Chinese President Hu
Jintao.

Although the prime minister has stated that his main focus in the
Japan-U.S. summit meeting is to build a relationship of trust, a
stronger relationship of trust will not be possible without concrete
measures. We hope that the two countries will identify common
interests and continue the basic policy line of maintaining the
alliance. The prime minister must not forget that partly due to the
publication of his article interpreted by some to be
"anti-American," the U.S. administration attaches great importance
to this summit meeting.

There are three pending issues between the two countries. One of
them is the refueling support provided by Japan's Maritime

TOKYO 00002208 002 OF 019

Self-Defense Force in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. regards this as an
"important contribution to the war against terrorism" and strongly
desires the continuation of the mission after the expiration of its
authorization in January 2010. The prime minister says Japan "will
not simply extend (the mission)." If that is the case, he should
propose other activities on par with the refueling support. Does he
have any good ideas?

The new administration has also made demands regarding the final
agreement reached between the two governments three years ago on the
relocation of the U.S. forces' Futenma base. Prime Minister Hatoyama
is demanding a review of the plan, saying, "the relocation of U.S.
military bases overseas is most desirable, or at least, they should
be relocated out of Okinawa." The revision of the Japan-U.S. Status
of Forces Agreement (SOFA) included in the coalition accord among
the Democratic Party of Japan, the Social Democratic Party, and the
People's New Party is probably also a cause of concern for the U.S.
government.

Both are issues critical for Japan's peace and security. Prime
Minister Hatoyama needs to modify his party's campaign pledges that
may harm the Japan-U.S. alliance. We would also like to ask Foreign
Minister Okada to reconsider from a realistic standpoint his
long-standing proposal to demand a declaration of no first use of
nuclear weapons from the U.S.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Hatoyama is advocating the building of an
"East Asian community" ahead of his meeting with President Hu
Jintao. While the community would aim at regional cooperation in
trade and other wide-ranging areas, this concept will also require
close coordination with the U.S. government.

The main sticking point between Japan and China is the development
of gas fields in the East China Sea. While the two countries agreed
in June 2008 on the participation of Japanese companies in the
development of gas fields that the Chinese side had already started
drilling, negotiations have stagnated since then.

We must realize that China's strategy to expand its maritime
interests is backed by the buildup of its military capability
through an increase in its defense spending for 21 consecutive
years. There are reports that China is building its first aircraft
carrier, and the advantage enjoyed by Japan and the U.S.in terms of
security in seas near Japan is being threatened.

Prime Minister Hatoyama should frankly convey the above concerns to
China. A "mutually beneficial strategic partnership" cannot be built
with mere diplomatic rhetoric.

(2) Many obstacles to "rebuilding the Japan-U.S. relationship"

MAINICHI (Pages 1, 3) (Excerpts)
September 20, 2009

Nakae Ueno, Takashi Sudo; Yoso Furumoto in Washington

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has started his first full-fledged
diplomatic tour by embarking on a visit to the United States on
September 21.

In early September, when the position of the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ) as the ruling party was guaranteed by its winning 308

TOKYO 00002208 003 OF 019

seats in the House of Representatives election, a Diet member close
to Hatoyama made secret contacts with the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.
This was a move made in light of Hatoyama's wish to achieve a soft
landing for the difficult issues in diplomacy toward the U.S. and
build a new era in the bilateral relationship. The main purpose was
to give an explanation on Hatoyama's article published in a magazine
reported to be anti-American and to sound out U.S. concerns about
the discontinuation of the refueling mission.

The U.S. side said that "Japan-U.S. relations will not deteriorate
as a result of the discontinuation," but stressed that "we would
like you to think about aid measures for Afghanistan (in place of
the refueling mission)." This confidant of the prime minister merely
responded with "we will think of alternative plans, including
humanitarian aid."

On September 9 U.S. Department of Defense spokesman Geoffrey Morrell
voiced a strong demand for Japan to continue the refueling mission.
This reflected the frustration in the U.S. government with the
difficulties in mopping up terrorism in Afghanistan. However, Prime
Minister Hatoyama, who has just taken over the reins of government,
will not be able to abandon the DPJ's campaign pledge that easily.

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell came to Japan and
met with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on September 18. At a
subsequent news conference, Campbell said: "The year 2010 marks the
50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty.
We should not only look back on past achievements, but should also
think about how to cooperate in the future." This echoed Hatoyama's
advocacy of a new era in the bilateral relationship. On the other
hand, Campbell also stressed that "Japan should think of how it can
contribute to peace and stability in Afghanistan." It is believed
that he asked for alternative proposals before President Obama's
visit in November.

Meanwhile, the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment issues,
including Futenma relocation, constitute a thorn in the bilateral
relationship. Since the DPJ has the Social Democratic Party (SDP) as
a coalition partner, trouble is inevitable in the review of
Futenma's relocation site. Okada has designated USFJ realignment as
"one of the issues that have to be resolved in the first 100 days
(of the administration)." A "plan for deepening Japan-U.S.
relations" (tentative name) - consisting of the USFJ issues, support
for President Obama's "world without nuclear weapons," and
Japan-U.S. collaboration for the revival of the world economy - is
being considered as a package of policies toward the U.S. to
accelerate discussions.

At their meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) on
September 18, Campbell said, "Basically, we stick to the existing
agreement," while Okada told him that "(the ruling party Diet
members) elected from the four single-seat districts in Okinawa have
all expressed clear opposition to relocation to Henoko." Even though
the two are old acquaintances, tension ran high when the discussion
moved to the relocation of the USFJ's Futenma Air Station (in
Ginowan City, Okinawa).

In the Japan-U.S. summit that will take place less than 10 days
after the inauguration of the new administration, if the prime
minister goes back on his previous policy, he is sure to be
criticized at home for "following the U.S. blindly." On the other
hand, if he declares his intention to work for relocation outside

TOKYO 00002208 004 OF 019

Okinawa, this will come across as a clear "anti-American" message,
since the U.S. has already informed Japan that it will uphold the
previous agreement.

Mindful of this situation, Campbell reportedly told Okada at their
meeting that "we are allies, so let's discuss all the issues. There
is nothing (in USFJ realignment) that we cannot talk about (with
Japan)."

Some MOFA officials advocate postponing these issues. One senior
official says that "there is no need for Japan to bring up specific
issues." However, deferring the issues will only offer very
temporary relief. USFJ realignment, the refueling mission, and other
issues are already expected to be discussed at the Japan-U.S.
foreign ministerial meeting on September 21. A source on Japan-U.S.
relations says: "President Obama's visit to Japan in mid-November is
the time limit. It will not do for Japan to say that they are still
under consideration."

At his first news conference after taking office on September 17,
Okada said that, "(SOFA revision) is the next step after solutions
are found for USFJ realignment and Afghanistan," clearly indicating
that SOFA revision will be deferred. This could be taken as a
message that this issue will not be taken up at the upcoming
Japan-U.S. summit, nor during President Obama's visit. Compared with
Futenma and the refueling mission, the U.S. position on SOFA
revision is that there is no need for revision and problems can be
dealt with through improvement of operations.

Japan's demand for SOFA revision touches on the most sensitive
issues for the U.S., including the issue of the human rights of U.S.
soldiers stationed abroad. In a sense, this a more profound question
than the specific issues relating to Futenma and the refueling
mission.

Hatoyama's article carried on The New York Times online edition
before the Lower House election became controversial not because of
its specific criticism of U.S. market fundamentalism or
globalization but because the article as a whole was interpreted as
anti-American or breaking away from the U.S. The U.S. tends to be
very wary of Japan going in a different direction on issues bearing
on fundamental U.S. values, including the market economy and human
rights. Hatoyama's concept of an East Asian community may come to
have a different meaning depending on how he handles relations with
Asian giant China, which embraces different values.

The main purpose of Hatoyama's U.S. visit is to strengthen the
relationship of trust between leaders. The U.S. side will be closely
watching his thinking as reflected in his words and actions.

(3) PM Hatoyama hopeful, excited about playing leading role in
achieving "world without nuclear weapons"

MAINICHI (Page 3) (Excerpts)
September 22, 2009

Nakae Ueno, Takayasu Ogura (New York)

"Playing a positive role"

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama will talk about the elimination of
nuclear arms at the UN Security Council (UNSC) high level meeting on

TOKYO 00002208 005 OF 019

nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in New York on September
24 and at the General Debate of the UN General Assembly following
that.

On the evening of September 8, before Hatoyama became prime
minister, he met Chairman Jitsuro Terashima of the Japan Research
Institute, his foreign policy adviser, at a Chinese restaurant in
Akasaka, Tokyo. He explained that, "I received advice (from Mr
Terashima) on my speech at the UN General Assembly and on the
Japan-U.S. summit."

The U.S. President, the most important diplomatic partner of the
Japanese prime minister, has sent out a message on a "world without
nuclear weapons." How should Japan offer its support as an
atomic-bombed country?

Based on advice from Terashima and Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji
Yabunaka, Hatoyama is expected to touch on the following three
points in his speech:

(1) The world is exposed to the threat of nuclear proliferation. The
risk of nuclear terrorism is approaching a critical stage with the
nuclear threat from Iran and North Korea and the acquisition of
nuclear materials by terrorist organizations;

(2) Japan, as the only atomic-bombed nation, will enhance the
effectiveness of the peaceful use of atomic energy through the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and support President
Obama's plan for a "world without nuclear weapons";

(3) Japan will propose a denuclearization treaty for Northeast Asia
in order to guarantee denuclearization in Asia and play a positive
role in promoting denuclearization in the world.

The above reflects the prime minister's hopes and excitement about
Japan and the U.S. leading the efforts toward nuclear disarmament.

First time in history for U.S. president to chair UNSC

In early July, about 45 days before the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) won 308 seats in the House of Representatives election and the
Liberal Democratic Party administration collapsed, Japan's UN
mission was notified by the U.S. government that, "We would like to
put nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament on the agenda for the
UNSC summit meeting in September. President Obama will preside over
the meeting."

A Japanese diplomatic source observes that: "This would have been
unthinkable during the previous (Bush) administration. It must have
been a major decision on the part of the President."

This is the first time in history for a U.S. president to chair the
UNSC. A UN source notes that, "The U.S. cannot afford to fail." By
putting the nuclear issue on the agenda, the U.S. has shown that it
is making this a pragmatic policy issue. Hatoyama is also very
conscious of the President's great enthusiasm.

The gap between Japanese and U.S. policies on the nuclear issue is
narrowing. The U.S. has not only decided to participate in the
Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which the previous Bush administration
refused to attend, but has discreetly conveyed its decision to

TOKYO 00002208 006 OF 019

support the Japan-sponsored UN General Assembly resolution on the
elimination of nuclear arms, also opposed by the former
administration. The conditions are becoming ripe for Japan and the
U.S. to cooperate in multilateral negotiations on the nuclear
issue.

On the other hand, there is no denying that subtle differences
remain in the two countries' positions. The above UN source explains
that: "While Japan gives the same importance to nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation, the U.S. focus is on non-proliferation.
Disarmament is a means for non-proliferation." The draft resolution
drawn up by the U.S. is also called the "draft resolution on nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament," with "non-proliferation"
preceding "disarmament."

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is at risk of
collapsing with North Korea conducting its nuclear tests following
the examples of India and Pakistan. And since the 9/11 terrorist
attacks, with nuclear arms and nuclear-related materials falling
into the hands of terrorists becoming a real possibility, the U.S.
has judged that the only way to avert the nuclear threat is to
realize a nuclear-free world. It has set nuclear non-proliferation
as a pragmatic policy for its own national interest.

On the other hand, Japan, which has promoted nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation at multilateral diplomatic venues, but has
constantly affirmed the "nuclear umbrella" in its bilateral
relations with the U.S., has not actually designated nuclear
disarmament as a pragmatic policy goal. How will nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament, on which the Obama administration
has shown great enthusiasm in multilateral diplomacy, affect
bilateral relations? Prime Minister Hatoyama and Foreign Minister
Katsuya Okada will need to examine the issues very carefully.

(4) The Hatoyama administration's foreign, security policies: How to
rebuild the Japan-U.S. relationship

NIKKEI (Page 1) (Full)
September 19, 2009

Hiroyuki Akita, editorial staff member

On the eve of his election as prime minister in early September,
Yukio Hatoyama took time out from his extremely hectic schedule to
prepare for diplomacy. He met Vice Foreign Minister Mitoji Yabunaka
twice and Deputy Foreign Minister Yoichi and other officials once
for one hour at a time and listened carefully to their briefings on
urgent issues.

Repeating the word "trust"

During the first meeting, the focus was on his visit to the U.S.
from September 21, while the second meeting was about issues in the
Japan-U.S., Japan-China, and Japan-ROK relationships. The subject of
the third meeting was how to handle the G-20 financial summit in
Pittsburgh on September 24-25.

In all these meetings, the rebuilding of the Japan-U.S. relationship
was a top priority. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) stood for a
"close and equal Japan-U.S. relationship" during the House of
Representatives election and called for a review of the Status of
Forces Agreement (SOFA) and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ). Hatoyama's

TOKYO 00002208 007 OF 019

article (in the New York Times) had also been reported by the U.S.
media to be anti-American, so there was both anxiety and expectation
in the U.S. about the new administration.

One Obama administration official noted that the misunderstanding
arising from the Hatoyama article has been resolved. "We will
closely observe what Prime Minister Hatoyama's true view of the U.S.
is."

The Japan-U.S. summit on September 23 will be a litmus test. Perhaps
in recognition of the U.S.'s anxiety, Hatoyama struck a conciliatory
tone at his news conference on September 16. "The first step is to
build a relationship of trust with President Obama," he said. He
repeated the word "trust" four times during the news conference.

For the immediate future the Hatoyama administration intends to
emphasize "continuity" rather than change in foreign and security
policies. Now that he has access to confidential information, unlike
when he was an opposition politician, Hatoyama's plan is to look
over such information, make an overall assessment, and come up with
a new strategy, according to his aides.

However, the U.S. may not necessarily be willing to wait for the
Hatoyama administration to finish its "test drive." At her first
meeting with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on September 21, U.S.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will reportedly "draw the line"
on USFJ realignment, Afghanistan, and other pending issues.

The U.S. may possibly convey the message that it will be difficult
to review SOFA and USFJ realignment. One U.S. government source says
that "it is better to let the Hatoyama administration know our
principles before it starts to review its policy toward the U.S."

The Hatoyama administration's emphasis on Asian diplomacy is another
variable in the potentially stormy Japan-U.S. relationship. At his
news conference held in the early hours of September 17, Minister of
Finance Hirohisa Fujii said that the plan for an Asian Monetary Fund
(AMF) is "one of the important issues," indicating a strong desire
to realize the AMF.

While it is quite natural for Japan to have closer relations with
the Asian countries, with whom it is increasingly strengthening
economic ties, if this is interpreted as a move to "quit America and
join Asia," it may give rise to conflict between Japan and the U.S.

China, Russia hopeful

China and Russia are also hoping to draw Japan closer. The first
foreign leader to call Hatoyama after he took office was Russian
President Dmitriy Medvedev. At the height of the Cold War, Prime
Minister Ichiro Hatoyama signed the Japan-Russia joint communiqu in
1956 despite U.S. reservations. Since Yukio is his grandson, Russian
diplomats openly voice expectations for the new administration's
policy toward Russia.

In late August, when the likelihood of a landslide victory for the
DPJ became strong, China discreetly sounded out Japan on its
participation in a trilateral summit with China and the ROK in early
October. This was a sign of its desire to consolidate Japan-China
collaboration before Obama's expected visit to Japan in November.

Hatoyama, who is keen on building an "East Asian community," asked

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Italian President Georgio Napolitano at their meeting on September
18 about the secret of the success of the European Union (EU) and
was told "patience and hard work are important."

It takes years for diplomacy to bear fruit. The Hatoyama
administration should not decide on a new strategy hastily. It
should remain patient and start with efforts to strengthen the unity
between Japan and the U.S.

(5) Interview with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada - I will say what
must be said

MAINICHI (Page 3) (Full)
September 20, 2009

-- What is the order of priority among the refueling mission in the
Indian Ocean, a revision of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces
Agreement, and the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air
Station (Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture)?

Okada: A shift in foreign policy resulting from a change of
government requires us to look at matters from a higher perspective.
We should conduct in-depth discussions with our partner.

-- You said that the government will not simply extend the refueling
mission in the Indian Ocean. Does that mean you might not withdraw
the Maritime Self-Defense troops? Are you going to seek alternative
legislation on the grounds that the refueling mission is a violation
of the Constitution?

Okada: Not making a simple extension means not to extend the mission
simply. I have no intention of elaborating on it any further.
Earlier when Ichiro Ozawa was president, he described the refueling
mission as a violation of the Constitution, but the party has not
said it is a violation of the Constitution.

-- President Yukio Hatoyama vowed to move Futenma Air Station at
least out of Okinawa.

Okada: We want to relocate it outside the prefecture. Nevertheless,
talks will not proceed smoothly if the range of options is narrowed
down from the beginning.

-- You have now taken power. How will that shift Japan's foreign
policy?

Okada: During the Bush administration, (then Prime Minister
Junichiro) Koizumi said Japan should simply follow the United
States. Since Barack Obama became the President, the Japanese
administration has admired the idea of a world without nuclear
weapons. The Japanese administration has always tried to fall in
step with (the U.S. government) without taking a firm stance. Those
days are over. We will seek the best solution by saying what must be
said and by making compromises when necessary.

-- A declaration to abandon the preemptive use of nuclear weapons
will weaken the United States' nuclear umbrella over Japan.

Okada: If the preemptive use of nuclear weapons is allowed, such an
argument can be engaged in. However, (the U.S. government) has said
that it will aim at the elimination of nuclear weapons. The two
perspectives do not mesh.

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-- In the upcoming Japan-U.S. talks, are you going to tell (your
counterpart) that (the United States) should declare the abandonment
of the preemptive use of nuclear weapons?

Okada: I want to avoid the mistake of urging the United States to
make a declaration unilaterally. Even so, I cannot understand the
view supporting the preemptive use of inhumane (nuclear) weapons in
this day and age when the use of other weapons of mass destruction
is said to be illegal.

-- Is the nuclear umbrella necessary?

Okada: I am not opposed to retaliation in response to a nuclear
attack.

-- Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama is eager to settle the Northern
Territories issue.

Okada: It is a matter of great interest to the Prime Minister, so I
want to listen to his view.

-- How are you going to deal with the North Korean issue?

Okada: In principle, the matter must be discussed in the framework
of the Six-Party Talks. Holding separate (talks) might work
favorably for North Korea. In other words, U.S.-DPRK talks should be
held as necessary to break the gridlock.

-- You ordered investigations into the secret pacts on your first
day in office. What is your aim?

Okada: The change of government provides a good opportunity. Past
prime ministers and foreign ministers have denied the existence of
secret agreements, so bureaucrats could not say that such agreements
existed in reality. Government officials should consider this to be
a good opportunity.

-- If such pacts exist, who should be blamed?

Okada: Basically the (past) prime ministers and foreign ministers
are to blame.

-- What if it becomes clear that the documents on the secret pacts
have been destroyed?

Okada: Too much thinking might spoil the efforts to investigate the
facts. We should first concentrate on investigating the agreements
thoroughly and disclosing them to the public.

(Interview by Takenori Noguchi)

(6) Editorial: Investigation into Japan-U.S. secret accords; Take
advantage of change of government

MAINICHI (Page 5) (Full)
September 18, 2009

Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada instructed ministry officials to
examine documents on secret pacts on security cooperation between
Japan and the U.S. and to issue a report on the results of the
investigation by the end of November. The secret pact issue has

TOKYO 00002208 010 OF 019

heightened public distrust in diplomacy. The Foreign Ministry should
carry out a thorough investigation to dispel such distrust, taking
advantage of the change of government.

Okada listed four secret accords for investigation: (1) a pact made
when the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was revised in 1960 allowing
stopovers in Japanese territory by U.S. military aircraft and
vessels carrying nuclear weapons; (2) a pact on combat operations in
emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula; (3) a pact made at the
time of Okinawa's reversion to Japan in 1972 allowing the U.S.
military to bring nuclear weapons into Japan in emergency
situations; and (4) a pact concerning Japan's payment of fees for
restoring sites vacated by the U.S. military to their original
state.

The revised treaty stipulates the need for Washington to hold prior
consultations with Tokyo before bringing nuclear weapons into Japan.
On the other hand, Japan and the U.S. reached a secret agreement
under which Tokyo would tacitly allow U.S. warships carrying nuclear
weapons to call on Japanese ports and pass through Japanese
territorial waters without requiring prior consultation. The two
countries also signed an agreement in which Japan would allow U.S.
forces based in Japan to conduct sorties without consultations in
emergency situations on the Korean Peninsula.

The existence of these secret accords has been revealed by official
documents that have been kept by the U.S. government. On the alleged
secret pact on warships carrying nuclear weapons, former
administrative vice minister Ryohei Murata said that he took charge
of the document (from his predecessor) when he assumed the vice
ministerial post and then later passed it on to his successor.

On the accord to allow the U.S. forces to bring nuclear arms into
Okinawa in emergency situations, the then Japanese prime minister
reached an agreement with his U.S. counterpart, according to
information disclosed in a book by former Kyoto Sangyo University
professor Kei Wakaizumi. Wakaizumi was engaged in negotiations with
the U.S. government as an emissary of then Prime Minister Eisaku
Sato. Former Foreign Ministry's American Affairs Bureau Director
General Bunroku Yoshino acknowledged the existence of the secret
accord concerning Japan's payment of fees for restoring sites
vacated by the U.S. military to their original state.

Foreign Minister Okada said that there are about 2,700 volumes of
materials related to the Japan-US. Security Treaty and about 570
volumes of data related to the return of Okinawa to Japan. Given
this, Okada is considering the possibility of temporarily calling
staff members of diplomatic missions abroad back to Japan to have
them examine these related documents. The ministry also plans to set
up a third-party committee after the investigation has made a
certain extent of progress and listen to the views of ex-ministry
officials. Okada also plans to also carry out an investigation in
the U.S.

When these secret accords were entered into, the U.S. and the Soviet
Union were hostile toward each other, but with the collapse of the
Cold-War structure, the international situation has changed
significantly. There is no rational reason for the Foreign Ministry
to continue to deny the existence of the secret accords. Okada has
also said that "the secret accord issue is increasing public
distrust (in the nation's diplomacy)." The Foreign Ministry should
realize that making diplomatic affairs more transparent will allow

TOKYO 00002208 011 OF 019

the ministry to develop diplomacy backed by the people for the first
time, and the ministry should actively cooperate in the
investigation.

Once the government admits the existence of the secret pacts based
on the results of the investigation, the issue of compatibility will
emerge between the secret accords and Japan's advocacy of the three
nonnuclear principles while depending on U.S. deterrence to secure
its national security, centering on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The
government also should prepare an explanation to respond to this
question.

(7) Work to uncover secret pacts moves into full swing:
Investigative team to be launched on the 25th

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Excerpts)
September 22, 2009

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) will launch a full
investigation into the so-called secret pacts between Japan and the
U.S. on permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into the
country and the reversion of Okinawa. A set of such pacts have
already been disclosed through the U.S. archives. However, the
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration and the LDP itself
denied the existence of such agreements. The capability of the new
Hatoyama administration will now be tested in terms of whether it
can do away with the secretive nature of the bureaucracy and promote
new diplomatic and security policies.

Shortly after the launch of the new administration, Foreign Minister
Katsuya Okada ordered Vice Minister Mitoji Yabunaka to launch an
investigation into the secret agreements and report on the survey
results by around the end of November. MOFA will also launch a team
of about 15 officials on Sept. 25. MOFA will also set up a committee
of experts from the private sector in late October and conduct an
interview survey of senior MOFA officials.

(8) Editorial: Russia should respond to U.S. scrapping of missile
defense deployment

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
September 20, 2009

The Obama administration of the United States has announced the
scrapping of a plan to deploy a missile defense (MD) system in
Eastern Europe. This was probably a concession to Russia, which is
opposed to the deployment, in order to give priority to confidence
building between the two countries. It is now Russia's turn to
cooperate with the U.S. on nuclear disarmament and Iran's nuclear
issue and fulfill its responsibility as a major nuclear power.

The plan to deploy an MD system was a project of the former Bush
administration. It consists of setting up a missile interception
base in Poland and building a radar facility in the Czech Republic,
aiming at synchronized operations by 2012.

The United States' purpose was to protect Europe from the threat of
nuclear and missile attacks by Iran, but Russia has opposed this on
the grounds it would weaken Russia's nuclear deterrence. This issue,
along with the eastern expansion of NATO, has been a major factor in
the chilling of U.S.-Russia relations.

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Naturally, an attempt to reduce defense spending is one reason why
the Obama administration reconsidered deploying an MD system in
Eastern Europe, but more importantly, the cancellation of the
deployment is meant to promote cooperation with Russia in nuclear
disarmament.

The U.S. and Russia are in the process of negotiating a new nuclear
disarmament treaty to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I
(START I) before the end of 2009. If these two countries, which
possess over 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons, are able to
agree on a substantial reduction in nuclear arms, this will be a
major step toward realizing President Obama's goal of a "world
without nuclear weapons."

U.S.-Russia cooperation is also important in solving the issue of
Iran's nuclear program. Talks among the six parties, the five
permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC) plus Germany,
are scheduled to resume on October 1, but Iran stands firm on
continuing its enrichment of uranium. The cooperation of Russia,
which has close relations with Iran, is indispensable for preventing
the development of nuclear arms.

Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev has welcomed the discontinuation
of the MD deployment plan in Eastern Europe as a "responsible
approach." However, Russia should not stop at mere welcome; it has
the responsibility to make sincere efforts for nuclear disarmament
and non-proliferation in the world.

We hope that the U.S.-Russia nuclear-disarmament talks will aim for
the conclusion of a strict treaty containing measures for mutual
verification, as well as indicate the future course for nuclear
weapon reduction. A U.S.-Russia summit will be held on September 23
and the UNSC's high-level meeting on nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament will be held on September 24. The U.S. and Russia need
to set an example, if only to prod China and the other nuclear
powers toward nuclear disarmament and realize thorough nuclear
non-proliferation.

Russia also needs to play an active role in preventing the
development of nuclear weapons by Iran and North Korea. If
negotiations produce no results, Russia should also cooperate in
taking strict measures, including imposing stronger sanctions.
Russia is suspected of supplying Iran with ground-to-air missiles in
secret. It goes without saying that it should stop exporting weapons
related to the development of nuclear arms to Iran.

(9) Editorial: Countries should use U.S. decision to suspend
deploying MD system in Eastern Europe as a springboard for further
negotiations on nuclear disarmament

ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
September 19, 2009

U.S. President Barack Obama has made a significant diplomatic
decision in an effort to turn his call for a world free of nuclear
weapons into action. The decision is to suspend the planned
deployment of the missile defense (MD) system in Czechoslovakia and
Poland in Eastern Europe. The Obama administration has decided to
review the MD plan for Europe promoted by the previous Bush
administration.

Russia has strongly reacted to the planned deployment of the MD

TOKYO 00002208 013 OF 019

system in Eastern Europe, claiming that the system would neutralize
its nuclear arms. By dispelling such Russian apprehension, Obama has
urged that nation, in a sense, to make a concession on drawing up a
treaty to be adopted after the expiration of the Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START 1). The U.S. is aiming to reach a conclusion
in the negotiations by the end of this year.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a statement welcoming the
U.S. decision as "a responsible approach" and calling on the U.S. to
jointly cope with the threat of missile expansion. Britain and
France have also welcomed the decision.

President Obama put an end to former president George Bush's
strategy of preventing nuclear proliferation by resorting to both
the MD system and preemptive strikes. We hope that the U.S. will
present a vision of further efforts for nuclear arms reduction after
the introduction of the new treaty succeeding START 1.

The new U.S. decision will be discussed first at the U.S.-Russia
summit meeting slated for Sept. 23 in New York and the upcoming
summit of the UN Security Council, which Obama will chair.

The purpose of the MD system in Eastern Europe was to defend the
region from possible nuclear and missile attacks from Iran. But the
previous Bush administration attempted to use the deployment plan as
a lever to expand the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to
the East. Czechoslovakia and Poland also seem to have aimed to apply
pressure on Russia by agreeing to deploy the MD system despite the
opposition of their peoples.

In countering the U.S. move to deploy the MD system in Eastern
Europe, Russia also brandished a public threat, as then president
Vladimir Putin said: "Countries that agree to deploy the MD system
will be exposed to the threat of nuclear attack."

Russia is also showing signs of selling its anti-air missiles to
Iran. Moscow should, of course, cancel such a plan now that
Washington has shown it consideration.

The Obama administration intends to deploy in stages a system
centering on the Standard Missile 3 (MS3) carried on Aegis ships to
replace the current MD deployment plan. The administration, while
emphasizing the flexibility of its new plan, intends to carefully
observe Iran's response.

On Oct. 1, six countries -- the five UN Security Council members and
Germany - and the Iranian government will discuss the nuclear issue.
The meeting will be crucial for the Obama administration, which has
asked Iran for dialogue.

If Russia favorably responds to the new U.S. approach and if the
U.S. and Russia adopt a cooperative policy, there will be major
effects in terms of nuclear arms reduction and nuclear and missile
nonproliferation. In order to deter nuclear and missile development
by North Korea, we expect more visible results to be produced (from
the U.S. decision to cancel the deployment of the MD system in
Eastern Europe).

(10) Profiles of new senior vice ministers

NIKKEI (Page 4) (Full)
September 19, 2009

TOKYO 00002208 014 OF 019

Cabinet Office

Atsushi Oshima
Graduated from Waseda University; former Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) Diet affairs committee vice chairman, former House of
Representatives economy, trade and industry committee member; Lower
House Saitama No. 6 district; fourth term; 52 (Yukio Hatoyama group
in the DPJ)

Motohisa Furukawa
University of Tokyo; former DPJ tax research committee vice
chairman, former DPJ pension research committee chairman; Lower
House Aichi No. 2 district; fifth term; 43 (Seiji Maehara group)

Kohei Otsuka
Waseda University Graduate School; former DPJ executive office
deputy chief, former DPJ policy research committee vice chairman;
Upper House Aichi constituency; second term; 49

Internal Affairs and Communications Ministry

Shu Watanabe
Waseda University; former DPJ deputy secretary general, former DPJ
tax research committee vice chairman; Lower House Shizuoka No. 6
district; fifth term; 47 (Maehara group)

Masamitsu Naito
University of Tokyo Graduate School; former DPJ election campaign
committee deputy chairman, former Upper House internal affairs and
communications committee chairman; Upper House proportional
representation segment; second term; 45 (Noto Kan group)

Justice Ministry

Koichi Kato
Sophia University; former DPJ Diet affairs committee deputy
chairman, former DPJ deputy secretary general; Lower House Tokyo No.
20 district; fourth term; 45 (Kan group)

Foreign Ministry

Koichi Takemasa
Keio University; former DPJ election campaign committee deputy
chairman, former Lower House foreign affairs committee member; Lower
House Saitama No. 1 district; fourth term; 48 (Yoshihiko Noda
group)

Tetsuro Fukuyama
Kyoto University Graduate School; former DPJ policy research
committee deputy chief; Upper House Kyoto constituency; second term;
52 (Maehara group)

Finance Ministry

Yoshihiko Noda
Waseda University; former DPJ deputy secretary general, former DPJ
Diet affairs committee chairman; Lower House Chiba No. 4 district;
fifth term; 52 (Noda group)

Naoki Minezaki
Hitotsubashi University Graduate School; former Upper House

TOKYO 00002208 015 OF 019

financial affairs committee chairman, former DPJ tax research
committee chairman; Upper House Hokkaido constituency; third term;
64 (Maehara group)

Education, Culture, Sports, and Science and Technology Ministry

Harumasa Nakagawa
Georgetown University; former Lower House financial affairs
committee member, former budget committee member; Lower House Mie
No. 2 district; 59

Kan Suzuki
University of Tokyo; former Upper House political ethics, election
system special committee chairman and former judicial affairs
committee member; Upper House Tokyo constituency; second term; 45
(Hatoyama group)

Health, Labor and Welfare Ministry

Ritsuo Hosokawa
Meiji University; former Lower House environment committee chairman,
former judicial affairs committee member; Lower House Saitama No. 3
district; seventh term; 66 (Social Democratic Party)

Hiroyuki Nagahama
Waseda University; former Upper House land, infrastructure, and
transport committee member; Upper House Chiba constituency; first
term (four terms in Lower House); 50 (Noda group)

Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry

Masahiko Yamada
Waseda University; former Lower House judicial affairs committee
member, former health, labor and welfare committee member; Lower
House Nagasaki No. 3 district; fifth term; 67 (Ozawa group)

Akira Gunji
Left Meiji Gakuin University in mid-course; former Upper House
agriculture, forestry and fisheries committee chairman, former Upper
House Diet affairs committee chairman; Upper House Ibaraki
constituency; second term; 59

Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry

Tadahiro Matsushita
Kyoto University; former cabinet office senior vice minister, former
Lower House cabinet committee chairman; Kagoshima No. 3 district;
fifth term; 70 (People's New Party)

Teruhiko Mashiko
Waseda University; former Upper House economy, trade and industry
committee member, former security special committee member; Upper
House Fukushima constituency; first term (three terms in Lower
House); 61 (Hatoyama group)

Land, Infrastructure and Transport Ministry

Kiyomi Tsujimoto
Waseda University; former Social Democratic Party policy chief,
former Diet affairs committee head; Lower House Osaka No. 10
district; fourth term; 49 (Social Democratic Party)

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Sumio Mabuchi
Yokohama National University; former DPJ policy research committee
deputy chairman, former Diet affairs committee deputy chairman;
Lower House Nara No. 1 district; third term; 49

Environment Ministry

Issei Tajima
Doshisha University Graduate School; former DPJ policy research
committee deputy chairman, former Lower House environment committee
member; Lower House Shiga No. 2 district; third term; 47 (DPJ group
affiliated with former Japan Socialist Party)

Defense Ministry

Kazuya Shinba
Otterbein College (U.S.A.); former Upper House foreign affairs and
defense committee chairman; Upper House Shizuoka constituency;
second term; 42 (DPJ group affiliated with former Japan Socialist
Party)

(11) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties

YOMIURI (Page 24) (Abridged)
September 18, 2009

Questions & Answers
(Figures shown in percentage)

Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet?

Yes 75
No 17
Other answers (O/A) 2
No answer (N/A) 6

Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the foregoing question)
Pick only one from among the following reasons for your approval of
the Hatoyama cabinet.

Something can be expected of its policy measures 29
The prime minister is aiming to make policy decisions at the
initiative of politicians 24
The prime minister has leadership ability 5
There's something stable about the prime minister 3
His cabinet's lineup is good 8
Because it's a non-Liberal Democratic Party government 25
O/A 0
N/A 5

Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the foregoing question) Pick
only one from among the following reasons for your disapproval of
the Hatoyama cabinet.

Nothing can be expected of its policy measures 40
Nothing can be expected of its policy decisions made at the
initiative of politicians 10
The prime minister lacks leadership ability 9
There's nothing stable about the prime minister 9
His cabinet's lineup is not good 12
Because it's a non-Liberal Democratic Party government 14
O/A 1

TOKYO 00002208 017 OF 019

N/A 5

Q: Which political party do you support now? Pick only one.

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 51
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 19
New Komeito (NK) 2
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 1
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0
Other political parties 0
None 20
N/A 2

Q: The Hatoyama cabinet is a tripartite coalition government of the
DPJ, SDP, and PNP. Do you approve of this combination of political
parties in office?

Yes 49
No 39
N/A 13

Q: Mr. Naoto Kan has been appointed to the post of minister for the
"National Strategy Bureau," which outlines the state budget and
makes other decisions. Do you approve of this appointment?

Yes 68
No 18
N/A 14

Q: Mr. Shizuka Kamei has been appointed to the post of minister for
financial services and postal issues. Do you approve of this
appointment?

Yes 41
No 43
N/A 16

Q: The Hatoyama cabinet is going to make policy decisions at the
political initiative of about 100 lawmakers in government posts. Do
you approve of this decision-making process?

Yes 71
No 16
N/A 13

Q: The Hatoyama cabinet plans to end the Maritime Self-Defense
Force's refueling activities in the Indian Ocean by January next
year when the antiterror special measures law expires. Do you
support this policy decision?

Yes 44
No 39
N/A 17

Q: The Hatoyama cabinet has decided to cut Japan's greenhouse gas
emissions by 25 PERCENT from 1990 levels by 2020 in order to
prevent global warming. Do you support this policy decision?

TOKYO 00002208 018 OF 019

Yes 74
No 15
N/A 10

Polling methodology: The survey was conducted from the evening of
Sept. 16 through Sept. 17 across the nation on a computer-aided
random digit dialing (RDD) basis. Households with one or more
eligible voters totaled 1,820. Valid answers were obtained from
1,087 persons (60 PERCENT ).

(Note) In some cases, the total percentage does not add up to 100
PERCENT due to rounding.

(12) Poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties

MAINICHI (Page 5) (Abridged)
September 18, 2009

Questions & Answers
(T = total; P = previous; M = male; F = female)

Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet?

T P M F
Yes 77 (20) 84 74
No 13 (60) 9 15
Not interested 9 (18) 6 10

Q: (Only for those who answered "yes" to the above question) Why?

T P M F
Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 3
3 4
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's leadership
4 4 4
Because something can be expected of the prime minister's policy
measures 15 15 15
Because the nature of politics is likely to change 77 77 77

Q: (Only for those who answered "no" to the above question) Why?

T P M F
Because the prime minister is from the Democratic Party of Japan 8
15 6
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's leadership 9
5 11
Because nothing can be expected of the prime minister's policy
measures 58 68 55
Because the nature of politics is unlikely to change 23 8 27

Q: Which political party do you support?

T P M F
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 45 (39) 51 42
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 12 (20) 15 11
New Komeito (NK) 4 (5) 2 5
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 3 (4) 5 2
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 2 (1) 2 3
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0 (0) 0 0
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 3 (2) 2 3
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0 (0) -- 1

TOKYO 00002208 019 OF 019

Other political parties 1 (1) 1 1
None 27 (26) 21 30

Q: Do you think public life will improve or worsen with the DPJ
running the government?

T P M F
Improve 47 57 43
Worsen 6 5 7
Remain unchanged 44 36 48

Q: When you look at the cabinet lineup, do you have expectations for
the Hatoyama cabinet?

T P M F
Yes 68 76 64
No 28 20 32

Q: The DPJ has set forth a policy of reducing Japan's greenhouse gas
emissions by 25 PERCENT from 1990 levels by 2020. The Aso cabinet's
goal was to reduce emissions by 8 PERCENT . Do you support the 25
PERCENT reduction?

T P M F
Yes 69 72 68
No 25 24 26

Q: The DPJ falls short of a majority in the House of Councillors, so
the DPJ has formed a coalition government with the SDP and the PNP.
Would you like to see the DPJ form a single-party government after
next summer's election for the House of Councillors?

T P M F
A single-party DPJ government 33 42 28
A DPJ coalition with the SDP and the PNP 34 33 35
A DPJ coalition with other political parties 25 20 27

Q: The LDP has become an opposition party as a result of this
summer's election for the House of Representatives. Would you like
the LDP to reconstruct itself?

T P M F
Yes 56 58 55
No 41 40 41

(Note) Figures shown in percentage, rounded off. "0" indicates that
the figure was below 0.5 PERCENT . "--" denotes that no respondents
answered. "No answer" omitted. Figures in parentheses denote the
results of the last survey conducted Aug. 26-27. The cabinet support
rate in parentheses is for the Aso cabinet from the last survey.

Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Sept. 16-17 over the
telephone across the nation on a computer-aided random digit
sampling (RDS) basis. A total of 1,650 households with one or more
eligible voters were sampled. Answers were obtained from 1,014
persons (61 PERCENT ).

ROOS

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