Cablegate: Day 3: U.S.-South Africa Nonproliferation And

VZCZCXRO4840
OO RUEHJO
DE RUEHC #0252/01 2682045
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 252025Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 6475
RUEHJO/AMCONSUL JOHANNESBURG IMMEDIATE 7125
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 5538

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 STATE 100252

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
DAY 3: U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE:
UPCOMING EVENTS
CONCLUDING REMARKS
AND NEXT STEPS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AF KNNP MNUC NP PARM ENRG SF
SUBJECT: DAY 3: U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: UPCOMING EVENTS, CONCLUDING REMARKS,
AND NEXT STEPS

REF: A. STATE 078766
B. STATE 082147
C. STATE 097420

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) On Day 3 of the U.S.-South Africa Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Dialogue, participants shared views and plans
for upcoming international events, and discussed next steps.
Einhorn provided an overview of the latest U.S. plans for the
upcoming UN Security Council Summit on Disarmament and
Nonproliferation. He exchanged views with Minty on the IAEA
General Conference (Minty recommended a Presidential
Statement instead of a resolution on contentious Middle East
issues), UNGA First Committee session (both countries need to
help manage expectations post-Prague speech), and UNSCR 1540
Comprehensive Review (SAG unconvinced of UNSCR 1540's
utility, but will participate in the review). NSC Senior
Director for WMD Terrorism and Threat Reduction Laura Holgate
provided information on the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit
and Sherpa planning meeting. South Africa will send a senior
representative, but has not yet designated an official
Sherpa. Planning for the 2010 NPT Review Conference was
discussed at length, including the need for discussions on
abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision, improving the
procedural setup of Treaty implementation, and coordination
to build consensus around substantive policy agendas.
Participants agreed to a series of next steps, to include a
robust agenda for expanded discussion and cooperation in the
coming months. A second round of the Dialogue was proposed
for November 2009 in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with
site visits to U.S. nuclear facilities.

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UN SECURITY COUNCIL SUMMIT ON DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION
---------------------------------------------

2. (SBU) Special Advisor Einhorn confirmed that President
Obama would chair a September 24 UN Security Council Summit
on disarmament and nonproliferation (per the U.S. presidency
of the Security Council in September 2009). The objective of
the summit is to have Heads of State and Government endorse a
broad non-proliferation and disarmament agenda, affirm and
reaffirm commitments, and establish future objectives to set
the stage for the Nuclear Security Summit and NPT RevCon.
Planning for the session is ongoing, and the United States is
consulting with the Council, plus other UN members (such as
South Africa), about meeting objectives. Einhorn emphasized
that the USG wants the UNSC Summit to address broad
nonproliferation and disarmament themes that are regime-wide.

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IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE
-----------------------

3. (SBU) Einhorn reiterated outcomes that the U.S. hopes for
at the General Conference and on its margins: signing of the
draft nuclear energy R&D agreement, announcement of the new
bilateral energy dialogue, and South African participation in
the Sherpa planning meeting for the nuclear security summit.
Regarding the General Conference itself and the perennial
problem of contentious Middle East issues, the United States
hoped the Chair could gain agreement on a single, consensus
resolution. Minty hoped all would avoid heated debate at the
General Conference. Minty also expressed his personal view
that it would be much more complicated, if not impossible, to
get a resolution because resolutions require sponsors, and
sponsorship issues can unleash political rivalries. Also,
once a resolution is adopted, that country will want another
one next year. He recommended a Presidential Statement,
instead. Both countries pledged to work constructively
towards consensus.

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NUCLEAR SECURITY SUMMIT
-----------------------

STATE 00100252 002 OF 005

4. (SBU) Following President Obama's personal invitation to
President Zuma on the margins of the G-8 Summit, NSC Senior
Director Holgate said that formal invitations to the Nuclear
Security Summit would be sent soon. The goal for the summit
would be to build common understanding on threats, and on the
importance of security for all nuclear materials in military
and civilian contexts. Our objective is for Heads of State
and Government to identify ways in which countries could more
fully implement their existing commitments, rather than make
it a venue for pressuring countries to join the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Proliferation
Security Initiative, or other such efforts. The Summit
agenda and outcomes will be refined during a series of three
Sherpa meetings in advance of the April Summit. Holgate
noted that the Summit likely would produce a document of
commitments for action on a number of issues, from accounting
to physical protection, nuclear forensics and enforcement,
information and intelligence sharing, etc. The Summit also
can provide a forum to showcase existing efforts towards
strengthening the global nuclear security agenda. A special
side conversation is being considered for nuclear industry
leaders, since the majority of nuclear materials are under
private control in the nuclear industry. She solicited South
African views on Summit planning.

5. (SBU) Einhorn added that the United States hopes that
Heads of State and Government attendance would motivate
bureaucracies to consider in the coming months what more they
could do to advance nuclear security within individual
countries in advance of the Summit. Minty and, separately,
Department of Energy Acting Director General Nelisiwe
Magubane noted that the SAG would likely not appoint a
permanent Sherpa in time for the mid-September planning
meeting. The SAG would send a senior official in September,
with a final Sherpa appointed thereafter. (Note: A few days
after the Dialogue, State officials received word that the
senior official representing South Africa at the Sherpa
planning meeting would be Ditebogo Kgomo, not Minty as
expected.)

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2010 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
--------------------------

6. (SBU) Einhorn stated that, for many years, the P-5 looked
at the NPT RevCons as damage-limiting exercises. The United
States, however, is taking a very different approach this
time. The regime is under great stress, and more than a
consensus final document is needed to remedy it. The USG
views the RevCon as an important milestone on a longer road
(not a destination), and will actively seek to improve how
the regime operates over the coming years. Mabhongo said
that South Africa had a similar approach to the RevCon, and
shared the United States' concern about balancing the three
pillars of the NPT appropriately.

7. (SBU) Minty said that South Africa was very interested in
the problems associated with abuse of the withdrawal
provision in the Treaty (see Day 1 Septel) and wished to work
with the United States on a way forward. Negative security
assurances were an important confidence-building measure for
the NPT-defined Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) in moving
the RevCon agenda forward. A major objective for South
Africa in May would be a reaffirmation of the 1995 RevCon
consensus outcome and the 2000 RevCon Final Document,
especially the "13 practical steps" towards nuclear
dismantlement contained therein.

8. (SBU) Einhorn contended that circumstances have changed
since the 2000 RevCon result and the "13 practical steps,"
and the disarmament agenda needed to be updated. He hoped
that delegations would not become fixated on precise
application of the 13 steps, noting that certain parts, such
as the one affirming the ABM Treaty (highlighted in step 7),
have been overtaken by events. The Parties therefore need to
chart a course for the future with an agenda that's
appropriate for 2010 and beyond. Part of that will be the
vision that President Obama outlined in his Prague speech.
As part of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the USG is
looking at the role of nuclear weapons in our national
security policy. We are also reviewing our declaratory
policy, including previous statements on negative security
assurances. Einhorn said it was premature to commit to
specifics at this time, but the USG is aware of other
countries' interest in that issue.

STATE 00100252 003 OF 005

9. (SBU) Minty said the NPT review process needs to be
strengthened. The Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meetings
are increasibly frequented by junior delegates with no
mandate to negotiate for consensus and with no substantive
grasp of the issues to debate. Issues of methodology and
process are just as important as substance in ensuring a
successful RevCon. Minty endorsed Einhorn's suggestion that
the United States and South Africa discuss new approaches to
strengthen the review process.

--------------------------------------------- ------------
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540 AND THE COMPREHENSIVE
REVIEW
--------------------------------------------- ------------

10. (SBU) Einhorn gave the USG perspective on UNSCR 1540,
and sought South Africa's views on the resolution, and on
funding mechanisms for implementation. He also informed
Minty of a U.S.-funded and UNODA-sponsored January workshop
on reducing biological threats in Africa. Mabhongo replied
that South Africa has had concerns with UNSCR 1540 from the
beginning, particularly the way that it was passed through
the Council. South Africa was not as optimistic about the
utility of UNSCR 1540. Most of the work under the resolution
focused on states instead of non-state actors, which the
resolution was designed to target. South Africa had seen
minimal progress on implementation. Country reports
submitted pursuant to 1540 Committee requirements lacked
substance. Minty said the resolution failed to address
illicit networks, striking against the credibility of the
resolution. Regarding implementation reporting, Minty had
previously suggested that the 1540 Committee use a simple
questionnaire that the Council could use to follow up with
countries whose responses indicated sophisticated technology
and capabilities. As it is now, even the first question is
way above the level of most countries. Minty recommended
that the UNSC take a country-by-country approach to see what
each individual country needs. Nevertheless, the SAG was
willing to discuss the issue. Einhorn encouraged South
Africa to convey its concerns during the UNSCR 1540
Comprehensive Review. He agreed that country-specific
assessments of national efforts, gaps, and the assistance
needed should help implementation move forward.

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CLOSING REMARKS
---------------

11. (SBU) Einhorn led the closing remarks. Balancing the
three NPT pillars was important, but so was balancing
responsibilities for strengthening the regime. The United
States is prepared to do more than its fair share in pursuing
nuclear disarmament and promoting peaceful uses of nuclear
energy; but, in exchange, we hope that NNWS, including
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members, will accept their
responsibilities and join with us to strengthen barriers
against further proliferation. South Africa is a leading
voice in the NAM and has a greater understanding of these
issues than many of its NAM colleagues, in part because of
its unique historical experience. Although cognizant of the
pressure to maintain NAM solidarity, Einhorn expressed hope
that South Africa would use its enormous credibility and
knowledge to lead the NAM toward pragmatic solutions to these
problems that genuinely serve NAM interests. In closing,
Einhorn expressed USG satisfaction with the week's nuclear
security discussions. Overall, the meetings marked a good
start toward fulfilling our Presidents' directive to create a
bilateral dialogue on these issues. Einhorn expressed the
expectation that South Africa and the United States would
maintain constant contact through DICO and State, and that
engagement would not be limited to episodic visits.

12. (SBU) Minty expressed appreciation for U.S. efforts to
build a partnership with South Africa. He looked forward to
expanded cooperation, but cautioned that the SAG often faces
unexpected demands on its time and attention from within the
continent. Meeting regional needs is a principal objective
of South African foreign policy, and Minty said it seems to
"never end." South Africa also has commitments to the
African Union and the South African Development Community
(including its year-long Chairmanship), all of which create
unanticipated obligations that South Africa must fulfill-a
persistent problem. (Note: Minty mentioned earlier in the
Dialogue that Russia and France had proposed similar future
dialogues, which also would take up finite SAG resources.

STATE 00100252 004 OF 005

SUBJECT: DAY 3: U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: UPCOMING EVENTS, CONCLUDING REMARKS,
AND NEXT STE
Embassy Pretoria has heard rumors of a Japanese Dialogue, as
well.) Minty reiterated South Africa's concerns about
"meddling with foundations" (such as the NPT, UN Security
Council Resolutions, etc.), because it establishes precedents
that others can meddle with as they wish. This relates to
South Africa's strong commitment to multilateralism: the SAG
seeks buy-in and consensus because that ensures the
legitimacy of decisions taken. Regarding block positions in
multilateral meetings, South Africa tries to work across
groups on global concepts, and speaks its mind on issues of
strong belief irrespective of any block position. This, he
said, is South Africa's commitment, and it will not change.
For example, at the 1995 NPT RevCon, South Africa sided
against the NAM by supporting the U.S. push for indefinite
extension of the Treaty. South Africa tries to generate
constructive approaches to build bridges between the G-77 and
the G-8. In closing, Minty looked forward to robust,
continuing cooperation with the United States over the coming
months, coordinated through DICO and the State Department.
End of Day 3 discussions.

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POINTS OF CONTACT FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
-----------------------------------------

13. (U) For further information, please contact State POC
(ISN/RA) Krista Fisher (202-647-6793, fisherkk@state.gov,
NNSA POCs Heather Looney (202-586-6772,
Heather.Looney@nnsa.doe.gov) or Andrew Bieniawski
(202-586-0775, Andrew.Bieniawski@nnsa.doe.gov), or NRC POC
Cindy Rosales Cooper (301-415-1168,
Cindy.Rosales-Cooper@nrc.gov).

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DIALOGUE PARTICIPANTS
---------------------

14. (U) United States:

Robert Einhorn, Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Arms
Control (State)
Laura Holgate, Senior Director, WMD Terrorism and Threat
Reduction (NSC)
Bruce Mallet, Deputy Executive Director for Operation (NRC)
Ken Baker, Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator for
Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DOE/NNSA)
Andrew Bieniawski, Assistant Deputy Administrator for Global
Threat Reduction (DOE/NNSA)
Dave Huizenga, Assistant Deputy Administrator for
International Material Protection and Cooperation (DOE/NNSA)
Jeff Eberhardt, Office Director (State)
Al Burkart, Deputy Director (State)
Madeline Seidenstricker, Political Counselor (State, Embassy
Pretoria)
Heather Looney, Special Assistant (DOE/NNSA)
John Mentz, Foreign Affairs Officer (State)
Cindy Rosales-Cooper, International Relations Officer (NRC)
David Young, Energy and Minerals Officer (State, Embassy
Pretoria)
Amy Prible, Nuclear Policy Analyst (OSD)
Krista Fisher, Foreign Affairs Officer (State)
Dave Barber, Physical Protection Expert, Sandia National
Laboratory
Greg Herdes, Physical Protection Expert, Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory

15. (U) South Africa:

Abdul S. Minty, Ambassador and Special Representative on
Disarmament and NEPAD, Department of International Relations
and Cooperation (DICO)
Xolisa Mabhongo, Chief Director, Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation (DICO)
Johann Kellerman, Deputy Director, Nuclear Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation (DICO)
Michiel J. Combrink, Deputy Director, Nuclear Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation (DICO)
Lunga Bengu, Office of the Ambassador and Special
Representative on Disarmament and NEPAD (DICO)
Melinda N. Williams, Deputy Director, Biological, Chemical
and Arms Control (DICO)
Simbongile V Mancotywa-Kumsha, Assistant Director, Nuclear
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (DICO)
Ingrid Kirsten, Assistant Director, Biological, Chemical and
Arms Control (DICO)
Jonathan D. Passmoor, Foreign Service Officer, Biological,

STATE 00100252 005 OF 005

SUBJECT: DAY 3: U.S.-SOUTH AFRICA NONPROLIFERATION AND
DISARMAMENT DIALOGUE: UPCOMING EVENTS, CONCLUDING REMARKS,
AND NEXT STE
Chemical and Arms Control (DICO)
Fadl Nacerodien, Director, US Directorate (DICO)
Graham Anderson, Deputy Director, US Political Desk (Safety
and Security) (DICO)
Alu Museisi, Foreign Service Officer US Political Desk
(Safety and Security) (DICO)
Elsie Monale, Director: Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Department
of Energy (DOE)
Lillian Sedumoeng, Deputy Director: Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(DOE)
G Clappison, Acting CEO, National Nuclear Regulator (NNR)
J Mwase, Senior manager, Strategic and stakeholder executive
(NNR)
Joseph Shayi, General Manager: Risk and Infrastructure
Management (responsible for Safeguards and Security)
(NECSA)
W J Theron, Emergency Planner (responsible for Emergency
planning and response) (NECSA)
Chantal Janneker, Senior Manager: Group Communication and
Stakeholder Relations (NECSA)
Lucky Molefe, Senior Manager International Trade and Customs
Policy, South African Revenue Service (SARS)
CLINTON

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