Cablegate: Meeting of Senior Advisor For

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PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHKI #0748/01 2560708
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 120708Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8409
INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE
RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000748

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MOPS KPKO CG
SUBJECT: Meeting of Senior Advisor for
Conflict Resolution with CNDP

1. (SBU) Summary: CNDP told Senior Advisor Shortley September 4
that it agreed in principle to (1) withdrawal to positions held on
August 28; (2) disengagement talks in Kimoka on the basis of a
proposed plan by MONUC; (3) agreement in principle of the Phase 1
disengagement, disarmament and integration with the agreement to
further discuss timing and modalities; and (4) public statement
reaffirming this agreement. End summary.

2. (SBU) Senior Advisor for Conflict Resolution to the Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs Tim Shortley led a U.S. - only team to
meet CNDP political and military officials September 4 at CNDP
headquarters at Bwiza, north of Kirolirwe. CNDP Chairman, General
Laurent Nkunda was unavailable (reportedly in Gungu). Shortley
regretted that much time had been lost in fulfilling the promise of
the Goma agreement with all sides, including the international
facilitation, responsible for missing many opportunities. Shortley
highlighted General Didier Etumba's insistence that all sides disarm
without military disengagement as a critical reason for the present
fighting and a reason for the failure of AMANI to date. He noted
that on his last visit the international facilitation had obtained
both President Kabila's and General Nkunda's agreement to a phase
one of the disengagement, disarmament and integration program that
could test and build the system necessary to be successful.
Shortley pressed CNDP to (1) return to positions held on August 28;
(2) return to disengagement discussions; (3) affirm its agreement to
implement Phase 1 of the disengagement, disarmament and integration
program; and (4) make a public statement announcing this agreement.

3. (SBU) Ten of the CNDP officials spoke. They lamented that the
government co-chair of the Joint Technical Commission, General
Etumba, had so narrowly focused on immediate disarmament, without
disengagement and without appropriate capacities and agreements on
brassage. CNDP representatives stressed that there has been a total
collapse of confidence between CNDP and Government officials as
AMANI was more than just disarmament (and more than just disarmament
of CNDP). CNDP representatives stressed that the international
facilitation bear responsibility as well for the state of AMANI
stating that it allowed the domineering and uninterested leadership
from Kinshasa to bankrupt dialogue in the AMANI process.

4. (SBU) Shortley stated that the Goma agreement was a ceasefire
and a commitment to engage in dialogue in an effort to resolve
underlying causes of conflict, and that a holistic approach was
necessary. Shortley reviewed efforts to fulfill the Nairobi
communiqu, which he saw as parallel to the Goma agreement. Deputy
Executive Secretary Kambasu insisted that Nairobi was not parallel
but integral to Goma and cited the reference to Nairobi in the Goma
agreement (Article 2) and stressed that combating FDLR was a
fundamental principle for CNDP. Others cited the government's
failure to meet CNDP's basic claims, some of which had been
enshrined in the Acte d'Engagement (such as amnesty and lifting road
blocks). They noted that the AMANI program had lapsed in early
August and a new framework was needed. Shortley refused to consider
a new framework, noting that Goma Agreement was not time-bound.
They condemned the government for stirring up the populace and
claimed that truckloads of soldiers had just passed through Goma
shouting anti-CNDP slogans and that forty CNDP had been arrested in
Goma. CNDP spokesman Rene Abandi said CNDP agreed to withdraw to
positions held as of the signing of the Acte d'Engagement on January
23. Shortley disagreed and said that both parties must agree to
return to positions held two weeks ago and that anything else would
be too difficult. Shortley said that the government had a long list
of its own criticisms of CNDP, such as Special Operations training,
redeployment, violations of the ceasefire, nonparticipation in the
Amani process, forcing human displacement, and recruitment of child
soldiers.

5. (SBU) After a long break for internal discussion, Abandi said
CNDP would agree to (1) withdrawal to positions held on August 28;
(2) disengagement talks in Kimoka on the basis of a proposed plan by
MONUC; (3) agreement in principle of the Phase 1 disengagement,
disarmament and integration with the agreement to further discuss
timing and modalities; and (4) a public statement reaffirming this
agreement. He said that CNDP believed that creation of buffer zones
was a priority, but that, in areas where it faced FDLR, CNDP would
not be able to withdraw. It would agree only to Kimoka as the site
for continuing technical work on disengagement. Abandi said that a
holistic approach, covering a range of issues beyond disengagement
and integration, was fundamental.

6. (SBU) Shortley said it was possible to use the Nairobi process
to seek disengagement of FDLR in areas bordering CNDP. Shortley
agreed to go on Radio Okapi to outline discussions and agreements
and to call for immediate renewed efforts on AMANI. He expressed
support for CNDP's request that there be talks within the AMANI

KINSHASA 00000748 002 OF 002

process on broader political issues per the Goma agreement and said
that the U.S. would approach Kinshasa on this point. Shortley
pressed that both sides must work together in the coming days to
calm tensions, refrain from inflammatory rhetoric, and move swiftly
into technical disengagement negotiations at Kimoka, with talks
beginning on Monday 8 September.

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