Cablegate: Georgia: Brazilian Views On Situation
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB
DE RUEHBR #1183 2521121
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081121Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2370
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0383
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0445
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 0019
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6553
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2675
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE VIENNA 0003
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0270
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001183
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR WHA/BSC AND EUR/CARC GEORGIA COORDINATION
GROUP
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV BR
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON SITUATION
REF: A. STATE 91894
B. STATE 90980
C. STATE 90978
D. STATE 89769
Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston, Reason: 1.5 d.
1. (C) Post has held a series of discussions with the
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations (MRE) using the
points and themes contained in reftels. Consistent with its
normal practice, the Brazilian government has avoided taking
a strong position on a situation distant from Brazil's
borders, although privately Brazilian officials are concerned
both by the violence and the apparent ineffectiveness of the
UN. MRE officials have stated clearly that there is no
chance Brazil will recognize the independence of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia unless such recognition were to be consistent
with a Security Council Resolution. While Brazil will
continue to avoid public condemnation of Russia's
disproportionate use of force, MRE views the Russian action
as excessive and contrary to Russia's interest in integrating
with its European neighbors. Brazil will continue to support
a peaceful resolution of the conflict, consistent with UNSCRs
and will also maintain its support for Georgia's sovereignty
and territorial integrity.
2. (C) The MRE also showed a willingness to accept Russian
linkage of Georgia to Kosovo. While they accepted post's
explanation that there are such key differences as the UN
resolutions affirming Georgian sovereignty while leaving
Kosovo's status open and the fact that Russian meddling in
Georgia predates the Kosovo crisis, some perception remains
that the U.S. and Europe gave Russia greater pretext to
intervene in Georgia by recognizing Kosovo independence.
3. (C) COMMENT: Concurrent with MRE's concern about Russian
actions, the Brazilian government continues its efforts to
develop a "Strategic Partnership" with Russia. The Lula
administration views Russia as having many similar attributes
to Brazil; both are large developing countries with vast
natural resources. Partnership (and presumed equality) with
Russia will help lift Brazil to what it would perceive as the
first rank of developing countries and solidify a status as a
major world power which Brazil views as its destiny. Given
these perceived Brazilian interests, Brazil will continue to
expand its relationship with Russia but will view such
enhancement as entirely separated from events in Georgia.
When asked if the Georgia situation had been considered
before the spectacularly ill-timed announcement this week
that President Medvedev will visit Brazil in November, MRE
contacts responded that there was no reason why Russia's
actions should affect an ongoing process of building
bilateral ties. END COMMENT
KUBISKE