Cablegate: Indonesia -- Draft 2007 Country Report On Terrorism

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OO RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #3397/01 3480750
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 140750Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7401
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1766
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1317
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 2161
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJB/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHJJPI/USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 JAKARTA 003397

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER ID
SUBJECT: INDONESIA -- DRAFT 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 145833

1. (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified -- Please
handle accordingly.

2. (SBU) The draft text of Mission's 2007 Country Report on
Terrorism for Indonesia follows in para 3. This text will be
posted on Intellipedia, the USG classified website, as part
of its review by Washington agencies.

3. (SBU) Begin text:

INDONESIA -- 2007 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

Indonesia experienced its second consecutive year of no major
terrorist incidents in 2007. Radical groups in Indonesia have
had their ability to carry out attacks further diminished
during the past year due to the Indonesian government's
counterterrorism efforts. The Indonesian National Police
(INP) scored major successes in breaking up terrorist cells
linked to Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and other violent Islamic
extremist organizations. While JI cells in Java and Central
Sulawesi have been weakened, JI and its radical associates
remained a security threat to both Western and domestic
targets. The Attorney General,s Office made some strides
toward conducting more efficient and effective CT
prosecutions despite weaknesses in Indonesia's anti-terror
law. The Government of Indonesia (GOI) continued to create a
legal and law enforcement environment conducive to fighting
terrorism within its borders, and numerous terrorists were
convicted of crimes in 2007.

In January, the INP conducted two raids against a radical
stronghold in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The second raid used
500 security force personnel against a large group of
terrorists and their supporters, who were armed with small
arms and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). The raids
ended with 18 dead, 18 injured and 28 captured. Subsequent
operations netted five more suspects. While the Poso
operation was criticized as "heavy-handed" by some members of
the local community, it calmed the previously tense situation
in Central Sulawesi. In March, information gained from the
Poso suspects helped the INP initiate a series of raids in
Central and East Java which resulted in the arrest of several
members of the so-called "military wing" of JI and several
cell leaders and the seizure of a large cache of explosives
in East Java. In June, INP,s Special Detachment 88 (SD-88),
stationed in Central Java, arrested several key JI terrorist
operatives, including alleged JI Emir Ustad Syahroni (aka
Zarkasih)) and senior JI operative Abu Dujana (aka Ainal
Bahri). As the JI Emir, Afghanistan-veteran Zarkasih, a
former JI leader, is thought to be senior to Dujana in the JI
hierarchy. Dujana, also an Afghanistan-veteran, was part of
JI's central command and had been involved in several JI
attacks in recent years.

The arrests in January, March, and June removed several key
JI leaders. To create sympathy for these radical groups and
to discredit the INP (especially SD-88), lawsuits were
brought against the INP by Abu Dujana's wife and by JI
co-founder and spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba,asyir. The
two lawsuits did not create the expected groundswell of
public attention and were eventually thrown out of court.

The newly-formed U.S.-funded Attorney General's Task Force on
Terrorism and Transnational Crime took the leading role in
handling prosecutions of terrorists. The Task Force won
convictions against: Hasanuddin, a JI leader in Poso; four
men who participated in the 2005 schoolgirl beheadings; and
three others who were involved in the 2005 Tentena market
bombings. The Attorney General also won convictions against
17 Poso Christians who had murdered two Muslims in revenge
killings in September 2006. The Task Force is currently
prosecuting six members of JI,s military unit who were
arrested in March. JI top operatives Abu Dujana and Zarkasih
are expected to come to trial in December 2007.

JAKARTA 00003397 002 OF 002

Other Indonesian legal institutions also took a hard line
against terrorists. In September, the Supreme Court rejected
the final appeals of three men on death row for carrying out
the 2002 Bali bombings. The Court also upheld the life
sentence imposed on JI trainer/recruiter Subur Sugiyarto. In
October, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights announced that
convicted terrorists would no longer be given automatic
sentence remissions at major holidays. The new policy came
too late to prevent the early release of some 20 convicted
terrorists in 2007, but most of these were minor figures.

The Indonesian government made genuine efforts to develop an
effective anti-money laundering system for investigations and
prosecutions. Indonesian police froze terrorist financial
assets uncovered during investigations. However, the
government's implementation of the UNSCR 1267 sanctions was
hampered by poor interagency coordination and by continued
lack of human and technical capacity within both the
government and financial institutions. It remains to be seen
whether or not the GOI has the political will to do what is
necessary to implement UNSCR 1267. USAID is promoting
capacity building through its Financial Crimes Prevention
Project, a multi-year program to provide technical advisors
and support to Indonesia's effort to develop an effective and
credible regime against money laundering and terrorism
finance. Other donors are also providing assistance to the
Financial Crimes Transaction and Analysis Center (PPATK).
The unit receives Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) and
Cash Transaction Reports. PPATK has dramatically increased
the number of STRs from 10 per month in 2002 to 483 per month
in 2007 and these reports have led to 32 successful
prosecutions to date. While only one of these had a
terrorist component, strengthened financial oversight will
assist the GOI in tracking potential terrorist financial
transactions.

In 2007, the INP continued a program to "de-radicalize"
convicted terrorists. The program identifies individuals who
may be open to more moderate teachings and INP officials work
with them while they are in prison. The program focuses on
providing spiritual support to the men and modest financial
support to their families. By providing this support, the
police attempt to gain the trust of the men and receive
valuable information about terrorist networks. The program
also aims to reduce terrorist recruitment inside prisons.

While Indonesia's counterterrorism efforts have been
impressive, more could be done in some areas. Despite the
successes in Sulawesi and Central Java, JI networks and
"sleeper" cells remain intact, and have the capacity to go
operational with little warning. Moreover, Malaysian JI
operative and recruiter Noordin Mohammed Top remains at
large, despite his suspected involvement in nearly every
major terrorist attack in Indonesia since 2002. Finally, the
GOI needs to address weaknesses in the prison system, where
convicted terrorists are able to maintain ties to their
communities and to recruit new members into groups like
Jemaah Islamiyah.

End Text.
HUME

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