Cablegate: Scenesetter for Codel Flake: Fidel Ebbing Away

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 HAVANA 023588

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR H AND FOR WHA/CCA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV ECON PHUM KDEM SMIG CU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL FLAKE: FIDEL EBBING AWAY

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED; NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION

1. (SBU) Summary: CODEL Flake arrives at a pivotal, historic
time in Cuba. We and others consider Fidel Castro's health
to be so critical that he could die any day. His brother,
Raul Castro, has been in charge since July 31, 2006, and has
done nothing to significantly change the Cuban regime's
totalitarian or anti-American character. The Cuban people,
on the other hand, have great expectations for change, are
pro-American, and are not likely to be as accepting of the
status quo under Raul as they have been under Fidel. The
peaceful pro-democratic opposition has thought through what
their country's post-communist future should look like,
although for now they lack the horsepower to themselves force
change. The U.S. Government, having recently updated its
assessments and contingency plans with the June release of
the report from the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba
(CAFC-II), stands ready to assist a democratic transition.
What we are not ready to do is legitimize a hereditary
succession from one dictator to another, without any
consultation with the Cuban people. Our public statements
have placed the responsibility for reform with Cubans on the
island, and called upon the ruling clique to release
political prisoners, dismantle the police state, and permit
the development of political parties, civil society and a
free market. The regime's answer has been to flex its
police-state muscles and stifle opposition. Subsidies from
Venezuela have played a key role in keeping the dictatorship
afloat. End summary.

2. (SBU) Fidel Incapacitated: The regime announced on July
31 that Fidel Castro was too ill to lead the country and that
Raul Castro would be "temporarily" in charge. Since then
Fidel Castro has appeared in brief videos and met a handful
of VIP visitors to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit the second
week in September. Fidel Castro's non-appearance at December
2 anniversary events commemorating 50 years of the rebel army
and 80 years of his life is the best indicator that he is
probably near death. Even if kept alive into 2007, we do not
expect him to be actively involved in running the country.
He has not spoken in public since July 26.

3. (SBU) Raul Equals Continuity: Raul Castro as acting
president has made a few cabinet changes, but not in the
direction of reform. His speeches to the Non-aligned
Movement and on the December 2 anniversaries were doctrinaire
and anti-American, but without his brother's long-windedness
or histrionics. State-run media have run stories about
corruption in the economy, but with a view towards squeezing
more efficiency and discipline from the communist system. A
state-run labor conference in October also decreed tighter
discipline, ideological rigor and better output within an
unchanged command-economy. Two billion dollars per year in
Venezuelan subsidies, plus a similar amount in revenue from
tourism help keep this inefficient system from collapsing
entirely of its own weight. And human rights abuses have
continued as ugly as ever. For example:

-- In Havana on December 10, International Human Rights Day,
a mob of at least 200 communist militants directed by at
least 100 State Security officials violently broke up a
peaceful march by 12 peaceful activists in front of the
UNESCO building.

-- In Santa Clara on October 10, the opening day of a
conference of independent librarians, militants brutally
attacked two dissidents. Orestes Suarez Torres, a welder,
and his wife Nancy Gonzalez Garcia, a cigar roller, were left
with black eyes, deep bruises and cuts. The husband also
suffered broken ribs, and the wife had her trousers ripped
off.

-- In Havana on November 24, 63 members of opposition youth
groups held a meeting. Afterwards, the Government detained
or threatened at least six participants, one of whom was
informed he will likely be charged with espionage.

-- In Pinar del Rio in November, guards at Taco Taco prison
showed up at political prisoner Orlando Zapata's cell and
hauled him away for a forced and bloody shave and haircut.
When he objected, the guards punched him in the head
repeatedly and kicked him in the stomach.

-- In Las Tunas on August 3, 100 militants staged an "act of

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repudiation" in front of the home of the family of political
prisoner Jose Garcia Paneque. His wife, Yamile Llanes, was
home with 11 youngsters when the mob arrived. The children
started crying when a member of the mob shouted, "Let's set
the house on fire and burn the worms!" One seven-year-old
girl remains traumatized.

Although the Raul-led regime released one political prisoner
from the 2003 group of 75, it also detained others; the net
number of documented political prisoners remains over 300 by
mid-December.

4. (SBU) Change: Cubans from all over the island tell us
they expect changes after Fidel Castro dies; however, it is
not clear who or what will be the agent of that change.
Leading dissidents (Oswaldo Paya, Martha Beatriz Roque,
Vladimiro Roca) have organizations that have planned for
change, but do not themselves have the means to force the
regime's hand. They expect that the stresses and strains on
Raul from elsewhere in "the palace" or from popular pressure
to improve standards of living will force the regime to
collapse. That said, in the short term, Raul Castro still
commands all the security forces, including the pervasive spy
network run by the Ministry of Interior. In 48 years of
rule, the regime has been most successful in instilling fear,
which has the effect of immobilizing many would-be
dissidents. In this environment, and with no immediate
prospects of improving their lives economically, most young
Cubans' preferred option is to migrate to the United States.
We issue over 20,000 travel documents per year, and more than
5,000 others migrate illegally.

5. (SBU) USG's Principled Position: Raul Castro mentioned,
in a December 2 speech that was largely anti-American, that
he was ready to sit down with the USG and negotiate our
differences. Our reaction, which has earned effusive support
from Cuba's democratic opposition, is that Raul Castro needs
to consult with the Cuban people first. We, along with some
of our allies, have also made public a call to release all
political prisoners, a point which unites the entire
dissident movement, and is the raison d'etre of the "Ladies
in White," who have continued to march every Sunday after
attending mass to pray for the release of their loved ones.

6. (SBU) The other aspects of our relationship with Cuba are
clearly spelled out by Helms-Burton and other legislation,
and by the recommendations in the CAFC reports. We are
reaching out both to the opposition and, to the extent
possible, to the Cuban people. Our aim is to help to break
through Cuba's information blockade, and seek to deny
resources to the regime, which we are certain would make ill
use of them -- financing anti-American propaganda, assaults
on fragile democracies, and keeping in place the police-state
apparatus. As Raul Castro was making his oft-quoted
reference to negotiations with the USG, his government was
holding USINT government property hostage at Cuban ports,
along with private property of USINT staff. Our staff is the
object of systematic spying, harassment, break-ins at our
residences and other abuses.

7. (SBU) Comment: We expect the Cuban regime to warmly
receive CODEL Flake because they've read the advance media
reports and expect the CODEL will call for changes in US
policy towards Cuba. We see this as an opportunity: To
teach the Cuban regime a lesson in separation of powers; and
provide US Members of Congress with a chance to express their
views to senior regime officials about democratization, human
rights and free markets.
PARMLY

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