Cablegate: P5 Meeting On Un Syg Sudan Proposal

VZCZCXRO9975
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUCNDT #2157/01 3191934
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 151934Z NOV 06
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0756
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 1067
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0759
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0475
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1066
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0214
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USUN NEW YORK 002157

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO, AF, PRM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER UNSC SU KPKO
SUBJECT: P5 MEETING ON UN SYG SUDAN PROPOSAL

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: UN D/SYG Mark Malloch Brown briefed the P5
on November 14 regarding the UN's planned approach with the
Government of Sudan (GOS) at the November 16 meeting of the
UN, P5, African Union, and Arab League in Addis Ababa. The
UN SYG plans to put forward the Phased Approach Paper (please
see paragraph 12 for text) as the basis for discussions with
the Sudanese on a peacekeeping deployment compromise. During
discussions following the briefing, several delegations,
including Russia and France, expressed a willingness to
accept a hybrid command or AU-led force. The UK PermRep
expressed support for an AU force as well. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------
The Phased Approach Paper
According to Malloch Brown
--------------------------

2. (SBU) Malloch Brown indicated that UN SYG intends to use
the phased approach paper as the basis of discussion with the
GOS. While the November 16 meeting with the GOS is only
scheduled to last two hours, UN SYG will let discussion go on
as long as is necessary to reach a compromise on a
peacekeeping deployment in Darfur.

3. (SBU) The UN SYG intentionally left language regarding the
third phase, hybrid command, vague so that the GOS would
engage in the process. Malloch Brown conceding that the
price of this flexibility was putting UNSCR 1706 "into play."
Language regarding the objectives -- able to protect
civilians, implement DPA, ensure humanitarian access -- is
intended to preserve the key elements of UNSCR 1706.

-------------------
Discussion Timeline
-------------------

4. (SBU) Malloch Brown said that SYG Annan had convinced the
parties that the November 16 meeting is a "crossroads moment"
and that the GOS in particular had to realize that the best
opportunity to compromise on a peacekeeping deployment is
now, at the end of the AU's mandate and before Annan leaves
office. Malloch Brown added that "Nothing has been given
away" (in UNSCR 1706) until all parties agree to a deal.

5. (SBU) Regarding approach, Malloch Brown said UN SYG hopes
to come to a deal on key issues with the GOS at the November
16 meeting. All the key players and those with the most
influence, such as the Egyptians, will be present.
Afterwards, the package would be presented to the AU PSC at
the November 24 meeting. UN SYG will then follow up with a
high-level visit to Khartoum to work out remaining details.
DPKO U/SYG Annabi is currently in Khartoum working out
details of the light assistance package, i.e. phase one of
the UN SYG paper.

----------------------
Sudanese Participation
----------------------

6. (SBU) Notably, neither SYG nor the P5 had yet received
confirmation that Bashir had decided to send appropriate
representation to the November 16 meeting. UKUN reported
that Mustafa Isma'il, the Sudanese Darfur Envoy is currently
in London. HMG is encouraging Isma'il to attend the Addis
Ababa meeting. All participants agreed that high-level GOS
participation is essential for the success of the meeting and
would be an important barometer of Sudanese seriousness.

-------------------
Disagreement on
Command and Control
-------------------

7. (SBU) In response to objections from the U.S. regarding
the problematic nature of a hybrid command structure, Malloch
Brown argued that there is no point in insisting on UN
command if the P5 is prepared to agree to a peacekeeping
force composed of only AU countries, "putting the UN top of
an AU mission won't help anybody." Instead Malloch Brown put
forward the idea of a strategic cell based Addis Ababa to
give the AU needed capacity. USUN PolMinister Counselor
responded that the USG remains concerned that the AU may be
unwilling or unable to take on the demands of an expanded

USUN NEW Y 00002157 002 OF 004

Darfur mission. UN leadership of the operation is essential
both for force effectiveness and to guarantee funding. The
question at hand is whether the Sudanese will reject any
option that will restrain their military campaign. Malloch
Brown responded that the SYG appreciated U.S. sensitivities
on the issue, but "everyone needs to come to Addis prepared
to make a deal."

8. (SBU) UKUN AMB Jones Parry agreed that unity of command is
essential, but surprisingly concluded that HMG could accept
either a UN or an AU-led force and command structure. French
AMB de la Sabliere responded that France is willing to accept
a hybrid command structure or AU-led force. PRC Wang, who
gave few specifics about the Chinese position, emphasized the
need for a common approach in advance of discussions with the
Sudanese.

----------------
P5 Role in Addis
Discussions
----------------

9. (SBU) Delegations pushed Malloch Brown for details on what
is expected from the P5 at the Addis Ababa meeting. Malloch
Brown asked delegations to deliver the message to the
Sudanese that "now is the time to make a deal" in advance of
discussions and serve as "witnesses, participants and
enforcers" during the meeting. Malloch Brown proposed a
series of pre-meetings with the P5 and the AU in Addis Ababa
to "divide up the script."

-------------
Core Problems
-------------

10. (SBU) In addition to the disagreement over command
modalities, Malloch Brown identified two areas where there
are broad differences of opinion and extended discussions can
be expected. The AU wants to retain control over the
political aspects of the DPA and hand military matters over
to the UN. The GOS strongly insists on the opposite. A
hybrid force would entail non-African UN troops on the
ground, which the Sudanese have indicated is a red line.

11. (SBU) UKUN AMB Jones Parry pressed hard regarding the
status of TCCs for the first two phases of the UN SYG
proposal, "Are the troops there if we reach an agreement?"
After some initial waffling, Malloch Brown conceded that
there was much work to be done in this area, but expressed
optimism that clarity on the command issues would convince
more countries to contribute. Malloch Brown repeated that an
African-only force was a "clear, bright, red line for the
Sudanese." The U.S. and others insisted on the need to leave
open the possibility of pQticipation by traditional
peacekeeping contributors, noting aloud that it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to put together the necessary
troop capacity and command structures from only African TCCs.

12. (SBU) Begin Text of UN SYG Phased Approach Paper:

Darfur: The Phased Approach

In order to strengthen the international community's response
to the ongoing tragedy in Darfur, a possible phased approach
to a strengthened peacekeeping presence in the region should
be adopted. The envisioned sequence of steps in this
approach should be consistent with the recommendations of the
joint AU-UN technical assessment mission, which visited
Darfur on 9-23 June 2006, as well as recent decisions of the
African Union Peace and Security Council requesting United
Nations, assistance in enhancing AMIS. Agreement on this
approach could form the basis for a joint position of the
international community in advance of the 24 November meeting
of the African Union Peace and Security Council.

As a component of any of the steps elaborated below, an
enhanced UN involvement in Darfur's reconciliation and
economic rehabilitation processes would be crucial. To this
end, the UN could assume a greater role in efforts to assist
in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and
facilitate the inclusion of non-signatories to the Agreement.
Enhanced UN involvement in the implementation of the bodies
and processes envisioned by the Darfur Peace Agreement would

USUN NEW Y 00002157 003 OF 004

also be a natural extension of this function. It would be
crucial to prevail upon the parties to the conflict to
implement a full cease-fire so as to enable these political
processes to take root.

The abiding priority of this strategic approach is the
protection of civilians in Darfur. With this in mind, the
phased approach has been developed based on the fundamental
assumption that any peacekeeping presence in Darfur would
follow the logic of general proposals on an international
operation contained in the Secretary-General,s report of 28
July on Darfur, which proposed parameters, in security terms,
for effective peacekeeping in the region. While the
international community continues consultations with the
Government of Sudan on creative steps towards the
implementation of the peacekeeping presence authorized by
Security Council resolution 1706, the phased approach, as
described below, could be pursued. To ensure the fulfillment
of the international community's key objectives in Darfur,
this approach would be:

a. Capable of contributing to the restoration of security and
protection of civilians in Darfur

b. Able to implement the security aspects of the Darfur Peace
Agreement

c. Ensure full humanitarian access

The mission must therefore:

a. Be logistically and financially sustainable

b. Have a predominantly African character

c. Have the strength and capacities described in the
Secretary-General,s report on Darfur of 28 July 2006

SIPDIS

d. Enjoy free and unhindered movement in Darfur

The first step, of this sequence would involve the full
and expeditious implementation of the short-term UN support
package to AMIS proposed in the Secretary-General,s 28 July
report on Darfur (591/2006), and endorsed by President
Bashir. This $21 million support package is currently being
delivered to AMIS in full coordination with the Government of
Sudan.

The Secretary-General has also proposed an enhanced support
package of UN assistance to AMIS in his 28 July report on
Darfur, which would be implemented as the second step, in
the phased approach. The enhanced support package, which
includes the deployment by the UN of several hundred
military, police, and civilian personnel to AMIS, as well as
substantial aviation and logistical assets, could be further
augmented in order to maximize AMIS,s efficiency and impact.
Discussions on the details of this package, which the
Security Council has generally approved for delivery, are
ongoing with the African Union. The Government of Sudan
would be fully consulted on these details.

The third step, would be an AU-UN hybrid operation. To
this end, a jointly appointed AU-UN Special
Representative/Envoy could lead the hybrid operation,
reporting to both the African Union Commission and the United
Nations. Additionally, the appointment of the Force Commander
and Deputy Force Commander, as well as other key
decision-making positions, could be coordinated between the
African Union and the United Nations. The UN could also
provide additional operational elements and enabling units in
the area of logistics and engineering to increase the hybrid
mission,s operational effectiveness. A hybrid operation
would also benefit from substantial UN involvement in its
command and control structure.

With respect to troop and police generation, African
countries will be approached as a matter of priority to
contribute to both the second and third steps of the
sequence. Traditional UN troop contributing countries with
critical peacekeeping experience might also be approached, if
necessary, to reach required strength and capacity.

The Secretary-General, supported by the international

USUN NEW Y 00002157 004 OF 004

community, would be prepared to recommend to the General
Assembly that the United Nations provide full financing to
the mission at any step of this sequence, as long as the
objectives of paragraph 3 are met.

Most importantly, the Government of Sudan will have to be
fully and transparently consulted in any further development
and/or implementation of this phased approach. It will be
important for all stakeholders to continuously assist the
Government and the people of Sudan in bringing just,
inclusive and sustainable peace and stability to Darfur, with
full respect for Sudan,s sovereignty and territorial
integrity.

As discussions on this phased approach proceed, all
stakeholders should call for the immediate and complete
cessation of hostilities and an end to all attacks on
civilians, as well as full access to populations in need and
security for humanitarian workers and their supplies.

End Text.

BOLTON

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