Cablegate: Policy Action Group November 22: Adz's And

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STATE PASS TO USAID FOR AID/ANE, AID/DCHA/DG
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CENTCOM FOR CFC-A, CG CJTF-76, POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR SNAR PTER AF
SUBJECT: POLICY ACTION GROUP NOVEMBER 22: ADZ'S AND
AUXILIARY POLICE

1. (SBU) Summary: The November 22 Policy Action
Group decided to:

- Consider expanding the Afghan Development Zone
(ADZ) concept to Regional Command - East (RC-East)
while maintaining the focus on RC South;

- Limit, for now, the Afghan National Auxiliary
Police (ANAP) recruitment, training, and fielding
program to Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul,
and Uruzgan provinces.

- Continue discussion of the Strategic
Communications way ahead, and;

- Meet in Kandahar during December.

2. (SBU) The group assessed that the October
agreement between Helmand Governor Daoud and Musa
Qala district elders, which has led to the
disengagement of ISAF maneuver units from the area,
while "still viable," has left space for Taliban
influence and intimidation of the populace. During
a discussion of ANAP program progress, several
international community PAG members registered
concern that the Ministry of Internior is failing to
recruit police who are representative of the tribal
Pashtun districts to which they will be assigned.
End summary.

Musa Qala
---------

3. (SBU) National Director of Security Amarullah
Saleh briefed on Musa Qala. He said that the past
month has proven that militarily Musa Qala may be
viable, but the Tailban still psychologically
dominate the area. He cited instances in which the
Taliban have violated the Musa Qala agreement: a
family was expelled from Musa Qala for watching
television; two visiting ANP were killed; visiting
Taliban groups displayed Taliban flags (though no
weapons); and schools are only half full with many
staying home for fear of the Taliban. The GOA has
not yet tested the agreement by pushing official
reconstruction assistance or summoning elders to
explain and condemn Taliban violations. In Panjwayi
and Zharey there have been some Taliban
infiltrations and incidents, but the majority of the
people still openly support the GOA. It was agreed
that the GOA should test the Musa Qala agreement by
pushing for safe access for officials and
implementation of development projects. ISAF CG
Gen. Richards said that ISAF would go back into Musa
Qalah, possibly within a month. Saleh invited MOI
to send groups to Musa Qala to monitor the real
situation. It was also agreed that Governor Daoud
should summon Musa Qala elders to explain Taliban
violations and prevent their reoccurrence.

ADZs in the East, but the South Remains the Focus
--------------------------------------------- ----

4. (SBU) ISAF Commanding General Richards opened
this discussion topic by urging expansion of the ADZ
concept to RC-East, as well as to RC-North and RC-
West, "to counter incipient problems" in those
regions. United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan (UNAMA) Deputy SRSG Alexander cautioned
against a loss of focus on the south and feeding a
popular perception that "the military and not the
government is the lead on development." Economic

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Adviser to the President Naderi warned against
diverting scarce resources from "an Afghan National
Development Plan that is barely working in 10
provinces." Representatives accepted National
Security Advisor Rassoul,s recommendation that the
PAG consider ADZ expansion to the East while
maintaining focus on the South.

ANAP: Internationals Worry about Quality
----------------------------------------

5. (SBU) The PAG endorsed the recommendations of a
November 11 special meeting of international
community representatives co-chaired by Deputy
Minister of Interior Khalid and Combined Security
Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) Deputy
Commander Brigadier General O,Brien. The most
important decision resulting from the November 11
meeting was that the Ministry of Interior would
immediately cease recruitment, training, and
deployment of auxiliary police outside of Farah,
Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan
provinces. The recommendation arose out of
gathering international community concern that the
expedited development of the ANAP lacked sufficient
coalition oversight and quality control. The ANAP
effort will be expanded only after the PAG receives
a capabilities study which clearly depicts that the
assets are in place to properly recruit, train,
equip, and pay the recruits in the expanded areas
without impacting the effort in the six previously-
mentioned provinces.

6. (SBU) Another critical recommendation from the
Nov. 11 meeting was that UNAMA would form a team to
conduct spot checks on the vetting process used to
certify recruits for the ANAP. This arrangement is
now in effect and spot checks will commence in
Kandahar this week. These should help to assuage
the apprehensions of the international community, as
well as leading to program adjustments where needed.
GEN Richards counseled against unnecessarily
hobbling a promising indigenous force-generation
program. Citing a deteriorating security situation
in Paktia province, Khalid and O,Brien urged
consideration of early deployment of auxiliary
police in RC-East. (Comment: Embassy will work
with MOI and CSTC-A to evaluate the feasibility of
expanding the program to another few provinces.
Paktia and Paktika are likely candidates should this
occur. End comment.) UNAMA D/SRSG Alexander
recommended MOI and CSTC-A shift the focus "from
quantity to quality"; Elaborating, he said many
alien ANAP "who don,t even speak Pashtu" are being
introduced into tribal districts where they will
arouse hostility. He also noted that the PAG must
be convinced that a process exists that will ensure
that the ANAP in remote provinces will be paid in a
reliable, timely manner. A failure to pay the ANAP
will undermine the effectiveness of the entire
program and will discredit the GOA. Canadian Charge
Colvin requested that MOI,s ANAP enlistment records
capture recruits, tribal origins. DCM recalled the
Ambassador,s request to Minister of Interior Zarar
Moqbil that ANAP force composition strive to reflect
the tribal and clan balances of the districts to
which auxiliary police will be assigned.

Strategic Communications: You,re Not Listening
--------------------------------------------- --

7. (SBU) In the meeting,s closing minutes,

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Information and Culture Minister Khoram strongly
criticized the international community for its
perceived lack of support for the Strategic
Communications (Stratcom) effort. DCM reminded the
group that its decision to lodge Stratcom in the
Ministry of Information and Culture deprived the
effort of the resources and authority of the
Presidential communications apparatus. NSA Rassoul
promised to continue the discussion at the next PAG
meeting. (Note: Embassy and CFC-A are working
with the Afghan NSC and the Minister of Information
on a proposal to reinvigorate the Strategic
Communications pillar of the PAG, given shortcomings
in the current structure. End note.)

8. (SBU) To enhance PAG members, familiarity with
RC-South issues and convey to that region,s
provincial leaders the group,s commitment to
establishing stability and the foundations of a
prosperous future there, the PAG plans to meet in
Kandahar sometime during the first half of December.
NEUMANN

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