Cablegate: Paraguay Perhaps Rethinks Military Immunities

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ASUNCION 001158

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR SUE CRONIN
SOUTHCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/15/2026
TAGS: PREL MASS MARR KICC PTER PINR BR VZ AR PA
SUBJECT: PARAGUAY PERHAPS RETHINKS MILITARY IMMUNITIES

REF: A. ASUNCION 1020
B. ASUNCION 1023

Classified By: DCM Michael J. Fitzpatrick. Reasons: 1.4 (C and D)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Since officially informing the Embassy in
early October that that the Paraguayan government does not
intend to renew immunities for US military exercises,
domestic criticism of that decision has mounted, spurred by
proximity to local elections and concerns re Venezuelan and
Bolivian regional intentions. With the November 19 municipal
elections likely to serve as a bellwether for the Duarte
Frutos administration, the government privately suggests it
is reconsidering its position -- while anxious to limit the
political damage of any "flip flop" in its position before
then. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) The political situation here has changed somewhat
since FM Ramirez confirmed to the Ambassador October 3 that
Paraguay had decided not to extend immunities to U.S.
participants in military exercises beyond December of this
year. The government,s earlier public announcement was
initially lauded by its supporters - only to be surprised by
the sustained intensity of criticism from many quarters.
(Indeed, some elements of the government were clearly caught
off guard by the announcement, as well.) Ongoing concerns
here re possible Bolivian revanchism towards the Chaco region
and Venezuela,s role in the region has led to widespread
calls for increased defense spending - and for a closer
defense relationship with the United States. After years of
studiously ignoring the issue, members of Congress are
suddenly in a mad scramble to see who among them can be seen
as the biggest supporter of proposals for major increases in
defense purchases.

VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE WEIGHS IN
=================================
3. (C) The government subsequently informed post that the
government in fact seeks to actually strengthen defense ties.
DCM and Pol Chief met November 1 with JuAN Carlos Facetti,
defense advisor to Vice President Castiglioni. Facetti
informed that the President and VP had met privately and
decided to offer the USG "equal treatment" ("igualdad") with
the Brazilian and Argentine military. The President remained
opposed to "total immunity" but was amenable to "functional
immunity" for U.S. military personnel. In fact, the President
sought to strengthen and broaden U.S. military cooperation in
traditional and non-traditional areas. Facetti noted that the
government intended to submit to Congress soon its proposed
renewal of Brazil,s 5-year agreement and would like to
submit an identical agreement with the US to Congress for
simultaneous approval. When Emboffs noted that the President
had recently rejected "A&T status" for the U.S. only now to
seemingly accept it, Facetti suggested that there had not
been very clear briefing of the President before he rejected
the proposed U.S. agreement. Facetti was crestfallen when
informed, per informal conversations with DC, that the
Brazilian proposed text was a clear non-starter for the USG.
Pol Chief informally provided Facetti with an
English-language copy of the new draft SOFA text recently
approved for global use in the Circular 175 process (reftel).

4. (C) Facetti called back November 2 to inform that the Vice
President, Foreign Minister Ramirez, and Vice Foreign
Minister Gonzalez Franco had already met and agreed that the
U.S. draft text appeared consistent with the President,s
wishes. He proposed DCM raise the issue in a forthcoming
meeting (already planned) with Gonzalez Franco.

FOREIGN MINISTRY ALSO KEEPS THE DOOR OPEN
=========================================
5. (C) In their November 6 meeting, DCM shared the draft
English text directly with Gonzalez Franco. In the presence
of his staff, Gonzalez Franco gave no hint of having ever
seen the text before. He did, however, reiterate that the
President sought "igualdad" for the U.S. and systematically
parroted Facetti,s points that the government was intent on
expanding U.S. military cooperation, both via humanitarian
assistance programs as well as traditional military exercises
and training. He was appreciative of the recently announced
IMET waiver and of the offer of GPOI funds (the details of
which DCM shared with Gonzalez Franco at this meeting).
Substantively, Gonzalez Franco asked if the U.S. would find
it objectionable for the USG to have A&T immunities cover all
those assigned to the Embassy under such a SOFA agreement,
but privileges (e.g., import rights, tax-free privileges)
would only be extended to any individuals assigned to post
for two years or longer. (NOTE: This is in keeping with the
Brazilian and Argentine agreements. END NOTE.)

6. (C) Procedurally, Gonzalez Franco asked whether, if/when a
final text were agreed, an exchange of notes was sufficient
for the U.S. or whether some other mechanism would be
required, and whether such an agreement would require U.S.
congressional approval. DCM noted the USG sought a
substantive agreement with the GOP, that we were flexible on
the exact procedures and that such an agreement does not
require U.S. legislative approval or ratification. Gonzalez
Franco said both the Brazilian and any U.S. agreement would
have to go to their Congress for approval -- as would any
subsequent entry of "troops" as opposed to "technicians" (the
word used in the Brazilian and Argentine texts for all those
assigned to their milgroups here). MEDRETE personnel, he
suggested, should be viewed as "technicians," not troops.
Asked whether the USG was opposed to a multi-year agreement,
DCM noted that a longer-term agreement had clear benefits,
starting with avoiding the need to detail far in advance
every single proposed exercise; it could also reduce the
political expense of renegotiating the agreement with us (and
resubmitting to their Congress) every single year.

7. (C) DCM also provided the Vice Minister a copy of the
signed letter from General Kanazawa confirming GOP approval
for the December Medical Readiness Training Exercise
(MEDRETE), as the second-phase of a MEDRETE visit to Paraguay
last February. DCM noted the Embassy understood there was
some GOP interagency confusion as to the status of this
MEDRETE under the terms of the current bilateral agreement on
immunities and that we were informing them so as to ensure
proper interagency coordination. DCM noted that the MEDRETE
constituted a dozen or so unarmed doctors, typically
reservist surgeons, who would be doing follow-up care to
previous patients as well as extending care to new patients.
The MEDRETEs, he concluded, were hugely popular within both
the government and opposition ranks; as such we saw no reason
for government concern but wanted them to understand that we
believed we had the authorities necessary for the MEDRETE (as
Kanazawa reports directly to the President). Gonzalez Franco
promised to get back to post regarding both the MEDRETE and
the draft agreement, noting that &these issues are being
decided at the very highest levels of government.8

COMMENT
=======
8. (C) COMMENT: All Paraguayan political parties are

consumed by last-minute campaigning for the November 19
municipal elections, the results of which are already
expected to serve as a mid-term referendum on the Duarte
Frutos administration. The government seems genuinely
surprised at how vociferous the domestic criticism has been
at their decision to not renew immunities, but unwilling to
pursue the issue further until they see the elections in the
rear view mirror. The Ambassador is to meet anew with the
Foreign Minister November 21. The issues of immunities,
MEDRETEs and military cooperation will no doubt lead off the
discussion. END COMMENT.
CASON

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