Cablegate: Miskito Vote Potential Obstacle to Fsln Ambitions

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R 102348Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 7859
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 002247

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: KDEM NU PGOV PINR
SUBJECT: MISKITO VOTE POTENTIAL OBSTACLE TO FSLN AMBITIONS

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador P. Trivelli for reasons 1.4b

1. (C) SUMMARY: Despite the Sandinista National Liberation
Front's (FSLN) significant campaign efforts in the remote
North Atlantic Autonomous Zone (RAAN), the indigenous Miskito
population remains staunchly anti-Sandinista. In response,
the FSLN-allied Yatama government has forced unelected
leaders onto Miskito communities in violation of the law,
creating civil unrest and low-grade violence. The FSLN,s
efforts may be part of larger plan to facilitate illicit
trade on the Atlantic Coast. END SUMMARY

A Battle for Hearts and Minds
-----------------------------

2. (C) The humble soft-spoken ex-resistance fighter, Osorno
Coleman - aka "Commandante Blas" - is locked in a battle of
ideals against the FSLN's powerful PR machinery in the RAAN.
Coleman is urging his fellow Miskitos never to forget the
past and the atrocities committed against the Miskito Indians
in the 1980s by the Sandinistas. Using disturbing video
footage shot in the 1980s (from the Documentary "Nicaragua
Was Our Home") featuring interviews with Miskitos, newspaper
articles, and his own words, Coleman recently appeared on
Channel 2's popular morning talk show "Primer Plano" to
remind the nation about what happened to the Miskito people.

3. (C) Coleman, who was known as a fierce fighter during the
1980s and is now running as a deputy for Montealegre,s
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) party, is a leader in the
Miskito counter-campaign against the FSLN. With few
resources and little logistical support, Coleman relies on
the determined nature of the Miskito people and his own
reputation to help resist the FSLN. On Oct 4, Coleman sat
down with Poloff to describe the FSLN,s campaign efforts on
the Atlantic Coast.

Yatama,s Alliance with the FSLN
-------------------------------

4. (U) In the May 4, 2006 regional elections in the RAAN,
Yatama - the indigenous Miskito political party founded in
the 1980s by anti-Sandinista fighters - won 13 seats, the
FSLN won 16 seats, and the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC)
won 16 seats. That same evening, Ortega announced an
alliance with Brooklyn Rivera, president of Yatama, giving
Ortega a majority 29-vote block in the Regional Council. Ten
days later, according to Coleman, 90% of the Yatama
leadership denounced the alliance and joined the ALN. Since
the split, there has been growing tension between the two
Yatama groups. In a surprising move, Sandy Bay,s Yatama
mayor, Elisabeth Henriquez, went so far as to dance on stage
with Daniel Ortega during the July 19 celebration of the
Sandinista Revolution.

FSLN,s Proselytizating Efforts Fail
-----------------------------------

5. (C) Much of the FSLN,s campaign success in Nicaragua,s
rural areas is due to its well-established party
infrastructure, enabling them to go door-to-door with their
campaign messages. However, according to Coleman, this
strategy has failed in the RAAN. Every time an FSLN campaign
caravan attempts to enter a Miskito village, hostile crowds
throwing stones and food and waving anti-FSLN signs chase
them away. Coleman recounted one occasion where the FSLN
visited a Miskito village with sodas and snacks and had them
promptly thrown back at them by the villagers. On another
occasion, Brooklyn Rivera asked a local teacher if he could
stay in the teacher,s house one evening instead of returning
home. The teacher responded that he could not allow it
because the teacher would face physical harm from the
villagers. The FSLN have also tried using the prestige of an
ex-combatant - known as Tiger 17, famous for wearing his
pistols like a cowboy - to influence the Miskito villagers.
This effort also failed because the Miskito,s view him as a
traitor and drove him out of town with rocks.

A Change in Tactics - Using the Airwaves
----------------------------------------

6. (SBU) As a result, reports Coleman, the FSLN now uses the
radio to spread their message. Using Radio Caribe, La
Portanisima, Radio Baca, and Radio Juvenil, the FSLN is
bombarding the RAAN with campaign messages. At a funding
level of 7,000 Cordobas a month (approx. US$400), Coleman,s
opposition group cannot compete with the FSLN. Coleman
claims, however, that most Miskitos, change stations or turn
off their radios when they hear FSLN advertisements.

Influencing the Influencers
---------------------------

7. (C) Coleman also revealed that the FSLN - through
Brooklyn Rivera - has been replacing the local judges and
coordinators with FSLN-allied personnel. According to
Coleman, these actions violate Law 445, which gives Miskito
communities the legal right to elect their judges and
coordinators. Acting much like a mayor, the local
coordinators are responsible for organizing civic events and
village work projects such as communal harvests as well as
allocating local government resources. Coleman reports that
Rivera has successfully over-ruled community decisions and
imposed his own people in at least eight communities. In
many more, the people are embroiled in struggles to elect or
keep their own candidates.

8. (C) This new tactic, explained Coleman, is much more
dangerous than campaign propaganda because the judges and
coordinators wield significant formal and informal authority
in Miskito communities. In the communities where Rivera has
imposed his own people, the level of civil unrest and
low-grade violence have increased. Judges are ruling in
favor of FSLN or pro-FSLN Yatama supporters and coordinators
are using local resources to support the FSLN campaign.
Aside from these abuses of formal power, Coleman warned, is
the more insidious issue of informal influence. Culturally,
Miskito,s put a lot of faith in their leaders and are easily
influenced by them.

Money and Meat
--------------

9. (C) Coleman commented on two additional FSLN tactics used
to influence voters. The FSLN has been paying Miskito
community leaders 150 Cordobas (US$8.50) to vote for the FSLN
and to encourage others to do the same. In addition, the
FSLN has promised to slaughter hundreds of cattle the week
before the election and distribute free meat to villagers in
the RAAN. These cattle have been in place near Miskito
villages for the past several months in preparation for the
elections. Coleman reports that many village leaders have
approached him for advice, asking whether they should accept
the money and meat. Coleman,s response: "This is a small
down payment on a very large debt. Take the food and money
and vote for someone else."

PLC Sends Message of ALN-FSLN Alliance
--------------------------------------

10. (SBU) Coleman also mentioned that the Constitutional
Liberal Party (PLC) is announcing that the ALN and FSLN have
joined forces, using as evidence the recent defection from
the ALN to the FSLN of Salvador Talavera, the president of
the Nicaraguan Resistance Party (PRN), a key ALN ally.

11. COMMENT: (C) What happens in the RAAN will likely impact
both in the elections and the next administration. The
FSLN,s interest in the RAAN and Atlantic Coast extends well
beyond the elections. According to Javier Williams-Slate,
Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and a Miskito from the RAAN,
the FSLN, using Venezuelan financing, is buying up large
tracts of land on the Atlantic Coast in order to facilitate
illicit trade in timber, ore and narcotics. The FSLN may
also be interested in oil exploration off the Atlantic Coast.
An FSLN judge in the Atlantic South (RAAS) recently upheld a
questionable injunction challenging the way in which offshore
exploration rights were awarded to two U.S. firms. (NOTE:
Embassy is working to remove the injunction. END NOTE) An
Ortega victory would help solidify FSLN and Venezuelan
control of the Atlantic Coast. If Ortega does not win, the
FSLN still controls the RAAN Regional Counsel through the
FSLN-Yatama 29-seat voting block achieved in May,s regional
elections, and Ortega supporter Brooklyn Rivera is certain to
obtain a National Asssembly seat. Either way, the RAAN and
entire Atlantic Coast may once again become a focus of
internal conflict.
TRIVELLI

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