Cablegate: Nicaragua Elections Update: Where We Are Now

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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMU #2116/01 2691849
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261849Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7679
INFO RUEHZA/WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

S E C R E T MANAGUA 002116

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL EAID KDEM SOCI NU
SUBJECT: NICARAGUA ELECTIONS UPDATE: WHERE WE ARE NOW

REF: A. MANAGUA 2065
B. MANAGUA 2044
C. MANAGUA 1960
D. MANAGUA 1795
E. MANAGUA 1388

Classified By: Ambassador Paul Trivelli for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

1. (C) Summary: Sandinista Front (FSLN) candidate Daniel
Ortega remains stagnant in the polls, though within striking
distance of victory (using fraudulent means), while the
Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance (ALN) under Eduardo Montealegre
and the Sandinista Renovation Movement's (MRS) Edmundo
Jarquin continue a slow climb, leaving the Liberal
Constitutional Party (PLC) in fourth place. The USG's
support for Nicaraguan democracy has enabled the reformist
parties to compete with entrenched and corrupt traditional
political forces. Post has promoted, and will continue to
promote, democratic continuity in Nicaragua by motivating
citizens to vote, ensuring suffrage for eligible voters,
informing the public, ensuring fairness, and encouraging
support for democratic parties, and highlighting the value of
Nicaragua's relationship with the U.S. For a more detailed
description of Nicaraguan political history, the candidates,
post strategies, and USG assistance, please see reftels. End
Summary.

Ortega Within Striking Distance of Victory
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2. (C) Although approximately two-thirds of Nicaraguans
reject FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega, he could still win the
November 5 election as a candidate can claim victory with
only 35 percent of the valid votes, with a margin of 5
percent or greater over the next closest competitor.
Contacts indicate that the FSLN has the ability to "steal"
several percentage points using their control of the CSE and
other fraudulent means. Although Ortega has yet to show over
35% in national polls, the ongoing Liberal division has
prevented Montealegre from reaching that magic number.

3. (C) Recent polls suggest the following range of support
for the candidates: Ortega 27%-31%; Montealegre: 21%-28%; PLC
candidate Jose Rizo and MRS candidate Edmundo Jarquin:
12%-17%; AC candidate Eden Pastora: 1%-2%. The latest
survey, and internal MRS poll (please protect) by Greenberg
Quinlan Rosner, reveals the following breakdown among 746
likely voters: Ortega: 32%; Montealegre: 27%; Jarquin: 20%;
Rizo: 18%.

USG Strategies to Promote Democratic Continuity and Fair
Elections
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4. (C) Although Nicaraguans traditionally enjoy a high
participation rate in national elections, anecdotal evidence
suggests some measure of disillusionment with the democratic
system caused by persistent corruption in the major political
parties and government institutions and a perceived lack of
economic advancement. The FSLN, with a highly motivated and
organized group of core supporters, would likely benefit most
from a high abstention rate. Consequently, post is focusing
on the following strategies to encouraged high voter turnout
and support for the democratic parties:

5. (SBU) Motivating Citizens to Vote: Post is working,
through the CEPPS partners, to promote voter participation by
funding media public information campaigns, "Rock the Vote"
concerts, and a grassroots door-to-door "get out the vote"
campaign, including comprehensive coverage of the Atlantic
Coast. Public Affairs is sponsoring local NGOs to promote
voter education and civic responsibility and has also
sponsored a traveling theater group to educate rural voters.
Education efforts have focused on youth and rural voters, who
are estimated to comprise 60-70 percent of the voting
population. We have also encouraged individual political
parties to persuade citizens to vote and make sure that
supporters can reach polling stations.

6. (U) Ensuring Suffrage for Eligible Voters: Through the
political parties, CEPPS partners, and local NGOs, we
coordinated a major effort to promote the solicitation and
distribution of national/voter ID cards (cedulas). We have
also sponsored major studies of the voter list (padron) to
identify problems and help voters locate their cedulas and
polling stations. Through IFES, we have provided resources
to the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE) to produce and
distribute cedulas and modify polling stations to accommodate
handicapped voters. Other partners conducted a study of the
cedula application and distribution process to identify
weaknesses and make recommendations to expedite cedula
dissemination.

7. (U) Informing the Public: Working with local NGOs, post
has promoted candidate debates and provided training to
political parties on the formation of party platforms. NGO
partners have targeted specific populations -- women, youth,
and minorities -- with voter awareness campaigns. Post
recently organized a seminar to link and publicize party
policies regarding the Nicaraguan Defense White Paper and a
series of workshops for local journalists to train them on
elections reporting. In addition, USAID organized a
political party finance conference to educate the public on
the need for parties to disclose financing mechanisms.

8. (C) Ensuring Fairness: Post is working very closely with
the OAS and local civil society groups to monitor CSE
activities and intervene when the CSE makes decisions to
favor specific political parties or interests. We have
worked with the CEPPS partners and NGOs to thoroughly analyze
CSE regulations regarding the elections process (and
encourage change in some areas), especially regarding the
processes used to nullify voting results. We have provided
resources to train poll officials and party poll watchers.
The USG is funding a large OAS observer mission -- one of the
largest ever conducted -- and post is fielding a separate
observation team to provide the widest coverage possible.
Through our domestic observation program, we will have near
universal coverage of the polling stations (almost 11,000),
which will enable us to conduct quick counts of both the
presidential and legislative races. NDI will also field a
team of lawyers trained in electoral law to respond
immediately to polling stations that experience
irregularities.

9. (S) Encouraging Support for Democratic Parties: Ambassador
and other senior USG officials have made clear statements to
the Nicaraguan public that, while they are of course free to
chose their political leaders, their choice will have a
positive or negative impact on relations with the U.S.
Specifically, we have been clear that an administration lead
by FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega could damage Nicaragua's
economy if Ortega, as he has stated, attempts to manipulate
the market economy, the system of remittances, and the
DR-CAFTA framework. We have also encouraged the widespread
publication of Ortega's and the FSLN's crimes perpetrated
during the 1980s and will distribute a film of interviews of
historical figures discussing the FSLN's and Ortega's
failures.

10. (C) Unification of Non-Corrupt Democratic Forces: We have
also made a concerted effort over the past year to create a
united front of the non-Alemanista, anti-Pact democratic
forces in Nicaragua. Post encouraged and assisted the
Movimiento por Nicaragua (MpN), a non-partisan anti-Pact
civil society group, from its inception. MpN helped
enormously in opening up the democratic space and facing down
the Pact forces that threatened to bring down the Presidency
several times in 2005. Beginning with the mission of Special
Envoy Garza in July, 2005, we sought to break Aleman's
stranglehold on the PLC. Those efforts were followed by a
visit of Deputy Secretary Zoellick in October 2005 to try to
bring Montealegre, Rizo, and current PLC vice presidential
candidate Jose Antonio Alvarado together. Since then,
Ambassador Trivelli and emboffs have worked persistently to
convince decent Liberal leaders at all levels to take control
of the party and sideline Aleman. While many Liberal leaders
have in fact defected to the ALN, considerably weakening the
PLC, the party unfortunately remains firmly in control of
Aleman and his cohorts. As the elections draw near, it has
become increasingly clear that Rizo and Alvarado have become
powerless stooges of Aleman. Repeated proposals by
Ambassador Trivelli, Montealegre, the business community, and
others to convince Rizo and Alvarado to join Montealegre have
failed due to Aleman's power and control over the candidates.
After initially accepting the concept of primaries in
March-April 2006, Rizo turned down the proposal made by
Ambassador Trivelli to have our CEPPS partners organize and
conduct multi-party primaries. Later, after initially
accepting the idea of conducting a poll to determine the
strongest Liberal candidate, Rizo again backed down. At one
point in April, Montealegre even accepted the PLC vice
presidential candidacy in exchange for a certain number of
deputy candidate slots and some key portfolios in the
government -- and again Rizo refused. At this stage in the
game and given previous results, it appears unlikely that
unification of the non-Alemanista Liberal forces can/will
take place.

11. (S) Likewise, the Ambassador and other senior USG
officials have reiterated on numerous occasions that we would
have difficulty with a PLC administration under the
domination of convicted ex-President Arnoldo Aleman. We
have, to the extent possible, assisted investigations against
Aleman and his family in Panama, the Dominican Republic, and
the U.S. News of proceedings against Aleman and his
associates has further damaged his credibility. Emboffs have
supported efforts within the PLC and FSLN to cross vote for
democratic candidates or abstain from voting rather than
return corrupt officials to power. Specifically, post is
supporting efforts within the PLC to draw local officials
away from Aleman and possibly defect to the ALN. The
Ambassador and emboffs have conducted several trips to all
areas of Nicaragua to meet with local officials to covey our
message directly -- efforts that have resulted in notably
increased support for the ALN and MRS in these areas.

12. (C) Highlighting the Value of Nicaragua's Relationship
with the U.S.: Nicaragua has enjoyed recent visits from
several senior USG officials representing USAID, MCC, State,
and Congress, who have highlighted the benefit of a positive
relationship with the U.S. Specifically, these visitors have
explained the benefits of DR-CAFTA on economic growth as well
as specific projects undertaken by USAID and MCC. The
Ambassador has attended and spoken at dozens of events
spotlighting USG assistance from education and health to
humanitarian relief and funds for demining activities and
assistance for mine victims. Focus group studies reveal that
most Nicaraguans hold a positive view of the U.S. largely due
to these activities.

Comment: Planning for a Close Election
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13. (S) While post has been successful employing elections
funding to open a space for new political parties to contest
the entrenched and coordinated interests of the FSLN and PLC,
the election will likely be close, with Daniel Ortega
capturing the largest number of votes in the first round. We
are working with the international and local observer groups
to discuss scenarios and responses should the FSLN declare a
first-round victory by fraudulently widening the margin of
votes between Ortega and his second closest competitor
(probably Montealegre). Knowing that Ortega has a strong
chance of losing in the second round, the FSLN will make a
concerted effort to ensure a first round win for their
candidate, or possibly attempt to disqualify Montealegre by
using the FSLN-PLC dominated courts to convict him of
wrongdoing in the CENIs (debt bond) case.

14. (S) The role of the OAS observation mission will be key
in this regard. In meetings last week with OAS
Undersecretary Dante Caputo and mission leader Gustavo
Fernandez, Ambassador Trivelli stressed the need for the OAS
to step in and defend against any FSLN/CSE attempts to
disqualify and/or steal votes to obtain the margin of
victory. Caputo and Fernandez were clearly cognizant of
their responsibility in this regard, and appeared prepared to
do what they can to prevent such occurrences, but it would
nonetheless be useful for WHA and USOAS to continue to
impress upon the OAS team (as we will) the important and
proactive role they will have to play should this scenario
come to pass.
TRIVELLI

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