Cablegate: Scenesetter for Visit of Jordan,S King Abdullah

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DE RUEHAM #6933/01 2501453
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071453Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3936
INFO RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2472
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2605
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0130
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 4031
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0431

S E C R E T AMMAN 006933

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2016
TAGS: PREL UN IS LE IZ JO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR VISIT OF JORDAN,S KING ABDULLAH

REF: A. AMMAN 6724

B. AMMAN 6519
C. AMMAN 6335
D. AMMAN 6179
E. AMMAN 6023
F. AMMAN 5963
G. AMMAN 6542
H. STATE 147035
I. AMMAN 6329
J. AMMAN 6932

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) King Abdullah will be in New York for the General
Assembly opening and will meet with U.S. and other officials
its margins.

2. (C) During the Israel-Hizballah hostilities, the King's
stock plunged among both ordinary Jordanians and elites (refs
a-f) because of his early public criticism of Hizballah and
his close identification with the U.S. Even before the
Lebanon conflict, most Jordanians viewed the GOJ's
relationships with the U.S. and Israel as an unpleasant
necessity at best; the violence in Lebanon unleashed emotions
so intense that it seems most came to view Jordan's ties with
the U.S. and Israel as matters for national shame. Nasrallah
and Hamas are regarded as heroes, and the course of
moderation viewed as discredited and obsolete. The King is
unapologetic about his stance, but believes moderate Arab
leaders need to be strengthened now. He believes moderate
Arab states are seriously undermined because they are unable
to show results from their peace efforts, while extremists of
Iran, Syria, Hizballah and Hamas are setting the regional
agenda and - to Arab eyes - putting Israel on the defensive
for the first time in decades. He fears that the failure of
moderates to address the roots of conflict and instability in
the region could lead to fundamental shifts in the region in
favor of extremists and paralyze reformists who are being
viewed as irrelevant to Arabs' core concerns, which are being
successfully defined by the rhetoric of the likes of
Al-Jazeera and Ahmadinejad. The King therefore views
effective and serious USG peace efforts in the region to
repair moderates' standing at home as essential. He
recognizes that for there to be progress, Abu Mazen needs to
form a government that meets Quartet conditions, and is
working toward that end. He also opposes Arab League efforts
to take the issue to the UNSC as an ineffective,
counterproductive gimmick.

3. (U) Other issues that may come up in the King's meetings
with the USG:

Lebanon's Recovery
------------------

4. (C) The GOJ, Jordanian NGOs and private donors have
provided considerable relief supplies to Lebanon. The
Jordanian military provided its own air transport, pilots for
other governments' relief aircraft, and engineers for
reconstruction work. In addition, Amman's international
airport has been serving as an inspection gateway so that
commercial flights could reach Beirut while the Israeli
blockade was in place. The GOJ reacted with tetchy denials
when some Arab media accused Jordan of permitting "Mossad
agents" to inspect aircraft (ref G), or otherwise helping
implement Israel's blockade.

5. (S) Even before the July 12 outbreak of hostilities, King
Abdullah was seeking USG approval and support for his ideas
on bolstering Lebanese government security forces. He has
now made rifles available to the LAF (ref H) and will support
other USG efforts to generate international security
assistance for Lebanese national forces.

Iraq
----

6. (S) The GOJ is worried that the USG and GOI are losing the
battle to impose control on Iraq. Visits to Jordan by senior
U.S. military leaders like General Abizaid (and General
Casey, due here September 12) have gone some way toward
helping the King understand U.S. strategy to address the
situation, but he has nevertheless told several U.S. and
European officials that he feels he must plan for "worst case
scenarios" in Iraq that include the breakup of the country.

7. (SBU) Jordan's Prime Minister Maarouf Bakhit and seven
other Jordanian cabinet members visited Baghdad August 17,
and at the same time a Jordanian Ambassador presented his
credentials. Bakhit returned to Jordan with an Iraqi promise
to provide Jordan discounted oil, though there is skepticism
here about Iraq's capability to comply in the near term (ref
I).

Iran
----

8. (S) Jordan's leadership views Iran's ambitions in the
region with suspicion and alarm, and as the main strategic
threat in the Middle East. For several years King Abdullah
and his top advisors have been expressing concern about an
Iranian play for regional dominance using cards that include
the nuclear standoff, Iraqi Shia parties, the Syrian
government, Hizballah, and some Palestinian groups. A viable
Israeli-Palestinian peace process is, in the King's view,
essential in order to strengthen moderate Arabs' ability to
reverse Iranian inroads, which in part stem from the
perception that Iran is the Palestinians' greatest champion.

9. (SBU) As on many other issues, however, ordinary
Jordanians' views diverge considerably from their leaders'.
The prospect of a Shia-dominated Iraq still worries most
here. But the Jordanian "street" now in large part welcomes
Iran's other regional gambits - including its nuclear
program. A tribal leader summed up the mood when he told
poloff that in the wake of Lebanon "we would welcome Satan
himself if he confronted Israel."

Reform
------

10. (SBU) King Abdullah convened Jordan's 700 top political,
business and cultural personalities for a retreat in July
that forged a consensus on the next steps in his push for
reform. Thanks in large part to this and other Palace
efforts, the normally reform-adverse parliament is making
progress toward passing much of the government's ambitious
agenda of reform legislation. The municipal government bill,
if passed, will provide for local elections within six
months; some opponents of the measure as currently drafted
warn that the Muslim Brotherhood will scoop up most of
Jordan's local governments. The cash-strapped GOJ hopes that
municipal government reform and other political reforms will
win it MCC compact funding. Champions of reform, however,
feel weakened and vulnerable in the face of public hostility
toward anything associated with the U.S. While until now,
Jordanian officials were loath to link progress on reform
with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, their views
changed this summer. Without urgent activity to resolve the
Palestinian problem, figures such as Bassam Awadallah argue,
moderate reformists will be dismissed as irrelevant and the
gap between the "street" and elitist reformers will widen
further.

Jordanian Candidate to Succeed Kofi Annan
-----------------------------------------

11. (S) Jordan nominated September 5 its PermRep at the UN,
Prince Zeid bin Raad, to succeed Kofi Annan. The GOJ appears
to have secured Arab League endorsement of the Prince's
candidacy (ref j.)

Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/
HALE

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