Cablegate: Darfur: September 7 Au Ditf Briefing Reports

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ADDIS ABABA 002524

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/SPG AND AF/RSA
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SU AU
SUBJECT: DARFUR: SEPTEMBER 7 AU DITF BRIEFING REPORTS
FUNDING SUFFICIENT TO EXTEND AMIS

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2420

B. ADDIS ABABA 2523

1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On September 7, African Union officials
reported to AU partners that recent cash contributions would
allow the AU Mission in Sudan to continue operations beyond
September 30, but that any decision on either extending or
strengthening AMIS by two additional battalions would have to
made at a September 18 meeting of the AU Peace and Security
Council. AU planners said they were making contingency plans
for withdrawal, while acknowledging that withdrawal would be
"a political tragedy for Africa." AMIS military observers
reported significant troop movements by GOS forces into
Darfur, but could not estimate their number. Among the
security incidents highlighted were an August 31 attack by
uniformed GOS forces on women and children in Graida; AMIS
forces did not react, angering local IDPs who then had to be
repelled with APCs. AU officials said that a September 5
incident, in which GOS troops entered an IDP camp at Kutum,
represents a violation of both the Darfur Peace Agreement and
the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement. AU officials said
Sudan's proposed security stabilization plan is unacceptable.
On the political front, AU officials said there are no legal
grounds for excluding DPA non-signatories from participating
in Ceasefire Commission meetings. END SUMMARY.

2. (U) On September 7, the African Union Darfur Integrated
Task Force (DITF) briefed selected AU partners (US, UK,
Canada, EC, NATO, and UN) on political, logistical, and
security developments of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS).
(NOTE: AU DITF's subsequent September 14 briefing has been
reported SEPTEL (ref B).)

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FUNDING SUFFICIENT TO CONTINUE, BUT WITHDRAWAL NOT RULED OUT
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

3. (SBU) AU DITF POLAD Dr. Solomon Gomes reiterated
observations made September 6 by AU Peace and Security
Commissioner Ambassador Said Djinnit (ref A) that the
possibility of AMIS withdrawal after September 30 could not
be ruled out, but that any decision on the future of AMIS
would have to await the outcome of a September 18 AU Peace
and Security Council (PSC) meeting. Partners who highlighted
the AU's "moral responsibility" to remain in Darfur, had the
equal responsibility of funding AMIS's continued presence,
Gomes said. AU DITF Head Ambassador Ki Doulaye Corentin said
the September 18 PSC would ask whether sufficient funds
existed to allow AMIS to continue to December; if not, it
would likely push for AMIS's withdrawal. The PSC would also
consider whether AMIS had sufficient logistics on the ground
to sustain its forces. Ki Doulaye said funds were sufficient
to take AMIS beyond September and suggested that the UNGA's
Fifth Committee could request additional funding. EC
representative clarified that current funding would cover
AMIS to October 22; cash contributions from the Netherlands
and the UK would cover AMIS to December. Ki Doulaye
acknowledged that the AU had been informed that USG support
for AMIS would continue beyond September 30.

4. (SBU) A September 14-15 meeting with the UN would discuss
how to strengthen AMIS on the ground, Ki Doulaye added.
Commenting on a new concept of operations (CONOPs) for AMIS,
AU DITF Military Component Chief Colonel Mayell Mbaye said
the AU needed to await the PSC decision before adding two
battalions and asking partners to airlift them. An UNMIS
representative had informed AU Commissioner Djinnit on
September 6 that the UN strongly needed these two additional
battalions. Ki Doulaye said the UN should fund these
battalions, if the UN wanted the AU to continue to December.
Gomes observed that UNSCR 1706 "has the potential to create a
problem between the AU and the UN," as it limited AMIS's
support to the DPA to only the transition. According to
UNSCR 1706, once transition occurred, the AU no longer had a
role to play; this was "troubling," Gomes said. He said that
the UNSCR was "far-reaching," but that a draft addendum to
the UN SYG report, prepared by UN DPKO and issued on the eve
of the adoption of UNSCR 1706, envisaged "incremental
infiltration" of UN staff into Darfur, which created a
problem for the AU. Gomes said the AU would send a

ADDIS ABAB 00002524 002 OF 004

delegation to the UN in New York. Mbaye commented that the
addendum was "opposite" to the agreement the AU had with the
UN.

5. (SBU) DITF's military component was discussing the
contingency of withdrawal with troop contributing countries
(TCCs), but the AU was "aware withdrawal from Darfur would be
a political tragedy for Africa," Ki Doulaye said. He noted,
however, that withdrawal "would not be the first," citing the
UN's withdrawal from Somalia in 1994. "It will be very
painful for all of us to pull out of Darfur," he said. Mbaye
confirmed that rotation of Nigerian troops, and of 152
CIVPOL, had started. DITF Head of Civilian Police Karl Mario
Nobin reported that 260 CIVPOL staff awaited rotation (down
from 498): those from Mali would rotate September 8, and
those from Cameroon would rotate September 10. Ki Doulaye
said that signing a contract for the construction of CIVPOL
stations should continue, despite uncertainty about AMIS's
future. (NOTE: On September 14, DITF announced that the
Nigerian rotation was complete, but that the rotation of
Rwandan troops had been put on hold pending the September 18
PSC. END NOTE.)

6. (SBU) Dr. Gomes noted that in discussions held the
previous day on options besides withdrawal, the concept of
"co-deployment" (implemented in Liberia) had not been raised.
He explained that if GOS continued to withhold consent to
transition, one could have UN CIVPOL, humanitarian, and other
staff arrive to reinforce AMIS; they would be AMIS forces but
would adopt the mandate outlined in UNSCR 1706.

---------------------------------------------
AMIS STANDS BY AS WOMEN AND CHILDREN ATTACKED
---------------------------------------------

7. (SBU) DITF Military Component Chief Mbaye reported that
the situation in Darfur over the last two weeks was
"generally calm" except for Sectors 1 and 6 (where National
Redemption Front and SLM Abdel Wahid forces had conducted
attacks) and Sector 2 (where Arab militia had conducted
attacks near Nyala). Heavy rainfall continued to limit AMIS
activities by road; banditry and rapes continued. There had
been significant GOS troop movements, although AMIS could not
estimate their number. Perhaps 6,000 GOS forces were in
Darfur; AMIS could confirm that they were being reinforced
but could not confirm that such reinforcements were coming
from the south. Canada noted that the GOS security plan had
called for 10,000 more troops in Darfur by August 31; Mbaye
said he could not confirm whether this was being implemented.

8. (SBU) Mbaye said MILOB group sites had reported the
following incidents:

August 31
-- Graida, Sector 2: 50 suspected Arab militia on horseback
but in GOS uniform attacked women and children gathering
grass. "Non-reaction" by AMIS MILOB group angered IDPs, who
were then "scared away" by AMIS using armored personnel
carriers (APCs). DITF does not know what AMIS did not
intervene, and has asked AMIS for an explanation. (EC said
non-action in Graida was "regrettable" and "shameful", and
welcomed the outcome of any investigation.)
-- Kutum, Sector 6: GOS representative reported seeing NRF
vehicles.
-- Sector 1: Intelligence report received of NRF preparing
an ambush (where attack of August 19 occurred).
-- CIVPOL vehicle hijacked; AMIS weapons, 140 rounds, and 1
CIVPOL radio seized.

September 1
-- Graida, Sector 2: 3 killed in clash with (pro-SLM/A Minni
Minawi) Zagawa fighters.
-- Tawilla, Sector 1: SLA Abdel Wahid sympathizers were
recruiting in IDP camp for his movement; led to approximately
100 IDPs departing the camp.
-- Sector 6: movement northwest (destination unknown) of 28
trucks with heavily armed GOS troops.

September 2
-- Sector 2: GOS army convoy sighted near Nyala/El Fasher

ADDIS ABAB 00002524 003 OF 004

road.
-- Sector 1: demonstration against international intervention
by 5,000 protestors who presented petitions and bore signs
reading, "No way, USA."
-- Sector 5: similar demonstration against UNSC resolution
1706 by 300 protestors, including women and children.

September 3
-- El Geneina, Sector 3: demonstration against UNSCR 1706 by
5,000 demonstrators (including students, GOS workers, police,
and National Congress Party members) led by the Wali
(governor) of West Darfur, with signs reading, "No to foreign
forces" and "No to non-believers."
-- Sector 3: 400 SLA Wahid soldiers conducted attack with
mortars and machine guns; 1 GOS police and 8 attackers killed.
-- El Fasher, Sector 1: GOS "show of force" as 50 vehicles
pointed their weapons at AMIS HQ while passing.

September 5
-- Nyala, Sector 2: Damage to UN property, some injured, as
result of demonstration against UN deployment in Darfur.
-- Kutum, Sector 6: 10 LandCruisers with mounted guns and
GOS soldiers moved to an IDP camp, where they were reportedly
conducting a "security patrol."
(NOTE: Col. Mbaye underscored that this was a violation of
the Darfur Peace Agreement and of the Humanitarian Ceasefire
Agreement. END NOTE.)
-- 20 trucks with GOS soldiers were sighted moving to an
unknown destination.

9. (SBU) In response to LG's request for additional
information on reports that the local sheikh in Sector 7 had
asked to participate in AMIS patrols, due to alleged abuses,
Mbaye said one could not impose conditions on AMIS. DITF
Head of Civilian Police Nobin explained that Zalengei, Sector
7, had been a "no-go area" for several months; DITF was
seeking information from the field on the resumption of AMIS
activities there, he said. Gomes said that the internal
report on alleged abuses had been completed and given to the
AU Chairperson but would not be publicized or given to the AU
PSC. Canada suggested that the AU strengthen its "lessons
learned" process: one could not afford to wait for the
completion of work of formal boards of inquiry; given NRF
threats to AMIS convoys, it was necessary to make preliminary
recommendations for implementation as soon as possible.

10. (SBU) Commissioner Djinnit had approved the appointment
of a retired Zambian general to serve as chief of staff of
the AMIS Forward Joint Mission Headquarters (FJMHQ), Colonel
Mbaye said. A note verbale had been sent, and he was
expected to arrive before the end of September. Mbaye
expressed concern about serious problems in AU
administration, noting a one-month delay in the hiring of an
official from Gambia.

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AU AGREES WITH UNSYG THAT GOS SECURITY PLAN UNACCEPTABLE
--------------------------------------------- -----------

11. (SBU) Asked to provide an assessment of GOS military
movement, Ki Doulaye said that the GOS intended to solve the
problems of Darfur by itself, as it had in 2003. He
reaffirmed that the AU's mandate in Darfur ended September
30; it was unknown whether the PSC would extend AMIS's
mandate to the end of December. The GOS wanted to implement
its own plan, "which would be catastrophic," Ki Doulaye said.
The GOS said it would fight the National Redemption Front
(NRF) and Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM), and the Janjaweed were "all over the place with
impunity," Ki Doulaye added. He said that the UNSYG had
already said the GOS security plan (sent to the UN but not to
the AU) was unacceptable, a position that all should
endorse, Ki Doulaye said. If the GOS were to implement its
plan, the number of IDPs would dramatically increase, he
said. He noted fighting between GOS and Minni parties to
control areas, and said that the AU had "no visibility on the
future of this mission."

12. (SBU) Canada reported that a Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation team had been attacked September 6 outside their

ADDIS ABAB 00002524 004 OF 004

hotel in Khartoum, likely by official security forces in
plain clothes; the CBC's visit to Khartoum had been
facilitated by AU DITF.

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NO LEGAL GROUNDS TO EXCLUDE DPA NON-SIGNATORIES FROM CFC
--------------------------------------------- -----------

13. (SBU) One could not rule out the possibility of the
breakup of Sudan, Gomes said; if the slow pace of the
implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) continued,
and the south sought independence, other states could follow.
Gomes reported that the DPA Implementation Team remained
understaffed, and that no replacement had been named for AU
Special Representative for Sudan Ambassador Baba Gana
Kingibe, who had recently announced his resignation. Ki
Doulaye said that appointments to the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue
and Consultation (chair and preparatory committee) were "in
the pipeline."

14. (SBU) Commenting on the recent expulsion of Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) non-signatores from the Ceasefire Commission
(CFC), Ki Doulaye underscored that Minni Minawi, not just the
GOS, strongly opposed the participation of non-signatories.
If a meeting were convened, an "incomplete picture" would
result. The AU therefore proposed holding two meetings (one
for signatories, one for non-signatories), as an earlier
proposal for a single meeting in two phases had been
rejected. Having non-signatories no longer participate in
the CFC had created problems for AMIS troops, who were now
being targeted. Nevertheless, he said, the AU still hoped to
engage non-signatories, especially Abdel Wahid. Gomes added
that AU Commission Chairperson Konare had indicated his
willingness to engage non-signatories. Gomes noted that AU
partners had said they were not part of the decision to
exclude non-signatories; Commissioner Djinnit had received a
note from the USG asking for reconsideration of the decision.
The GOS had taken a political decision, not a legal
decision, Gomes said, as the DPA did not specify "those who
did not sign should not sit." "They have no grounds,
legally," Gomes said, noting that discussions in Abuja had
proposed a two-track mechanism. Ki Doulaye highlighted the
need to find ways to engage non-signatories, not exclude
them; a high-level meeting to engage non-signatories,
especially Abdel Wahid, was possible, he said.

15. (SBU) COMMENT: The August 31 incident in which AMIS
peacekeepers failed to intervene to protect women and
children under attack in Graida by uniformed GOS forces was
still under investigation as of September 14, and appears to
have prompted AMIS to respond more robustly to subsequent
attacks (ref B). Lack of progress on the political front
(i.e., slow implementation of the DPA, dysfunctional
Ceasefire and Joint Commissions, and delays in launching the
Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation) highlights that the
AU faces significant challenges in fulfilling not only its
peacekeeping role but also its political role in Darfur. END
COMMENT.
WILGUS

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