Cablegate: Au Military Staff Questions Plan for Igasom

VZCZCXRO1423
PP RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHDS #2410/01 2481611
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051611Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2310
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 002410

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF AND AF/E
LONDON, PARIS, ROME FOR AFRICA WATCHER
CJTF-HOA FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MOPS KPKO SO AU
SUBJECT: AU MILITARY STAFF QUESTIONS PLAN FOR IGASOM
DEPLOYMENT TO SOMALIA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 2389 (NOTAL)

1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. On August 28, the African
Union's Military Staff Committee (MSC), comprised of defense
attaches or other military representatives of each of the 15
members of the AU Peace and Security Council, reviewed the
proposed deployment plan for an IGAD peace support operation
(IGASOM) in Somalia. The MSC's review followed the
presentation of the plan to AU PSC permreps on August 25 by
Kenyan PermRep to the AU Ambassador Francis Espilla (reftel).
In a written report, a copy of which was obtained by the
Embassy of Sweden, the MSC highlights a number of concerns,
including:
-- the proposed mission's mandate is "scanty and ambiguous,"
as it remains unclear whether IGASOM would focus on
aggressive peace enforcement (e.g., as under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter) or on more passive peace-keeping;
-- the concept of operations (CONOPS) calls for deploying 4
infantry battalions in Baidoa, and another 4 battalions in
Mogadishu, but none to any other areas in Somalia, raising
concerns about force protection and "an open flank for the
ICU to exploit;"
-- the proposed mission structure lacks details (e.g.,
currently does not include any military observers or civilian
police);
-- the proposed USD 196 million budget lacks detailed
justification.

2. (SBU) The MSC's frank observations suggest that AU members
are applying lessons learned from the beleagured AU Mission
in Sudan (AMIS), as the MSC calls for the establishment of a
joint operations center for effective coordination of mission
components; suggests that "the substantial part of the force
and funding should be secured" prior to initial deployment;"
and advises that "lessons should be drawn from ... past
missions and operations"). The MSC's report concludes that
the deployment plan "requires to be redrafted." END SUMMARY
AND COMMENT.

3. (U) BEGIN TEXT.

REPORT BY THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE ON IGASOM DEPLOYMENT
PLAN HELD ON 28 AUGUST 2006

INTRODUCTION
------------

1. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) held a meeting on
Monday, 28 August 2006, to discuss the IGASOM Deployment Plan
that was presented to the Peace and Security Council on 25
August 2006 by Mr. Francis Espilla, the Kenyan Ambassador to
the AU, with the view to providing the PSC with the requisite
technical advice to enable the Council (to) make informed
decisions on the deployment plan. Representatives of IGAD
who took part in the preparation of the plan, were invited to
present the plan and also to shed more light on certain
areas, but were unable to attend the meeting. The MSC
therefore went ahead to discuss the plan without any further
input from IGAD.

2. The MSC took note of the time and effort put in by IGAD
in drafting the deployment plan, as well as its political
will and enthusiasm to deploy IGASOM at the earliest possible
time. The Committee was particularly happy to note that much
effort had been made since the last meeting of the IGAD
Chiefs of Defense Staff, to operationalise the Command and
Control Structure of the Mission, at both the strategic and
operational levels. However, the MSC argued that the plan
lacks depth in some areas and contains some inconsistencies
that will make it unworkable.

AIM
---

3. The aim of this report is to determine the feasibility,
risks and implications as well to identify major unclear
areas of the deployment plan that are likely to affect its
usefulness for implementation.

ADDIS ABAB 00002410 002 OF 003

MAJOR OBSERVATIONS
------------------

4. The Mission Mandate. It was noted that the statement of
the mission mandate was scanty and ambiguous. There is need
to expand it and also to indicate clearly whether it is a
Peacekeeping or a Peace Enforcement Mission. This may
resolve the inconsistencies between the mandate and the
concept of operation.

5. Current Situation. The current situation paragraph needs
to be reviewed to reflect the situation in Somalia at the
time of preparing the deployment plan.

6. Assumptions.

a. The assumption that 'Deployment of IGASOM will be based
on consensus in Somalia' downplays the concerns of the ICU,
which is one of the two parties identified in the Somali
conflict.

b. The assumption that the mission will be funded appears to
be hanging. It may be recast to read "The international
community will support and fund the mission'.

7. Concept of Operation. The concept of operations
envisages an 8 (eight) infantry battalion operation in a
2-Phase Deployment. Phase I covers the deployment of 4
reinforced infantry battalions in the Baidoa area, one
battalion at a time. There is no indication of the duration
between the deployment of these battalions. Phase II covers
the deployment of 4 additional battalions into the Mogadishu
area. The deployment is thus restricted to only some
portions of Southern Somalia. The concept does not also put
the transition of IGASOM to an AU mission into perspective.
The implications here are that:

a. Troops stand the chance of being defeated piece meal.
They may not be able to defend themselves in the face of
hostilities.

b. Troops deployed during Phase I may not be effective on
the ground, thus complicating security issues and making
subsequent Phases difficult to undertake.

c. The AU may be pressurized (sic) to supplement the force
during Phase I if that force is to survive and make a
meaningful impact on the ground.

d. Deployment only to Southern Somalia will leave an open
flank for the ICU to exploit, further complicating security
issues.

e. It would be difficult for the AU to determine its
responsibilities and make adequate preparations, especially
in terms of force generation, if the issue of the transition
is not clarified. This is likely to create an operational
gap.

8. Use of Force and Rules of Engagement. It has been
provided for under the Use of force and Rules of engagement
that 'Force will also be used in carrying out the mandate'.
This underscores the need to deploy, particularly in Phase I,
in strength and in force.

9. The Mission Structure. While the Mission Structure at
Annex K has omitted some components, it also lacks details in
some aspects. The structure needs to be expanded to include:

a. Military Observers.

b. The structure under the command of the CIVPOL
Commissioner.

c. A Joint Operations Centre for effective coordination of
the mission components and efficient use of scarce resources.

d. Appendices indicating details/strength of personnel under
each component/sub-component and also the structure and

ADDIS ABAB 00002410 003 OF 003

details of a generic battalion are needed.

10. The Budget.

a. The plan does not contain sufficient details to justify a
budget of USD 196m.

b. Multiplying the cost of deployment and maintenance of one
battalion by the total number of battalions to be deployed in
Phase I is quite unrealistic, as not all the battalions will
be deployed at the same time.

c. The request of USD 18.5m 'Priority Fund' requires
justification.

11. Deployment Time Line. The deployment time line does not
seem achievable under the circumstances. This requires to be
reviewed.

RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------

12. The Committee recommends that:

a. The MSC in principle supports the deployment plan,
however it requires to be redrafted, taking into
consideration the observations made in the report from
paragraph 4 to 11.

b. The substantial part of the force and funding should be
secured before Phase I deployment in order to avoid issues of
insufficient funds in the middle of operations.

c. The Committee is of the view that lessons should be drawn
from the past missions and operations, with the special
emphasis from the Darfur Mission.

END TEXT.
WILGUS

© Scoop Media