Cablegate: Action Plan to Build Capacity And

Published: Sat 1 Oct 2005 03:30 AM
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
B. BAGHDAD 02052
C. MNF-I FRAGO 05-120
1. (U) This is a U.S. Mission Baghdad/MNF-I
coordinated cable.
2. (SBU) Summary. As directed by the references,
Provincial Support Teams (PST) and Provincial
Reconstruction and Development Committees (PRDC)
were established by June 2005 in all 15 non-KRG
provinces to accomplish their stated mission.
Efforts met with varied success in the provinces,
but PST's were generally unable to accomplish all
actions mandated. A comprehensive review of
actions taken to implement the initiative was
undertaken and the results, supported by weekly
assessments, revealed key weaknesses. In
conjunction with the review, U.S. Mission and MNF-
I jointly developed a follow-on initiative to
ensure unity of MNF-I and Mission effort in the
field in strengthening the capabilities of
provincial governments, assisting in the
coordination of USG reconstruction and development
assistance efforts, and providing enhanced
reporting on political developments and advocacy
of coalition political and economic policy goals.
The result of this effort is the recommendation to
deploy joint, civil-military Provincial
Reconstruction Teams to each of the 15 non-KRG
provinces, as well as a Regional Reconstruction
Team to the KRG. This cable lays out the
mission, tasks and goals related to implementation
of this new initiative. End Summary.
3. (SBU) An interim review of efforts, successes
and weaknesses relating to the PRDC initiative was
conducted in late July by Mission that identified
problem areas related to procedures,
infrastructure and resource allocation. In
August, MNF-I and Mission further evaluated the
impact that PSTs were having on developing the
capacity of provincial governments, as well as the
specific needs of the governmental elements.
Consensus was that PSTs were not effectively
developing governance capacity in the provinces,
but only on a very small scale, and that
fundamental change would be required in order to
accomplish priorities of action identified in
reference (B). Key factors in limiting the
successes of the PSTs included gaps in DOS
staffing and skill sets, limited PSD support, and
inconsistent support from MNF-I elements to the
initiative. In addition, the lack of a standing
body at the Mission/MNF-I level to support,
coordinate and guide activities of the PSTs was
identified as a key weakness.
4. (U) As a result of the review, the Mission and
MNF-I have jointly developed an initiative to
strengthen our support to provincial governments
during this critical period in the development of
Iraq's democratic institutions. We started with a
revised mission statement to focus clearly on the
objectives of the new effort.
Newly Defined Mission and End State Goals
5. (U) The proposed new mission statement for the
USG/Coalition effort to build capability and
sustainability of Iraq's provincial governments
"To assist Iraq's provincial governments with
developing a transparent and sustained capability
to govern, promote increased security and rule of
law, promote political and economic development,
and provide provincial administration necessary to
meet the basic needs of the population."
6. (SBU) The mission statement of our provincial
initiative is intended to focus the effort on
reaching an end state - or goals - that are
achievable, well-defined and measurable, based on
sound metrics. Accomplishment of these goals is
essential to the evolution of a stable democracy
in Iraq and facilitates increased stability
throughout the Middle East. These goals are:
--Provincial governments that have a stabilized,
transparent process for identifying redevelopment
needs throughout their province, and a solid
program to address redevelopment issues;
--Provincial governments that are confident and
transparent in the execution of their duties and
--Provincial governments that have the support of
their citizenry;
--Provincial governments that have increased
efficiency and capability in the delivery of
services to their citizens, and that are
increasingly self-sufficient;
--Provincial governments that have regularized
mechanisms for citizen participation in
governmental decision-making processes;
--Provincial governments that have increased core
competencies (public administration, finance and
budgeting, urban/municipal planning) and
--Provincial governments that foster stability and
security throughout their provinces; and
--Enhanced reporting and assessment on political
and economic developments, and strategic
activities at the local level, and advocacy of
Coalition political and economic policy goals.
Mission Tasks
7. (SBU) The U.S. Mission and MNF-I have
identified eight primary components inherent to
the mission statement that serve to focus
Coalition efforts and achieve the desired end
state; these are:
--Facilitate achievement of Coalition goals in
Iraq by enhancing the capabilities of provincial
governments, with emphasis on capacity building
and sustainability;
--Promote government reform at the provincial
level and develop self-sufficiency;
--Assist provincial governments and local ministry
representatives with developing a comprehensive
strategy that results in a capable and accountable
local government;
--Develop the ability of provincial governments to
identify and prioritize the needs of their
citizens, and to address those needs via Iraqi
Government, Coalition, Donor, NGO and private
--Develop the ability of provincial governments to
devise short and long-term strategies for economic
programs, and provide training and mentoring that
will assist with their implementation;
--Assess and report political and economic
developments at the local level, and advocate
Coalition goals and objectives;
--Develop a phased plan for transition from heavy
civil-military assistance to traditional post-
conflict assistance, and finally to self-reliance;
--Coordinate all USG reconstruction, development
and humanitarian assistance in the field; and
--Coordinate provincial governance capacity-
building efforts with Coalition forces, in order
to synchronize activities with stability
Transition to Self-Reliance
8. (SBU) An Iraq that is democratic, stable, and
economically viable in the free-market economy is
key to its self-reliance and future role in Middle
East and world affairs. The provincial
development aspect of this initiative is to be
coupled with a similar Mission/MNF-I initiative at
the national/ministerial level geared toward
developing a democratic, cohesive and capable
government that fully integrates the cultural,
religious and regional needs and desires of all of
its citizenry. Both initiatives consider and plan
for a phased transition to self-reliance that
decreases the requirement for security forces to
conduct stability operations, while the local and
national governments increase their capability to
govern and manage security.
9. (U) Inherent to developing the capacity and
sustainability of the national and local
governments are the civilian subject-matter
experts available through MNC-I Civil Affairs
elements and USAID programs, such as the Local
Governance Program (LGP). In the provinces, LGP
will form the heart of our efforts in a phased
approach taking us out over the next four years.
The LGP Work Plan will form the baseline document
from which our efforts at training, mentoring and
coaching will evolve.
10. (SBU) In executing this phased approach, we
anticipate the necessity for a robust civil-
military capability in each of the 15 non-KRG
provinces for approximately two years, and in the
KRG (based in Arbil) for a lesser period of time.
During this timeframe - varying by province - we
anticipate the security needs of the province
diminishing as provincial governments demonstrate
an increasing capability to govern and manage
elements affecting their security environment. As
this occurs, we will begin reducing the military
role in the provincial teams and increasingly move
the LGP elements toward a capability to continue
with the initiative independent of Coalition
Forces support.
11. (U) The focus of main effort at the
provincial level will be in providing training,
mentoring and coaching to provincial government
entities, in order to develop their capacity to:
--Develop core competencies;
--Establish effective provincial linkages with
ministries and the central government;
--Plan and prioritize provincial government
direction and activities;
--Prepare budgets, identify funding needs, and
develop fiscal responsibility;
--Determine government staffing requirements and
address these via government code;
--Plan and coordinate civil construction and
development activities, and coordinate
support by Iraqi national and local government
resources, donors, NGOs and private
capital investment;
--Communicate with constituents via effective
public affairs initiatives;
--Provide and enhance the delivery of provincial
and municipal services;
--Develop by-laws and effective committee
structures; and
--Conduct local elections using uniformly applied
model elections ordinance.
12. (U) Determining successful achievement of
this initiative's goals will be based on
qualitative measurements against established
benchmarks. Mission and MNF-I are currently
developing metrics that will cover three general
areas: governance, infrastructure, and security.
Each broad area will have sub-categories and
indicators sufficient to provide a clear
assessment that supports decision-making at the
Mission, MNF-I and NCA level. Provincial teams
will develop baseline assessments and follow with
monthly assessments to the Mission/MNF-I.
Concept of Operations
13. (U) U.S. Mission and MNF-I, in coordination
with Coalition partners, will establish joint,
civil-military teams in each of the 15 non-KRG
provinces, and one regional team for the KRG.
Teams will be named Provincial Reconstruction
Teams (PRT) and Regional Reconstruction Teams
(RRT) respectively. Each team will be modular in
nature, built around a standard core structure,
and tailored to the specific needs of each
province and region. In support of the PRT/RRTs,
Mission/MNF-I will establish a National
Coordination Team (NCT) to provide strategic
guidance, direct operational activities, and
provide direct and indirect logistics and
administrative support to the PRT/RRTs.
14. (U) This is a coordinated U.S. Mission/MNF-I
initiative that will fully integrate Coalition
partners. It will be a DOS lead and with IRMO
functioning as the executive agent. While the
intention is to have a civilian Team Leader for
each PRT/RRT, experience indicates that there will
be circumstances where MNF-I will have the most
experienced officer present. In such
circumstances, and as directed by the NCT, the
senior civilian will serve as the Deputy Team
Leader. The PRT/RRT Team Leader will be
responsible for all facets of the initiative at
the provincial level, to include political
liaison, governance development, reconstruction
and Coalition assistance, assessments and
reporting. The PRT/RRT will be subordinate to the
NCT, and team members and elements of the PRT/RRT
will be under operational control of the PRT Team
Leader; administrative control will be retained by
the parent unit/organization. The DOS Regional
Coordinator, in collaboration with Coalition
partners (where appropriate) and coordination with
the NCT, will provide guidance regarding regional
political and economic issues and initiatives.
15. (U) PRT/RRTs will be reliant on in-place REO
and MNF-I/FOB support for housing, administration,
logistics and security, where available; but, will
have organic elements to support personnel
movement security, communications and
transportation. In remote areas, additional
assets will be attached for force protection,
logistics, vehicle maintenance, etc., as
necessary. Where necessary, contract security
assets will be under the operational control of
the PRT/RRTs. State Embedded Teams (SET) will be
absorbed into PRTs in provinces where SETs
currently exist. In establishing PRT/RRTs, the
intent is to build sufficient flexibility that
will enable them to outlive current REO and MNF-I
force positioning, as well as adapt to FOB
16. (U) The National Coordination Team (NCT) will
coordinate with Mission, MNF-I, Coalition
Diplomatic Missions and Iraq's national
government, under the direction of the NCT's
Executive Committee. The Executive Committee will
approve assignments of all Team Leader and Deputy
Team Leader positions to PRT/RRTs.
PRT/RRT Structure and Organization
17. (U) The organization of the PRT/RRTs will be
tailored to the specific needs of each province,
built around a core structure. Additional
personnel or elements will be detailed as
required. The basic core structure of a PRT/RRT
is as follows:
No.: Position Title, No. Pers., Mil/Civ/Cont/LN,
1: PRT/RRT Team Leader, 1, Civilian (OC equiv),
DOS-IRMO/Coalition Partner
2: Assistant Team Leader, 1, Military Officer (0-
5), MNF-I
3: Provincial Program Manager, 1, Civilian, (GS-
4: Political Officer, 1, Civilian (FS-02), DOS/Pol
5: USAID/DFID Officer, 1, Civilian/Contractor,
6: MSC Liaison Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-4),
7: Engineer Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-4),
8: Personal Security Det (Desig Sites only), 17,
Civilian Contractor, DOS
9: Movement Security Team, 17-26, Military
Officer/Enlisted, MSC
10: Civil Affairs/CIMIC Team(s), 4-20, Military
Officer/Enlisted, MSC
11: Provincial Partnership Program (P3), 2,
Military Officer/Civilian, MNSTC-I
12: Local Governance Team, 18-30, Civilian
Contractor/LN, USAID/LGP
13: Local national (LN) Translators, 4, Local
Nationals, DOS/USAID
18. (U) The core structure of the PRT/RRT will be
augmented, as required by the unique security
requirements, governance needs and in-place
support structures (FOB, REO, Iraqi Base) existing
in each province. This will include additional
subject-matter experts that are needed for a
particular province or region, force protection
elements for site security and logistics support
elements for remote sites located on non-Coalition
National Coordination Team
19. (U) The mission and purpose of the NCT will
be to support the PRT/RRTs by synchronizing
governance, reconstruction, security and economic
development assistance, and providing coordination
and deconfliction of provincial efforts with
efforts of the Mission, Coalition partners and the
Iraqi government. The Executive Committee of the
NCT will be chaired by the Deputy Chief of
Mission, and will provide strategic guidance to
the NCT, develop and review policy, and resolve
significant issues. Inherent tasks of the NCT are
--Coordinate with Iraqi ministries for development
of sustainable support to provincial governments;
--Provide strategic guidance and direction to
PRTs, based on Coalition priorities;
--Synchronize PRT/RRT regional efforts with Iraqi
ministries, the US Mission and Coalition partners;
--Facilitate lines of communication between Iraq's
provincial and national governments;
--Liaise and coordinate with Mission, Coalition
Partners and MNF-I for logistics and
administrative support to the PRT/RRTs;
--Coordinate with Mission, Coalition partners,
Iraqi Government and MNF-I for liaison with Donor
--Oversee political and economic reporting, and
strategic advocacy efforts.
20. (U) The organization of the NCT will be built
around a core structure, with additional
representatives participating on an as-needed
basis. The core structure of the NCT is as
No.: Position Title, No. Pers., Mil/Civ/Cont/LN,
1: Team Leader, 1, Civilian (OC), DOS/IRMO
2: Deputy Team Leader, 1, Military Officer (0-6),
3: Operations Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-5),
4: Political Advisor, 1, Civilian (FS-02), DOS
5: Public Diplomacy Advisor, 1, Civilian (GS-14),
6: USAID Coordinator, 1, Civilian (GS-14), USAID
7: Plans Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-5), MNF-I
8: Assistant Operations Officer, 1, Military
Officer (0-4), MNF-I
9: Assistant Plans Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-
4), MNF-I
10: Administrative Specialist, 1, Military
Enlisted (E-6), MNF-I
11: Administrative Specialist, 1, Military
Enlisted (E-4), MNF-I
12: Office Manager, 1, Contractor, DOS/IRMO
21. (U) The National Coordination Team provides
strategic guidance, directs operational
activities, and provides direct and indirect
support to PRT/RRTs. The NCT is directed by the
Executive Committee, who - in turn - reports to
the Chief of Mission and CG, MNF-I.
22. (SBU) The DOS Regional Coordinator provides
guidance, in coordination with the NCT, regarding
regional political activities and regionally cross-
cutting issues for the PRT/RRTs. This recognizes
the need to maintain a regional perspective, in
addition to a provincial focus.
23. (SBU) The PRT/RRT and MSC relationship is one
of coordination and consultation. They will
maintain close and constant communication, in
order to ensure that security, governance and
economic lines of operation are mutually
reinforcing. The MSC commander will retain
responsibility for security and stability
operations, while the governance and economic
lines of operation will become the responsibility
of the PRT/RRT Team Leader.
24. (U) The PRT/RRT Team Leader has operational
control (OPCON) over all assigned personnel and
elements. Administrative Control (ADCON) will be
retained by the parent organization (DOS, USAID,
LGP, MNF-I, etc.)
25. (U) MSCs will be responsible for providing
logistics, housing, security and transportation
support to the PRT/RRTs from organic assets in all
locations where DOS REO or SET facilities are
insufficient to support PRT/RRT requirements.
26. (U) REOs will be responsible for providing
logistics, housing, security and transportation
support to the PRT/RRTs, within currently existing
capabilities. In order to support this
initiative, all SET assets will be absorbed by the
provincial PRT.
27. (SBU) The first step of this initiative will
begin 01 Oct 05, with stand-up of the National
Coordination Team (NCT), out of existing
resources. The NCT will conduct planning
necessary to begin phasing the deployment of
PRT/RRTs on 01 Nov 05, to include coordinating
with MSCs, RCs and supporting agencies, conducting
site surveys and developing baseline assessments
to guide stand-up planning.
28. (SBU) Provincial/Regional Reconstruction
Teams will rolled out on an incremental basis,
beginning with establishment of the first three
"proof of concept" teams on 01 Nov 05, conditions
permitting. We will roll out remaining teams
incrementally, at an estimated rate of three per
month. This incremental approach will allow us to
make timely adjustments to the deployment
sequencing and packaging of follow-on teams. The
initial teams will stand-up for Anbar, Ninawa and
Sala ad Din provinces.
29. (SBU) While proactive efforts will be taken
to reassign and pre-stage elements to support this
initiative, active engagement of local governments
by the teams will not begin until teams have
sufficient assets on hand to begin execution of
the mission, and the NCT's Executive Committee has
concurred. As the actual commencement of
operational engagement of local government has
significant political and diplomatic implications,
this will be a coordinated decision involving
senior Mission staff. Appropriate meetings
between senior Mission staff and local government
officials will be conducted in advance of each
team becoming operationally active.
Personnel Support
30. (U) DOS Team Leader positions (16) will be
filled from a variety of sources, to include DOS
FSOs, 3161 civil service personnel and WAEs, if
available. IRMO's existing authority to hire 3161
civil service personnel will be used, in
conjunction with USAID contractor recruitment
system, to reach out to the best qualified
personnel experienced in post-conflict
redevelopment, diplomacy and nation-building. In-
place IRMO recruiting assets in Washington will
coordinate with USAID for access to their cadre of
former PSC personnel, etc., and DOS-HR for access
to WAEs and FSOs.
31. Action Request. Request DOS-HR coordinate
with USAID and IRMO recruiting staff to identify
16 qualified FSOs or WAEs for assignment to Team
Leader positions.
32. (U) USAID Officer positions will be filled by
a USAID officer.
33. (U) Political Officer positions will be
filled by absorbing all IPAO positions currently
resident at REOs into the PRT/RRTs, augmented by
designated SET officers. Political Officers will
continue to provide PolAd services to MSCs, as
coordinated by the PRT/RRT Team Leader.
34. (U) IRMO Provincial Program Manager positions
will continue to be filled via in-place IRMO
recruiting assets, and will be supplemented by
Bearing Point contractors, if necessary.
35. (U) Local Governance Program civilian
personnel will be filled via standing USAID
contract with Research triangle Institute under
the LGP-II contract.
36. (U) MNF-I personnel assigned in support of
this initiative will be as designated by MNF-I
FRAGO. Personnel will be assigned OPCON to the
PRT/RRT, while remaining ADCON to their parent
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