Cablegate: Brazil's Response to U.S. Proposals to Enable Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India by the Nuclear Supplier's Group

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 002798

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2015
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP BR IN

SUBJECT: BRAZIL'S RESPONSE TO U.S. PROPOSALS TO ENABLE CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA BY THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIER'S GROUP REF: STATE 190856 Classified By: Political Counselor Dennis Hearne for Reasons 1.4. (B) a nd (D)

1. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche October 18 to Acting Director Jandyr Santos of the Foreign Ministry's Disarmament Division. Calling the briefing very timely given the ongoing Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) meeting in Vienna -- where Division Director Santiago Mourao is heading the Brazilian delegation -- Santos said he appreciated the new details of the U.S.-India accord and said he would forward them immediately to the Brazilian delegation in Vienna. He also noted that the Brazilian side would raise the issue with its American counterparts during the ongoning JSNEC meetings in Brasilia.

2. (C) Santos noted that, given Brazil's history, this issue is a particularly sensitive one and Brazil has serious concerns that India may be profiting from its decision to pursue a nuclear weapons program -- a path Brazil decided to forego. He told Poloff that the GOB had held discussions with the GOI recently in Delhi on the issue and he expected there would be further contacts in the future, but said it is still too early to have a clear idea of how Brazil will deal with the new situation.

3. (C) Santos said Brazil was most interested in the proposed timetable for moving forward. He was pleased to note the points Poloff made that any provision of trigger list items to India would come only after India has implemented its commitments under the Joint Statement, and that we did not advocate a making changes to the essential substance of the NSG guidelines, a step which Santos said constituted a red line for Brazil. He also said he was pleased that the IAEA would be responsible for concluding a safeguard agreement with India and for concluding and overseeing the Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities.

4. (C) In response to his question as to how the U.S. could claim that the Joint Statement would not constitute a precedent for other nuclear states, Poloff provided Santos with the points concerning Israel and Pakistan, as well as those concerning Iran and North Korea, stressing that the U.S. did not believe any other countries were comparable to India and therefore, the Joint Statement would not set a precedent.

5. (C) Although he said he understood the U.S. position that the Joint Statement would provide for a safer world and acknowledged that in a world of tough choices, this one could be seen as a practical way forward, he still insisted it was hard to see how the Joint Statement upheld the NPT. In closing, he said he would carefully review the materials provided and looked forward to continuing discussion on this important issue.

DANILOVICH

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