Cablegate: (Sbu) Gvn Advisor Thanh On Party Reform, China, Central

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

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FM AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1374
INFO AMEMBASSY HANOI PRIORITY
ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS HO CHI MINH CITY 000422

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PGOV PINR VM CH HUMANR ETMIN CVR RELFREE
SUBJECT: (SBU) GVN ADVISOR THANH ON PARTY REFORM, CHINA, CENTRAL
HIGHLANDS AND VIETNAM-USG RELATIONS

REF: A) HCMC 127 B) 04 HCMC 1400 C) HCMC 55 D) HANOI 909

1. (SBU) Summary and Comment: Special Advisor to the Prime
Minister in the South Vo Viet Thanh described for the Consul
General on April 18 his frustrations with the pace and tenor of
reform in Vietnam and outlined ideas for change, particularly
within Vietnam's Communist Party (CPV). Thanh said that the
majority of senior CPV members -- spurred by growing unease over
China's strength in the region -- see a long-term convergence of
interests with the United States and favor greater strategic
dialogue with the USG. Pro-Chinese elements and party ideologues
are resisting this trend, however. Thanh, who had just returned
from a "fact finding" trip to the Central Highlands, said that
the GVN is striving to deal with hardline provincial officials
that are obstructing implementation of Hanoi's new approach to
resolve social, religious and economic problems involving the
region's ethnic minorities, including family reunification (VISAS
93) issues. Thanh is aligned with the reformist wing of the Party
and his comments seem to reflect an internal CPV debate on how the
Party must adapt to changing domestic and international conditions
in the run-up to the CPV's 10th Party Congress in 2006. End
Summary and Comment.

2. (SBU) Consul General and PolOff met with Special Advisor to the
Prime Minister for the South Vo Viet Thanh on April 18. This was
our third meeting with Thanh, who had returned from a weeklong
"fact finding" trip to the Central Highlands. Thanh had met with
us twice before, in November 2004 and January 2005 (refs A and B).
Thanh is a protege of former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, a leading
advocates of economic and social reform within the CPV.

Reforming the Party, Dissent and Human Rights
---------------------------------------------

3. (SBU) Thanh spent a considerable amount of our three-hour lunch
discussion focusing on his frustrations with the functioning of
the Party. Thanh said that to combat corruption, end cronyism and
spur economic growth, the CPV needed substantial reform. "I
participated in the revolution to build a more democratic regime,
not a dictatorship," Thanh said. Thanh contended that the CPV
must extend the right of the people to vote for their leaders to
the senior-most levels of Government and Party. (Vietnam has been
experimenting with limited and controlled grassroots "democracy"
at the village level.) Thanh said that he also has been urging
Vietnam's political elite to focus less on drafting and
interpreting party resolutions and more on passing concrete laws
that are needed to spur Vietnam's modernization, international
integration and economic growth.

4. (SBU) Thanh added that the Party must learn to accept far more
criticism than it now tolerates. Thanh, former Deputy Minister of
Public Security, said that he is working on a proposal to redefine
what is legally considered a dissident or a "reactionary element"
so as to give the average Vietnamese more room for constructive
criticism. The CPV also needs to recognize that it cannot remain
isolated or separate from the evolution in international thinking
on concepts of human rights and religious freedom. These are
universal norms, not U.S. constructs, that Vietnam and the CPV
must embrace in order for Vietnam to integrate effectively with
the rest of the world.

5. (SBU) Thanh said that he recently had discussed the case of the
Tuoi Tre journalist Lan Anh with the Minister of Public Security
(ref C). (Lan Anh is facing indictment for allegedly revealing
"state secrets" while reporting on a price gouging scandal linked
to the Ministry of Health.) The Minister had explained that Anh's
reporting had disrupted an ongoing corruption investigation. The
MPS is investigating whether or not there was corruption or
malfeasance on the journalist's part that led her to break the
story prematurely. Thanh had cautioned the Minister that the case
had attracted significant public attention and that the MPS
"better be right" if they take this case to trial, or risk facing
a scathing backlash.

6. (SBU) Thanh said that he could not predict if the CPV would
implement internal political reforms at the 2006 10th Party
Congress, although over time, reform was "inevitable." In our
January meeting Thanh was more confident, telling us that 2006
would usher in a period of political "Doi Moi" (renovation)
comparable to the economic reform that Vietnam initiated in 1986.
(Note: in a recent conversation with the Ambassador, Party
External Relations Commission Chair Nguyen Van Son also said that
the upcoming Party Congress would address "political doi moi."
End Note. Ref D.)

Relationship with the U.S. and China
------------------------------------

7. (SBU) Thanh said that the majority of Hanoi's senior leadership
believes that over the long term Vietnam and the United States
will not have fundamental conflicts but only "shared interests."

While a minority of conservative ideologues still want to keep the
United States at arms' length, disquiet over growing Chinese
influence in the region tipped the scales in favor of Vietnam
forging improved ties with the United States. In this regard,
Thanh indicated that the GVN would welcome enhanced strategic or
policy planning dialogue with the USG on China and the region. At
the same time, Thanh cautioned that the United States needed to
avoid creating the impression that we are an immediate threat to
the Vietnamese regime. This would only strengthen the pro-Chinese
lobby at senior levels of the Party. The CG replied that, while
we welcome and encourage strengthened dialogue, Vietnamese leaders
had to become more sophisticated in approaching sensitive issues
such as human rights and religious freedom.

Central Highlands and VISAS-93
------------------------------

8. (SBU) Thanh said that the GVN sees clearly which provinces in
the Central Highlands are implementing Hanoi's directives to
resolve religious freedom issues and economic tensions involving
ethnic minorities and which are not. It is becoming increasingly
clear in Hanoi that local officials are misusing concerns over
"instability" in the region as an excuse to keep the pressure on
ethnic minority and religious groups. This is particularly the
case in Dak Lak Province, where senior Party leaders have not
"adjusted" to Hanoi's new approach on ethnic minority and
religious issues. However, the Prime Minister does not have the
authority to remove CPV officials from their positions; Thanh
maintained that the situation is particularly delicate in Dak Lak
as some of the hardline officials, including the local Party
Secretary, are from the ethnic minority community. He said that

SIPDIS
personnel changes could occur following the provincial Party
congresses in late 2005.

9. (SBU) Thanh said that the GVN also is committed to resolve the
problem of reunification of ethnic minority refugee families
(VISAS-93 cases). In February he had met with the Minister of
Public Security and handed over our list of outstanding cases.
The MPS Minister reportedly had said he was going to issue a
directive to the provinces to speed up processing of the cases.
Thanh advised that the MPS must be at the center of any solution
to resolve the VISAS 93 issue and encouraged us to notify the
Minister directly of continuing problems. He characterized the
MPS Minister as trustworthy and reasonably "progressive." (Note:
The Ambassador has on two occasions sent lists of outstanding
VISAS-93 cases to the Minister of Public Security. End Note.)

10. (SBU) Comment: Thanh was unusually direct in discussing
internal reform, distrust of China, and combating corruption and
cronyism. His message was very carefully and deliberately
articulated; in fact, he did not want to leave until he had
finished delivering his message on China, which was well past the
second cup of coffee. However, his themes are consistent with the
position of many reformers within the Party, of which, Thanh is a
loyal and respected member. It is not clear why we are getting
this message so strongly at this time, but the views that Thanh
articulated appears to reflect reformers' concern that the Party
must modernize or risk losing legitimacy. It also reflects their
concern -- as nationalists -- that the Party must reform to be
able to address effectively Vietnam's security and economic needs.
These reformers are locked in an ongoing internal debate with
conservatives in advance of the 10th Party Congress. End Comment.

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