The Nation: Terrorism expert Professor Martha Crenshaw
On Newshub Nation Mike Wesley-Smith interviews terrorism expert Professor Martha Crenshaw
Lisa Owen: The terror threat posed by Isis may be waning, but does that mean terrorism itself is declining? And is our small area of the Pacific safe or just as much at risk? Martha Crenshaw is a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Co-operation at Stanford University. Mike Wesley-Smith asked her what is classed as terrorism in 2018?
Martha Crenshaw: Well,
that’s a very contentious question, so it’s a good thing
you started off with it. We think of terrorism as a form of
violent communication. It typically is directed at civilian
targets. It’s intended to shock. It’s intended sometimes
to intimidate, sometimes to motivate enthusiasm on the part
of supporters. And it depends largely on a psychological
effect on a watching audience. So it’s designed with that
purpose in mind. So that really distinguishes it from other
forms of political violence, but I think it’s important to
remember it is a form of political
violence.
Right, so it’s really about
promulgating the
message.
Yes.
What role does
the media play? Do they become unwitting agents of extending
that message out to a wider audience?
Well,
there’s certainly been a widespread perception that the
media are the lifeblood of terrorism. I think Margaret
Thatcher famously said something like that with regard to
the IRA many, many years ago. It’s actually a mixed
relationship. Many terrorist groups are not sympathetic to
the mainstream media. They want attention from the media,
but they don’t trust it entirely. They’ve been known to
attack journalists. I’m sure we’re all familiar with
many instances of that. And what you see these days is they
provide their own media through — very easily — social
media, YouTube. They record their own attacks, and they
broadcast them through their own websites and media
channels. So I think it would be unfair to say that the
mainstream media is an instrument of these
actors.
Okay. Going back to the definition of
terrorism, I just want to look at some recent examples. We
had the terrible massacre in Las Vegas perpetrated by
Stephen Paddock — I think 58 people were killed; more than
500 were injured. Would analysts consider that an act of
terrorism?
That’s a really good case to
bring up. There is a database called the Global Terrorism
Database that’s held at the University of Maryland, and
they have defined that incident as an act of terrorism. And
some of us questioned that definition. Their argument was
that the perpetrator did issue some statements that
indicated that he had a political motive, but I think most
people think that his motive is unknown. The police
certainly said that they found his motive to be unknown. And
this points to a basic problem in deciding whether something
is terrorism - you don’t always know someone’s
motivation. You know what they did, you know that it
resembles many acts of terrorism, but you don’t know their
motivation, so you’re sort of hampered. But in this case,
after fairly careful investigation, they decided that it was
terrorism. But many people disagree.
And then
in the United Kingdom, you had the Finsbury Park incident in
June 2017, where a van was driven into a group of people
outside a mosque by a person saying, they ‘want to kill
all Muslims’ and ‘this is for London Bridge’. Would
analysts consider that an act of
terrorism?
I think, in most cases, they
would. And I think that many people feel that sometimes
defining something as terrorism is biased, that we are all
inclined to label our opponents as terrorists and not say
that a group with which we might agree is a terrorist. In
this case, of course, it was an anti-Muslim attack outside
the Finsbury Park mosque, but, certainly, that — I think
by any standard — would be regarded as an act of
terrorism. The perpetrator announced his purpose. London
Bridge, also, I think that most people think that was an act
of terrorism. And in particular, the fact that some
well-known, well-established organisations, such as the
Islamic State, have deliberately called for individuals to,
in effect, take up arms on their own and act in any way they
can — this leads us more and more to think these are,
indeed, acts of terrorism that have been inspired by these
appeals.
Reading through your research, you
said that foreign intervention in internal conflicts can
contribute to the rise of terrorism. And some would say,
‘Well, what’s the alternative? Do countries just stand
by and do nothing?’
Well, I think the
thing is that a country that wants to intervene has to
consider this to be one of the risks they’re going to run.
That through intervention, they may, in effect, incur the
wrath of a group like al-Qaeda or the Islamic State or one
of their many affiliates around the world. So the government
simply says, ‘All right, here are the costs and the
benefits to intervention, and it’s worth the cost. We
realise that this will be something that our public might
suffer from, but we think that the intervention is
sufficiently important. We’re going to go ahead'. The
important thing is not to ignore the fact that it’s going
to create this risk.
Yes. And Syria’s
obviously the most recent quagmire that the international
community is struggling with. In your view, is there any
particular strategy that they should be using that they
haven’t implemented to try and solve what’s going on
there?
I think that Syria, as you say, is,
indeed, a quagmire with so many different outside
interventions, not just one side — the West or the United
States — but many different outside actors — Russia,
Iran, even Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Emirates —
and at cross purposes as well. So it’s enormously
complicated. I think that there needs to be some sort of
settlement of the conflict. I don’t think there’s going
to be a solution that is entirely satisfactory to Western
governments, particularly the United States. But it appears
to me now that Russia and Iran have the initiative, joined
by Turkey. And it looks to me like there’s going to be
some sort of settlement that will maintain Assad in power.
Not what the United States wanted, but I think the American
administration very badly wants to get out of
Syria.
And I think in the context of 9/11,
you’ve talked about the tendency with which some
governments have overreacted to domestic attacks. And,
indeed, that’s been a stated objective of terrorism. How
should governments respond to attacks post-9/11 and the
lessons we’ve learnt from that?
Well, I
think, first, they can step back and take a very deep breath
and think, ‘All right, what are my options for responding?
Do I need to respond within the next 24 hours with a bombing
strike?’ Or might decision-makers take a little more time,
think through different options, think of ways of responding
that are perhaps less attention worthy, more subtle, more
behind-the-scenes and think of a way to deal with it. I
think governments, particularly democratic governments with
a public to answer to, are inclined to act very quickly
without thinking through their options and thinking through
the long-term effects of what they might do. So this is not
advice that governments typically welcome — be patient,
think through your options, take some time, you don’t have
to respond right away. But sometimes I think governments
exaggerate the amount of public pressure that’s going to
be brought to bear in such an incident. And there is
opportunity to educate the public when something
happens.
What do you consider is the biggest
terror threat in the Asia-Pacific region — the area which
we call home?
Well, I think for some
countries like Australia, it remains Islamist-inspired,
jihadist-inspired groups, and there are many of them, as we
all know. Certainly, in countries like the Philippines and,
to a certain extent, Indonesia, it remains a problem.
We’re still concerned with the ability of the central
groups, like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, to, in effect,
metastasize around the world. It’s not an existing threat
to countries in this region or anywhere, unless it’s a
very weak country already destabilized by other factors. But
I think this is going to remain the threat for the
foreseeable future, in effect.
I suppose this
is a question without an easy answer, but most New
Zealanders watching this may have it foremost in their mind,
and for an expert like yourself, what are the chances of a
country like New Zealand experiencing a terrorist attack,
maybe like we’ve seen in Australia or
Canada?
It’s really impossible to say.
These attacks are so unpredictable. It’s not unimaginable
to think that someone might think that New Zealand was an
appropriate target. How likely it is, is just impossible to
say. If you look at many of the sort of ‘lone wolf’, as
they’re often called, attacks, they were really, I’m
sorry to say, extremely unpredictable. You might be able to
draw up a mathematical model, but it’s really very, very
difficult to say. There’s a lot of study now of what is
called ‘radicalisation’ — that is, developing the
sort of beliefs that would lead someone to justify violence
— but we still don’t quite know what causes
it.
And so, again, for a country like New
Zealand, which is a part of the Five Eyes, what should we be
doing, do you see, in the fight against global
terrorism?
I think probably good
intelligence work still outweighs the main bow work against
terrorism. It’s not easy. It’s not easy to penetrate
these types of groups. But, let us say, a sort of watchful
eye by all the Five Eyes is the best preventive for
terrorism. That’s not to say there are not limits to how
far we want intelligence operations to go in democracies,
but this is still the best way of figuring out what’s
going on and trying to forestall it.
And when
New Zealand governments are considering assisting in, say,
Iraq or Afghanistan, should they have in their mind,
‘Well, if we do intervene, even in a humanitarian sense,
it will elevate our risk of a domestic attack’. Should
that realistically factor in their
decision?
It elevates the risk, to a certain
extent, but so do many other things that governments do.
Whether this is a higher risk than many other things, but
yes, anything that associates a country with what radical
jihadists view as a crusader alliance, depending on a
particular incident, a publicity incident, where a potential
perpetrator happens to be located, ease of access to a
target — all these sorts of imponderables enter into
it.
Well, Professor, thank you so much for
your time.
It’s my pleasure. Thank you for
having me.
Great. Thank you very
much.
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