3 MAY 2017
MEDIA RELEASE – FOR IMMEDIATE PUBLICATION
ASG v HARLENE HAYNE, VICE-CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO
(SC 61/2016) [2017] NZSC 59
PRESS SUMMARY
This summary is provided to assist in the understanding of the Court’s judgment. It does not comprise part of the
reasons for that judgment. The full judgment with reasons is the only authoritative document. The full text of the
judgment and reasons can be found at Judicial Decisions of Public Interest www.courtsofnz.govt.nz
[Scoop copy of judgment: ASGvHayne.pdf]
The suppression orders made in the Employment Court on 27 May 2014 and 4 June 2014 remain in force.
The issues
This case dealt with the scope of suppression orders under s 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 in the context of an
employment relationship. At issue were two questions: whether the disclosure of information about a University of Otago
employee’s District Court appearance to his employer constituted a breach of the Court’s suppression order, and second,
whether, having received the information, the University was entitled to rely and act upon it.
Result
The Court held that suppression orders made under s 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act do extend to prohibit “word of
mouth” communications as well as publication by the media.
However, it held that the section does not encompass the dissemination of information to persons with an objectively
established genuine need to know the information.
In this case, given the nature of the appellant’s charges and his role at the University, his employer had a genuine
interest in knowing he had pleaded guilty to an offence of violence against his spouse.
Having found no breach occurred, it was not necessary for the Court to address the second question regarding the actions
taken by the University on receipt of the information.
Background
The appellant, ASG, is employed by the respondent as a campus security guard at the University of Otago. Whilst in this
employment he pleaded guilty to one count of wilful damage and another of assaulting a female. Both charges were in
relation to his former spouse. ASG appeared in the District Court for sentencing on these charges and was discharged
without conviction. In addition, the Judge made an order under s 200 of the Criminal Procedure Act preventing
publication of the appellant’s name and other details.
The Deputy-Proctor of the University was in Court whilst ASG was being sentenced, having been informed by a third party
of the proceedings. After seeking legal advice as to the scope of the suppression order, the Deputy Proctor disclosed
ASG’s name and details about the charges to a small number of individuals within the University with personnel
responsibilities, including the Vice-Chancellor. The University undertook an investigation. ASG was suspended until the
Vice-Chancellor reached the view that a final written warning was appropriate. ASG then returned to work.
ASG brought a personal grievance in relation to his employer, the Vice-Chancellor. He said he had been unjustifiably
disadvantaged in two ways, first, by his suspension and, second, by the final written warning.
In assessing those claims, the Employment Relations Authority took the view that the University breached the name
suppression order made by the District Court Judge. The Employment Court overturned this finding, deciding that there
was no breach of the order. This was upheld by the Court of Appeal.
In this Court, the appellant submitted that s 200 prohibits any disclosure of the appellant’s name or other details
beyond the courtroom. The respondent submitted that s 200 only prohibits making the information available to the public
or a section of the public generally, or alternatively, any disclosure beyond the courtroom except “bare disclosure” to
persons with a genuine interest.
This Court has unanimously dismissed the appeal.
Reasons
The Court has found that the disclosure to the respondent of the information regarding the appellant’s appearance in the
District Court did not breach the suppression order. The Court has held that the prohibition of publication under s 200
encompasses both publication in the wide sense by the media as well as word of mouth communications. The focus of s 200
will generally be on publication beyond the courtroom to the public or a section of the public at large, although
publication to one person or a small number of persons in a situation where that will undermine the purpose of the
suppression order will also be captured by the section. The prohibition under s 200 does not encompass the dissemination
of information to persons with an objectively established genuine need to know the information. In this case, given the
nature of the appellant’s charges and his role at the University, his employer had a genuine interest in knowing he had
pleaded guilty to an offence of violence against his spouse.