Make Deficits Great Again: Maintaining A Pragmatic Balance

Friday, 9 May 2025, 3:28 pm
Opinion: Keith Rankin

Donald Trump is a mercantilist, as noted in Trump’s tariffs: Short-term damage or long-term ruin? 'The Bottom Line', Al Jazeera, 11 April 2025 (or here on YouTube). But the United States, in today's world, is not a mercantilist country. Or at least not a successful mercantilist country, though it is inhabited by many mercantilists.

In that television interview, Georgetown University professor of Public Policy, Michael Strain said: "I don't think [Trump's tariffs are] smart politics, but I think the president [thinks they are]. I think that President Trump is a true mercantilist. The president believes that if the United States are running a trade deficit that means we are losing economic value to the rest of the world."

Mercantilism, in its most literal form, is the belief that international trade is 'economic warfare', and that winning is achieved by a country exporting more than it imports. Obviously, the total amount of exports in this world is exactly equal to the total amount of imports. Every internationally traded good is both an export and an import. So, mercantilism is a belief-system which sees the world in zero-sum terms, as winners and losers, as warfare by financial means.

My chart and article yesterday (International Trade over time: gifts with strings, Evening Report, 8 May 2025) shows the accumulated 'excess benefits' of unbalanced global trade over the last forty years. The countries on the top-left-side of the chart are deficit/debtor countries; and the countries on the bottom-right-side are surplus/creditor countries. (The countries are selected on the basis of available 'current account' data from the IMF's World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025, and as representatives of deficit and surplus countries. China, if on the chart, would belong close to Malaysia. The chart is made from my own calculations to adjust for inflation.)

The chart necessarily – because deficits must be financed elsewhere by surpluses – has a seesaw shape. Some countries are up, some countries are down; and some countries occupy the central pivot, neither up nor down. So long as some countries have consumed substantial amounts of stuff (imports) which they have not yet paid for (the deficit countries), some other countries (the surplus countries) have supplied stuff (exports) that they have not yet accepted payment for (and are unlikely to accept payment for in the imaginable future). Imports are paid for by exports.

It's not a true seesaw, which is typically either grounded or horizontally balanced. We may think of it as a seesaw pivoting above a chasm. What is true is that if the downside goes further down – that is, if the surplus countries' accumulated surpluses get bigger – then the upside (accumulated deficits) must go further up. The seesaw is a 'system', and the only alternative to the seesaw shape is system collapse, analogous to the whole seesaw breaking off its pivot and falling into the chasm.

Imports are paid for by exports. But many contracted payments are deferred, indeed to the point where the payments will never actually take place. Instead of receiving payment in the form of imports, the mercantilist surplus countries have gleefully accepted 'promises'; effectively 'IOUs' ('I owe you'). (These 'financial promises' or 'financial assets' are essentially bonds [ie credit], or titles [ie equity]; promises themselves can be bought and sold, and can appreciate or depreciate in market trading [including depreciating to zero]. Promises typically earn, for their owners, additional promises in the form of interest and dividends. Interest and dividends may be realised – that is, spent – on imports, or may be 'compounded' – another word for 'accumulated' – hence the concept of compound interest.) Technically, inflation exists when the particular promise that we call money depreciates in market value.

In a mercantilist world, all countries want to occupy the low 'ground' (ie a point below the seesaw pivot); they want to import less than they export, and to accumulate promises. In a stable world economy, so long as some countries insist on occupying the low ground, then some others must occupy the high ground.

The most obvious deficit countries in the chart – countries with an accumulation of enjoyed (or invested in new structures) but unpaid-for imports – are the United States, Australia, Greece, the United Kingdom, and New Zealand. (Another important deficit country is Türkiye, for which the data is not good enough, but would almost certainly have an accumulated 'current account' deficit of over $US100,000 per Turkish person.) These are the world's 'spendthrifts'.

The most obvious surplus countries in the chart are Taiwan, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Indeed, the European Union – more than anywhere else, including China – is a mercantilist enterprise. (Further, the European Union is starting to look quite shabby, especially the countries just mentioned.) This is what Donald Trump means by the European Union 'screwing' the United States. (Refer EU was born to 'screw' US, Trump says, France24, 26 Feb 2025.)

Surplus/creditor nations (like Germany) do not want to settle; they want to compound, they want deficit/debtor nations (like Aotearoa New Zealand) to extend their liabilities. The mercantilist countries are content – indeed, more than content – for other countries to enjoy the fruits of their labour and their capital.

Just as the deficit countries are the world's 'spendthrifts', the surplus countries are the world's 'misers'. The global economy maintains a successful equilibrium so long as the willing spendthrifts balance out the insistent misers.

Donald Trump threatens to disturb that global equilibrium by saying – in effect – that he wants the United States to join the 'miser club'; he says he wants his country to stop being screwed by the misers. The thing is, though, he probably doesn’t actually mean it. His natural proclivity is to spend, and to gamble. He's a hedonist, not a puritan nor a thriftwad; his nature is neither parsimonious nor austere.

(I would rather Donald Trump than Friedrich Merz was United States' president; and prefer the pragmatism of the United States and Australian Treasurers over the austere Nicola Willis or the United Kingdom's brutally austere Rachel Reeves. In 2027, I am optimistic that, in office, NZ Labour's Barbara Edmonds will be able to break away from the austere image of female Finance Ministers with whom we have become familiar – remember Ruthenasia; public austerity is an election-losing strategy, a generator of societal inequality and low morale.)

Nevertheless, Trump may be unintentionally breaking the world economy, on account of his – or his advisers' (eg Peter Navarro) – weak understanding of it. If the surplus/creditor nations sought to spend their credits (except for spending in very small increments) they would: either bankrupt the debtor countries, creating systemic collapse; or, due to depreciating prices of assets being dumped onto financial markets, have to accept many fewer imports than they felt they were due. Financial promises work according to the use-it or lose-it rule.

The Great Depression

Parsimony, austerity, and mercantilism in the 1920s got us into the Great Depression of 1930 to 1934. (These were the core years of the Depression; the timing varies for different countries.) The Great Depression was a global event that occurred as a 'race to the bottom'; almost all countries wanted to be below the pivot of the seesaw and none at the top. The United Kingdom – under Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill – in particular was a deficit country that tried to push its side of the seesaw down through a process of internal devaluation (deflation) at a time when France, United States (under the curmudgeonly Coolidge), and Germany had anchored their side of the seesaw down. (At that time, Germany had been – thanks to post World War One reparations – forced onto the same downside of the seesaw. Churchill's most specific action was the returning of the British pound to an unworkable restored Gold Standard at an overvalued exchange rate.)

(In the pre WW1 global environment, one of the most important balancing deficit/debtor countries was Russia. Russia seceded from the global capitalist system in 1917, largely as a result of the war. The loss of Russia's pre-war presence – as a counterweight – was an aggravating factor in the Great Interwar Crisis.)

Deep Mercantilism

Donald Trump, while an overt mercantilist, is shallow in his convictions. He loves 'money', but he also loves what money can buy.

Deep mercantilists love money, and other financial assets ('virtual gold') including cryptocurrencies, in miserly ways; they believe in making money, not spending it. (Stereotypical new wave misers are young men, mining and trading in Bitcoin from bedrooms in the parents' homes.) Through hoarding, they act to impede the global circulation of money, not to enable it.

Finance, as an academic discipline, is quintessentially mercantilist. It equates the accumulation and appreciation of financial assets – promises – with the creation of wealth; and that the wealthiest country in the world is the one with the fullest Treasury. And so many people – especially journalists – buy into that vision of wealth as a pile of treasure, as an accumulation of credits.

Modern mercantilists only regard mined gold as wealth, not gold still in the ground; and only promises that are tradeable, or at least potentially tradeable. Financial institutions regard your mortgage as their wealth; and they understand public debt to be private wealth; they buy and sell mortgages, along with other assets such as government debt.

And they believe in the magic of compound interest. They believe that unspent money – unsettled promises – grow exponentially and indefinitely. The seesaw chart, showing unpaid-for imports accumulated over 40 years, belies this. If the surplus nations all tried to spend their gold and their paper (and other virtual) riches – by becoming deficit countries, by shifting the seesaw into the alternate position – then they would find both that their ability to import from the present deficit/debtor countries would amount to less than the unpaid-for amounts shown in the chart – and they would find that many of their claims (ie promises) would be unrealisable.

As already noted, trade credits – promises – are accumulated on a 'use-it or lose-it' basis; this amounts to a negative form of compound interest. The surplus countries have not sufficiently used their credits; without realising it, their hoarded credits have already lost much of their initial purchasing capacity. While individual countries – especially small ones like Finland – may successfully shift from one side of the seesaw to the other, it is too late for the seesaw to swing without the surplus group of countries incurring heavy losses. The present deficit countries are simply not tooled up to produce masses of goods and services for export.

Private pension funds represent the epitome of deep mercantilism.

Deep mercantilism is not just about countries and international trade. A major feature of the next Great Depression will be the collapse of these funds, as far too many 'first world' people in their fifties and sixties seek to withdraw and spend their retirement savings. Thus, the next Great Depression will be one of stagflation – not 1930s'-style deflation – as there will be a rush of 'Generation Jones' people (born in the later 1950s and early 1960s) to spend their savings and finding that the global cupboard of goods and services is becoming bare.

Non-Mercantilism

Human wealth is actually the 'factors of production': people (simplistically construed as 'labour') and nature (simplistically construed as 'land') and structures [and inventories; and including intangible structures such as 'knowledge'] (construed by economists true to their discipline as 'capital') and the enjoyable goods and services which flow to humans from these 'factors'.

The next global Great Depression can be forestalled if the deficit countries (like United States and Aotearoa New Zealand) – the less-mercantilist countries, or at least the 'unsuccessful' would-be mercantilist countries – continue as net spenders, given that the substantial likelihood is that the prevalent mercantilist countries (like Germany and Sweden and Netherlands and China) are likely to at least try to persevere as accumulators of financial assets through the process of selling more goods than they buy.

Or the next Great Depression can be forestalled by most countries slowly moving, in concert, into a position of balance. Imagine each end of the seesaw neither up nor down, a horizontal seesaw on its pivot. Here countries like France, Italy, Indonesia and Philippines serve as examples.

Collapse and its prevention

Under prevailing mercantilist ideology, the best place for a country to be is on the downside of the seesaw. The biggest danger – the danger of system breakage – is that of the deficit countries trying to get their side of the seesaw down while the surplus countries are also trying to keep their side down. Any option of voluntary balance – of some countries trying to do what the majority are trying not to do – may forestall a global economic collapse; including a voluntary continuation of the present situation, with one group of countries happy to stay up while another group of countries want to stay down.

The irony is that the real winners are the alleged losers. For good reason, the seesaw chart shows these real-winner countries at the top rather than at the bottom. The real winners like to import, to enjoy their stuff; they do not pursue the mercantilist illusions of treasure hoards and compound interest.

Children understand that when one side of the seesaw is down, the other should be up. And that being up is fun. Will the adults learn what children already know?

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Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

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Keith Rankin

Political Economist, Scoop Columnist

Keith Rankin taught economics at Unitec in Mt Albert since 1999. An economic historian by training, his research has included an analysis of labour supply in the Great Depression of the 1930s, and has included estimates of New Zealand's GNP going back to the 1850s.

Keith believes that many of the economic issues that beguile us cannot be understood by relying on the orthodox interpretations of our social science disciplines. Keith favours a critical approach that emphasises new perspectives rather than simply opposing those practices and policies that we don't like.

Keith retired in 2020 and lives with his family in Glen Eden, Auckland.

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